Ronald L. Lynch v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 31 2018, 10:08 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert G. Bottorff II Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bob Bottorff Law PC Attorney General of Indiana
Jeffersonville, Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ronald L. Lynch, January 31, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
88A01-1707-CR-1583
v. Appeal from the
Washington Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Larry W. Medlock, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
88C01-1607-F4-299
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Ronald L. Lynch (“Lynch”) was convicted after a jury trial of child solicitation 1
as a Level 4 felony and was sentenced to ten years executed. Lynch appeals
and raises the following restated and consolidated issues for our review:
I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
his conviction and to rebut his claimed defense of
entrapment; and
II. Whether the trial court properly sentenced him.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On June 26, 2016, John Routson (“Routson”), who, at the time, worked at the
Washington County Jail as the assistant jail commander, was at home and off
duty, when he received a random text from an individual who was later
identified as Lynch. This text was one of hundreds sent by Lynch that day.
Routson asked Lynch why Lynch was texting him, and Lynch responded by
asking Routson if he was a girl. Tr. Vol. 2 at 36-37. Lynch told Routson that he
was fifty-three years old,2 and when Lynch asked Routson his age, Routson
replied that he (she) was fifteen. Id. at 39-40. Routson did so because he
suspected that Lynch was a sex offender. Id. After Lynch stated that he wished
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6(c).
2
Although Lynch told Routson that he was fifty-three years old, he was in fact sixty-three years old at the
time this crime occurred. Ex. Vol. 4 at 5; Tr. Vol. 2 at 201.
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Routson was older, Routson replied that age is just a number, and Lynch then
began attempting to get Routson to meet him. Id. at 40-41. Lynch requested
pictures of Routson and repeatedly asked Routson if he could see “her” breasts.
Ex. Vol. 4 at 7-10. When Lynch asked Routson “her” name, Routson replied
that it was “Sarah.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 42; Ex. Vol. 4 at 9. Lynch texted “Sarah”
about wanting to have sex with her. Ex. Vol. 4 at 15-20. When “Sarah” asked
Lynch for his name, Lynch replied that it was Ron, and that he would give his
last name when they met because he did not want to encounter any trouble
because “Sarah” was underage. Tr. Vol. 2 at 47-49.
[4] Lynch called “Sarah” the same day, and Routson had his wife answer the call.
Routson attempted to contact law enforcement concerning the text messages he
was receiving from Lynch, but was unsuccessful. After the brief phone call,
Lynch continued to text “Sarah” throughout the day, again stating that he
wanted to have sex with her. Ex. Vol. 4 at 12-25. Lynch stopped texting
“Sarah” around 6:00 p.m.
[5] Lynch began texting “Sarah” the next morning around 4:00 a.m. Before
responding, Routson was able to speak with law enforcement about the text
messages. Lynch continued texting “Sarah” and, again, tried to set up a
meeting for them to have sex. Id. at 30-38. Lynch stopped texting “Sarah” for
the day around 6:00 p.m.
[6] The next day, June 28, 2016, Lynch again renewed his texting to “Sarah,”
beginning at approximately 5:00 a.m., and Routson eventually responded to
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these texts a few hours later. Lynch again requested a meeting with “Sarah,”
and Routson, with the aid of police, set up a meeting with Lynch at the
fairgrounds for June 30. Tr. Vol. 2 at 55; Ex. Vol. 4 at 43-63. Lynch texted
“Sarah” again on June 29, and he asked “Sarah” if she had ever had sex with
another girl, and he requested that “Sarah” bring another girl with her to their
meeting for sex. Tr. Vol. 2 at 57; Ex. Vol. 4 at 69, Ex. Vol. 5 at 2. “Sarah” told
Lynch that, sometime, she would try to get a friend to come with her to have
sex with Lynch and that her friend was also fifteen. Ex. Vol. 5 at 6. Lynch
continued the next day to text “Sarah” about having sex with her in various
ways. Ex. Vol. 5 at 8-40.
[7] On the morning of June 30, 2016, Lynch texted “Sarah” that he was on his way
to meet her and also called and left a voicemail stating he was on his way. Law
enforcement had arranged to have an employee of the Sheriff’s Department
pose as “Sarah” at the fairgrounds and had undercover surveillance of the area
in place. Lynch arrived at the fairgrounds and got out of his car, with his pants
unzipped, and approached “Sarah.” Police officers then placed Lynch under
arrest. The State charged Lynch with one count of Level 4 felony child
solicitation. While Lynch was in jail awaiting trial, he made phone calls to his
wife and to a twenty-three-year-old woman named Amanda Michael
(“Michael”), who was his girlfriend. During these calls, Lynch did not deny
that he had been texting and attempting to have sex with a fifteen-year-old girl.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 135-50. A jury trial was held, where Lynch raised as a defense that
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he had been entrapped into committing the crime. At the conclusion of the
trial, Lynch was found guilty as charged.
[8] During Lynch’s sentencing hearing, evidence was presented that Lynch violated
the terms of his pre-trial release by using a cell phone to constantly call and text
Michael. During these calls and texts, Lynch told Michael that he was on
house arrest and was not supposed to have a cell phone. Tr. Vol. 3 at 20, 38-39,
63. Lynch admitted at the hearing that he contacted his girlfriend by cell phone
thousands of times during his pre-trial release. Id. at 55-56, 58-60. Also, during
sentencing, Lynch testified that he cared for his elderly mother and that he
could probably live with his mother if he was given a suspended sentence.
Testimony was also given that, prior to the present offense, Lynch had led a
law-abiding life except for a prior misdemeanor conviction in 1986. The
probation department testified that, although it had initially recommended a
six-year sentence in the pre-sentence investigation report, after learning of
Lynch’s violation of his pre-trial release, its recommendation changed to ten
years executed. Id. at 45-46, 50.
[9] In sentencing Lynch, the trial court observed that he did not see any remorse
from Lynch, but that Lynch had led a mostly law-abiding life and thanked
Lynch for his military service. Id. at 72. The trial court also took note of
Lynch’s extensive violation of the pre-trial release order and observed that it
demonstrated Lynch’s unwillingness to abide by court orders. Id. at 72-73. The
trial court then sentence Lynch to a ten-year executed sentence. Lynch now
appeals his conviction and sentence.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[10] Our standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
well established: we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We examine
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that support
the conviction. Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012). We consider
conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. McElfresh v. State,
51 N.E.3d 103, 107 (Ind. 2016). “[W]e affirm if there is substantial evidence of
probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004). A conviction may rest on
circumstantial evidence, and it is sufficient if an inference from the
circumstantial evidence reasonably tends to support the conviction. Perry v.
State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[11] Lynch argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for Level 4 felony child solicitation. Specifically, he contends that
insufficient evidence was presented to prove that he believed he was speaking to
a fifteen-year-old girl when he sent text messages soliciting the person for sex
and when he travelled to the fairgrounds to meet the person he had been
texting. Lynch asserts that the evidence showed that he began texting with
Routson, who lied to Lynch and stated that he was a fifteen-year-old girl, and
that a short time later, Lynch spoke with Routson’s wife, an adult woman, on
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the phone. Lynch claims that his testimony at trial was that, after this
conversation, he knew that he was conversing with an adult woman and that
the State failed to present any evidence to rebut this testimony.
[12] In order to convict Lynch of Level 4 felony child solicitation, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lynch, (1) being at least
twenty-one years old, (2) did knowingly or intentionally solicit an individual he
believed to be a child at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old
(3) to engage in sexual intercourse, other sexual conduct, or any fondling or
touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or
Lynch, and (4) committed the offense by using a computer network and
travelled to meet the individual he believed to be a child. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-
6(c)(1). Lynch’s sole argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction is that the State failed to produce evidence from which the jury
could have reasonably inferred that he knowingly intended to solicit sex from a
fifteen-year-old child. He does not dispute that sufficient evidence existed for
the other elements. At trial, Lynch admitted that he was sixty-three years old,3
that he sent text messages through the use of a cell phone that was connected to
the internet and was essentially a computer network, that his texts clearly
requested a meeting to engage in sexual intercourse and other sexual conduct,
3
We note that, although there was a discrepancy in Lynch’s actual age and the age he told “Sarah,” it is of
no moment here because under the elements of the crime of Level 4 felony child solicitation, the defendant
only has to be at least twenty-one years old to satisfy the age element of the crime. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-
6(c)(1).
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and that he traveled from his home to the Washington County Fairgrounds to
meet with the individual with whom he had been texting in order to engage in
sexual intercourse and other sexual activity with that person. Tr. Vol. 2 at 180,
201-07.
[13] Lynch’s sole challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is that he believed the
person he was texting and soliciting for sex and travelled to meet for sexual
activity was an adult woman. The evidence at trial showed that, in her text
messages to Lynch, “Sarah” told him she was fifteen years old and that, later in
their message exchange, Lynch, in response to a question as to why he could
get in trouble, stated, “Your [sic] under age [sic] babe.” Ex. Vol. 4 at 23. Later,
in their conversation, Lynch requested that “Sarah” bring a girlfriend with her
for sex, and “Sarah” told him that her girlfriend was also fifteen years old. Ex.
Vol. 5 at 2-7. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Lynch
believed “Sarah” to be only fifteen years old. Additionally, in other parts of the
text message conversation, “Sarah” told Lynch that, “My mom is home right
now,” “My mom keeps on asking me who is texting me,” “I won’t be able to
text you when I’m on vacation because I’m going to be with my mom and
dad,” “Thursday in the morning will be the best time . . . because I’ll be at the
pool and I can sneak away,” “I’m sorry I haven’t texted you back but I only
have enough min[utes] for 2 text message[s,] my mom promised to get me more
min[utes] tom[orrow],” “I’m with my mom shoping [sic] . . . and I [sic] waiting
on her to get me more min[utes] for my phone,” and “I can’t talk on the
phone[,] I’m with my mom.” Ex. Vol. 4 at 8, 10, 52, 55, 63, 65; Ex. Vol. 5 at 15.
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Based on this evidence, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have reasonably inferred that Lynch believed “Sarah” was fifteen
years old and could have found Lynch guilty of child solicitation.
[14] Although Lynch argues that he testified that he believed the person with whom
he was texting about meeting for sex was an adult woman because after he
spoke with the person, who was actually Routson’s wife, on the phone on June
26, he believed from her voice that she was an adult woman in her twenties or
thirties, the jury was not required to believe his testimony. Lynch’s argument is
merely a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.
McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the
elements of Level 4 felony child solicitation.
[15] Lynch also argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the
State to overcome his defense of entrapment. He contends that the evidence
showed that, when he found out that the person he was texting was only fifteen,
Lynch attempted to extricate himself from the conversation, but that Routson’s
comment that, “Age is just a [number],” Ex. Vol. 4 at 6, induced his illegal
conduct. Lynch further claims that the State failed to elicit any evidence that he
was predisposed to commit the crime of child solicitation.
[16] We review a claim of entrapment using the same standard that applies to other
challenges to the sufficiency of evidence. Griesemer v. State, 26 N.E.3d 606, 608
(Ind. 2015). We neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of
witnesses. Id. We instead look to the probative evidence supporting the verdict
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and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. If we find a
reasonable trier of fact could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we will
affirm the conviction. The defense of entrapment is available to a defendant
where the defendant’s illegal conduct was the product of a law enforcement
officer, the officer used persuasion or other means likely to cause the defendant
to engage in the conduct, and the defendant was not predisposed to commit the
offense. See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-9(a). Entrapment is not available as a valid
defense where law enforcement merely affords the defendant an opportunity to
commit the offense. See I.C. § 35-41-3-9(b).
[17] A defendant does not need to formally plead the entrapment defense, and it can
be raised, often on cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, by affirmatively
showing the police were involved in the criminal activity and expressing an
intent to rely on the defense. Griesemer, 26 N.E.3d at 609 (citing Wallace v. State,
498 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. 1986); Fearrin v. State, 551 N.E.2d 472, 473 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990)). The State then has the opportunity for rebuttal and must disprove
one of the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. No entrapment
exists if the State shows either (1) there was no police inducement, or (2) the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Id. “To rebut the inducement
element, the State must prove police efforts did not produce the defendant’s
prohibited conduct because those efforts lacked ‘a persuasive or other force.’”
Id. (citations omitted).
[18] Here, the evidence showed that Lynch initiated contact by sending out
hundreds of random text messages, and when Routson responded, Lynch
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persistently asked if he was a girl. Even after Routson told Lynch that he was
texting with a fifteen-year-old girl, Lynch continued to send text messages and
Lynch was the one who, first asked if “Sarah” wanted to meet sometime, and
then began talking about having sex. Based on the evidence presented at trial,
the jury could have reasonably inferred that the criminal conduct originated
with Lynch, that the police did not engage in any persuasive or other force with
Lynch, and that the police did not induce Lynch to commit the offense but
merely afforded him the opportunity to engage in his own criminal conduct.
Because the evidence at trial showed that the police did not induce Lynch into
committing child solicitation and merely afforded him the opportunity to
commit the offense, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to rebut
Lynch’s entrapment defense.
II. Sentencing
[19] Lynch next argues that the trial court did not properly sentence him. Lynch
initially contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d
218 (Ind. 2007). As long as a sentence is within the statutory range, we review
only for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the
sentencing decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court may be found to have
abused its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; entering a
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sentencing statement that explains its reasons for imposing a sentence where
such reasons are not supported by the record or are improper as a matter of law;
or entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons which are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Id. at 490-91.
“[R]egardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, a trial court may impose any sentence authorized by statute and
permissible under the Indiana Constitution.” Kubina v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1134,
1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1, providing
non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances court may
consider). A trial court is not required to accept a defendant’s argument as to
what is a mitigating factor or to give mitigating factors the same weight as does
a defendant. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012). “If the trial court
does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by
counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the
factor does not exist.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. However, a court abuses
its discretion if it does not consider significant mitigators advanced by the
defendant and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 490.
[20] Lynch contends that the trial court’s sentencing order amounted to an abuse of
discretion. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in analyzing the
aggravating and mitigating factors and that it failed to clearly indicate its
reasons for sentencing him to ten years executed. Lynch specifically takes issue
with the trial court’s finding as an aggravator his violation of the court’s pre-
trial release order and the fact that the trial court “inexplicably” cancelled out
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that he had essentially led a law-abiding life with the fact that he had been
convicted of a misdemeanor over thirty years ago. Lynch also maintains that
the trial court abused its discretion because it disregarded his military service as
a mitigating factor.
[21] Although Lynch alleges that the trial court did not clearly show its reasons for
sentencing him, in its written sentencing statement, the trial court stated its
reasons as follows:
The aggravating factors considered by the Court are:
A. The Defendant violated the Court’s pretrial release order.
B. That the Defendant failed to show remorse for the offense.
Factors that balanced each other:
A. The Defendant has little criminal history and has le[d] a law-
abiding life for a substantial period before commission of the
crime.
B. The Defendant has a criminal history.
That the Court finds the Aggravating Factors outweighed the
Mitigating Factors.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 221. Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, the trial
court made an oral sentencing statement, in which it stated these reasons on
which it based Lynch’s sentence. Tr. Vol. 3 at 72-73. We, therefore, conclude
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that the trial court did in fact make an adequate sentencing statement and listed
the factors it relied on in making its sentencing determination.
[22] As to Lynch’s assertion that the trial court wholly disregarded his military
service as a mitigating circumstance, we find no abuse of discretion. The trial
court actually did comment on Lynch’s military service in its oral sentencing
statement by thanking Lynch for his service, but finding that such service was
not a factor in sentencing. Id. at 72. Although a defendant’s military service is
commendable, it is not necessarily a significant mitigating circumstance and a
trial court may reject it as a significant mitigating factor for sentencing. Harman
v. State, 4 N.E.3d 209, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Forgey v. State, 886
N.E.2d 16, 23-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), trans. denied. That is particularly true
where, as here, the defendant fails to explain why his military service should be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. See id. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in not finding Lynch’s military service to be a significant
mitigating factor.
[23] As to Lynch’s contention that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
cancel out his law-abiding life because of a minor criminal conviction many
years ago, we do not find error. In making its determination, the trial court
carefully weighed the fact that Lynch had led a law-abiding life for a substantial
period of time before committing the present offense with the fact that he did, in
fact, have some criminal history, albeit many years prior to the current offense.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 221; Tr. Vol. 3 at 72. We do not find any abuse of
discretion for the trial court to make such a determination. See Harman, 4
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N.E.3d at 219 (finding no abuse of discretion when trial court found that
defendant’s limited criminal history did not constitute a significant mitigating
circumstance); Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find
defendant’s limited criminal history to be a mitigating circumstance, nor when
it found the limited criminal history to be an aggravating circumstance), trans.
denied.
[24] Further, as to Lynch’s argument that it was an abuse of discretion to find his
violation of the pre-trial release order to be a significant aggravating factor, we
find no error. Lynch was prohibited by his pre-trial release conditions from
using any smart phones, computers, or other electronic devices both to keep
him from contacting children and in order to gauge whether he would abide by
court orders. Tr. Vol. 3 at 72. Lynch, however, blatantly violated this condition
of his pre-trial release. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding this violation to be a significant aggravating factor
because it demonstrated that Lynch was not a good candidate for probation
because he had shown that he was unwilling to abide by the trial court’s orders.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Lynch.
[25] Lynch also argues that his ten-year sentence is inappropriate. Pursuant to
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this Court “may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
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character of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the principal
role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to
achieve a perceived correct result in each case. Brown v. State, 52 N.E.3d 945,
954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.
2008)), trans. denied. We independently examine the nature of a defendant’s
offenses and his character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference
to the trial court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015).
“In conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s
sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate;
rather, the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994
N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The defendant bears the
burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Brown, 52 N.E.3d at
954.
[26] Lynch argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. Specifically, Lynch contends that, as
to the nature of the offense, it was no more egregious than what the State was
required to prove at trial and therefore not worthy of an aggravated sentence.
Based on his character, Lynch asserts that his sentence is inappropriate because
with the exception of the present offense and a single misdemeanor conviction
thirty years ago, “his character is nearly completely unblemished.” Appellant’s
Br. at 22. He also maintains that his character causes his sentence to be
inappropriate because he served in the military for seventeen years and had a
steady employment history.
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[27] “As to the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point the
legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.”
Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In the present case,
Lynch was convicted of Level 4 felony child solicitation. The advisory sentence
for a Level 4 felony is six years, with a range of between two and twelve years.
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. The trial court sentenced Lynch to a fully executed
sentence of ten years.
[28] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the
commission of the offense and the defendant’s participation. Croy v. State, 953
N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In the present case, Lynch explicitly
communicated various sexual acts and desires that he wished to perform with
“Sarah,” who he believed to be a fifteen-year-old girl. This communication
occurred over a four-day period with hundreds of text messages exchanged.
Lynch further arranged to meet with “Sarah” in order to engage in these acts.
There was also evidence that Lynch had initially sent out hundreds of random
text messages from which can be inferred that he was attempting to make
contact with multiple young girls for the same solicitation. We conclude that
Lynch’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.
[29] “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life
and conduct.” Croy, 953 N.E.2d at 664. As to Lynch’s character, the evidence
showed that he led a law-abiding life for the most part prior to this instant
offense; however, he did have a public intoxication conviction from 1986.
Although he did not have an extensive criminal history, the evidence showed
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that Lynch blatantly violated his pretrial release order by utilizing a cell phone
to send thousands of text messages to his girlfriend. This violation
demonstrated that Lynch was not able to abide by orders of the trial court and
that he would not be a good candidate for probation. We conclude that
Lynch’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of his character. For all of the
above reason, we find that Lynch’s sentence is not inappropriate under
Appellate Rule 7(B).
[30] Affirmed.
[31] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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