State of Indiana v. Christopher J. Basinger (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Oct 12 2016, 8:58 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory F. Zoeller Patrick J. Smith
Attorney General of Indiana Bedford, Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, October 12, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
59A05-1601-CR-195
v. Appeal from the Orange Circuit
Court
Christopher J. Basinger, The Honorable Larry R. Blanton,
Appellee-Defendant Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
59C01-1503-F5-236
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Pursuant to a warrant, police officers searched Christopher J. Basinger’s home
and seized several firearms and white powder that field-tested positive for
methamphetamine. The State charged him with level 5 felony possession of
methamphetamine. Basinger filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized
during the search, arguing that the warrant was invalid because the underlying
affidavit lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause. The trial court granted the
motion.
[2] The State dismissed the charge against Basinger and filed this appeal, arguing
that the affidavit contained sufficient indicia of probable cause or, in the
alternative, that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. We
disagree on both counts and therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On March 25, 2015, Indiana State Police Detective Shane Staggs submitted an
affidavit for a warrant to search Basinger’s home for evidence of
methamphetamine possession. The judge who reviewed the affidavit found
probable cause to issue a search warrant, which Detective Staggs and the local
sheriff executed within the hour. Basinger was not at home when the officers
arrived. The officers searched his home and seized several firearms, “used foil
boats” with “burn residue,” a white powder that field-tested positive for
methamphetamine, and a digital scale with white residue that field-tested
positive for methamphetamine, among other things. Appellant’s App. at 66.
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The State charged Basinger with level 5 felony possession of
methamphetamine. 1
[4] Basinger filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid
because the affidavit lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause. After a
hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The State dismissed the charge
against Basinger and filed this appeal. Additional facts will be provided below.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient
indicia of probable cause, and therefore the warrant was
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
[5] The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Basinger’s motion to
suppress. “We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress as a
matter of sufficiency.” State v. McCaa, 963 N.E.2d 24, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
trans. denied. We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.
Id. The State appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the trial
court’s ruling was contrary to law. Id. We “will reverse a negative judgment
only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to
a conclusion opposite that of the trial court.” Id.
1
See Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-6.1(b)(2), 35-48-1-16.5(2) (possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine
is level 5 felony if person commits offense while in possession of firearm).
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[6] To generally deter law enforcement officers from violating citizens’ Fourth
Amendment rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has created the exclusionary rule,
which prohibits the admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010). The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The warrant requirement is a principal protection against unnecessary
intrusions into private dwellings. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001).
[7] The State challenges the trial court’s determination that the search warrant
affidavit here lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause. “Probable cause is a
fluid concept incapable of precise definition and must be decided based on the
facts of each case.” Bradley v. State, 4 N.E.3d 831, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied. “The level of proof necessary to establish probable cause is less
than that necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jellison v.
State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In fact, probable cause
requires only a fair probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing.
Id.
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[8] Our supreme court has stated,
In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, “[t]he task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit … there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 181 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “The duty of the reviewing court is to determine
whether the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable
cause existed.” Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). “‘[S]ubstantial basis
requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to the magistrate’s
determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the
totality of the evidence support the determination’ of probable cause.” Id. at
181-82 (quoting Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind. 1997)). “‘Reviewing
court’ for these purposes includes both the trial court ruling on a motion to
suppress and an appellate court reviewing that decision.” Id. at 182. We
review the trial court’s substantial basis determination de novo. State v. Spillers,
847 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ind. 2006). We consider only the evidence presented to
the issuing magistrate – here, Detective Staggs’s affidavit – and not additional
justifications or facts presented after the search. Cartwright v. State, 26 N.E.3d
663, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also Taylor v. State, 615 N.E.2d
907, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]here must be sufficient factual information
on the face of the affidavit from which a neutral and detached magistrate or
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judge could have reasonably concluded that probable cause existed for the
issuance of a search warrant.”).
[9] Probable cause “may be established by evidence that would not be admissible at
trial.” Lamagna v. State, 776 N.E.2d 955, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Such
evidence may include hearsay, which is an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is
inadmissible unless the Evidence Rules or other law provides otherwise. Ind.
Evidence Rule 802. Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2(a) provides that a search
warrant affidavit must particularly describe “the house or place to be searched
and the things to be searched for,” allege “substantially the offense in relation
thereto and that the affiant believes and has good cause to believe that … the
things sought are concealed there[,]” and set “forth the facts known to the
affiant through personal knowledge or based on hearsay, constituting the
probable cause.” The statute further provides,
When based on hearsay, the affidavit must either:
(1) contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the
source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and
establishing that there is a factual basis for the information
furnished; or
(2) contain information that establishes that the totality of the
circumstances corroborates the hearsay.
Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(b).
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[10] In Spillers, the court explained that
[t]he trustworthiness of hearsay for the purpose of proving
probable cause can be established in a number of ways, including
where: (1) the informant has given correct information in the
past, (2) independent police investigation corroborates the
informant’s statements, (3) some basis for the informant’s
knowledge is demonstrated, or (4) the informant predicts conduct
or activity by the suspect that is not ordinarily easily predicted.
These examples however are not exclusive. “Depending on the
facts, other considerations may come into play in establishing the
reliability of the informant or the hearsay.”
847 N.E.2d at 954 (citing and quoting Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 182).
[11] Detective Staggs’s affidavit reads in relevant part as follows:
Det. Shane Staggs, Indiana State Police, swears/affirms under
the pains and penalties of perjury that he believes and has
Probable Cause to believe that certain property and/or evidence
of a crime hereinafter described is concealed upon the following
described property, premises, vehicles, outbuilding(s) and
residence, to-wit:
The address of the residence is … [in] Paoli, Orange County,
Indiana. It is the residence of Chris Basinger.
That the affiant believes that there is Probable Cause to search
the above described premises, for evidence of the commission of
the crime of Possession of Methamphetamine, to-wit:
Methamphetamine, materials and substances used to facilitate
the use of methamphetamine[.]
In support of your affiant’s assertion of Probable Cause, the
following facts are within your affiant’s personal knowledge, to-
wit:
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On March 25, 2015, this affiant was contacted by Heather
Basinger, who is the ex-wife of Chris Basinger. Heather Basinger
stated that on Monday, March 23, 2015 she had been to the …
residence of Chris Basinger to pick up personal belongings.
While Heather Basinger was inside the house she located a long
piece of burnt aluminum foil. As she was looking for books that
belong to her she opened up a drawer located in a coffee table in
the living room area. When Heather opened the drawer she saw
several pieces of aluminum foil and a clear glass-like substance.
Heather Basinger stated that while the coffee table drawer was
open Chris Basinger entered the room and stated "what the f[**]k
are you doing?" Heather stated she then shut the drawer and
walked into the bedroom to look for more of her personal items.
Chris Basinger followed Heather into the bedroom and while
Heather was looking for items in the closet area, Chris Basinger
told her to leave the house. Heather stated it was obvious that
Chris Basinger did not want her looking in his closet.
While in the bedroom Chris Basinger also stated to Heather that
what she had just seen in the coffee table drawer could send him
to prison for thirteen years. Heather then took her children and
left the residence.
On March 25, 2015, this affiant interviewed Heather Basinger
regarding the above information. During that interview Heather
showed me a text message that was sent from Chris Basinger on
March 17, 2015 that stated “that’s the Chris and [H]eather I want
us to be minus the drugs and alcohol.” During the interview this
affiant informed Heather that her name would be used as a
witness in the investigation and she stated that was okay, she was
just concerned about her children. This affiant has also received
other information from officers reporting that Chris Basinger’s
name has come up in other investigations concerning
methamphetamine.
This affiant has been a police officer for 8 years and has had
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specific training in the detection of methamphetamine. In this
affiant’s training and experience aluminum foil is consistent with
the use of methamphetamine.
Therefore, your affiant respectfully requests the Court to issue a
SEARCH WARRANT directing the search of the property,
premises, vehicles, outbuilding(s) and residence and the seizure
of the above-described items if they are found.
I hereby swear or affirm under the pains and penalties of perjury
that the foregoing is true.
Appellant’s App. at 62-63.
[12] The primary basis for the affidavit is Heather’s statements, which are hearsay
(or, as to Basinger’s statements, hearsay within hearsay). The affidavit does not
contain reliable information that establishes Heather’s credibility, nor does it
contain information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances
corroborates the hearsay. The State asserts that Heather’s firsthand account
“entitles the tip to ‘greater weight than might otherwise be the case.’”
Appellant’s Br. at 12 (quoting Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting Gates, 462
U.S. at 234)). But Basinger correctly observes that “such alleged first-hand
statements are ‘easily’ fabricated by informants to bolster their own credibility.”
Appellee’s Br. at 20 (quoting Newby v. State, 701 N.E.2d 593, 601 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998) (citing Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 184)). The State also asserts that “Heather’s
account of what she had seen was corroborated by a text message she showed
to Detective Staggs, which referenced Basinger’s drug use.” Appellant’s Br. at
12. The message does not specify who used the drugs, let alone where or when
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they were used. Finally, the State contends that Heather’s statements were
“corroborated by Staggs’ knowledge that Basinger had been named in other
methamphetamine investigations.” Id. at 12. Detective Staggs’s secondhand
information regarding other investigations is itself uncorroborated and
hopelessly vague. “Uncorroborated hearsay from a source whose credibility is
itself unknown, standing alone, cannot support a finding of probable cause to
issue a search warrant.” Buford v. State, 40 N.E.3d 911, 913 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015). Accordingly, we conclude that the affidavit lacked sufficient indicia of
probable cause and therefore the warrant was invalid under the Fourth
Amendment. 2
Section 2 – The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
is inapplicable.
[13] This determination is not dispositive, however, because exclusion of evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant is not required when the officer obtaining
the warrant has acted in objective good faith and within the scope of the
warrant. Gerth v. State, 51 N.E.3d 368, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)). In Leon, the court “cautioned that
2
Given our resolution of this issue, we need not squarely address the fact that, contrary to the affidavit,
Heather was married to Basinger when she contacted Detective Staggs on March 25. At the suppression
hearing, Basinger presented evidence that Heather had filed a petition for dissolution on March 11 and
requested custody of their two minor children. Defendant’s Ex. D (petition). Basinger also presented
evidence that, contrary to the affidavit, Heather did not see a long piece of burnt aluminum foil in his home.
Defendant’s Ex. C at 10-11 (deposition). Assuming for argument’s sake that Heather was the bad actor in
this scenario, her deceptions underscore the necessity of establishing a source’s credibility and corroborating
hearsay statements in search warrant affidavits.
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certain police conduct would not qualify for this” good-faith exception,
including where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in the validity of the warrant entirely
unreasonable. Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 184. Officers are reasonably charged with
knowing the basic requirements of Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2. Id. at 186.
Thus, Detective Staggs should have known that establishing Heather’s
credibility or corroborating her hearsay statements was necessary. Brown v.
State, 905 N.E.2d 439, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The detective also should
have known that the other statements in the affidavit did not provide probable
cause to search Basinger’s residence. Therefore, we conclude that the
detective’s reliance on the validity of the warrant was not objectively reasonable
and thus the good-faith exception is inapplicable. The trial court’s ruling is
affirmed.
[14] Affirmed.
May, J., concurs.
Kirsch, J., dissents without opinion.
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