Quincy Hawkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 29 2018, 7:46 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. O’Connor Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
O’Connor & Auersch Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Quincy Hawkins, June 29, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1710-CR-2490
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marc T.
Appellee-Plaintiff Rothenberg, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G02-1508-F1-30160
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Quincy Hawkins appeals his conviction for level 4 felony possession of a
narcotic drug following a jury trial. Hawkins argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. Finding that the evidence was sufficient, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that on August 21, 2015,
officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department SWAT team
executed a no-knock search warrant on Hawkins’s home. In an effort to keep
everyone safe, the SWAT team broke a window and used a flash bang, a
diversionary device meant to disorient the occupants of a residence, as they
announced their presence by yelling that they had a search warrant.
[3] The flash bang woke and frightened Hawkins and his girlfriend, Maleisha
Robinson, who had been sleeping in the master bedroom. Fearing that his
home was under attack, Hawkins rolled out of bed, grabbed a rifle, and began
shooting through the bedroom window and siding of the house.1 The police did
1
This case offers yet another vivid illustration of the dangers of using flash bangs during search warrant
executions. Officer safety is frequently cited as a justification for flash bang usage, but Hawkins’s startled
(and violent) reaction to the flash bang’s explosion actually put the lives of the SWAT team members at risk.
In Watkins v. State, our supreme court cautioned that flash bangs “should be the exception in search warrant
executions” and that “[t]heir extraordinary degree of intrusion will in many cases make a search
constitutionally unreasonable.” 85 N.E.3d 597, 603 (Ind. 2017). We have serious concerns about what
appears to be an upsurge in the use of flash bangs, as well as about the standards (if any) that govern their
use.
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not return fire because they could not see the shooter, but continued to
announce their presence. Hawkins laid down his weapon when he heard the
police yelling. Robinson and two house guests exited the home, and Hawkins
exited moments later. All the occupants were taken into custody.
[4] The police then searched the home. In addition to finding several firearms and
a few bongs throughout the house, the police found a plastic bag containing less
than a gram of heroin in a bathroom shower and less than a gram of marijuana
on the dining room floor. The police also found two white paper envelopes on
the dresser in the master bedroom. Each envelope contained hydrocodone pills
that weighed a combined total of 15.73 grams.
[5] The State charged Hawkins with level 1 felony attempted murder, level 5 felony
battery by means of a deadly weapon, level 6 felony maintaining a common
nuisance, level 4 felony possession of a narcotic drug (hydrocodone), level 6
felony possession of a narcotic drug (heroin), and class C misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. At trial, Robinson claimed that she obtained
the hydrocodone pills via a prescription that she filled at a pharmacy, and she
subsequently separated the pills into the envelopes. The jury convicted
Hawkins of the two possession charges and the paraphernalia charge, but found
him not guilty on the other charges. Hawkins was sentenced to seven years.
This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Hawkins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his level 4 felony
conviction. In reviewing an insufficient evidence claim, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003,
1005 (Ind. 2009). Rather, we consider only the evidence that supports the
judgment and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom. Id. “We will affirm
if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of
fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id.[7] A person who knowingly possesses a narcotic drug without a valid prescription
commits possession of a narcotic drug, a level 4 felony if the amount of the drug
involved is at least ten but less than twenty-eight grams. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-
6(a), -(c)(1). A person actually possesses contraband when he has “direct
physical control over it.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). If
actual possession cannot be proven, then a conviction for possessing
contraband may rest on constructive possession. Id. A person constructively
possesses contraband when he has the intent and capability to maintain
dominion and control over it. Id. Hawkins argues that the evidence presented
at trial does not establish that he possessed the hydrocodone. He concedes that
he had the capability to maintain dominion and control of the hydrocodone,
but argues that the State failed to establish the intention to do so.
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[8] A trier of fact may infer that the intent element is satisfied based on a
defendant’s possessory interest in the premises on which the contraband is
found. Id. Circumstantial evidence is required to support this inference when
the possessory interest is not exclusive. Id. Among the additional
circumstances that will support an inference of intent to control the contraband
are:
(1) a defendant’s incriminating statements; (2) a defendant’s
attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of
contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4)
the item’s proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of
contraband within the defendant’s plain view; and (6) the
mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.
Id. at 175. This list is not exhaustive, as other circumstances could just as
reasonably demonstrate a defendant’s requisite knowledge. Id.
[9] Here, the hydrocodone pills were found in envelopes on top of a dresser in the
master bedroom. It is undisputed that Hawkins regularly slept there and that he
was sleeping there when the raid occurred. Thus, the envelopes containing
contraband were in immediate proximity to where Hawkins was sleeping.2 The
presence of the bongs, marijuana, and heroin in plain view would support an
inference that Hawkins intended to maintain dominion and control over the
envelopes and their contents. Based on Hawkins’s knowledge that the other
2
On page 11 of his brief, Hawkins cites this Court’s memorandum decision in Funk v. State, No. 27A02-1601-
CR-170 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016), trans. denied (2017), in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 65(D).
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drugs and drug paraphernalia were in the house, the jury could reasonably infer
that he also had knowledge of and intended to maintain dominion and control
over the pills inside the envelopes as well. Moreover, the jury was free to
disbelieve Robinson’s claim that the pills were hers, especially since no
prescription was found in the home or produced at trial.
[10] Hawkins merely invites this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge the
credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. We must decline this invitation.
Therefore, we affirm Hawkins’s conviction.
[11] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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