Steven Wright v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 14 2016, 8:08 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Aaron E. Haith Gregroy F.Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Steven Wright, January 14, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1409-CR-426
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court, Criminal Division, Room
State of Indiana, No. 1
Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Steven Rubick,
Magistrate
The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber,
Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G01-0211-FB-276086
Altice, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Steven Wright appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his
sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] The facts underlying Wright’s convictions were set out on direct appeal by our
Supreme Court as follows:
Wright was the stay-at-home caregiver for four very young
children, whom he battered and neglected over a substantial
period of time.
***
When the Marion County Sheriff’s Department went to Wright’s
home on September 2, 2001, to investigate the concern of an
alarmed relative who had recently seen the children, it was not
the first indication that Wright was abusing and neglecting the
children in his care. In April 1999, Ma. W., then five months
old, arrived at the hospital with a fever, but medical examination
revealed she also had seven right rib fractures and two left rib
fractures and a healing fracture in her right femur. Wright told
investigating officers that the leg was broken when an uncle had
lost his grip while holding the child and grabbed her to prevent
her from falling. At that time, Wright had no explanation for the
broken ribs, except to suggest that he had, perhaps, held Ma. W.
too tightly. At trial, however, Wright suggested the possibility
that both the ribs and femur were broken when the uncle grabbed
his daughter to prevent her from falling.
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The scene observed by the sheriff’s deputies thirty months later
was a chilling one. Two twins lying on a couch presented such a
shocking appearance that the officers immediately called an
ambulance. The children’s heads were enlarged and swollen;
their bodies were malnourished and thin; their eyes were popping
out of their heads. Medical examination showed that each child
had suffered at least seventeen fractures on various parts of their
bodies. At seven months of age, they weighed barely ten pounds
apiece. The record is replete with details of brain injury and
other damage to the twins. Upstairs, the deputies found Ma. W.
and her sister, ages three and two, in somewhat less distressful
condition.
Wright v. State, 829 N.E.2d 928, 929 (Ind. 2005) (citations to record omitted).
[4] Wright was convicted of two counts of neglect of a dependent and four counts
of battery, all class B felonies. Wright was subsequently sentenced to fifteen
years on every count with three terms ordered consecutive thereby resulting in
an aggregate executed sentence of forty-five years. Wright appealed challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence and the appropriateness of his sentence. This
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Wright v. State, 818 N.E.2d 540 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), trans. granted. The Indiana Supreme Court summarily affirmed
this court’s opinion insofar as it was determined that the evidence was sufficient
to support Wright’s convictions, but held that while several aggravating factors
could be relied upon to support consecutive sentences, those aggravators could
not be used to enhance Wright’s sentences. The Court remanded for a new
sentencing hearing. On September 1, 2005, the trial court reduced Wright’s
sentence from fifteen years on each count to ten years on each count and then
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ordered the sentences on four counts to run consecutively for an aggregate
sentence of forty years imprisonment.
[5] On March 28, 2014, Wright filed a Motion for Reduction of or a Suspension of
Sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17. On April 30, 2014, the State filed
an objection to Wright’s motion. On May 7, 2014, the trial court requested a
conduct report from the Department of Correction. A hearing on Wright’s
motion was held on July 18, 2014. The trial court denied the motion on August
18, 2014. This appeal ensued.
Discussion & Decision
[6] Wright argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
reduce or suspend his sentence. Wright maintains that the trial court ignored
the intent of I.C. § 35-38-1-17, which, he asserts “presents a question of
rehabilitation which must be considered not from the stand point of the initial
sentencing decision but by the convicted person’s conduct and achievements
toward the desired goal of rehabilitation - reformation.” Appellant’s Brief at 8
(citing Ind. Const. art. 1, §§ 16 and 18).
[7] Before we address Wright’s argument, we note the State, relying upon the
version of I.C. § 35-38-1-17 in effect at the time of Wright’s original sentencing
and still in effect when Wright filed his request for modification, argues that the
trial court did not have authority to modify Wright’s sentence without the
prosecutor’s approval. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(b) (2014) (“If more than three
hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the convicted person began
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serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is
present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of
the prosecuting attorney.” (emphasis supplied)). This statute, however, was
amended again and the current version, which went into effect on May 5, 2015
now “applies to a person who: (1) commits an offense; or (2) is sentenced;
before July 1, 2014.” See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(a) (2015); P.L. 164-2015. The
amended statute further provides, in pertinent part, that a convicted person who
is not a violent criminal1 “may file a petition for sentence modification . . .
without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(j). Another
panel of this court recently considered the amended statute and held that “[i]n
light of the legislature’s clear intent that the statute be applied retroactively, we
agree with the State that the amended statute applies to [defendant], whose
appeal was pending when the retroactivity amendment went into effect.” 2
Vazquez v. State, 37 N.E.3d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The same is true in
this case. Wright’s appeal was pending when the amended statute went into
1
For purposes of this statute, “violent criminal” is defined in I.C. § 35-38-1-17(d). The State argues that the
facts underlying Wright’s crimes would constitute aggravated battery pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5,
and thus asserts that Wright should be deemed a violent criminal. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(d)(6). If classified as
a “violent criminal” under this statute, a convicted person “may not file a petition for sentence modification
without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(k). In this appeal, we will not reclassify
Wright’s crimes as aggravated battery.
2
In Vazquez, the defendant pleaded guilty in 2004 and filed his most-recent petition to modify his sentence in
October 2014. The Vazquez court ultimately determined that the amended statute did not entitle the
defendant to the relief sought because the defendant’s request for modification was untimely as it was filed
less than three months after his previous request for modification. The court noted the amended statute
mandates this result in that it clearly provides that “[a] convicted person who is not a violent criminal may
file a petition for sentence modification under this section . . . not more than one (1) time in any three
hundred sixty-five (365) day period . . . .” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(j)(1).
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effect. The prosecutor’s consent was therefore not required in order for the
court to have authority to consider Wright’s request for modification of his
sentence.
[8] We now turn to Wright’s argument. A decision to grant or deny a motion for
sentence modification is within the trial court’s discretion. Hawkins v. State, 951
N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion will
not be found unless the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218
(Ind. 2007).
[9] During the hearing on Wright’s motion, Wright noted his many
accomplishments while incarcerated, including completion of a self-help
program and receiving an associate’s degree in finance, as well as his good
behavior and family support, in arguing to the court that he had been
rehabilitated and was deserving of a modified sentence. In response, the State
objected to any modification based “mostly [on] the nature of the crime.”
Transcript at 9. In its order denying Wright’s motion, the trial court concluded
that having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence before it,
modification of Wright’s sentence was “neither warranted nor appropriate.”
Appellant’s Brief at 12.
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[10] We reject the notion espoused by Wright that the court was limited to
considering only his achievements and efforts at rehabilitation occurring after
the initial sentencing decision. While such efforts are to be considered, the facts
and circumstances of the crimes are undoubtedly important to consider when
the court decides whether to modify a sentence. In fact, we have before held in
considering a different statute allowing for sentence modification that “the
heinousness of a person’s crime alone can serve as the basis for denying a
sentence reduction.” Myers v. State, 718 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Marshall v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (balancing
defendant’s rehabilitative conduct against the aggravating circumstances in
original sentencing order in affirming denial of motion to modify sentence),
trans. denied. As our Supreme Court observed on direct appeal, “even in the
substantial flow of cases reflecting child abuse, Steven V. Wright’s appeal
stands out.” Wright, 829 N.E.2d at 929. Wright was the stay-at-home caregiver
for four very young children, whom he battered and neglected over a substantial
period of time, the alarming details of which are recounted above.
[11] The trial court’s decision to modify, reduce, or suspend a sentence is entirely
discretionary, and the fact that rehabilitation has begun does not compel a
modification of the underlying sentence. Given the extreme depravity of
Wright’s crimes, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Wright’s motion to modify his sentence.
[12] Judgment affirmed.
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Barnes, J., concur.
Robb, J., concurring in result with opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Steven Wright, January 12, 2016
Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1409-CR-426
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana,
Appellee
Robb, Judge, concurring in result
[1] The sentences for the crimes for which Wright was convicted (neglect of a
dependent and battery) are, by law, modifiable. It is not the fact of the crimes
themselves that cause me to agree they should not be modified. I do not believe
the heinousness of the crime alone is sufficient to deny modification, if Indiana
law has not excluded the crime from consideration. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-
17(d); see also slip op. at 5 n.1. I ultimately agree with the majority that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright’s motion for sentence
modification. I agree based on a consideration of the facts of his crime—
specifically his position of trust over four small children and the severity of the
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damage he inflicted on them—and his efforts at rehabilitation since—which are
admirable but do not appear targeted toward his ability or willingness to resist
abusing such a position of trust in the future. I respectfully concur in result.
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