T.M.J. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 16 2015, 8:30 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Gregory F. Zoeller
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
T.M.J., December 16, 2015
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1504-JV-236
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Faith Graham,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D03-1501-JD-2
May, Judge.
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[1] T.M.J. appeals his adjudication of delinquency for an act that would be theft as
a Class A misdemeanor 1 if committed by an adult. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 5, 2015, T.M.J. and his friends, C.D. and W.D., were at the bus
depot when they spotted a woman looking at her phone. The three boys
discussed a plan to take the woman’s phone. They decided W.D. would take
the phone from the woman when she stepped outside to catch her bus, and
W.D. would run away. T.M.J. advised W.D. to avoid “get[ting] caught with
it.” (Tr. at 57.)
[3] The boys did not take the phone from the first woman because W.D. objected
to taking the phone from someone with a child. They then selected a female
foreign exchange student named Xi Peng. T.M.J. and C.D. encouraged W.D.
to complete the robbery by saying, “There goes your chance, there goes your
chance.” (Id. at 62.) W.D. walked away from the other boys and nearer to
Peng. When there were fewer people around, W.D. stepped past Peng, took
the phone from her hands, and all three boys started running away. T.M.J.
again reminded W.D. not to be caught in possession of the phone.
[4] The boys ran about twelve blocks. Lafayette Police Officer Jason Savage saw
the boys walking and started following them. The boys then ran into a nearby
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (2015).
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neighborhood. Officer Savage called for backup and the officers cornered the
boys and arrested them. W.D. indicated he stuffed the phone into his
underwear while they were running and it fell out.
[5] On January 7, 2015, the State alleged T.M.J. was a delinquent child because he
committed what would be Level 5 felony robbery, 2 Class A misdemeanor theft,
and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement 3 had the offenses been
committed by an adult. The trial court adjudicated T.M.J. as a delinquent for
the theft allegation, finding the State presented sufficient evidence he acted as
an accomplice.
Discussion and Decision
[6] T.M.J. argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he acted as an
accomplice to the theft of Peng’s phone. When reviewing the evidence to
support a juvenile adjudication, we do not assess the credibility of the witnesses
or reweigh the evidence. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). We
look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom supporting the
judgment, and we affirm if the record contained probative evidence that would
allow a reasonable factfinder to infer the offense was committed. Id. Therefore,
we may reverse only “if there is no evidence or reasonable inference to support
any one of the necessary elements of the offense.” Id.2
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2015).
3
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a) (2015).
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[7] There was sufficient evidence T.M.J. was W.D.’s accomplice. “A person who
knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit
an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. We consider four
factors to determine whether someone is an accomplice: “(1) presence at the
scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure
to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and
after occurrence of crime.” Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012).
The mere fact a defendant was present during a crime and did not oppose the
crime is not sufficient to convict him based on accomplice liability. However,
“presence at and acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and
circumstances” may be considered. Id.[8] The facts most favorable to the trial court’s decision are that T.M.J. was present
when W.D. took Peng’s phone. W.D. testified he, C.D., and T.M.J. rode the
bus together to the crime scene. T.M.J. encouraged W.D. to take the phone
from Peng and advised W.D. to avoid getting caught with it. Finally, T.M.J.
ran when officers chased the three. T.M.J. offers an alternate version of events
and suggests he was incapable of exerting authority over W.D. due to their two
year age difference, but those are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence,
which we cannot do. See K.W., 984 N.E.2d at 612 (appellate court cannot
reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses on appeal).
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Conclusion
[9] The State presented sufficient evidence to support T.M.J.’s adjudication as a
delinquent for an act that would be Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by
an adult. Accordingly, we affirm.
[10] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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