Justin A. Hines v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Jul 30 2019, 9:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Benjamin J. Church Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Church Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Monticello, Indiana
Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Justin A. Hines, July 30, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-3136
v. Appeal from the White Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
91D01-1711-F6-204
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Statement of the Case
[1] Justin Hines (“Hines”) appeals his conviction following a jury trial for Level 6
felony residential entry.1 Hines specifically argues that there is insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. Concluding that there is sufficient evidence,
we affirm Hines’ conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Hines’ conviction
for Level 6 felony residential entry.
Facts
[3] In November 2017, the State charged Hines with Level 6 felony domestic
battery, Level 6 felony residential entry, and Class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass. At trial, Hillary Likens (“Likens”) testified that she was in her living
room when Hines opened the door to her apartment and walked through the
front door. Hines pushed Likens into a wall and grabbed her cell phone out of
her pocket. Likens told Hines to leave her apartment. Hines got into a gold car
and threw Likens’ cell phone out of the window as he drove away. Likens also
1
IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1.5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 2 of 5
testified that Hines had asked her to write a letter explaining that she had
invited him into her apartment. Likens never wrote such a letter.
[4] Also at trial, the property manager at Likens’ apartment complex (“the property
manager”) testified that she had heard Likens scream and had watched a gold
vehicle leave the complex. When the property manager arrived at Likens’
apartment, Likens, who was crying, was in the process of contacting the police.
[5] Monticello Police Department Patrolman Nathan Miller (“Patrolman Miller”)
testified that he was dispatched to Likens’ apartment with information that
there had been an uninvited guest in the apartment. When Patrolman Miller
arrived at the apartment, Likens was crying and upset.
[6] Also at trial, Hines and his friend, the driver of the gold car, testified that Likens
had opened the door to her apartment and invited Hines into her home. A jury
convicted Hines of residential entry and criminal trespass. Hines now appeals
his residential entry conviction.
Decision
[7] Hines’s sole argument is that there is insufficient evidence to support his Level 6
felony residential entry conviction. Our standard of review for sufficiency of
the evidence claims is well-settled. We consider only the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d
144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness
credibility. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact finder
could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 3 of 5
The evidence is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to
support the verdict. Id. at 147.
[8] Here, Hines specifically argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction because Likens’ testimony about Hines breaking and entering into
her apartment without her permission was “equivocal” and “contradictory.”
(Hines’ Br. 9). Hines therefore asks us to apply the incredible dubiosity rule.
According to Hines, if this Court applies the incredible dubiosity rule, “there
would be no evidence to sustain a Residential Entry conviction.” (Hines’ Br.
9).
[9] The incredible dubiosity rule provides that a court may impinge on the jury’s
responsibility to judge witness credibility only when confronted with inherently
improbable testimony. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2015). This
rule is applied in limited circumstances, namely where there is “1) a sole
testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or
the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.”
Id. at 756.
[10] Our review of the evidence makes it clear that the incredible dubiosity rule
simply does not apply in this case for three reasons. First, there were multiple
testifying witnesses in this case. See Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756. Second, Likens’
testimony was not internally inconsistent. See Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211,
1221 (Ind. 2015) (explaining that the second prong of the test is satisfied “only
when the witness’s trial testimony was inconsistent within itself, not that it was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 4 of 5
inconsistent with other evidence or prior testimony”). Third, the testimony
from the other witnesses provided circumstantial evidence of the crime.
Specifically, the property manager, who had heard Likens scream, testified that
she had found Likens in her apartment crying and in the process of contacting
the police. In addition, Patrolman Miller testified that he had been dispatched
to Likens’ apartment with information that there had been an uninvited guest in
the apartment. When the patrolman arrived at the apartment, Likens was
crying and upset. The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Hines of
Level 6 felony residential entry.
[11] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 5 of 5