Trent M. Summers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 07 2018, 8:30 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Phillips Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Boonville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Trent M. Summers, February 7, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A01-1709-CR-2021
v. Appeal from the Dubois Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Nathan A.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Verkamp, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
19C01-1607-F6-575
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Trent M. Summers appeals his conviction for battery, as a Level 6 felony,
following a jury trial. Summers raises a single issue for our review, namely,
whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-
defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In the late evening of July 9, 2016, and early morning of July 10, Jonathon
Wirthwein and some of his friends were at the Snaps restaurant and bar in
Jasper. Wirthwein and his friends had been drinking and were “goof-balling
around.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 217. Summers was also at the bar. At some point,
Wirthwein obtained a bottle of lime juice, and he squirted lime juice on
Summers’ chest and arm. In response, Summers punched Wirthwein in the
face and broke his nose.
[3] On July 11, the State charged Summers with battery, as a Level 6 felony. At his
ensuing jury trial, Summers asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense, but
a jury rejected his defense and found him guilty. The trial court entered its
judgment of conviction and sentenced Summers to one year suspended to
probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] On appeal, Summers asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence
to rebut his claim of self-defense. As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:
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When a defendant challenges the State’s sufficiency of the
evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense, the standard of review
remains the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.
We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of
witnesses but look solely to the evidence most favorable to the
judgment with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
We will affirm a conviction where such evidence and reasonable
inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value
sufficient to support the judgment.
Self-defense is recognized as a valid justification for an otherwise
criminal act. When raised, a defendant must establish that he or
she was in a place where he or she had the right to be, acted
without fault, and was in reasonable fear or apprehension of
death or great bodily harm. Once a defendant claims self-
defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant’s
claim to fail. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the
defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not
act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its
evidence in chief. Whether the State has met its burden is a
question of fact for the jury.
Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699-700 (Ind. 1999) (citations omitted). Further,
the amount of force used to protect oneself must be proportionate to the
urgency of the situation. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999). Where a person has used more force than necessary to repel an
attack, the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that
the victim becomes the perpetrator. Id.
[5] Here, Summers asserts that he was legally justified in punching Wirthwein in
the face because Wirthwein had squirted lime juice on him. According to
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Summers, the lime juice hit Summers in the eye, which caused discomfort.
Summers further asserts on appeal that, prior to him punching Wirthwein,
Summers had heard Wirthwein use racial epithets.
[6] As an initial matter, Summers’ reading of the record is not consistent with our
standard of review. The evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdict
demonstrates that none of the lime juice Wirthwein squirted on Summers hit
Summers in the eyes. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2 at 176. The evidence most favorable
to the jury’s verdict also demonstrates that Wirthwein did not use racial
epithets. See, e.g., id. at 201-02. Accordingly, insofar as Summers’ arguments
on appeal are premised on his assessment of the record, Summers’ arguments
must fail.
[7] In any event, Summers also asserts that a reasonable person, when squirted
with an unknown, burning liquid, would act in self-defense. As Summers says,
“[f]or all [he] knew, the liquid could have been acid.” Reply Br. at 5. Thus, he
argues, he had a “reasonable fear or apprehension of death or great bodily
harm,” which the State failed to negate.1 See Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 700.
[8] We conclude that the jury was entitled to reject Summers’ self-defense claim on
the evidence before it. The State’s evidence demonstrated that Wirthwein had
squirted Summers on the chest and arm with some lime juice. Summers’
discomfort aside, the jury was free to conclude that no reasonable person would
1
The other elements of Summers’ self-defense claim are not in dispute.
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have concluded that such an act placed him in fear of death or great bodily
harm. See id. The jury was also free to conclude that the force with which
Summers struck Wirthwein was more than necessary to repel the lime-juice
attack, and, as such, Summers had become the perpetrator and Wirthwein the
victim. See Hollowell, 707 N.E.2d at 1021. Accordingly, the State presented
sufficient evidence to rebut Summers’ claim of self-defense, and we affirm his
conviction.
[9] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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