Robin Maze v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 11 2015, 9:34 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Gregory F. Zoeller
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robin Maze, December 11, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1503-CR-162
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda Brown,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G10-1412-CM-55386
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 1 of 7
[1] Robin Maze (“Maze”) appeals her conviction for Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement.1 On appeal, she argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support her conviction because the officers involved in her arrest
were not lawfully engaged in the execution of their duties. Concluding that the
officers were lawfully impounding her car at the time she resisted, we affirm her
conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether sufficient evidence supports Maze’s conviction.
Facts
[3] At 3:00 a.m. on December 17, 2014, Officers Scott Yaden (“Officer Yaden”)
and Jeremy Jones (“Officer Jones”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department were dispatched to the area of Barth Avenue and Beecher Street in
Marion County. The dispatch involved an illegally parked car that was
blocking traffic. When the officers arrived, they observed a white Jeep parked
three feet from the curb and facing east in the westbound lane on Beecher
Street. The officers also described the Jeep as parked “about three feet into the
intersection” of Barth Avenue and Beecher Street. (Tr. 9). The officers checked
the registration on the Jeep and learned that it was registered to Maze. The
officers then approached her door in order to get her to move the Jeep.
1
IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 2 of 7
[4] The officers knocked on Maze’s door, and Maze’s German Shepherd began
barking. Officer Yaden called out for Maze, and she answered the door after
about three minutes. When Maze opened the door, she yelled at the officers for
waking her up. In addition, the officers observed that her eyes were bloodshot
and glassy; they also smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath.
Maze also slurred her speech while speaking with the officers.
[5] The officers informed Maze that her Jeep was illegally parked and needed to be
moved. However, the officers would not let Maze move the Jeep herself
because she exhibited signs of intoxication. Officer Yaden told Maze that he
would move the vehicle for her if she gave him the keys. Maze then invited the
officers into her home to help search for the keys. While the officers searched
Maze’s home, she looked inside of her Jeep. Still, no one found the keys. After
about fifteen minutes, the officers informed Maze that they were going to tow
her vehicle and asked her to go back into her house.
[6] The officers returned to their vehicle to issue a ticket and begin the process of
towing the vehicle. Maze did go in her house, but she eventually ran back
outside and yelled, “You are not towing my vehicle” and entered the Jeep
through the driver’s side door. (Tr. 17, 37-38). Maze’s German Shepherd also
came out of the house and circled Officer Yaden, barking at him and
“snipping” at his leg. (Tr. 27). Officer Yaden took out his Taser and turned
toward the dog, and it ran away.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 3 of 7
[7] Officer Jones ordered Maze out of the vehicle, but she refused to exit. Officer
Yaden then grabbed Maze by her left arm to remove her from the Jeep.
However, Maze grabbed the steering wheel with her right hand, preventing her
removal from the Jeep. The officers eventually got Maze out of the vehicle, and
she began to swing her arms, preventing the officers from placing handcuffs on
her. The officers eventually pinned Maze against the Jeep and placed her in
handcuffs. While Maze was in custody, her dog was still loose and running
around. The officers attempted to get the dog back in the house, but it became
aggressive and charged at Officer Yaden. At that time, he used his Taser on
Maze’s dog.
[8] On December 17, 2014, the State charged Maze with resisting law enforcement
as a Class A misdemeanor and public intoxication as a Class B misdemeanor.
After a bench trial was held on February 24, 2015, the trial court found Maze
guilty of resisting law enforcement but not guilty of public intoxication. Maze
now appeals.
Decision
[9] Maze appeals her resisting law enforcement conviction and argues that
insufficient evidence supports her conviction. Specifically, she alleges that
Officers Yaden and Jones were not lawfully engaged in the execution of their
duties at the time she resisted.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 4 of 7
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
[10] To convict Maze of resisting law enforcement as charged, the State had to
prove that she forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with Officer Jones or
Yaden while they were lawfully engaged in the execution of their duties. (App.
13); I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
[11] Here, Maze’s only contention is that the officers were not lawfully engaged in
their duties when she resisted the officers’ attempt to remove her from the Jeep.
She attempts to frame her argument as a “continuous episode of unreasonable
police activity” that violated the Fourth Amendment. (Maze’s Br. 6).
However, the relevant inquiry involves the encounter at Maze’s Jeep and
whether Officers Yaden and Jones were lawfully executing their duties when
she physically resisted her removal from her vehicle.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 5 of 7
[12] Maze compares her case to Briggs v. State, 873 N.E.2d 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. There, Briggs had allowed a friend to live in his apartment for
several weeks until Briggs eventually asked him to leave. Id. at 131. The friend
contacted the police and requested “stand-by assistance” while retrieving his
personal belongings from Briggs’s apartment. Id. Two officers came to the
apartment to help “keep the peace.” Id. Although Briggs was very angry, when
the officers informed him of the purpose of their visit, he said, “Okay,” and
walked away, leaving the door ajar. Id. Briggs started walking toward his
bedroom. Id. Concerned that Briggs could be retrieving a weapon, the officers
entered his residence and ordered him to stop, but Briggs ignored them. Id.
The officers tried to grab him, but he pulled away. Id. Eventually, they forcibly
placed him in handcuffs. Id. Briggs was charged and convicted with resisting
law enforcement, and he appealed.
[13] On appeal, we concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the officers
were lawfully engaged in the execution of their duties when they ordered him to
stop and grabbed his arms. Id. at 134. Because the encounter was consensual,
we held that he was free to disregard the officers or even order them to leave his
home. Id. A mere hunch that Briggs could have a weapon in his bathroom was
not a sufficient basis for detaining him. Id.
[14] Briggs is distinguishable from the case before us because Officers Yaden and
Jones were in the process of impounding Maze’s Jeep when Maze yelled at the
officers and jumped inside the vehicle. While Briggs’s movement was restricted
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 6 of 7
by the officers while inside of his home, Maze actively inserted herself into the
officers’ process of towing her Jeep.
[15] We further note that Maze does not attack the propriety of impounding of her
vehicle. Rather, she tacitly concedes that impoundment was proper by
suggesting the officers should have towed the vehicle when they arrived rather
than knocking on her door and asking her to move it. Maze further argues,
“[b]eing in the car did not obstruct the officers’ duties when the tow truck had
not yet arrived.” (Maze’s Br. 14). However, Maze cites no authority requiring
the officers to let her sit in her vehicle before the tow truck arrived. In addition,
given that she entered her Jeep and told the officers they were not going to tow
it, the reasonable inference is that she was not leaving her vehicle voluntarily.
Thus, Maze’s reliance on Briggs fails, and the officers here were lawfully
engaged in their duties when she resisted. Accordingly, we affirm Maze’s
conviction for resisting law enforcement.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-162 | December 11, 2015 Page 7 of 7