Warren Parks v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                      FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  Sep 24 2019, 10:03 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Warren Parks                                             Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Greencastle, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Frances Barrow
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Warren Parks,                                            September 24, 2019
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-PL-3068
    v.                                               Appeal from the Putnam Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Charles Bridges,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    67D01-1807-PL-30
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-3068 | September 24, 2019              Page 1 of 6
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Plaintiff, Warren Parks (Parks), appeals the trial court’s denial of his
    request for an extension of time to file a rebuttal to a pleading filed by the
    Appellee-Defendant, the State of Indiana (the State).
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Parks presents several issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive and
    restate as the following: Whether the trial court erred in denying his request for
    an extension of time.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   Parks is currently serving a thirty-year sentence at Putnamville Correction
    Facility. On July 2, 2018, Parks filed a motion for preliminary injunction,
    seeking to enjoin the warden, Brian Smith (Warden Smith). Parks claimed that
    Warden Smith had improperly taken “money off [his] inmate trust fund [] for a
    child support order” issued by a “magistrate” who did not have authority to
    “act as a judicial officer, because he/she was never properly elected as a
    [j]udge.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pp. 9-10). On July 30, 2018, the State filed a
    motion for an extension of time to respond to Parks’ preliminary injunction.
    Parks responded by stating that he had no objection to the State’s request for an
    extension of time; however, he included interrogatories in that same response.
    On August 6, 2018, Parks filed an affidavit, which the State construed as a
    discovery request.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-3068 | September 24, 2019   Page 2 of 6
    [5]   On September 10, 2018, Parks filed a writ of mandamus, arguing that Warden
    Smith retaliated against him after he filed his motion for preliminary injunction
    and denied him access to the prison law library. The following day, on
    September 11, 2018, the State filed its response to Park’s motion for a
    preliminary injunction, pointing out that Parks had not requested any specific
    relief. The State also attached three child support income withholding orders
    from Ohio and a judgment from the Ohio court of appeals affirming Parks’
    child support obligation. On the same day, the State filed an extension of time
    with respect to Parks’ discovery request filed on August 6, 2018. On September
    17, 2018, the trial court extended the time within which the State could respond
    to Parks’ preliminary injunction. On October 12, 2018, the State responded to
    Parks’ discovery requests and, with specificity, objected to Parks’
    interrogatories.
    [6]   On October 22, 2018, Parks filed three motions (October 22nd Motions). The
    first was a motion to compel discovery. Even though Parks had never filed a
    complaint, the second motion was a request to file an amended complaint. The
    third motion was a motion to strike the State’s responsive pleading as to his
    motion for preliminary injunction, arguing that it was “irrelevant” since the
    State’s counsel had withdrawn her appearance. (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 96).
    After Parks filed his October 22nd Motions, the State filed a consolidated
    response (Consolidated Response) on November 9, 2018.
    [7]   On November 28, 2018, through several orders, the trial court denied Parks’
    motion for preliminary injunction and Parks’ October 22nd Motions—i.e., the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-3068 | September 24, 2019   Page 3 of 6
    motion to strike, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and the
    motion to compel discovery. The next day, on November 29, 2018, Parks filed
    a motion for extension of time to file a rebuttal to the State’s Consolidated
    Response. Since it had already denied Parks’ underlying action and other
    pending motions, on November 30, 2018, the trial court denied Parks’ motion
    for extension of time, finding that it was moot.
    [8]    Parks now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    [9]    At the outset we note that Parks proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se
    is held to the rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. See Hill
    v. State, 
    773 N.E.2d 336
    , 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). One of the risks that a
    defendant takes when he decides to proceed pro se is that he will not know how
    to accomplish all of the things that an attorney would know how to accomplish.
    
    Id. When a
    party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for us to indulge
    in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule for the orderly
    and proper conduct of the appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 
    844 N.E.2d 494
    , 496 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2006).
    [10]   Parks’ appellate brief is deficient in many respects. First, the statement of facts
    section lists the number of pleadings filed by the parties, which is essentially a
    violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6), which limits the statement of facts
    to a narrative description of the relevant facts stated in accordance with the
    appropriate standard of review. See New v. Pers. Representative of Estate of New,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-3068 | September 24, 2019   Page 4 of 6
    
    938 N.E.2d 758
    , 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Similarly, Parks’ statement of the
    case fails to lay out the relevant procedural posture of the case as required by
    Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), but instead includes allegations and
    arguments comprised of two sentences.
    [11]   Turning to the argument section in his brief, it appears that Parks does not
    challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion for preliminary injunction or the
    denial of his October 22nd Motions. Rather, Parks’ challenge on appeal is that
    the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his request for an
    extension of time to file his rebuttal to the State’s Consolidated Response.
    [12]   Without addressing the fact that his underlying action has been dismissed—i.e.,
    the preliminary injunction and accompanying motions—Parks repeatedly
    asserts that the trial court’s denial of his request for an extension of time to file
    his rebuttal to the State’s Consolidated Response interfered with his
    constitutional rights; however, he fails to cite a single case in support of his
    assertion. Parks further baldly claims that the trial court was unfairly biased
    against him and, although he cites some legal authority, he fails to then offer a
    semblance of cogent argument or reasoning. The mere citation to legal
    authority in support of an argument is insufficient if it is not also supported by
    cogent reasoning. See, e.g., Wingate v. State, 
    900 N.E.2d 468
    , 475 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2009).
    [13]   Because Parks’ contentions are too poorly expressed and developed, it has
    prevented our appellate analysis and consideration of her alleged errors. See
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-3068 | September 24, 2019   Page 5 of 6
    Davis v. State, 
    835 N.E.2d 1102
    , 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “While we are often
    tolerant of minor infractions of the appellate rules so that we may decide
    appeals on their merits, those rules are nonetheless binding on all persons
    bringing appeals to this court.” Ramsey v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
    Dev., 
    789 N.E.2d 486
    , 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Further, we will not search the
    record to find a basis for a party’s argument, nor will we search the authorities
    cited by a party in order to find legal support for his position. Thomas v. State,
    
    965 N.E.2d 70
    , 77 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In short, this Court will “not
    become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or
    too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 
    58 N.E.3d 980
    , 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In the instant case, because Parks’
    noncompliance with the appellate rules substantially impeded us from reaching
    the merits of this appeal, we are compelled to find the issue waived, and we
    affirm the trial court.
    CONCLUSION
    [14]   Concluding that Parks has waived our review of his claims on appeal, we affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    [15]   Affirmed.
    [16]   Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-3068 | September 24, 2019   Page 6 of 6