Phillip Young v. Jessica Davis f/k/a Jessica Brummet and Dakota Faunce ( 2019 )

FILED
Dec 30 2019, 9:05 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Kimberly S. Lytle JESSICA DAVIS
Banks & Brower LLC Rebecca M. S. Johnson
Indianapolis, Indiana Spitzer Herriman Stephenson
Holderead Conner & Persinger,
LLP
Marion, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Phillip Young, December 30, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JP-1015
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
Jessica Davis f/k/a Jessica The Honorable Dana J.
Brummet, Kenworthy, Judge
The Honorable Brian F. McLane,
Appellee-Respondent,
Magistrate
and Trial Court Cause No.
27D02-1510-JP-133
Dakota Faunce,
Appellee-Intervenor.
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 1 of 10
Case Summary
[1] We have recognized a significant public policy interest in correctly identifying
parents and their offspring. In this case, Phillip Young, knowing that he was
not E.Y.’s (“Child”) biological father, initiated proceedings to establish himself
as Child’s legal father. Based on the testimony of Young and Jessica Davis
(“Mother”), the juvenile court issued an order establishing paternity in Young.
Genetic testing subsequently identified Dakota Faunce as Child’s biological
father. Given the test results, the juvenile court vacated the previous order
establishing Young as Child’s legal father and established Faunce as Child’s
father. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In mid-2012, Mother engaged in sexual relationships with both Young and
Faunce. Around that time, Mother became pregnant. Child was born on April
24, 2013.
[3] Young filed a petition to establish paternity of Child on October 29, 2015.
During a November 13, 2015 hearing, Young and Mother indicated that Young
was Child’s father. Young and Mother also claimed to have executed a
paternity affidavit shortly after Child’s birth but neither provided a copy of the
paternity affidavit to the juvenile court.
[4] On August 9, 2016, while the paternity proceedings were pending and before
the juvenile court entered any order establishing Young as Child’s father,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 2 of 10
Mother filed a motion for genetic testing. Young objected to Mother’s motion,
claiming that Mother was not entitled to genetic testing because they had
executed a paternity affidavit. Young did not support his claim by providing
the juvenile court with a copy of the paternity affidavit.
[5] On September 6, 2016, Faunce filed a motion to intervene in the ongoing
paternity proceedings and for genetic testing. In this motion, Faunce indicated
that he “just learned about [the] possibility” that he may be the biological father
of Child and sought to intervene to “protect his possible rights and
responsibilities as” Child’s father. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40. He also
asked that the juvenile court “enter an Order requiring all parties to submit to
genetic testing.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 41.
[6] On October 26, 2016, the juvenile court issued an order granting Faunce’s
request for genetic testing. On or about November 28, 2016, more than one
year after Young filed his petition to establish paternity, the juvenile court
issued an order granting Young’s petition to establish paternity. Mother,
Faunce, and Young subsequently filed a joint petition requesting that the
juvenile court enter an agreed order for genetic testing. The juvenile court
granted the joint petition on February 1, 2018.
[7] The results of the genetic testing were filed with the juvenile court on April 20,
2018, establishing a 99.99% probability that Faunce is Child’s biological father.
Given these results, on May 14, 2018, Mother filed a motion to vacate the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 3 of 10
November 28, 2016 paternity order. Mother subsequently petitioned the court
to enter an order establishing paternity in Faunce.
[8] The juvenile court held a hearing on all pending motions on September 26,
2018. During this hearing, Young, for the first time, provided the juvenile court
with a copy of the paternity affidavit that he and Mother executed after Child’s
birth. On December 26, 2018, the juvenile court issued an order in which it
found that Mother knew that Young was not Child’s biological father when she
and Young executed the paternity affidavit and although Mother had initially
falsely informed Faunce that he was not Child’s biological father, genetic
testing had subsequently confirmed otherwise. The juvenile court also found
that “Mother gave admittedly false testimony leading to the establishment of
Young as [Child’s] father. Young’s testimony was doubtful, at best, leading to
the establishment of him as [Child’s] father.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 166–
67. The juvenile court vacated the November 28, 2016 order establishing
paternity in Young and issued an order establishing paternity in Faunce.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[9] Young appeals from the juvenile court’s order granting Mother’s motion to
vacate the November 28, 2016 paternity order. The parties agree that Mother’s
motion is essentially a Trial Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 4 of 10
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for relief from
judgment using an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of
discretion occurs only when the trial court’s action is clearly
erroneous, that is, against the logic and effect of the facts before it
and inferences drawn therefrom. Moreover, where as here, the
trial court enters special findings and conclusions pursuant to
Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard of
review. First we determine if the evidence supports the findings,
and second whether the findings support the judgment. The trial
court’s findings and conclusions will be set aside only if clearly
erroneous. We neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness
credibility. Instead, we must accept the ultimate facts as stated
by the trial court if there is evidence to sustain them.
Barton v. Barton, 47 N.E.3d 368, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations
omitted).
II. Whether the Juvenile Court Abused its Discretion in
Granting Mother’s Motion to Vacate the November 28,
2016 Paternity Order
[10] “[T]here is a substantial public policy in correctly identifying parents and their
offspring.” In re Paternity of S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. 1992). “Proper
identification of parents and child should prove to be in the best interests of the
child for medical or psychological reasons.” Id. Indiana Code Title 31, Article
14 (“Article 14”) covers the establishment of paternity. “A man’s paternity may
only be established: (1) in an action under [Article 14]; or (2) by executing a
paternity affidavit in accordance with [Indiana Code section] 16-37-2-2.1.” Ind.
Code § 31-14-2-1. “The general assembly favors the public policy of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 5 of 10
establishing paternity under [Article 14] of a child born out of wedlock.” Ind.
Code § 31-14-1-1.
[11] Young asserts that his paternity was established pursuant to Indiana Code
section 16-37-2-2.1. Contrary to this assertion, however, the record
demonstrates that paternity was established pursuant to Article 14. Young
initiated proceedings to establish his paternity on October 29, 2015. While it is
true that Young and Mother had executed a paternity affidavit prior to
initiation of the underlying proceedings, the juvenile court was not provided
with a copy of the paternity affidavit until the September 26, 2018 hearing. The
juvenile court, therefore, could not have based its November 28, 2016 order on
the paternity affidavit as it was not part of the record before the court. Instead,
the juvenile court based its order on testimony provided by Mother and Young
during the November 13, 2015 hearing indicating that Young is Child’s
biological father. The juvenile court made this fact clear in its December 26,
2018 order, stating the following:
The original paternity order of 11/28/2016 was based on the
knowingly inaccurate testimony from the hearing on 11/13/2015
wherein both Young and Mother indicated that Young was the
father of [Child]. The court finds both Young and Mother were
aware that Young was probably not the father when they testified
on 11/13/2015 to the contrary.
and
The paternity affidavit was not provided to the court until after
the genetic test had conclusively established that Faunce was the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 6 of 10
biological father of [Child]. Rescission of the affidavit was not
required prior to the genetic test because the paternity affidavit
had not been provided to the court at the time the genetic testing
order was entered. The order on paternity was based solely on the
testimony of Young and Mother at the 11/13/2015 hearing.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 165, 166 (emphasis added). Young’s paternity,
therefore, was established through Article 14 proceedings.
[12] Young argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting Mother’s
motion to vacate the November 28, 2016 order establishing his paternity. We
disagree. After the juvenile court entered its order establishing paternity in
Young, additional evidence was brought to the court’s attention that rebutted
Young’s claim that he is Child’s father. Again, Young initiated the underlying
proceedings and Faunce successfully intervened in the proceedings. The
juvenile court granted a motion for genetic testing but, before testing had been
completed, the court issued the November 28, 2016 order establishing paternity
in Young. Mother, Faunce, and Young subsequently filed a joint petition for
genetic testing. The results of the testing were filed with the juvenile court on
April 20, 2018, establishing a 99.99% probability that Faunce is Child’s
biological father. The juvenile court subsequently heard evidence indicating
that (1) although Mother and Young had executed a paternity affidavit on or
about May 1, 2013, Mother knew at the time that Young was not Child’s
biological father and (2) Mother and Young had provided false testimony
during the November 13, 2015 hearing regarding paternity. Based on this
evidence, the juvenile court vacated its prior order establishing paternity in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 7 of 10
Young. Upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court acted within its
discretion in doing so.
[13] We are unpersuaded by Young’s argument that neither Mother nor Faunce had
standing to challenge the November 28, 2016 order because neither filed a
timely petition to establish paternity pursuant to Article 14. This argument is
without merit, as both Mother and Faunce were parties to the ongoing paternity
proceedings initiated by Young, i.e., Mother was an original party to the
proceedings and Faunce successfully intervened. Given that both were parties
to said proceedings, it would have been superfluous to require either Mother or
Faunce to initiate separate proceedings under Article 14.
[14] Additionally, we would reach the same conclusion even if the juvenile court
had based its order establishing Young’s paternity on the paternity affidavit
executed by Young and Mother. As Young argues, a properly executed
paternity affidavit conclusively establishes paternity. See Ind. Code § 16-37-2-
2.1(p). However, “may that presumption of paternity be rebutted? The answer
clearly is yes.” Paternity of Davis v. Trensey, 862 N.E.2d 308, 312 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007). Stated differently, execution of a paternity affidavit “does not preclude
another man from attempting to establish paternity of the child.” In re Paternity
of N.R.R.L., 846 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
[15] In this case, the presumption was sufficiently rebutted. Indiana Code section
16-37-2-2.1(l) provides that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 8 of 10
A paternity affidavit that is properly executed under this section
may not be rescinded more than sixty (60) days after the
paternity affidavit is executed unless a court:
(1) has determined that fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact existed in the execution of the
paternity affidavit; and
(2) at the request of a man [who is a party to the
paternity affidavit] has ordered a genetic test, and the
test indicates that the man is excluded as the father of
the child.
As for subsection (1), the juvenile court found that the paternity affidavit was
based upon knowingly false assertions by Mother. We have previously found
similar acts of knowingly asserting paternity in a man by a mother to constitute
fraud on the courts, which subsequently may rely on the knowingly false
statements in making decisions relating to paternity, visitation, child support,
etc. See In re Paternity of S.C., 966 N.E.2d 143, 148–52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). As
for subsection (2), during the pendency of the proceedings, Mother, Young, and
Faunce filed a joint petition requesting that the juvenile court enter an agreed
order for genetic testing. The juvenile court granted this petition and the results
of the genetic testing established a 99.99% probability that Faunce is Child’s
biological father.1 There is no suggestion in the record that Faunce and Young
have identical DNA or that Child and Young share any genetic identifiers.
Based on these facts, we conclude that even if the juvenile court had relied on
1
The juvenile court noted in its December 26, 2018 order that Young performed at least two genetic tests,
both of which indicated that he was not Child’s biological father. It is unclear, however, who requested these
tests.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 9 of 10
the paternity affidavit in establishing paternity in Young, it did not abuse its
discretion in vacating said order.
[16] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JP-1015 | December 30, 2019 Page 10 of 10