Joseph E. Waldron v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 23 2017, 9:31 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Justin R. Wall Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wall Legal Services Attorney General of Indiana
Huntington, Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joseph E. Waldron, June 23, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
35A02-1701-CR-122
v. Appeal from the Huntington
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
35C01-1609-FC-155
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Joseph E. Waldron brings an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence, following a hearing on that motion. He raises
one issue, namely, whether the trial court erred when it found that a search
warrant included within its scope the seizure of electronic devices capable of
storing video recordings from surveillance cameras. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On Tuesday, May 10, 2016, six-year-old A.W. disclosed to school personnel
and police that Waldron, her father, had physically battered her with a Taser
over the previous Friday and Saturday at their home in Huntington. Based
upon the information from A.W., Huntington Police Detective Andrew Ellet
(“Officer Ellet”) obtained a search warrant that afternoon for Waldron’s
residence to search for and seize: “a taser, all surveillance cameras both inside
and outside the home, and electronic devices used to store video recordings
from the surveillance cameras.” Appellant’s App. at 28-29; State’s Ex. 1. The
search warrant also directed the officers “to search all recovered surveillance
cameras and electronic devices for the following: video recordings or pictures
involving child physical abuse.” Id.
[3] At around 4:00 p.m., Officer Ellet and other Huntington police officers
executed the search warrant in Waldron’s presence. The officers located in the
home a digital video recorder (“DVR”) connected to the indoor and outside
surveillance cameras. Officer Ellet was aware that the purpose of the DVR was
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to record video from the surveillance cameras and that it had limited capacity to
store information. Within close proximity to the DVR, the officers also located
a taser, a computer tower, a laptop computer, an internal hard drive, several cell
phones, and a digital camera. The computer tower, the laptop computer, and
the internal hard drive all had the capability of storing video recordings from
the surveillance cameras transferred through the DVR over a wireless router.
The officers did not know which electronic devices Waldron used to store the
videos recorded by the DVR.
[4] Detective Ellet seized the taser, the laptop computer, the computer tower, the
internal hard drive, and the DVR, including its hard drive. Indiana State Police
Sergeant Jeremy Chapman (“Officer Chapman”), a forensic examiner of digital
evidence and an audio visual enhancement specialist, examined the electronic
devices and discovered on them evidence of child solicitation committed
against a sixteen-year-old girl and images of child pornography. On September
1, 2016, the State charged Waldron with two counts of Class C felony child
exploitation and one count of Level 6 felony possession of child pornography.
[5] On October 3, Waldron filed a motion to suppress, which alleged that the
officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing all electronic devices
except the DVR. Specifically, Waldron argued that the language of the search
warrant limited the seizure of evidence to only those electronic devices
physically connected to the surveillance cameras, i.e., the DVR. Following a
hearing on Waldron’s motion to suppress, the trial court issued an order
denying that motion. The trial court’s order stated, in relevant part:
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The Court finds this attempt to restrict the ability of the officers
to properly search for evidence with the [w]arrant is incorrect.
The home had many devices upon which storage of video
recordings from the surveillance cameras could have been stored.
The Court could not have been aware of what was in the home
and capable of storage. Therefore, devices capable of storage by
connecting to the camera on the DVR would be allowed to be
taken and searched by the [w]arrant.
Appellant’s App. at 58.
[6] Waldron subsequently obtained an order certifying the order on his motion to
suppress for interlocutory appeal. On February 24, 2017, we accepted
jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Waldron appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other
sufficiency issues. Gonser v. State, 843 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
We determine whether there is substantial evidence of probative
value to support the trial court’s ruling. Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). We do not reweigh evidence and
[we] construe conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial
court’s ruling. Widduck v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). We must also consider uncontested evidence
favorable to the defendant. Id. The trial court’s ultimate
determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is,
however, reviewed de novo. Harper v. State, 922 N.E.2d 75, 79
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241,
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244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)) (applying this standard to a Terry stop),
trans. denied.
Woodson v. State, 960 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[8] Waldron maintains that all electronic devices except the DVR were erroneously
admitted into evidence because they were beyond the scope of the warrant to
search his home.
To protect a citizen’s right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, our state and federal constitutions require officials
to obtain a warrant before conducting searches and seizures.
Green v. State, 676 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans.
denied. A warrant may not issue unless an affidavit is submitted
to a judge or magistrate, describing with particularity the place to
be searched and the items to be seized. Id. The particularity
requirement restricts the scope of the search, authorizing seizure
of only those things described in the warrant; a warrant which
leaves the executing officer with discretion is invalid. Lee v. State,
715 N.E.2d 1289, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
However, “[o]ur supreme court has noted that while the items to be searched
for and seized must be described with some specificity, there is no requirement
that there be an exact description.” Id. (citing Phillips v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1073,
1075 (Ind. 1987)).
[9] Here, the search warrant authorized the police to search Waldron’s home for
“electronic devices used to store video recordings from the surveillance
cameras,” and to seize such items. Appellant’s App. at 58. The warrant further
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authorized the police to “search all recovered surveillance cameras and electronic
devices for . . . video recordings or pictures involving child physical abuse.” Id.(emphasis added). Officer Chapman, who had been employed as a forensic
examiner of digital evidence for thirteen years, testified that recordings from the
surveillance cameras could have been transferred from the DVR to the seized
laptop computer, computer tower, and internal hard drive for storage. Such a
transfer could have been accomplished either by a hard connection or through a
wireless router. He testified that such a transfer was likely, given the limited
storage capacity of the DVR. Moreover, the DVR unit had the capability of
transferring data directly to the computer tower. Thus, the seized electronic
devices were capable of storing “video recordings from the surveillance
cameras.” Id. And, since the officers obviously could have no way of knowing
which, if any, of the devices actually stored such recordings until they searched
each of them, the warrant authorized them to conduct such a search of each
seized electronic device. Id.[10] Waldron maintains that only the DVR fell within the scope of the warrant
because it was the only device that was physically connected to the surveillance
cameras at the time of the search. Thus, he contends, only the DVR could be
used to store video recordings “from” the surveillance camera. That contention
is without merit. The warrant contains no language limiting the search and
seizure to electronic devices that happen to actually be attached to the
surveillance camera at the time of the search. Nor does it limit the search to
only devices that can directly record the video from the surveillance camera.
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Rather, the plain language of the warrant applies to devices “used to store”
recordings, and the evidence shows that the seized electronic devices were
capable of such storage. Moreover, this was not a situation where the officers
were authorized to seize one kind of item, but seized an item of unrelated
character. C.f. Ogburn v. State, 53 N.E.3d 464, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding
seizure exceeded scope of warrant where the item seized “was not of the same
character as” the items described in the warrant), trans. denied.
[11] The record contains substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial
court’s denial of Waldron’s motion to suppress the electronic devices.
[12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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