shawn-telligman-v-review-board-of-the-indiana-department-of-workforce ( 2013 )

Oct 29 2013, 5:41 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
JILL DOGGETT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Hart Bell, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Vincennes, Indiana
ELIZABETH ROGERS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SHAWN TELLIGMAN, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1304-EX-303
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT AND INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT )
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUDICATION, )
)
Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
The Honorable Steven F. Bier, Chairperson
Cause Nos. 13-R-484, 13-R-485, 13-R-486
October 29, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Shawn Telligman appeals a decision by the Review Board of the Indiana
Department of Workforce Development (the “Board”) in favor of Indiana Department of
Workforce Development Unemployment Insurance Claims Adjudication (“IDWD”) on
IDWD’s claim that Telligman failed to disclose or falsified information to IDWD in
order to receive unemployment benefits, that he received certain benefits to which he was
not entitled, and that he is liable to repay IDWD the benefit overpayment amounts
together with applicable penalties and interest. Telligman raises two issues which we
restate as whether the Board erred in finding that he knowingly failed to disclose or
falsified any fact that would disqualify him from receiving benefits, reduce his benefits,
or render him ineligible for benefits or extended benefits, and whether the Board abused
its discretion in denying his request to submit additional evidence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Telligman filed claims for unemployment benefits starting in October 2009 and
received those benefits for certain weeks between December 2009 and December 2010.
Following an investigation, an investigator with the IDWD issued three determinations of
eligibility notifications on November 15, 2012, finding that Telligman knowingly failed
to disclose or falsified material facts and that Telligman had filed vouchers for and
received unemployment benefits for weeks during which he had been employed and had
employment earnings. Telligman appealed the determinations. On January 16, 2013, a
hearing was held before an administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) at which the parties
presented documentary evidence, testimony, and arguments.
The ALJ issued a decision dated January 17, 2013, which provided in part:
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FINDINGS OF FACT: The claimant filed an initial claim for
unemployment benefits approximately October 6, 2009 which had a benefit
year ending date of October 1, 2010. The claimant subsequently filed an
extended unemployment claim with the same benefit year ending date on
May 11, 2010. A second regular claim was filed on October 3, 2010, with
a benefit year ending date of October 1, 2011. The claimant’s weekly
benefit amount of unemployment benefits was $390.00 for the first regular
claim and federal extended claim and $372.00 for the second regular claim.
Vouchers requesting unemployment benefits were submitted electronically
for the period from weeks ending December 10, 2009 through February 27,
2010. After a brief break, vouchers were then submitted again for the
period from week ending May 15, 2010 through week ending October 2,
2010. Following the filing of the second claim, vouchers were then
submitted from week ending October 9, 2010 through week ending
December 18, 2010. The Administrative Law Judge finds that a debit card
was issued to the claimant at his then correct address of record which had
been submitted to the Department when he filed his claim. Unemployment
benefits were deposited to the debit card for each of the weeks for which
vouchers had been submitted. The debit card was used for purchases from
various merchants and cash withdrawals were made from the debit card
during such time period.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant opened his initial
claim in the Vincennes Local WorkOne Office. The claimant was
accompanied by his spouse at that time. The claimant created a user ID and
unique password to enable vouchers to be submitted electronically
thereafter. The claimant shared such information with his spouse who
subsequently submitted vouchers on the claimant’s behalf with the
claimant’s knowledge and consent. The claimant permitted his spouse to
have possession and use of the debit card although the claimant regained
possession of the card periodically. The Administrative Law Judge finds
that the claimant personally had possession of the debit card in August of
2010. The claimant alleged that the debit card was removed from his wallet
in August 2010 without his knowledge. The Administrative Law Judge
finds that debit card usage records for August of 2010 reflected similar
usage for purchases and withdrawals at the same merchants and ATM
locations as prior debit card usage.
The Administrative Law Judge further finds that the claimant’s spouse was
incarcerated from approximately October 7 through October 26, 2010. The
debit card was used for a cash withdrawal during such period of time on
October 19, 2010 while the claimant’s spouse was incarcerated and unable
to make a withdrawal.
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The claimant returned to work on November 2, 2009 with Hetsco, Inc. The
claimant had wages from such employer in excess of his weekly benefit
amount during both of his regular claim periods and his federal extension
claim period. No wages were ever reported on any of the vouchers
submitted by or on behalf of the claimant and no information was provided
on the vouchers indicating that the claimant had worked.
In order to apply for benefits the claimant had to read a computer screen
which contained a statement “I understand that I must report all earnings
from employment or self-employment regardless of source”. The claimant
had to click a button indicating “Yes, I agree, file my claim”. In order to
click such button, the claimant had to also read a screen advising him of the
claimant handbook which stated “By clicking the button ‘Yes I agree, file
my claim’, you are agreeing to the responsibilities in the claimant handbook
and indicating that you understand the penalties for falsification above.”
Each voucher submitted for which the claimant received unemployment
benefits contained a question inquiring “Did you work?” and “If you
worked, how much did you earn for the week?”. Each of the vouchers
submitted for which the claimant received unemployment benefits all are
marked with a negative response to such questions. In order to submit each
voucher, the claimant had to read a voucher certification screen which
stated “I certify that I have entered any and all work, earnings and self-
employment activity for this week --- I certify that all answers given in the
application for benefits are true and accurate. I am aware that if I
knowingly fail to disclose information or give false statements to receive
unemployment benefits I may lose my unemployment benefits, be required
to repay benefits received improperly with interest and penalty, and may be
subject to civil and criminal prosecution”. The claimant had to read such
screen before clicking the button “Yes, I agree, file my claim” to submit the
voucher.
When questioned by the Department Investigator, the claimant alleged that
his spouse had continued to file vouchers without his knowledge and had
continued to use the debit card without his knowledge after he had returned
to work. The Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant’s
allegations lack credibility in light of the fact that the claimant had personal
possession of the debit card several months after he had returned to work
and debit card usage remained consistent during the entire time frame even
when the claimant’s spouse was physically incarcerated. Further, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that if the information concerning the
claimant’s employment and earnings during such time frame had been
properly reported then his benefits would have been reduced or the claimant
would not have been eligible to receive unemployment benefits for
substantially all of the weeks for which vouchers were submitted and
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benefits paid to the claimant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
******
The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the claimant knowingly
provided his confidential user ID and password to his spouse and that his
spouse submitted vouchers requesting unemployment benefits during the
period of time in question with the claimant’s knowledge and consent. The
claimant was placed on notice at the time of filing his claim that he was
responsible for ensuring that all information submitted was honest and
accurate and that he was responsible for all information submitted using his
confidential user ID and password. Further, the Administrative Law Judge
concludes that the claimant received benefits to which he would not have
otherwise [] been entitled if his employment status and wage information
had been properly reported to the Department. Further, the Administrative
Law Judge concludes that the claimant benefited from the mutual use of the
unemployment insurance debit card by his wife and had exclusive control
over such card during a period of time when his wife could not have used
the card during which the debit card was still used. The claimant was
negligent in the supervision and control of his confidential user ID,
password and debit card. Further, the Administrative Law Judge concludes
that this information submitted on the claimant’s claim was knowingly
done by an individual with the consent of and knowledge of the claimant.
As such, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that the terms of Ind.
Code 22-4-13-1.1 apply to the claimant in this case.
DECISION: The decision of the Investigator dated November 15, 2012, is
affirmed. The claimant received benefits to which he was not entitled and
is now liable to repay to the Department. A penalty amount of 25% is
assessed for the first instance occurring during the regular claim with
benefit year ending October 1, 2010, a 50% penalty is assessed with regard
to the second instance occurring in the federal extended unemployment
claim with the same benefit year ending date and 100% penalty is assessed
with regard to the third instance occurring during the second regular claim
with a benefit year ending date of October 2, 2011. All the claimant’s
wages earned during the weeks of overpayment are cancelled for future use
in establishing unemployment benefits. Interest will accrue on the
overpayment balance until satisfied.
Exhibits at 248-250. Telligman appealed the ALJ’s decision and requested to submit
additional evidence, and on March 4, 2013, the Board, after noting that no hearing was
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held by the Board and that no additional evidence was accepted, affirmed the ALJ’s
decision. Telligman now appeals the Board’s decision.
DISCUSSION
The first issue is whether the Board erred in concluding that Telligman knowingly
failed to disclose or falsified any fact that would disqualify him from receiving benefits,
reduce his benefits, or render him ineligible for benefits or extended benefits. Telligman
contends that “[t]here is much in the record to dispute the inference that [he] had
knowledge of the claims at issue,” that his former spouse was the person “who
subsequently filed vouchers for [him] using the computer at her parent’s [sic] home,” that
he did not accompany her, that she “had access to and primary possession of [his] debit
card,” and that he “had no reason to continue to monitor the ID, password, and debit card
after returning to work because he believed his unemployment benefits stopped when he
started working.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. Telligman further asserts that the Board applied
Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1.1 in error, that “[t]he statute does not include a definition for what
constitutes an ‘instance,’” and that “[n]o explanation was provided for why claims with
the same benefit year would be assessed separately.” Id. at 6-7. As to the second issue,
he argues that the Board abused its discretion in denying his request to submit additional
documents which would rebut the inference that he must have been using the
unemployment benefits debit card during a period his former spouse stated she was
incarcerated and which would show that he did not submit certain vouchers.
The Board maintains that the statute was correctly applied and that Telligman had
fraudulently applied for and received unemployment benefits. The Board argues that,
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with respect to each of three claims, vouchers were submitted and Telligman received
benefits while he was employed. The Board further argues that Telligman shared his user
ID and password with his wife, that she submitted vouchers on his behalf and with his
consent, and Telligman knowingly allowed his wife control and access to his
unemployment account. The Board maintains there was substantial evidence to arrive at
the conclusion that Telligman had actual knowledge that he was committing fraud by
submitting electronic vouchers while he was employed. The Board also argues that
IDWD “has consistently interpreted ‘instance’ to mean each time a new claim for
benefits is opened rather than each time a fraudulent voucher is submitted on a particular
claim” and that “Telligman filed three separate claims, which translates to three separate
instances.” Appellee’s Brief at 13. The Board also argues that the ALJ found that
Telligman knew his former wife was filing the vouchers, that he agreed pursuant to a
“User Agreement” to accept responsibility “for all activities that occur at the site under
[his] password,” and thus that, “when [he] knowingly shared his user ID and password
with [his former spouse], he became responsible for all information submitted on
vouchers.” Id. at 14. Finally, the Board argues that Telligman was not entitled to
introduce additional evidence and that he failed to show that the evidence could not have
been submitted at the initial hearing.
The standard of review on appeal of a decision of the Board is threefold: (1)
findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed
questions of law and fact—ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal
propositions are reviewed for correctness. Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of
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Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011) (citing McClain v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied).
Ultimate facts are facts that involve an inference or deduction based on the findings of
basic fact. Id. (citing McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317). Where such facts are within the
special competence of the Board, the Court will give greater deference to the Board’s
conclusions, broadening the scope of what can be considered reasonable. Id. (citing
McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1318).
Ind. Code § 22-4-1-1 provides that the unemployment compensation system was
established “to provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed through no fault
of their own, to encourage stabilization in employment, . . . and to provide maximum job
training and employment opportunities for the unemployed, underemployed, the
economically disadvantaged, dislocated workers, and others with substantial barriers to
employment . . . .” At the time Telligman received the benefits at issue, Ind. Code § 22-
4-13-1.1 provided in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, if an individual
knowingly:
(1) fails to disclose amounts earned during any week in
the individual’s waiting period, benefit period, or
extended benefit period; or
(2) fails to disclose or has falsified any fact;
that would disqualify the individual for benefits, reduce the
individual’s benefits, or render the individual ineligible for benefits
or extended benefits, the individual forfeits any wage credits earned
or any benefits or extended benefits that might otherwise be payable
to the individual for the period in which the failure to disclose or
falsification occurs.
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(b) In addition to amounts forfeited under subsection (a), an individual
is subject to the following civil penalties for each instance in which
the individual knowingly fails to disclose or falsifies any fact that if
accurately reported to the department would disqualify the
individual for benefits, reduce the individual’s benefits, or render the
individual ineligible for benefits or extended benefits:
(1) For the first instance, an amount equal to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the benefit overpayment.
(2) For the second instance, an amount equal to fifty
percent (50%) of the benefit overpayment.
(3) For the third and each subsequent instance, an amount
equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefit
overpayment.
(Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 154-2013, § 5 (eff. Jul. 1, 2013)).
To the extent Telligman challenges findings of basic fact, our review of the record
reveals substantial evidence of the findings of basic fact of the ALJ and the Board. See
Recker, 958 N.E.2d at 1139. The ALJ and Board found, and the documents introduced
by the IDWD show, that Telligman filed his first claim for regular benefits on October 6,
2009, his second claim for extended benefits on May 11, 2010, and his third claim for
regular benefits on October 3, 2010. Further, as found by the ALJ and Board, vouchers
were submitted electronically with respect to a number of weekly benefit periods during
the time periods associated with each of the three claims, unemployment benefits were
deposited to a debit card sent to Telligman, and the card was used for purchases and cash
withdrawals. Telligman opened his initial claim at a WorkOne Office, he created a user
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ID and unique password, and he shared the user ID and password with his wife at the
time.1
In addition, the ALJ and Board found and the evidence at the hearing shows that
Telligman was placed on notice at the time he filed his claim that he was responsible for
ensuring that all information submitted was accurate, and that he received benefits to
which he would not have otherwise been entitled if his employment status and wage
information had been properly reported. The User Agreement which Telligman accepted
when he created his online account to file his claims provided in part that Telligman was
“responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of [his] account and password” and that
“[b]y establishing an account, [Telligman] agrees to accept responsibility for all activities
that occur at the site under [Telligman’s] password.” Exhibits at 83. IDWD presented
evidence that, in order to submit a claim online, a warning regarding penalties for
falsification appears in the middle of the webpage which states: “I understand that I must
report all earnings from employment or self-employment regardless of source.” Id. at 78.
Further, IDWD presented evidence that, for each of the vouchers submitted by or
on behalf of Telligman, a number of questions required responses including whether the
claimant worked during the weekly benefit period and, if so, how much the claimant
earned. Each of the vouchers showed that he did not work and did not have earnings
during the applicable benefit weeks. The evidence demonstrates that he earned wages in
excess of his weekly benefit amount during weeks for which a voucher was submitted by
or on his behalf during both of his regular claim periods and his extension claim period.
1
A decree of dissolution of marriage was entered on May 9, 2012.
10
To the extent Telligman argues that his former wife submitted the weekly
vouchers on his behalf and that he had no reason to monitor his user ID, password, and
debit card after returning to work because he believed his unemployment benefits had
ended, and that he did not knowingly fail to disclose income, we note that “[a] person
engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high
probability that he is doing so,” see Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b), and this definition of
knowingly is incorporated into Ind. Code §§ 22-4-11.5 by Ind. Code §§ 22-4-11.5-6. In
Tiller v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., the ALJ and Board had found that
the claimant’s wife “did the computer work for claimant, filing for unemployment
benefits and filing weekly vouchers.” 974 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The
ALJ and Board found that the claimant failed to disclose or falsified a material fact and
therefore was liable to repay to IDWD the total overpayment plus penalties pursuant to
Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1.1. Id. The claimant argued that the Board did not resolve several
issues including whether he was “computer illiterate,” whether “there was a reasonable
explanation for [the claimant’s] wife’s sporadic disclosure of part[-]time wages,” and
whether he knew that incorrect information was reported to IDWD. Id. at 481. This
court noted that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the claimant earned wages
during his benefit and extended benefit periods and that his wife, acting on his behalf,
knew of those wages but did not disclose them to IDWD. Id. at 482. We also stated that
“it would be futile to require such disclosures if claimants could circumvent them by
stating they were computer illiterate while their agents were ignorant of their actual
income.” Id. Telligman provided his user ID and password to his spouse, who submitted
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vouchers on his behalf for numerous benefit weeks during which he had employment and
earnings. As previously noted, the User Agreement which Telligman accepted provided
that he was “responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of [his] account and
password” and that “[b]y establishing an account, [Telligman] agrees to accept
responsibility for all activities that occur at the site under [Telligman’s] password.”
Exhibits at 83. The ALJ found that he permitted his spouse to have possession and use of
the debit card, although he regained possession of the card periodically, that Telligman
personally had possession of the debit card in August 2010, that he alleged it was
removed from his wallet that month without his knowledge, and that the usage records
for the card for that month reflected similar usage for purchases and withdrawals at the
same merchants and locations as prior usage. The ultimate findings of the ALJ and the
Board, including that the submission of the vouchers by Telligman’s former spouse on
his behalf was performed with his knowledge and consent, are not unreasonable. See
Recker, 958 N.E.2d at 1139.
Based upon the evidence recited above and in the record regarding Telligman’s
three unemployment benefit claims, the vouchers submitted by his former wife with
respect to each of the claims, and his employment and earnings, we conclude that the
Board did not err in finding that Telligman knowingly failed to disclose or falsified facts
related to his employment and earnings that would disqualify him from receiving
benefits, reduce his benefits, or render him ineligible for benefits or extended benefits.
With respect to Telligman’s argument that the Board erred in failing to accept the
evidence he wished to present after the hearing, we note that the decision to accept
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additional evidence is a decision left to the discretion of the Board. Tiller, 974 N.E.2d at
481. “The rule requires a party offering additional evidence to show good cause why
such evidence should be accepted and good reason why it was not introduced before the
ALJ.”2 Id. (Smitty’s Painting, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Workforce Dev., 908 N.E.2d 244,
247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Telligman’s argument is premised on his belief that the
additional evidence, if considered by the ALJ and Board, would have negated the
conclusion that he knowingly failed to disclose amounts earned during his benefit and
extended benefit periods. In Tiller, the claimant similarly argued that, had the Board
accepted additional evidence, the evidence would have negated the ALJ’s conclusion that
he knowingly failed to disclose amounts earned during his benefit periods. Id. at 482.
We noted that we had “no reason to assume the Board would have credited the additional
evidence in the same way [the claimant] does” and that the undisputed evidence
demonstrated that the claimant earned wages during his benefit and extended benefit
periods, that his wife, acting on his behalf, knew of those wages but did not disclose them
to IDWD, and that the Board did not abuse its discretion when it did not consider the
claimant’s additional evidence. Id.
In this case, like in Tiller, we cannot say that the Board, if it had accepted and
considered the additional evidence Telligman wished to present, would have credited the
2
646 IAC 5-10-11(b) (2011) provides:
Each hearing before the review board shall be confined to the evidence submitted
before the administrative law judge unless it is an original hearing. Provided, however,
the review board may hear or procure additional evidence upon its own motion, or upon
written application of either party, and for good cause shown, together with a showing of
good reason why the additional evidence was not procured and introduced at the hearing
before the administrative law judge.
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additional evidence in the same way Telligman does. See id. Telligman claims that his
additional evidence of his debit card activity “would serve to rebut the inference that [he]
must have been using the debit card during those dates” and “would also support [his]
claim that he did not file the May 11, 2010 or October 3, 2010 claims or submit vouchers,
as [his former spouse] was not incarcerated and free to take those actions.” Appellant’s
Brief at 9. The evidence before the ALJ and Board included certain debit card usage
records, and the ALJ expressly determined that the debit card which accessed the
unemployment benefits released to Telligman “was used for purchases from various
merchants[,] and cash withdrawals were made from the debit card during such time
period” and that, while Telligman alleged that the card was removed from his wallet in
August 2010 without his knowledge, “the usage records in August 2010 reflected similar
usage for purchases and withdrawals at the same merchants and ATM locations as prior
debit card usage.” Exhibits at 248-249. The ALJ and Board considered evidence of the
nature and frequency of the usage of the debit card and the extent to which the usage
records tended to show either that Telligman or his former wife were in possession of the
debit card or that Telligman was aware that he or his former wife were using
unemployment benefits while he was employed and earning wages.
Further, the additional evidence Telligman wished to present to the Board was
available prior to the hearing before the ALJ, and he was aware of the dates his former
spouse indicated she was incarcerated in her sworn statement made available to him prior
to the hearing. Specifically, in her statement which was admitted as IDWD’s Exhibit E at
the hearing, when asked if she received certain benefits using the debit card belonging to
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Telligman “for weeks ending 10/9/10 to 12/18/10,” Telligman’s former spouse stated:
“No I did not use Shawn Debit card in that time Oct 7 to Oct 26 I was in jail.” Exhibits at
165. On another page of her statement, when asked if she had been incarcerated
anywhere during any of the other dates of the claims, Telligman’s former spouse stated
“yes oct 2010.” Id. at 167. At the hearing, Telligman indicated that he had an
opportunity to review the pages of IDWD’s Exhibit E, and if he wished he could have
presented, at the hearing, the additional evidence he later asked the Board to accept.
Further, even if there was no usage of the debit card, Telligman’s former wife, on his
behalf, used his user ID and password (which he had shared with her) to submit weekly
vouchers indicating that Telligman did not have employment when that was not in fact
the case. Pursuant to the User Agreement, Telligman remained responsible for the
information provided when the vouchers were submitted on his behalf. We conclude that
the Board did not err or abuse its discretion when it did not accept his additional
evidence. See Tiller, 974 N.E.2d at 482 (concluding the Board did not abuse its
discretion when it did not consider the claimant’s additional evidence).
Finally, with respect to Telligman’s assertion that the ALJ and Board incorrectly
interpreted the term “instance” in Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1.1 and thus that the penalties
assessed against him were improper, we find that the penalties assessed by the ALJ and
Board were not improper or erroneously imposed. Subsection (b) of Ind. Code § 22-4-
13-1.1 provides for penalty assessments of twenty-five percent, fifty percent, and one
hundred percent of the benefit overpayment amounts for the first instance, second
instance, and third and each subsequent instance, respectively, when an individual
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knowingly fails to disclose or falsifies any fact that would disqualify him for benefits. In
Tiller, the claimant filed an initial claim for unemployment benefits in February 2010,
another claim for extended benefits in August 2010, and a third claim for regular benefits
in February 2011. 974 N.E.2d at 479-480. The ALJ and Board assessed penalties for the
overpayments and this court affirmed the Board’s decision. Id. at 482. In Tiller, the
claimant’s three claims (two claims for regular benefits and one for extended benefits)
were not considered one “instance” under Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1.1(b). This interpretation
of the statute is reasonable. Telligman filed his first claim for regular benefits on October
6, 2009, a second claim for extended benefits on May 11, 2010, and a third claim for
regular benefits on October 3, 2010. Vouchers indicating that he was not employed and
did not earn wages were submitted during each of the applicable claims periods, and
Telligman was employed and earned wages during each of the three claims periods. We
find that the assessment of penalties set forth in the decision of the ALJ and adopted by
the Board was proper.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the record, we conclude that the ALJ and Board did not err in finding
that Telligman knowingly failed to disclose or falsified facts that would disqualify him
from receiving benefits, reduce his benefits, or render him ineligible for benefits or
extended benefits, in finding him liable to repay IDWD the benefit overpayment amounts
together with applicable penalties and interest, and that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying his request to submit additional evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Board.
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Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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