Tyler Matthew McAfee v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Aug 29 2016, 6:04 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kristin A. Mulholland Gregory F. Zoeller
Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Matthew McAfee, August 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1602-CR-431
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G01-1503-MR-1
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 1 of 12
Statement of the Case
[1] Tyler Matthew McAfee (“McAfee”) appeals his sentence imposed following his
guilty plea to Level 5 felony reckless homicide1 and Level 6 felony criminal
recklessness.2 The trial court sentenced McAfee to five years for his Level 5
felony reckless homicide conviction and one and one-half years for his Level 6
felony criminal recklessness conviction, and it ordered that the two sentences be
served consecutively. McAfee now appeals his sentence, arguing that his
aggregate six and one-half year sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that
McAfee has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm his
sentence.
[2] Affirmed.
Issue
Whether McAfee’s sentence is inappropriate pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B).
Facts
[3] On March 3, 2015, McAfee stabbed and killed Alton Bradley (“Bradley”) and
stabbed and injured Matthew Smolek (“Smolek”). The facts of McAfee’s
crimes are set out in the following stipulated factual basis, to which McAfee
and the State agreed when he pled guilty:
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-1-5.
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 2 of 12
3. That on March 3, 2015, TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE was
driving a vehicle with three passengers in the area of 142nd
Avenue and Lauerman Road in Cedar Lake, Lake County,
Indiana.
4. Throughout the time that TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE
was driving the vehicle on that date, TYLER MATTHEW
MCAFEE had possession of a stainless steel, double edged knife
that measured approximately ten (10) inches in length with a
blade that was approximately five and a half (5½) inches in
length and a handle that was wrapped in black electrician’s tape.
5. On said date and said location, victims Alton Bradley
(deceased) and Matthew Smolek were walking in the roadway
when there was a two-car vehicle crash involving cars driven by
TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE and Dakota Young.
6. Matthew Smolek broke a passenger side window of the car
TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE was driving by using his
flashlight.
7. All of the passengers of TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE’S
car fled the scene.
8. Following the car accident, there was a verbal altercation that
escalated into a physical altercation.
9. At a point in the tumult, TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE
grabbed the knife in [his] driver’s door compartment.
10. A physical struggle ensued in the road in the area of the
accident that involved TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE and
Matthew Smolek with other individuals in the immediate area
who were unknown to TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE.
11. A neutral third party looked out the window and saw a group
of five or six people physically interacting in the street.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 3 of 12
12. Alton Bradley was one of those people, and at some point, he
made a quick movement to intervene, causing him to come close
to TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE.
13. Around this time, TYLER MATTHEW MCAFEE was
swinging the knife in a wild, uncontrolled fashion, and stabbed
both Matthew Smolek and Alton Bradley.
14. Alton Bradley suffered three stab wounds, one to the chest
under the right clavicle which penetrated the lung and
brachiocephalic artery, a second superficial wound of the back, in
the upper thoracic spine area, and a third superficial wound to
the posterior left shoulder.
15. Matthew Smolek suffered two stab wounds, one under the
left arm and one on the left side of his chest.
16. As a result of the single puncture wound to his chest, Alton
Bradley died.
17. Matthew Smolek suffered serious injury, including a deep
laceration requiring stitches.
(App. 84-85).
[4] The State initially charged McAfee with murder and Level 3 felony aggravated
battery. The State later filed an amended charging information, adding counts
of Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter; Level 5 felony involuntary
manslaughter; Level 5 felony reckless homicide; and Level 6 felony criminal
recklessness.
[5] Thereafter, in November 2015, McAfee entered into a written plea agreement,
in which he agreed to plead guilty to Level 5 felony reckless homicide and
Level 6 felony criminal recklessness in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 4 of 12
remaining four charges. The parties agreed that sentencing would be open to
the trial court’s discretion. The parties also agreed to the stipulated factual
basis, as set forth above. During the guilty plea hearing, McAfee pled guilty to
the Level 5 felony reckless homicide and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness
charges, and the trial court took the pleas under advisement.
[6] Prior to sentencing, the trial court received multiple support letters from
McAfee’s family and numerous letters from Bradley’s family and friends. On
the day of the January 26, 2016 sentencing hearing, McAfee filed a sentencing
memorandum in which he attached post-crime excerpts of Facebook comments
from Bradley’s family and friends that he contended “indicate[d] there was
much more to the situation than police reports had disclosed and newspapers
[had] reported.” (App. 91). McAfee also discussed the nature of his offenses
and suggested that he had acted in self-defense. He claimed that the car in front
of him “slammed on its brakes directly in front of [him,]” causing him to hit the
other car. (App. 93). He also asserted that “[t]here [wa]s not one iota of
evidence that indicate[d] that [he] in any way acted aggressively toward any
individual” until after Smolek broke his car window and after the altercation
with the other individuals. (App. 98). McAfee also attached an affidavit from a
person who witnessed part of the events of the crimes. McAfee asked the trial
court to consider certain mitigating factors, including his guilty plea, his
acceptance of responsibility, and the fact that he had “acted under strong
provocation.” (App. 96). He also argued that his prior felony offense should
not be considered as an aggravating factor because it was “completely unrelated
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 5 of 12
to the nature and circumstances of the event resulting in [McAfee’s] pleas of
guilt in this case.” (App. 97). McAfee requested that the trial court sentence
him to concurrent advisory terms for each felony (or an aggregate sentence of
three years) and to suspend all but the time he had already served in pretrial
incarceration and place him on probation.
[7] During the sentencing hearing, both parties presented evidence, including
witnesses and exhibits, that focused on the facts surrounding the nature of the
offenses and the facts leading up to the night of the crimes. For example, the
State questioned McAfee’s claim that the vehicle in front of McAfee’s vehicle
intentionally stopped and caused him to hit the other vehicle. After McAfee’s
father made reference to McAfee acting in self-defense and asserted that there
was no evidence regarding his son’s intent, the trial court had McAfee’s counsel
clarify that McAfee understood that he was waiving a claim of self-defense by
pleading guilty. Additionally, the State introduced copies of files from
McAfee’s cell phone, which included: (1) texts messages, which were sent the
evening before the crimes, stating that he and three others were “[b]outta f***
up half of [C]edar [L]ake[;]” and (2) a “selfie” photograph, which was taken on
the morning of the crimes, of McAfee holding up the knife used in the crimes.
(State’s Sent. Ex. 1 at 7); (Tr. 79).
[8] When sentencing McAfee, the trial court explained that it would determine “an
appropriate sentence given the nature and circumstances of the event that
occurred and the character of the defendant, [which were] two broad factors
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 6 of 12
that [it] would consider for any particular sentence.” (Tr. 114). The trial court,
when addressing the nature of the case, stated:
I believe it’s quite clear that the contact, the accident or the
incident that took place when these cars collide[d] or something
occurred was not happenstance. You being in Cedar Lake, I
think it’s quite clear, is not just [you] happen to be driving around
. . . What I do gather here is that this is no happenstance
encounter. You were there for a particular purpose in my
guesstimate is that that particular purpose has something to do
with the occupants in one or both cars that were involved here.
(Tr. 112-13). The trial court acknowledged that Smolek had broken McAfee’s
car window, but it also pointed out that McAfee had been carrying a knife that
he ultimately used and that resulted in the death of seventeen-year-old Bradley
and serious injury to Smolek. The trial court stated that while McAfee’s actions
may have had “unintended consequences, all this was preventable[.]” (Tr.
117).
[9] When discussing McAfee’s character and aggravating circumstances, the trial
court gave significant weight to his criminal history. The trial court pointed out
that McAfee, who was nineteen years old when he committed the current
offenses, had been convicted of Class D felony theft just two years prior. The
trial court noted that McAfee had pled guilty to the theft charge in exchange for
the dismissal of a Class B felony robbery resulting in bodily injury charge. The
trial court also noted that, although McAfee had this one conviction only, it
“would never ignore that because of the short gap in time from the time
[McAfee] w[as] eventually released from that case to the time [he] kill[ed]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 7 of 12
somebody.” (Tr. 116). The trial court stated that it had shown McAfee “great
leniency in allowing that robbery to go do[w]n[] to a theft” and “[f]urther
leniency by allowing [him] to serve that out . . . at home.” (Tr. 116). The trial
court found that the leniency shown to McAfee had “absolutely no deterrent
effect” on him and his “future criminal conduct[,]” and it determined that this
was an aggravating circumstance. (Tr. 116). In regard to mitigating
circumstances, the trial court recognized McAfee’s guilty plea and his
admission of responsibility as such.
[10] The trial court imposed a five (5) year sentence for McAfee’s Level 5 felony
reckless homicide conviction and a one and one-half (1½) year sentence for his
Level 6 felony criminal recklessness conviction. Additionally, the trial court,
noting that McAfee’s actions involved two separate victims, ordered that these
sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. McAfee
now appeals.
Decision
[11] McAfee contends that his aggregate six and one-half year sentence for his Level
5 felony reckless homicide and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness convictions
is inappropriate. He requests this Court to reduce both of his sentences to the
advisory terms and to order that they be served concurrently, resulting in an
“aggregate sentence of three years, with a portion to be served on probation.”
(McAfee’s Br. 10).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 8 of 12
[12] We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The
defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of a
Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some
guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the
sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Whether a sentence is
inappropriate ultimately turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity
of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that
come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
[13] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that
the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081.
Here, McAfee pled guilty to Level 5 felony reckless homicide and Level 6
felony criminal recklessness. A Level 5 felony has a range of one (1) to six (6)
years with an advisory sentence of three (3) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). A Level
6 felony has a range of six (6) months to two and one-half (2½) years with an
advisory sentence of one (1) year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court imposed a
five (5) year sentence for McAfee’s Level 5 felony reckless homicide conviction
and a one and one-half (1½) year sentence for his Level 6 felony criminal
recklessness conviction. Due to the existence of two separate victims, the trial
court ordered that the two sentences be served consecutively.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 9 of 12
[14] The nature of McAfee’s offenses involved him waving a knife at individuals
that resulted in the death of one young man and serious injury to another.
McAfee acknowledges that his offenses resulted in “a tragedy for all those
involved and their families.” (McAfee’s Br. 7). Nevertheless, he seems to
minimize the nature of the offense and contends that his aggregate sentence is
inappropriate because Smolek, Bradley, and the individuals in the other car
“instigated the confrontation with [him.]” (McAfee’s Br. 7). He suggests that
he committed his reckless homicide and criminal recklessness offenses because
“[w]hat began as an automobile collision when the car in front of [him]
suddenly came to a stop, quickly escalated to a violent confrontation when
Smolek bashed McAfee’s car windows in with a flashlight” and five individuals
“physically attacked him.” (McAfee’s Br. 7, 8). The trial court, however,
considered these asserted facts when sentencing McAfee, and it recognized
McAfee’s role and actions that resulted in Bradley’s death and Smolek’s injury.
[15] Turning to McAfee’s character, we—as did the trial court—acknowledge that
McAfee accepted responsibility and pled guilty. McAfee contends that his
character should be reviewed favorably because he had support from family and
a job. While that is commendable, we note that the trial court took his family
support into consideration, recognizing that “[s]upport [wa]s a big deal because
certainly support is something [McAfee] w[ould] need when [he is] eventually
out of incarceration.” (Tr. 112). The trial court also recognized that “many
times . . . notwithstanding that support, people still continue to screw up.” (Tr.
112).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 10 of 12
[16] McAfee also contends that his criminal history “should not hold great
aggravating weight in evaluation of his character” because it was “unrelated to
the current offenses.” (McAfee’s Br. 10). We disagree. First, to the extent that
McAfee appears to be challenging the weight the trial court gave to his criminal
history, such an argument is not subject to appellate review. See Anglemeyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007) (holding that the relative weight or value
assignable to aggravating circumstances is not subject to review for abuse of
discretion), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Moreover, the trial
court explained why it considered McAfee’s prior conviction to be a significant
aggravating circumstance and a negative reflection of his character.
Specifically, the trial court explained that it had shown “great leniency” with
his prior conviction and sentence, yet McAfee had disregarded that chance and,
less than two years later, had ended up killing a person. (Tr. 116). The trial
court stated that McAfee “ha[d] no business being back here again” and that his
prior sentence was the trial court’s “effort to try to rehabilitate [him].” (Tr.
118). Aside from this disregard for the law and failure to reform, the
presentence investigation report also reveals that McAfee has a history of daily
marijuana use from the time he was fifteen years old until just prior to his
arrest.
[17] Lastly, McAfee asserts—without analysis—that his crimes were “essentially a
single episode of criminal conduct” and should have been ordered to be served
concurrently. (McAfee’s Br. 9). Because McAfee makes no cogent argument to
support this assertion, he has waived appellate review of the argument. See Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 11 of 12
Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, the presence of multiple
victims is an aggravating circumstance that justifies the imposition of
consecutive sentences. See Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)
(explaining that “[w]hether the counts involve one or multiple victims is highly
relevant to the decision to impose consecutive sentences”). Accordingly, we
reject his assertion that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was
inappropriate.
[18] McAfee has not persuaded us that his aggregate six and one-half year sentence
for his Level 5 felony reckless homicide and Level 6 felony criminal
recklessness convictions is inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
sentence.
[19] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-431 | August 29, 2016 Page 12 of 12