local-1963-of-the-united-automobile-aerospace-and-agricultural-implement ( 2013 )

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
BARRY A. MACEY WAYNE E. UHL
ROBERT A. HICKS Stephenson Morow & Semler
Macey Swanson & Allman Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
JAMES W. WILSON
Bingham Farrer & Wilson
Elwood, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LOCAL 1963 OF THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE, )
AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL ) Dec 18 2013, 8:41 am
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 27A05-1301-CC-40
)
MADISON COUNTY, INDIANA, MADISON )
COUNTY ASSESSOR, and MADISON )
COUNTY RECORDER, )
)
Appellees-Defendants. )
APPEAL FROM THE GRANT SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Warren Haas, Judge
Cause No. 27D03-1111-CC-408
December 18, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, Local 1963 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW (UAW), appeals the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of Appellees-Defendants, Madison County, Indiana (County),
the Madison County Assessor (Assessor), and the Madison County Recorder (Recorder)
(collectively, County Group).
We affirm.
ISSUES
UAW raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following
single issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the Board
of County Commissioners (Commissioners)1 and County Council (Council)2 had no
authority to encroach upon the rights of the Assessor and Recorder to appoint and discharge
deputies.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 1, 2009, the County, through the Commissioners and Council, entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with UAW. The CBA was to remain in
effect until December 31, 2011, at which point it would automatically renew for another
year and will continue to renew each year until either party elects to terminate by providing
1
The three-member board of commissioners, as the county executive, “is the corporate entity
representing the county through which it acts[;]” as such, “in legal contemplation [it is] the county.”
Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Accordingly, all references to the County
necessarily include the Commissioners and vice versa. See Ind. Code § 36-2-2-2.
2
The seven-member county council serves as the county’s fiscal body. I.C. § 36-2-3-2.
2
sixty days’ notice. The CBA provides that UAW is “the exclusive bargaining agent with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment
for all employees who are covered by this Agreement.” (Appellant’s App. p. 23). Among
other provisions, the CBA mandates that covered employees pay dues to UAW as a
condition of their continued employment; sets forth a detailed grievance procedure that
includes binding arbitration; imposes a progressive disciplinary action regimen favoring
corrective rather than punitive measures; and creates a hierarchy of employees whereby
hiring, layoffs, and promotions are based on seniority.
In November of 2010, the voters of Madison County elected a new Assessor, Larry
Davis, and a new Recorder, Angela Shelton (collectively, Officials).3 Shortly after the
election, in mid-November, the County’s human resources director provided the Assessor-
Elect and Recorder-Elect with copies of the County Personnel Handbook, the CBA, and
various other documents. The human resources director informed the Officials that the
employees in their offices were subject to the CBA. On January 1, 2011, the newly-elected
Officials assumed office. The Assessor learned that his office had one first deputy and
fourteen other deputies and employees, and the Recorder learned that her office had one
first deputy and six additional deputies. As the Officials transitioned into their positions,
both became aware of severe deficiencies in their offices, including substantial backlogs,
3
On November 12, 2012, between the summary judgment hearing and the trial court’s Order, Shelton
resigned from her position as Recorder for reasons unrelated to this litigation. Pursuant to Indiana Trial
Rule 25(F)(1), her successor, Linda Smith, was automatically substituted as the defendant.
3
non-compliance with State-mandated reports and other deadlines, outdated and
unorganized systems, and failed audits by the State Board of Accounts.
Prior to beginning his term, on December 27, 2010, the Assessor-Elect notified five
deputies and employees “that they would be relieved of their duties upon [his] taking
office.” (Appellant’s Supp. App. p. 67). On December 30, 2011, UAW delivered a
grievance to the Assessor on behalf of two of the discharged individuals, long-time deputy
assessors Lelia Kelley (Kelley) and Linda Stephens (Stephens), charging that the Assessor
had violated the CBA’s provisions for progressive disciplinary action and non-
discrimination, and had “wrongfully and illegally discharged” Kelley and Stephens
(Appellant’s Supp. App. pp. 26-27). UAW demanded the issue be immediately resolved
through binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of the CBA. The Assessor requested a
certification from UAW of the positions covered by the CBA, which UAW did not provide.
On January 18, 2011, the Commissioners requested that the Assessor reinstate Kelley and
Stephens. The Assessor refused, explaining that, under Indiana law, he may appoint his
own deputies and employees.4
Less than two months into the new term, on February 17, 2011, UAW filed two
more grievances with the Assessor, asserting that any employees who had not paid their
union dues must be terminated and requiring the Assessor to recognize UAW as the
exclusive bargaining agent because the “Assessor’s office is an entity of Madison County
4
At some point, the Assessor hired both his son and daughter. On June 20, 2012, the Commissioners
adopted an anti-nepotism policy applicable “to any department, office or elected official of the County.”
(Appellant’s App. p. 80). The Assessor’s children were subsequently terminated.
4
and hereby deemed as the employer in accordance with the CBA.” (Appellant’s Supp. App.
pp. 31-32). In three more grievances filed the same day, UAW claimed that the Assessor
had breached the CBA by disciplining Theresa Newman (Newman) without the presence
of UAW representation, and had discriminated against her on the basis of her political
affiliation. The Assessor explained that he had addressed Newman’s failure to timely
submit a report but did not discipline her and, believing his office was not subject to the
CBA, took no action to comply with the CBA’s grievance process.
When the Recorder assumed her office on January 1, 2011, with the exception of a
part-time deputy whose salary was not included in the budget, she retained and swore in
all of the incumbent deputies. On March 18, 2011, having observed her staff’s
performance, the Recorder terminated a deputy recorder, Jodi Fesler (Fesler), for
continuing to do “substandard work” despite being given several opportunities to improve.
(Appellee’s Br. p. 10). Thereafter, on March 21, 2011, UAW filed a grievance with the
Recorder, claiming that she had violated the progressive disciplinary system and non-
discrimination provisions outlined in the CBA and requesting Fesler’s reinstatement. On
March 30, 2011, the Recorder notified UAW, as well as the Commissioners and Council,
that she believed the CBA did not bind her office, and she declined to reinstate Fesler.5 On
November 21, 2011, the Officials each submitted a letter to the Commissioners and the
Council that stated it was their understanding that they were not governed by the CBA and
5
In its brief, UAW mentions a grievance filed against the Recorder on behalf of another terminated
deputy, Kelly Kean, but provides no further details or arguments regarding this matter.
5
would not authorize the Commissioners and Council to negotiate a new CBA to govern
their deputies and employees.
On June 27, 2011, UAW filed its Complaint, alleging the County had breached the
CBA. UAW sought an injunction for the reinstatement of the two deputy assessors, Kelley
and Stephens, and further sought recognition from the County that UAW is the exclusive
bargaining representative for the Officials’ deputies. On July 18, 2011, UAW amended its
Complaint to include the Officials as defendants.
On April 16, 2012, the Officials moved for summary judgment, contending the
Commissioners and Council lacked the “authority to unilaterally bind non-consenting,
independently elected officials” to the CBA, which “restricted the elected officials in their
appointment, removal and supervision of deputies and employees.” (Appellant’s Supp.
App. pp. 59-60). On October 25, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the Officials’
summary judgment motion, at which the County adopted the Officials’ motion. On January
1, 2013, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered
summary judgment in favor of the County Group.
UAW now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
UAW challenges the trial court’s summary judgment because “it is based on an
erroneous interpretation and application of the statutory provisions governing the
respective authority and duties of the Commissioners and the elected officials.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 3). Specifically, UAW claims reversal is warranted based on three
errors: (1) the trial court’s misinterpretation of statutes that expressly state that the
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Commissioners employ the deputies in the offices of the Officials; (2) the trial court’s
conclusion that the Officials have statutory authority to independently control the
employment decisions in their offices; and (3) the trial court’s determination that the
Commissioners and Council lack authority to bind the Officials to the CBA.
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s entry of summary judgment, our court applies the same
standard relied upon by the trial court: pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), a motion for
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wright v. City of Gary, 963 N.E.2d
637, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Considering only the evidence designated by
the parties, we construe all facts and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom in favor
of the non-moving party. Bellows v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Elkhart, 926 N.E.2d 96,
113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In this case, the parties have agreed that there are no disputes
regarding the material facts; thus, the issues are pure questions of law, so our review is de
novo. Id. at 114. As such, UAW bears the burden of persuading this court that the trial
court erroneously granted summary judgment. Shaffer v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1072, 1075
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
II. Employed by County or Elected Official
UAW first asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the deputies working
in the Officials’ offices are employees of the Officials. Specifically, the trial court
determined “that the Commissioners [do] not have general employment authority over all
of the elected officers’ deputies and employees.” (Appellant’s App. p. 18). UAW argues
7
that, taken together, Indiana Code section 36-2-2-13 (Section 13) and Indiana Code section
5-4-1-1 (Section 1) “conclusively establish that the General Assembly considers the
deputies and employees who work [for the Officials] to be employed by the Commissioners
on behalf of [the] County.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 23).
A. Indiana Code § 36-2-2-13
UAW has presented an apparent issue of first impression regarding the
interpretation of Section 13, which states, in part:
(a) The executive may employ a person:
(1) to perform a duty required of a county officer by statute; or
(2) on a commission or percentage basis;
only if the employment is expressly authorized by statute or is found by
the executive to be necessary to the public interest.
I.C. § 36-2-2-13. When a statute is unambiguous on its face, this court applies its clear and
plain meaning. Ind. Mun. Power Agency v. Town of Edinburgh, 769 N.E.2d 222, 226-27
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Where a statute is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations,
we endeavor to effectuate the legislative intent and give credence to the statute as a whole.
Id. We presume the General Assembly knows “of existing statutes in the same area” and
will construe statutes relating to the same general subject matter “so as to produce a
harmonious result.” Schafer v. Sellersburg Town Council, 714 N.E.2d 212, 217 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999), trans. denied. We further presume that the General Assembly intends statutory
“language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the underlying policy and goals
of the statute.” Shepherd, 733 N.E.2d at 990.
UAW focuses on the phrase “only if the employment is expressly authorized by
statute” and posits that, because statutes expressly authorize the Officials to appoint
8
deputies and employees, the actual “authority to employ these deputies and employees is
conferred on the Commissioners by [Section 13].” (Appellant’s Br. p. 21).6 We disagree
with UAW’s reading of the statute and decline to find that such an interpretation is
reasonable. See Ind. Pub. Emp. Ret. Fund v. Bryson, 977 N.E.2d 374, 377-78 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, trans. denied. Finding no ambiguity, without enlarging or
restricting its plain and obvious meaning, Section 13 clearly states that, in the absence of
public necessity, a statute must explicitly authorize the Commissioners to employ a person.
If, as UAW claims, Section 13 afforded the Commissioners carte blanche power to
fill any statutorily created position, other statutes in the same article and chapter—which
identify specific jobs that the Commissioners may employ—would be superfluous. See,
e.g., I.C. § 36-2-2-14 (county administrator); I.C. § 36-2-2-30 (attorney); I.C. § 36-2-16-
10 (county animal disease control emergency coordinator). Also, a myriad of statutes that
grant appointment power to other officers would be meaningless if, under Section 13, the
Commissioners could usurp their hiring and firing authority. See I.C. Ch. 36-2-16 (listing
elected officials who may appoint deputies and other employees). Moreover, UAW’s
interpretation of Section 13 fails to contemplate the overall structure of the County
government. The role of the Commissioners is to act as “a general overseer or manager.”
Roberts v. State ex rel. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 278 N.E.2d 285, 292 (Ind. Ct. App.
1972). In this capacity, the Commissioners may exercise only the power “expressly
conferred . . . by the Constitution and the statutes of the state, or such powers as arise by
6
It is important to note that the deputies of a county official are empowered to perform all of the duties
of his or her appointing official, and the deputy’s acts are attributed to the officer. I.C. § 36-2-16-3.
9
necessary implication from those expressly granted, or such as are requisite to the
performance of the duties which are imposed on it by law.” Bd. of Comm’rs of
Vanderburgh Cnty. v. Sanders, 30 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. 1940). Accordingly, the
Commissioners may employ personnel to manage the County’s operation, but if a position
statutorily reserved for a County officer’s performance is not explicitly designated as
employable by the Commissioners, Section 13 curtails the Commissioners’ employment
authority unless justified by public necessity.
B. Indiana Code § 5-4-1-1
UAW further claims that the language of Section 1 establishes that deputies are
employees of the County. Section 1 requires all officers and deputies to take an oath
affirming they will “faithfully discharge the duties” of the office. I.C. § 5-4-1-1(a). Section
1 also states:
(c) This subsection applies to a deputy of a political subdivision. An
individual appointed as a deputy is considered an employee of the political
subdivision performing ministerial functions on behalf of an officer and is
not required to take the oath prescribed by subsection (a). However, if a chief
deputy assumes the duties of an office during a vacancy under IC 3-13-11-
12, the chief deputy must take the oath required under subsection (a) before
entering on the official duties of the office.
I.C. § 5-4-1-1(c) (Appellant’s emphasis). The trial court concluded that Section 1
does not vitiate the more specific statutes giving employment authority to the
independent elected officers. Instead, it was passed as part of legislation
declaring that deputies of officers of a political subdivision do not hold a
“lucrative office” under Article 2, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. . . .
[I]t is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the General Assembly
intended that the deputies and employees of elected officers are “employees”
of the Commissioners for all purposes.
(Appellant’s App. p. 19 (internal citation omitted)). We agree with the trial court.
10
It is well-established that “[a] statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding
excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual
words.” State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. 2008). Here, UAW relies on
“just one sentence of a more complex statute” that has been isolated in context. Warrick
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Warrick Cnty. Council, 706 N.E.2d 579, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans.
denied. Based on the context of the surrounding provisions, Section 1 simply serves to set
forth the oath and bond requirements for various categories of public employees. We find
nothing to indicate that Section 1 was intended to identify the County as the ultimate
employer of the deputies of all elected officers.
In its reply brief, UAW claims Section 1 is unambiguous, and “the alleged ‘focus’
of [Section 1] cannot contravene its plain language.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 12). We
find no merit to UAW’s plain language rationale because Section 1(a) clearly states that
the oath is required of “every officer and every deputy,” and Section 1(c) very plainly
pertains to those who are employed by the County as opposed to appointed by an officer.
It is a longstanding presumption that the General Assembly does not intend statutory
language “to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” City of
Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. 2007). Adopting UAW’s interpretation would
render Section 1(a) and 1(c) redundant, and, as we have established, the County is
authorized to hire employees to carry out the management of county government and may
also make appointments under limited circumstances. Accordingly, the logical
interpretation of Section 1 is that an “employee of the political subdivision” refers to one
hired by the County to perform “ministerial jobs that would be performed without
11
contravention of the statutes” and are necessary for the “maintenance of certain county
functions.” Roberts, 278 N.E.2d at 291-92.
We find further absurdity in UAW’s contention that an excerpt from Section 1
carries greater significance than the words of numerous other statutes which state the
deputies and employees actually belong to the officer. See, e.g., I.C. § 36-2-2-5(a)(2)
(“[E]ach county officer . . . shall prepare an itemized estimate of the amount of money
required for the officer’s . . . office” including “the expense of employing deputies.”); I.C.
§ 36-2-8-4 (“A county officer or a deputy or employee of a county officer is entitled to
payment for services only after he has rendered those services.” (emphasis added)). We
thus conclude that Section 13 and Section 1 do not render the County the employer of the
Officials’ deputies and employees.
III. Independent Employment Decisions
Second, UAW asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the CBA
“improperly impinges” on the Officials’ independence. (Appellant’s Br. p. 29).
A. County’s Employment Authority
UAW first posits that Section 13 and Indiana Code section 36-1-4-14 (Section 14)—
which states the County “may hire and discharge employees and establish a system of
employment for any class of employees based on merit and qualification”—together
“confer the power to employ, hire and discharge deputies and employees of the Assessor
and the Recorder to the Commissioners.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 30-31). UAW disagrees
with the trial court that the County functions as “little more than the landlord and payroll
service.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 29). In response, the County Group claims that the Officials
12
have “the right to appoint their employees. And by implication they then have the right to
remove their employees.” (Transcript p. 16).
By statute, the Assessor may “appoint the number of full-time or part-time deputies
and employees authorized by the county fiscal body.” I.C. § 36-2-16-8 (Section 8).
Similarly, the Recorder “is entitled to appoint one (1) first or chief deputy, and also may
appoint the number of other full-time or part-time deputies and employees authorized by
the county fiscal body.” I.C. § 36-2-16-4 (Section 4). UAW understands these statutes to
confer to the Officials only the power to “name officially” and maintains that Section 4 and
Section 8 “do not negate the express authority conferred to the Commissioners through
[Sections 1, 13, and 14].” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 30-31). If the legislature had intended to
grant to the Officials “unfettered independence and authority[,]” UAW insists that Section
4 and Section 8 would explicitly include a right to terminate. (Appellant’s Br. p. 31). In
contrast, the County Group claims that “the power to appoint would be meaningless
without the concomitant power to discipline or remove the employee.” (Appellee’s Br. p.
18).
Although cited by neither party, we find a prior decision of our court particularly
instructive. In Roberts v. State ex rel. Jackson County Board of Commissioners, 278
N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972), following the death of the county’s elected
surveyor, the board of commissioners requested that the deputy surveyor maintain
operations in the office pending the surveyor’s official replacement. Reasoning that the
deputy’s position had automatically terminated upon the surveyor’s death, the county
auditor refused to compensate the deputy. This court found that “[i]t is elementary that
13
there can be no deputy without there first being a principal; the principal being the duly
elected, qualified and acting official of the county.” Id. at 290.
The general and well-affirmed rule is that, in the absence of some statutory
provision to the contrary, the commission or appointment of a deputy officer
runs or continues only during the term of the officer making the appointment.
Of course, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the principal has the
right, at his pleasure, to remove his deputy.
Id. (quoting Hord v. State, 79 N.E. 916, 922 (Ind. 1907)). “If the principal officer is re-
elected or reappointed for another term, his deputies must also be reappointed in order to
continue them in office.” Hord, 79 N.E. at 922 (holding Attorney General could not
contract on behalf of the State to employ an assistant attorney beyond the Attorney
General’s own term). Our court concluded in Roberts that, because the board of
commissioners had requested that the deputy keep the surveyor’s office open out of
necessity to the public interest—and the deputy spent two months doing only “ministerial
things” without “pretend[ing] to be the County Surveyor”—the deputy was entitled to
compensation as an employee of the county. Roberts, 278 N.E.2d at 291-93.
In the present case, UAW ardently insists that the Commissioners, rather than the
Officials, have the authority to appoint and discharge the deputies. We disagree. In
Roberts, the deputy was found to be employed by the county only after the surveyor’s death
and only for the period of time that he acted at the board of commissioners’ behest to keep
the office open in the public interest. The statute in-force in Roberts provided:
[O]fficers may appoint deputies and other assistants as may be necessary for
the proper discharge of the duties, and the number of such deputies and
assistants shall be subject to the board of commissioners, both as to full and
part time employment, and the board of commissioners shall make
14
recommendations to the county council as to the amount of salary that each
shall receive.
Id. This statute parallels Section 4 and Section 8, which enable the Officials to appoint as
many “full-time or part-time deputies and employees” as the Council authorizes. I.C. §§
36-2-16-4; 36-2-16-8. “To provide for independently elected officers but to deprive them
of the ability to choose and supervise their own employees would render elections
meaningless and convert the officers to mere department heads or functionaries” of the
Commissioners. (Appellee’s Br. p. 15). The Roberts court confirmed that the right to
appoint and discharge generally belongs to the elected officer, but found the board of
commissioners had appropriately acted to prevent burdening the public.
Observing both Roberts and the rule set forth by our supreme court in Hord, we
conclude the Officials are independently empowered to appoint and discharge their own
deputies at their discretion. Furthermore, we find that the Commissioners have the power
to hire an officer’s deputy in two instances: (1) a statutory provision “expressly
authorize[s]” the Commissioners to make such an appointment; or (2) as in Roberts, the
Commissioners determine that such employment is “necessary to [serve] the public
interest.” I.C. § 36-2-2-13(a).
B. Anti-Nepotism Statute
UAW next cites Indiana Code Chapter 36-1-20.2 (Anti-Nepotism Statute) as
indicative of the lack of independence of the Officials with respect to their deputies. The
Anti-Nepotism Statute prohibits counties from employing two related individuals where
one would be directly supervised by the other and authorizes counties to implement a
15
“more stringent” policy. I.C. §§ 36-1-20.2-9 to -10. UAW claims that the Officials
conceded to the County’s employment authority because, following the Commissioners’
enactment of a more extensive anti-nepotism policy than the one promulgated by the
General Assembly, the Assessor complied and terminated his children’s employment.
The trial court concluded that the Anti-Nepotism statute “provides a very narrow
exception that proves the general rule that in the absence of such express statutory
authority, the county bodies lack the power to dictate to elected officials who they can hire
and fire.” (Appellant’s App. p. 18). We agree. And while UAW fixates on the phrase that
related individuals may not be employed by the County, we find the focus of the statute is
to prevent conflict of interest-related predicaments—not to partition the County from its
Officials regarding the role of “employer.” Furthermore, Section 16 of the Anti-Nepotism
Statute and the County’s policy both state that, annually, “[e]ach elected officer” must
submit a written certification to the Commissioners, swearing “that the officer has not
violated” the anti-nepotism mandate. (Appellant’s App. p. 84 (emphasis added)). If, as
UAW contends, the County is strictly the employer, this provision would be illogical
because the County—not the officer—would be accountable to report hiring violations.
Therefore, we conclude the Anti-Nepotism policy does not negate the fact that the power
to appoint and discharge belongs to the Officials.
IV. Authority to Bind Elected Officials to CBA
Lastly, UAW asserts that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the
Commissioners and Council had the requisite authority to enter into the CBA to regulate
the personnel policies affecting the Officials’ deputies. The trial court concluded “that the
16
CBA imposes impermissible restrictions on the ability of the . . . elected officers to select,
discipline, remove, and direct the work of their deputies and employees.” (Appellant’s
App. p. 17). UAW, however, argues that the CBA does not interfere with the ability of the
Officials to manage their offices and should be enforced because the Commissioners and
Council have inherent authority, “well-established under Indiana law[,]” to set the
employment standards for all County deputies and employees. (Appellant’s Br. p. 38). It
is undisputed that the Commissioners may execute contracts on behalf of the County, and
the Council may appropriate funds to control the number of deputies each officer may
appoint. I.C. §§ 36-1-4-7; 36-2-5-3(b).
We have already concluded that the Officials have complete discretion to hire and
discharge their deputies and employees, subject to certain limitations imposed by State law.
UAW submits that the CBA “simply establishes standards that create parameters within
which the [Officials] must operate when making their employment-related decisions” and
controls the County’s liability because elected officers “cannot be expected to have a
sophisticated knowledge of the multitude of applicable employment laws.” (Appellant’s
Br. pp. 37-38). UAW relies on our court’s holding in Nass v. State ex rel. Unity Team,
Local 9212, 718 N.E.2d 757, 763-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, that it was “a
reasonable exercise of the Governor’s responsibility for the efficient operations of the
executive branch of government” to issue an executive order allowing executive branch
employees to join labor unions. UAW, however, fails to consider the important “technical
point” we noted in Nass. Id. at 763. There, the Governor did not negotiate and sign an
agreement that bound all executive branch employees to specific terms and conditions; his
17
executive order simply “provided a framework by which collective bargaining could take
place.” Id. In actuality, the executive branch department heads negotiated the agreements
for the employees in their departments. Id. In distinction, the Officials in the present case
did not negotiate individual CBAs with UAW for their own deputies and employees.
We agree with the trial court that, unlike the policies in the County Personnel
Handbook, which are “part and parcel of” general County management, the CBA obstructs
the independence of the Officials to staff their offices as they deem best. (Appellant’s App.
p. 18). The CBA imposes a strict seniority system for hiring preferences, specifies the
manner and duration of advertising vacant positions, and “encourages internal promotion
and transfer of current employees.” (Appellant’s Supp. App. p. 85). The CBA also compels
protracted disciplinary and grievance procedures that preclude an officer’s ability to
remove and replace a problematic employee in a timely and efficient manner. We conclude
that the Commissioners and Council, by entering into the CBA, exceeded their authority
and encumbered the Officials’ right to appoint and discharge their deputies and employees.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly issued summary
judgment for the County Group because, as a matter of law, the Commissioners and
Council had no authority to execute a CBA interfering with the independence of the
Officials in appointing and discharging their deputies and employees.
Affirmed.
ROBB, C. J. and KIRSCH, J. concur
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