D.L. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    Jan 20 2016, 10:59 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Megan Shipley                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    Marion County Public Defender Agency                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Karl Scharnberg
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    D.L.,                                                    January 20, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1507-JV-834
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court, Juvenile Division
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Marilyn A.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Moores, Judge. The Honorable
    Geoffrey A. Gaither, Magistrate.
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49D09-1503-JD-512
    Mathias, Judge.
    [1]   D.L. appeals the order of the Marion Superior Court finding him to be a
    delinquent child for committing what would be Class B misdemeanor criminal
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 49A02-1507-JV-834 | January 20, 2016   Page 1 of 7
    mischief if committed by an adult. On appeal, D.L. claims the evidence was
    insufficient to support the trial court’s finding.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   At approximately one o’clock in the morning on March 29, 2015, Robert
    Lipinski and his wife were watching television in their bed when they heard a
    noise coming from the area of their driveway. When they looked out their
    window, they saw five youths yelling and making a lot of noise. Mr. Lipinski
    telephoned the police, who arrived at the scene only a few minutes later. By the
    time the police arrived, however, the youths had moved to a less well-lighted
    area next to a nearby creek. The responding officer said something to the
    youths, who then moved away.
    [4]   At approximately 1:34 a.m., Mr. Lipinski again heard noise, this time coming
    from the darker area near the creek. He again called the police. Shortly
    thereafter, Mr. Lipinski saw one of the youths, later identified as then thirteen-
    year-old D.L., jump over the Lipinskis’ chain-link fence and come into his yard.
    D.L. appeared to be picking something up off the ground. Mr. Lipinski and his
    wife yelled at D.L. through their window. D.L. then jumped back over the
    fence, and the youths began to walk away.
    [5]   The police arrived and ordered the youths to stop and sit near the Lipinskis’
    fence. Mr. Lipinski identified D.L. as the one who had jumped his fence and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 49A02-1507-JV-834 | January 20, 2016   Page 2 of 7
    entered his yard. After an initial denial, D.L. eventually admitted to jumping
    over the Lipinskis’ fence.
    [6]   Because Mr. Lipinski had heard a “cracking” sound earlier, he and the
    responding officer looked for damage to his fence. Tr. p. 13. They discovered
    damage to the top of one section of the fence which had not been present
    earlier. Mr. Lipinski later presented evidence that it would cost $560 to repair
    the damage to that part of the fence.
    [7]   On March 30, 2015, the State filed a petition alleging that D.L. was a
    delinquent child for committing what would be Class A misdemeanor trespass
    and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief if committed by an adult. The trial
    court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter on June 2, 2015. At the
    conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted D.L.’s motion to
    dismiss the charge of criminal trespass. The court found that D.L. did commit
    what would have been Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief if committed by
    an adult. At the dispositional hearing held on June 30, 2015, the court ordered
    D.L. to be placed on probation, write a letter of apology to the Lipinskis, abide
    by curfew, and participate in services. D.L. now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   D.L. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
    delinquency finding. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile
    adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the
    witnesses. K.S. v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 538
    , 543 (Ind. 2006). Instead, we consider
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 49A02-1507-JV-834 | January 20, 2016   Page 3 of 7
    only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and the
    reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. 
    Id.
     We affirm if
    substantial probative evidence supports the conclusion. 
    Id.
     Although the State
    must prove every element of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is
    not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence. A.M. v. State, 
    981 N.E.2d 91
    , 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing A.B. v.
    State, 
    885 N.E.2d 1223
    , 1226 (Ind. 2008)).
    [9]    To prove that D.L. committed what would be Class B misdemeanor criminal
    mischief if committed by an adult, the State was required to prove that D.L.
    recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged the property of another person
    without the other person’s consent. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2
    (a).
    [10]   D.L. acknowledges that evidence exists that he jumped over the Lipinskis’ fence
    and that some damage was done to the fence. He claims, however, that the
    State failed to prove precisely where D.L. jumped over the fence and that this is
    where the damage was located. D.L. notes that the Lipinskis’ yard was quite
    large and that the area where he could have jumped was not necessarily where
    the damage occurred. This is little more than an argument that we reweigh the
    evidence, which we will not do.
    [11]   The evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment reveals the following. The
    Lipinskis’ fence had no damage earlier that evening. Mr. Lipinski saw D.L.
    jump over his fence, appear to pick something up from the Lipinskis’ yard, and
    then jump back over the fence. Mr. Lipinski also heard a cracking sound. After
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 49A02-1507-JV-834 | January 20, 2016   Page 4 of 7
    this, Mr. Lipinski discovered damage done to his fence that had not been
    present before. From this, the trial court could reasonably infer that the damage
    to the fence was caused by D.L.’s actions of jumping over the fence.
    [12]   D.L. draws our attention to Zinn v. State, 
    424 N.E.2d 1058
     (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
    In that case, the evidence established only that a series of harassing telephone
    calls were placed from the telephone associated with the defendant’s home. Id.
    at 1060. No evidence in the record indicated who had actually placed the calls
    or that the defendant was the only one with access to her telephone. Id.
    Accordingly, the Zinn court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish
    the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
    [13]   The present case is readily distinguishable from Zinn. Here, Mr. Lipinski
    identified D.L. as the one he saw jump over his fence twice. Mr. Lipinski heard
    a cracking sound, and later discovered damage to his fence that had not been
    there earlier that evening. This is unlike the case in Zinn where the identity of
    the caller was unknown.
    [14]   We find this case more similar to Jennings v. State, 
    956 N.E.2d 203
     (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2011), summarily aff’d in relevant part, 
    982 N.E.2d 1003
     (Ind. 2013), also
    cited by D.L. In Jennings, the defendant went to the home where the victim,
    Pope, was visiting friends with the defendant’s girlfriend, Terrell. When Terrell
    prepared to leave, Jennings pulled up in his vehicle and approached Terrell.
    Pope stayed inside his friends’ home because Jennings had previously
    threatened his life for “messing with” Terrell. Id. at 204. Shortly thereafter,
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    Pope and his friends heard a loud noise, which they described as a “a pssshh
    sound” akin to the sound made by an airbrake. Id. They then heard Jennings’
    car quickly drive away. When Pope went to his truck, he discovered that it had
    been scratched and that one of the tires had been slashed. Jennings was charged
    with criminal mischief for damaging Pope’s vehicle.
    [15]   On appeal, we held that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to
    support Jennings’ conviction:
    It was reasonable for the jury to infer that the noise Pope and Ms.
    Martin heard was the sound of air escaping from Pope’s slashed
    tire, especially in light of the testimony that Jennings
    immediately sped away with “screeching tires.” Further, the
    testimony concerning Jennings’s animosity toward Pope,
    combined with the lack of any evidence supporting a conclusion
    that Terrell bore any ill will toward Pope, supports an inference
    that Jennings, not Terrell, was the perpetrator.
    Id. at 205 (record citation omitted).
    [16]   If anything, the evidence in the present case is stronger than that in Jennings. In
    Jennings, no one saw the defendant damage the truck. Here, although no
    evidence of any animosity between D.L. and the Lipinskis exists, Mr. Lipinski
    actually saw D.L. jump the fence twice and heard a cracking sound before he
    discovered the damage to his fence.
    [17]   We therefore conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to establish
    that D.L. committed what would be Class B criminal mischief if committed by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 49A02-1507-JV-834 | January 20, 2016   Page 6 of 7
    an adult. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding D.L. to be a
    delinquent child.
    [18]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 49A02-1507-JV-834 | January 20, 2016   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1507-JV-834

Filed Date: 1/20/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/20/2016