Michael L. Zackmire v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                        Jul 03 2017, 9:01 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                          Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                     and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Bryan K. Coulter                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Lafayette, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Larry D. Allen
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Michael L. Zackmire,                                     July 3, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    23A01-1701-CR-202
    v.                                               Appeal from the Fountain Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Stephanie S.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Campbell, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    23C01-1509-F3-407
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017       Page 1 of 10
    [1]   Michael Zackmire pled guilty to two counts of Level 3 felony rape. The trial
    court sentenced Zackmire to nine years executed for each conviction and
    ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of
    eighteen years. Zackmire appeals, challenging the sentence imposed in two
    respects: 1) Zackmire contends that the trial court abused its sentencing
    discretion and 2) he claims that his sentence is inappropriate.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   On September 15, 2015, the State charged Zackmire with four counts of Level 3
    felony rape. The trial court held a combined plea and sentencing hearing on
    December 22, 2016. Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Zackmire
    agreed to plead guilty to two counts of Level 3 felony rape in exchange for
    dismissal of the remaining charges. The plea agreement also provided that
    sentencing would be left to the trial court’s discretion. At the guilty plea
    hearing, Zackmire agreed with the factual basis for his convictions—that
    between the dates of August 1, 2015, and September 8, 2015, he had sexual
    intercourse and other sexual contact with J.S., a twenty-four-year-old female for
    whom Zackmire was co-guardian and who was mentally incapable of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 2 of 10
    consenting to sexual intercourse or other sexual contact. 1 The trial court
    accepted Zackmire’s guilty plea.
    [4]   During the sentencing portion of the hearing, the trial court noted that it
    considered the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) and arguments of
    counsel. The PSI indicated that Zackmire was fifty-two years old when he
    committed the instant offenses. J.S. was Zackmire’s niece2 and Zackmire had
    guardianship over her for approximately a year and a half before he raped her.
    The PSI also indicated that Zackmire had no prior criminal history. In his
    statement of the offense for purposes of the PSI, Zackmire claimed that at the
    time he committed these offenses, he was under a lot of stress, drinking heavily,
    and having marital problems.
    [5]   In pronouncing the sentence, the trial court made the following sentencing
    statement:
    The Court finds as an aggravating circumstance that you were in
    a position of trust over this young lady. That is considered
    aggravating, not because it’s just simply a position of trust over
    this young lady, you were her court appointed guardian to
    protect her and you took advantage. You manipulated that
    position as her caregiver for your own personal satisfaction. You
    were in a position of care, custody and control over this young
    lady. This factor is considered aggravating because the victim
    had been placed in the home that you shared with the victim’s
    1
    The victim’s mental age is reportedly twelve years of age.
    2
    Zackmire was adopted as an infant and thus his niece is not a blood relative.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 3 of 10
    co-guardian and you failed to protect her while the co-guardian
    was at work and away from the home. The nature of the crime is
    considered as aggravating because these events were not isolated.
    You demonstrated a pattern of abusive behavior over a several
    week period. The victim was a virgin prior to your acts and you
    took from her the beauty of what a loving, physical relationship
    could be. You caused her physical pain. You have created in
    her a general lack of trust and fear of men. The Court finds as a
    mitigating factor your remorse. Factor is considered mitigating
    because you have apologized. You have acknowledge [sic] your
    guilt for your actions and did not put the victim through the pain
    of testifying at trial. Your lack or prior criminal history is
    considered a mitigating factor. The fact that the crime was a
    result of circumstances unlikely to reoccur is a mitigating factor.
    That it may create an undue hardship on you is considered a
    mitigating factor. But the Court gets to balance mitigators
    against aggravators and in this case the Court does give weight to
    your expression of remorse and lack of prior criminal history,
    and it gives substantial weight to the aggravators.
    Transcript of 12-22-16 at 17-19. The trial court then sentenced Zackmire to the
    advisory sentence of nine years3 on each count and ordered the sentences to be
    served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of eighteen years executed. The
    trial court then explained its reasons for ordering consecutive sentences:
    [T]he offenses were committed over a period of time. There were
    days between your offenses which allowed you time to consider
    the crimes you were committing and the impact those offenses
    could have on your victim. You stole from your victim her right
    3
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5
     (“[a] person who commits a Level 3 felony (for a crime committed after June 30,
    2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory
    sentence being nine (9) years”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017              Page 4 of 10
    to determine who and when she would surrender her virginity to.
    You caused pain and physical injury to the victim. You took
    advantage of her [sic] position of trust and care of the victim.
    Your victim is disabled as defined by Indiana law and you knew
    what her disability was.
    
    Id. at 19
    . Zackmire now appeals.
    Discussion & Decision
    1. Abuse of Discretion
    [6]   Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.
    Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    . “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic
    and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
    probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” 
    Id. at 490
     (quoting
    K.S. v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 538
    , 544 (Ind. 2006)). A trial court may abuse its
    sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a
    sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes
    aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3)
    entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by
    the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are
    improper as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 490-91
    . Because trial courts are no longer
    obligated to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors when imposing a
    sentence, a trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in failing to
    properly weigh such factors. 
    Id. at 491
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 5 of 10
    [7]   Zackmire first argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in
    finding as separate aggravating factors that he was in a position of trust with the
    victim and that he was in a position of care, custody, and control. Zackmire
    claims that these aggravators are essentially the same and should have been
    considered as one aggravator, not two.4
    [8]   Zackmire does not argue that the trial court’s considerations were improper, but
    rather, seems to suggest that the balancing and weighing of aggravators and
    mitigators is a product of comparing enumerated lists of aggravators and
    mitigators with the greatest weight given to the longest list. This is simply not
    the case. Here, the trial court carefully and thoughtfully discussed the
    aggravating and mitigating circumstances and articulated the weight and
    balancing of such factors in deciding what sentence to impose. We find no
    abuse of discretion in the trial court’s consideration of the fact that Zackmire
    was in a position of trust as a court appointed co-guardian of J.S. and that he
    also was in a position of care, custody, and control when he was solely
    responsible for J.S. while the co-guardian was at work.
    4
    In its written sentencing order, the trial court stated:
    (1) [Zackmire] was in a position of trust. This factor is considered as aggravating in that the
    victim was under his care as her court appointed guardian. [Zackmire] manipulated his position
    as her caregiver for his own personal satisfaction;
    (2) [Zackmire] was in a position of care, custody and control. This factor is considered as
    aggravating because the victim had been placed in the home he shared with the victim’s co-
    guardian and he failed to protect her while the co-guardian was at work.
    Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 3 at 46-47.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017                 Page 6 of 10
    [9]    Zackmire argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
    victim had been a virgin because such finding was “not fully supported by the
    record.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. As Zackmire notes, however, such fact is noted
    in the probable cause affidavit that was included in the pre-sentence
    investigation report and Zackmire did not object to inclusion of such
    information therein. There is thus evidence in the record to support the trial
    court’s finding in this regard.
    [10]   Zackmire also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the
    sentences to run consecutively. As set out above, the trial court explained the
    reasoning behind its decision to impose consecutive sentences, specifically
    noting that the offenses were committed over a period of time and that
    Zackmire had time to consider the crimes he was committing and the impact
    they had on J.S. Zackmire claims that imposition of consecutive sentences
    requires more than this “single statement.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
    [11]   We disagree with Zackmire. Here, the trial court identified several aggravating
    factors, including the repeated nature of the offenses, that the victim suffered
    physical and emotional pain, that Zackmire abused a position of trust, and also
    that the victim was disabled. The trial court articulated its balancing of these
    factors with the identified mitigators. The trial court clearly identified several
    aggravating factors and provided more than a single statement in explaining its
    decision to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in ordering Zackmire’s advisory sentences to be served consecutively.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 7 of 10
    2. Appropriateness
    Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a
    sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize
    independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial
    court. Alvies v. State, 
    905 N.E.2d 57
    , 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Anglemyer,
    868 N.E.2d at 491). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana
    Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court “may revise a sentence
    authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
    Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
    and the character of the offender.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.
    Nevertheless, “we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s
    sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give ‘due
    consideration’ to that decision and because we understand and recognize the
    unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Stewart v.
    State, 
    866 N.E.2d 858
    , 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The appellant bears the
    burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    [12]   Here, Zackmire pled guilty and received the advisory sentence of nine years for
    both offenses when he could have received up to sixteen years for each offense.
    The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. The starting
    point that the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for a crime is
    the advisory sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. Therefore, when the trial
    court imposes the advisory sentence, the defendant bears a heavy burden in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 8 of 10
    persuading this court that the sentence is inappropriate. McKinney v. State, 
    873 N.E.2d 630
    , 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
    [13]   With regard to the character of the offender, Zackmire asserts that he has
    cooperated with authorities since the beginning of their investigation, that he
    has no criminal history, that he is remorseful, that his overall risk assessment
    places him in the low risk category to reoffend, and that he accepted
    responsibility by pleading guilty thereby saving his victim the pain of testifying
    at trial. He also points out that he owns a successful trucking company and that
    he voluntarily sought out counseling prior to sentencing. As did the trial court,
    we accept these factors as having some mitigating weight, but not as redeeming
    character traits in light of the nature of the offense.
    [14]   The nature of the offense justifies the sentence imposed. Zackmire raped his
    mentally disabled niece, over whom he had a guardianship, approximately
    seven times in a period of a little more than a month. Zackmire admitted that
    he knew J.S. could not make adult decisions and that she had the mental
    capacity of a twelve-year-old. Moreover, after he committed his offenses, he
    tried to cover them up by warning J.S. not to tell anyone and making her
    shower after he raped her. In her victim impact statement, J.S. wrote that she
    cannot trust men and has been depressed. The nature of the offenses supports
    the trial court’s imposition of consecutive, advisory sentences for an aggregate
    sentence of eighteen years.
    [15]   Judgment affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 9 of 10
    [16]   Kirsch, J. and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 23A01-1701-CR-202 | July 3, 2017   Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23A01-1701-CR-202

Filed Date: 7/3/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/3/2017