Jason Hansbrough v. State of Indiana , 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 20 ( 2016 )

Jan 29 2016, 8:25 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lawrence M. Hansen Gregory F. Zoeller
Hansen Law Firm, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Noblesville, Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason Hansbrough, January 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A04-1508-CR-1121
v. Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Paul A. Felix,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29C01-1410-F4-8157
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Jason Hansbrough appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a level 4 felony. During a
valid traffic stop of Hansbrough’s vehicle, police officers conducted a dog sniff
around the vehicle. After the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics,
officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm. Hansbrough unsuccessfully
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search arguing that the dog
sniff prolonged the traffic stop in violation of his constitutional rights. The
evidence was subsequently admitted at trial over his continuing objection. The
sole restated issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the search. Finding no abuse
of discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 30, 2014, Fishers Police Officer Kevin Silbaugh was driving
north on Interstate 69 when he observed a black SUV following less than one
second of braking distance behind another vehicle. 1 Officer Silbaugh activated
his emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop of the black SUV.
Hansbrough was driving the black SUV and was the vehicle’s sole occupant.
1
Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-14 provides that “[a] person who drives a motor vehicle may not follow
another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of both vehicles,
the time intervals between vehicles, and the condition of the highway.” A violation of this section constitutes
a class C infraction. See Ind. Code § 9-21-8-49.
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[3] Officer Silbaugh approached the passenger side of the vehicle and asked
Hansbrough for his license, registration, and insurance information. Officer
Silbaugh also asked Hansbrough where he had come from and where he was
headed. Hansbrough informed Officer Silbaugh that he was traveling from
Indianapolis to Muncie.
[4] While he was speaking to Hansbrough, Officer Silbaugh observed what he
believed to be marijuana “shake” in the area between the cup holder and the
center console inside the vehicle. Tr. at 12. 2 Based upon this observation,
Officer Silbaugh suspected the presence of drugs in the SUV. Accordingly, as
he walked back to his police vehicle with Hansbrough’s documents, Officer
Silbaugh immediately called for a canine unit to come to the scene. Officer
Silbaugh then sat in his police vehicle and began typing out a warning ticket
and running a records check of Hansbrough. Officer Silbaugh returned once to
Hansbrough’s vehicle to verify that he still lived at the address listed on his
identification. Officer Silbaugh again returned to his police vehicle, and at that
time a backup officer arrived at the scene as a matter of routine practice.
Within fourteen minutes of the commencement of the traffic stop, the canine
unit arrived at the scene. Officer Silbaugh was on the phone checking for
2
At trial, Officer Silbaugh explained that the term “shake” is used to refer to remnants of marijuana because
“it’s a small amount.” Tr. at 12. He described it as “similar to if someone ate a bag of chips and dropped
some crumbs on the floor.” Id.
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outstanding warrants on Hansbrough and had not yet completed his paperwork
for the traffic stop when the canine unit arrived.
[5] Sixteen minutes after the traffic stop began, Officer Gerald Fenimore of the
Noblesville Police Department conducted a dog sniff around Hansbrough’s
vehicle by walking his narcotics-trained canine around the perimeter of the
vehicle. The canine alerted to the presence of narcotics by sitting down outside
the open window on the driver’s side. Officer Silbaugh was still on the phone
checking for outstanding warrants on Hansbrough, and when he learned that
the canine had alerted to the presence of narcotics he “asked to call them back.”
Id. at 15. Due to the canine alert, Officers Silbaugh and Fenimore proceeded to
search Hansbrough’s vehicle. Officer Fenimore noticed what he also believed
to be “marijuana shake” in the front passenger area of the vehicle, but he did
not try to collect it. Id. at 57. The search revealed a handgun underneath the
driver’s seat.
[6] Officers handcuffed Hansbrough and placed him in one of the police vehicles.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, Hansbrough admitted that the
handgun was his and that he kept it for protection. Hansbrough also
acknowledged that he had a prior conviction for class C felony battery resulting
in bodily injury.
[7] The State charged Hansbrough with unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon, a level 4 felony. Thereafter, Hansbrough filed a motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the vehicle search claiming that the
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dog sniff impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop and therefore violated his
constitutional rights. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A
bench trial was held on May 28, 2015. During trial, Hansbrough objected to
the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of the search of his vehicle.
The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court found Hansbrough guilty as charged. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Although Hansbrough challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle, that issue is no
longer viable. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). Because he
appeals following a completed trial, the issue before us is properly framed as
whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence at trial.
Id. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of
evidence. Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly
against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Id.
[9] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence obtained
from an allegedly illegal search, we do not reweigh the evidence but defer to the
trial court’s factual determinations unless clearly erroneous. Meredith v. State,
906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). We view conflicting evidence most favorable
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to the ruling, and we consider “afresh any legal question of the constitutionality
of a search and seizure.” Id.
[10] In this case, Hansbrough does not dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop.
Instead, he asserts that the stop became unlawful because the dog sniff
prolonged the duration of the stop beyond the time reasonably required to
complete the original purpose of the stop, and that Officer Silbaugh lacked
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity to otherwise
extend the stop. Therefore, he argues, the subsequent search of the vehicle was
invalid and the evidence obtained was inadmissible. We must disagree.
[11] The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable search and seizure
and this protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001). 3 Our supreme
court has recognized that a reasonable narcotics dog sweep is not a search for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034
(Ind. 2015) (citations omitted). “However, such a sweep is an unreasonable
investigatory detention if the motorist is held for longer than necessary to
complete the officer’s work related to the traffic violation and the officer lacks
reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in criminal activity.” Id.
3
Although Hansbrough cites to both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution in his appellant’s brief, he provides no independent argument or analysis of his claim pursuant
to the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, neither do we. See Jackson v. State, 996 N.E.2d 378, 385 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) (failure to provide independent analysis of Article 1, Section 11 results in waiver of the issue on
appeal), trans. denied (2014).
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[12] We need not engage in a reasonable suspicion analysis here because the record
reveals that the dog sniff of Hansbrough’s vehicle did not prolong the duration
of the valid traffic stop. In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612
(2015), the United States Supreme Court recently held that “a police stop
exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made
violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Specifically,
the Rodriguez court held that “[a] seizure justified by only a police-observed
traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the
violation.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The court
explained that, beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s
mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop such as “checking
the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against
the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”
Id. at 1615. The court determined that the police may not extend an otherwise-
completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog
sniff. Id. The critical question is whether “conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e.,
adds time to—‘the stop[.]’” Id. at 1616; see Washington v. State, 42 N.E.3d 521
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (rehearing opinion reaffirming conviction pursuant to
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Rodriguez and concluding that dog sniff did not prolong traffic stop), opinion on
reh’g, trans. denied. 4
[13] The facts and inferences from the record indicate that the dog sniff of
Hansbrough’s vehicle was conducted while his valid traffic stop was ongoing,
or in other words, before the traffic stop was completed. The police dash cam
evidence establishes that the dog sniff occurred within sixteen minutes of the
start of the traffic stop. Officer Silbaugh testified that he had not yet completed
his paperwork and was still on the phone checking for outstanding warrants on
Hansbrough when the canine unit arrived and conducted the sweep. Under the
circumstances, we cannot say that the dog sniff prolonged or added any time to
the valid traffic stop. Therefore, the subsequent search of Hansbrough’s vehicle
was not rendered invalid, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence obtained during that search. 5 See Myers v. State, 839
N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 2005) (finding no error in trial court’s determination
that dog sniff occurred while traffic stop was ongoing because officer was
4
For a detailed summary of previous “Indiana dog sniff cases” that we believe remain consistent with
Rodriguez, see State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), clarified on reh’g, 929 N.E.2d 897), trans. denied (2014)).
5
While we need not reach the issue, we conclude that even if the dog sniff prolonged Hansbrough’s traffic
stop, the evidence establishes that Officer Silbaugh had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (based upon
his observation of what he believed to be marijuana shake) in order to detain Hansbrough beyond the time
necessary to complete the mission of the stop. See Gray, 997 N.E.2d at 1152 (recognizing that once a
justifiable stop is made, the scope of the officer’s investigation may be broadened beyond the purpose for
which the person was stopped only if additional particularized and objective suspicions come to light;
although additional suspicion is not required to perform a dog sniff, suspicion is required for any additional
seizure that the dog sniff caused).
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explaining traffic citation to defendant while canine was performing sniff and
only thirteen minutes had elapsed from start of traffic stop).
[14] Hansbrough urges that Officer Silbaugh knew “how long the canine officer
[would] take to get there,” and therefore his testimony that he was not finished
with his ordinary traffic stop inquiries when the canine unit arrived and
conducted the sniff was “suspect.” Appellant’s Br. at 5, 9. He argues that
accepting an officer’s testimony in this regard “creates a real danger of officers
slowing down their processes to allow time for the canine to arrive.” Id at 9.
We acknowledge the legitimacy of his concerns. Nevertheless, the Rodriguez
court observed that the reasonableness of a seizure depends “on what the police
in fact do” and reasonable diligence on the part of police can only be gauged
“by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it [.]” Rodriguez, 135 S.
Ct. at 1616. We remind Hansbrough that it was the trial court’s prerogative to
accept or reject Officer Silbaugh’s testimony, and we do not reweigh the
evidence but defer to the trial court’s factual determinations unless clearly
erroneous. Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 869. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the trial court’s determinations here were clearly erroneous. We
affirm Hansbrough’s conviction.
[15] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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