William Church v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 29 2016, 9:53 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick Vaiana Gregory F. Zoeller
Voyles Zahn & Paul Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William Church, January 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1508-CR-1176
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Wayne A.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Sturtevant, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D05-0805-FD-2747
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] In 2010, Appellant-Defendant William Church pled guilty to Class D felony
operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. In accordance with the plea
agreement, Church’s driver’s privileges were suspended for life. In 2015,
Church filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence. Church now appeals the
trial court’s denial of that motion. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 5, 2008, the State charged Church with Class D felony operating a
vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. Church entered into a plea agreement with
the State and pled guilty. The plea agreement read as follows:
Should the defendant enter a plea of guilty to the charge(s) below
and if the court accepts this plea agreement, then the Court shall
sentence the Defendant as follows:
Count 1: Operating a Vehicle as a Habitual Traffic Offender,
Class D Felony
1095 days in the Department of Correction, with 180 days
executed and 915 days suspended. Executed time to be served
through the Hamilton County Work Release program.
Defendant given 28 days credit for 14 actual days served.
$164.50 court costs. $100.00 administrative probation fee. The
Court recommends to the BMV that the Defendant’s license be
suspended for life. Defendant shall be placed on probation for a
period of 2 years, with all standard terms and conditions, and
shall also include: 1) payment of court costs, fines and fees; and
2) determine how the defendant will be transporting himself and
provide that information to his probation officer
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and then the State shall move to dismiss ALL REMAINING
CHARGES UNDER THIS CAUSE NUMBER.
Appellant’s App. p. 12.
[3] On April 27, 2010, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Church in accordance with the terms therein. On April 28, 2010, the trial court
issued its abstract of judgment which stated that Church’s driving privileges
were suspended for 999 years. On July 15, 2015, Church filed a motion to
correct erroneous sentence, which was denied without a hearing on July 22,
2015. Church appeals the denial of his motion.
Discussion and Decision
[4] A trial court may correct an erroneous sentence when a sentence
is facially defective. A sentence is facially defective if it violates
express statutory authority at the time it is imposed. When we
review the trial court’s decision on such a motion, we defer to the
trial court’s factual finding and review its decision only for abuse
of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it. However, we will review a trial
court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.
Parrett v. State, 800 N.E.2d 620, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citations and
quotations omitted).
[5] On appeal, Church argues that the trial court had no authority to suspend his
driving privileges for 999 years because there was no such term in the plea
agreement. The only term in the plea agreement regarding suspension of
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Church’s license reads, “The Court recommends to the BMV that the
Defendant’s license be suspended for life.” Appellant’s App. p. 12. This
provision was recited verbatim in the trial court’s sentencing order. Church
argues that the trial court was bound by the plea “only to recommend the
suspension of Church’s driving privileges for life rather than specifically
ordering the suspension….” Appellant’s Br. p. 5. The State contends that
remand is appropriate to determine whether the suspension was issued pursuant
to the plea agreement or whether it is an additional suspension.
[6] Church was convicted under Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16, which provides
as follows:
(a) A person who operates a motor vehicle:
(1) while the person’s driving privileges are validly
suspended under this chapter or IC 9-12-2 (repealed July 1,
1991) and the person knows that the person’s driving
privileges are suspended; or
(2) in violation of restrictions imposed under this chapter
or IC 9-12-2 (repealed July 1, 1991) and who knows of the
existence of the restrictions;
commits a Class D felony.
****
(c) In addition to any criminal penalty, a person who is convicted of
a felony under subsection (a) forfeits the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle for life. However, if judgment for conviction of a Class A
misdemeanor is entered for an offense under subsection (a), the
court may order a period of suspension of the convicted person’s
driving privileges that is in addition to any suspension of driving
privileges already imposed upon the person.
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(Emphasis added). According to subsection (c), a Class D felony conviction
under subsection (a) automatically causes the convicted individual to forfeit
their driving privileges for life. According to the statutory language, neither the
trial court nor the BMV has the authority to deviate from this mandatory
forfeiture.
[7] Nevertheless, Church argues that the language from the plea agreement and
sentencing order, stating that the trial court “recommends” that the BMV
suspend Church’s driver’s license for life, is only a recommendation and not an
order. Although this argument is novel, it is not supported by law. Regardless
of the language used in the plea, Church forfeited his driving privileges for life
upon pleading guilty to being a habitual traffic offender and the trial court was
bound to order as such.1 The method by which the trial court communicates
Church’s driving privilege forfeiture to the BMV, whether via an order,
recommendation, notification, etc., is irrelevant. The result is the same.
[8] We think it clear that the 999-year suspension in the abstract of judgment was
meant to be a lifetime suspension in accordance with the Indiana Code section
9-30-10-16 and the plea agreement. However, the State believes that remand is
appropriate to clarify that the 999-year suspension is not a secondary
1
Church also argues that, under Section 9-30-10-16(c), it is not the trial court’s place to judicially order the
lifetime suspension but the BMV’s duty to administratively order the suspension. Church goes on to argue
that because the trial court and BMV both issued suspensions, he essentially received two lifetime
suspensions. We find that attempting to distinguish these suspensions is an exercise in semantics. Church
forfeited his license once, and only once, under Section 9-30-10-16. The BMV simply imposed the
suspension mandated by statute and ordered by the trial court.
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suspension in addition to the lifetime suspension provided for in the sentencing
order. Additionally, we note that, despite its functional effect, the trial court
had no authority to order a term-of-years suspension. Accordingly, we remand
with instructions that the trial court make its abstract of judgment consistent
with the sentencing order’s recommendation of a lifetime suspension.
[9] We affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand
with instructions.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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