Hobert C. Lamb v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                               Jan 19 2016, 8:22 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Paula M. Sauer                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Danville, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Lyubov Gore
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Hobert C. Lamb,                                          January 19, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    32A04-1506-CR-539
    v.                                               Appeal from the Hendricks
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Karen M. Love,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    32D03-1502-F5-18
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016     Page 1 of 12
    Case Summary and Issues
    [1]   Following a jury trial, Hobert Christopher Lamb was convicted of possession of
    methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony, possession of marijuana as a Class B
    misdemeanor, and possession of paraphernalia as Class A misdemeanor. Lamb
    appeals, raising two restated issues: (1) whether the State presented sufficient
    evidence to support his conviction for possession of methamphetamine; and (2)
    whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting his proposed jury
    instruction on constructive possession. Concluding the evidence was sufficient
    and any error in the instruction of the jury was harmless, we affirm Lamb’s
    convictions.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Venkata Nattam manages the Wingate and Super 8 motels in Plainfield,
    Indiana. In February 2015, Nattam hired Lamb to install floor tile in the
    stairwells of the Wingate. Nattam compensated Lamb by providing a
    complimentary room at the Super 8 for the duration of the project. Lamb was
    the only person who had permission to stay in the room and was the only
    person given a key.
    [3]   On February 21, 2015, a motel employee informed Nattam she detected the
    odor of burnt marijuana emanating from Lamb’s room. Nattam called the
    room to remind Lamb that smoking was not permitted, but Lamb’s employee
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 2 of 12
    Jason answered the phone.1 Jason laughed and hung up, so Nattam called the
    police.
    [4]   Officers Zach Gadawski and Justin Walker of the Plainfield Police Department
    were dispatched to the Super 8 in reference to a marijuana odor. As the officers
    climbed the stairs leading to the second floor, they detected the odor of burnt
    marijuana, which grew stronger in the hallway. The odor was the strongest
    outside the door of Room 209, so the officers knocked on the door. Lamb
    answered approximately thirty seconds later and invited the officers inside.
    Lamb was the only person in the room.
    [5]   Officer Gadawski advised Lamb his room smelled strongly of burnt marijuana.
    Lamb stated he did not know why the room smelled of marijuana and claimed
    he was asleep when they knocked. Officer Gadawski asked Lamb if anyone
    else was staying the room. Lamb stated “to his knowledge” Jason and a
    woman named Heather had stayed the night before. State’s Exhibit 1. Lamb
    also told Officer Gadawski that Jason had been “hollering the police were
    coming” and left just before the officers arrived. Id. While speaking with
    Lamb, Officer Gadawski noticed in plain view on the nightstand a small plastic
    baggie with one end tied off and the bottom ripped out, which he knew through
    his training and experience to be associated with narcotic use. Officer
    Gadawski asked Lamb what was in the baggie; Lamb said he “had no idea.”
    1
    Nattam knew he was speaking with Jason because he had seen Jason in the lobby and had told Jason he
    was not allowed to stay in Lamb’s room.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016      Page 3 of 12
    Id. Officer Gadawski then asked Lamb for consent to search the room, but
    Lamb declined. “I was asleep, so I don’t know what’s in here, man. . . . I
    really don’t know who’s been in here, who ain’t been in here,” Lamb explained.
    Id. Nattam confirmed there had been a variety of people “coming and going”
    from Lamb’s room. Transcript at 235-36.
    [6]   The officers obtained a search warrant for the room and executed the warrant
    later that day.2 First, Officer Brad Elston of the Plainfield Police Department
    conducted a sweep of the room with his K-9 partner. The dog indicated the
    presence of narcotics in several areas of the room. Then, Officers Gadawski
    and Elston conducted the search, focusing on the areas indicated by the dog.
    Lamb was detained in the hallway with Officer Walker during the search.
    Lamb asked Officer Walker “if possession of marijuana is a ticketable offense in
    Indiana,” and told Officer Walker “if they find anything under the bed it’s not
    mine.” Id. at 422. Lamb also stated “something to the effect of I just don’t see
    this ending up well.” Id.
    [7]   Officers Gadawski and Elston uncovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and
    paraphernalia throughout the room. The room had two beds, one of which
    appeared undisturbed when the officers entered. In the bed that Lamb had been
    2
    A second search warrant was issued in this case. While searching the room, Officer Gadawski cut himself,
    so the police obtained a warrant to test Lamb’s blood for bloodborne pathogens. Tr. at 33. Lamb, in his brief
    and reply brief, erroneously states the search warrant was issued to test his blood for drugs. See Brief of
    Appellant at 17; Reply Brief at 9-10. We remind counsel of her duty of candor toward this court under
    Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.3.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016          Page 4 of 12
    sleeping in, they discovered a broken glass pipe with burnt residue. They found
    six syringes under the mattress of the other bed and a second glass pipe between
    the sheets. In the dresser and the area surrounding it, they found clothing, raw
    marijuana, the burnt end of a marijuana cigarette, several more ripped plastic
    baggies, and an Altoid tin with a straw and white residue inside.3 They
    discovered rolling papers in the nightstand, as well as a prescription bottle
    bearing Lamb’s name. On the toilet in the bathroom, the officers noticed a
    residue suggesting something had been flushed. In a trashcan next to the toilet
    they discovered a syringe buried in the trash. Next to the sink, they found a
    toiletry bag that contained a toothbrush, an electric razor, an extension cord,
    and a plastic baggie of suspected methamphetamine. Subsequent forensic
    testing confirmed the plastic baggie contained methamphetamine.
    [8]   The room was cleaned prior to Lamb checking in on February 11, 2015, but the
    room had not since been cleaned. When the search concluded, Officer
    Gadawski informed Lamb of what they had found. Lamb admitted the
    marijuana was his but denied having knowledge of the other items. On
    February 23, 2015, the State charged Lamb with possession of
    methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony, possession of methamphetamine as a
    Level 5 felony, possession of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor, and
    possession of paraphernalia as Class A misdemeanor. The trial court granted
    3
    Officer Gadawski testified straws are commonly used to ingest “powdery substance[s]” through a drug
    user’s nose, “whether it be pills, cocaine, meth.” Tr. at 309-10.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016       Page 5 of 12
    the State’s motion to dismiss the Level 5 felony on April 7, 2015, and a jury
    trial was held the following week. The jury found Lamb guilty of the remaining
    charges. The trial court ordered Lamb to serve an aggregate sentence of 730
    days executed in the Department of Correction. This appeal followed.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Sufficiency of Evidence
    A. Standard of Review
    [9]    Lamb contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
    possession of methamphetamine. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and
    reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    ,
    146 (Ind. 2007). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of
    witnesses. 
    Id.
     Unless no reasonable fact-finder could conclude the elements of
    the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the
    conviction. 
    Id.
    B. Possession of Methamphetamine
    [10]   A person commits possession of methamphetamine if he knowingly or
    intentionally possesses methamphetamine without a valid prescription. 
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6
    .1. Lamb argues the State failed to prove he possessed the
    methamphetamine found in the motel room.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 6 of 12
    [11]   We have long recognized a conviction for a possessory offense may rest upon
    proof of either actual or constructive possession. Goodner v. State, 
    685 N.E.2d 1058
    , 1061 (Ind. 1997). A defendant constructively possesses an item when he
    has both the capability and the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.
    Gray v. State, 
    957 N.E.2d 171
    , 174 (Ind. 2011). Proof of a possessory interest in
    the premises where the item is found satisfies the capability prong, regardless of
    whether possession of the premises is exclusive. Gee v. State, 
    810 N.E.2d 338
    ,
    340-41 (Ind. 2004). As for the intent prong, if a defendant’s possession of the
    premises is non-exclusive, the inference of intent to maintain dominion and
    control must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the
    defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the item and its presence. Id. at 341.
    Recognized “additional circumstances” include: (1) incriminating statements;
    (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a setting that suggests drug
    manufacturing; (4) the proximity of the item to the defendant; (5) whether the
    item was found in plain view; and (6) the mingling of the item with other items
    the defendant owns. Id.
    [12]   Lamb properly concedes he had a possessory interest in the motel room and
    thus had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the
    methamphetamine. On appeal, Lamb contends his possession of the room was
    non-exclusive and the State failed to show additional circumstances
    demonstrating his knowledge of the methamphetamine. We agree Lamb’s
    possession of the room was non-exclusive but conclude the evidence presented
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 7 of 12
    at trial supplied additional circumstances that sufficiently demonstrated Lamb’s
    intent to maintain dominion and control over the methamphetamine.
    [13]   Lamb argues the evidence established at least two people had been staying in
    the room and the State presented no evidence regarding which items in the
    room belonged to Lamb. When the police arrived, however, Lamb was the
    only person in the room and was in close proximity to the methamphetamine.
    The sink was in the same area as the beds, in between Lamb’s bed and the door.
    The sink was not in the bathroom, so Lamb could see the toiletry bag from
    where he was lying. Lamb was furthermore the only registered guest for Room
    209. When the police conducted the search, he had been staying in the room
    for ten days, and the second bed appeared undisturbed, as if no one had slept in
    it during that time. Given these facts, the jury could reasonably infer the
    personal items in the room belonged to Lamb and the methamphetamine was
    thus mingled with Lamb’s possessions. See Tate v. State, 
    835 N.E.2d 499
    , 511
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding it reasonable to infer firearms found in a motel
    room were mingled with the defendant’s possessions because the defendant was
    staying in the motel room at the time, notwithstanding the fact that he was
    sharing the room with several others), trans. denied.
    [14]   Lamb also made incriminating statements. While Officers Gadawski and
    Elston searched the room, Lamb asked Officer Walker “if possession of
    marijuana is a ticketable offense in Indiana.” Tr. at 422. He also told Officer
    Walker “if they find anything under the bed it’s not mine,” and stated
    “something to the effect of I just don’t see this ending up well.” 
    Id.
     The
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 8 of 12
    officers found six syringes under the mattress of the bed that appeared
    undisturbed and a glass pipe under the other mattress. Lamb argues his
    incriminating statements “linked him to the marijuana, not the
    methamphetamine,” Reply Br. at 2, but we cannot agree. Syringes are not used
    to ingest marijuana, and the pipe the police found in the bed could have been
    used to smoke either marijuana or methamphetamine. See Tr. at 309. As
    Officer Gadawski testified, syringes are typically used to inject “[c]ocaine,
    methamphetamine, heroin, anything that can be melted into a liquid and
    introduced in the body.” 
    Id.
                We therefore cannot agree Lamb’s incriminating
    statements linked him only to the marijuana.
    [15]   The jury could reasonably infer Lamb’s guilt from the evidence presented at
    trial, and we consider the bulk of Lamb’s argument on this issue—regarding
    how many toothbrushes were found in the room, for instance—merely a
    request for this court to reweigh the evidence. Lamb had a possessory interest
    in the motel room, and the evidence supplied additional circumstances that
    sufficiently demonstrated his intent to maintain dominion and control over the
    methamphetamine. The evidence was sufficient to support Lamb’s conviction
    for possession of methamphetamine.
    II. Jury Instructions
    A. Standard of Review
    [16]   Lamb also contends the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting his
    proposed jury instruction on constructive possession. “Instructing a jury is left
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 9 of 12
    to the sound discretion of the trial court and we review its decision only for an
    abuse of discretion.” Washington v. State, 
    997 N.E.2d 342
    , 345 (Ind. 2013). In
    determining whether a jury instruction was properly refused, we consider: “(1)
    whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was
    evidence presented at trial to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the
    substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given.”
    McCowan v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 760
    , 763-64 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). But
    reversal is not warranted unless the instructions as a whole misstate the law or
    mislead the jury. Wallen v. State, 
    28 N.E.3d 328
    , 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
    denied. An error in refusing an instruction is harmless “where a conviction is
    clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found
    otherwise.” Dill v. State, 
    741 N.E.2d 1230
    , 1233 (Ind. 2001).
    B. Final Instruction No. 9B
    [17]   As stated above, where a defendant has non-exclusive possession of the
    premises where an item is found, the inference of intent to maintain dominion
    and control of the item must be supported by “additional circumstances”
    pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the item and its
    presence. Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 341. Our supreme court has identified various
    examples of “additional circumstances,” and has supplied a non-exhaustive list
    of the types of evidence which would tend to show a defendant’s knowledge.
    Supra, at ¶ 11; see also Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 174-75 (stating the list is “not
    exhaustive as other circumstances could just as reasonably demonstrate
    requisite knowledge”) (citing Carnes v. State, 
    480 N.E.2d 581
    , 586 (Ind. Ct. App.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 10 of 12
    1985), trans. denied). Lamb’s proposed jury instruction on constructive
    possession included the list of recognized “additional circumstances.”
    Appendix at 130.
    [18]   The trial court refused to include the list in the instruction, fearing its inclusion
    would amount to improper comment on the evidence. Tr. at 476-77.
    Accordingly, Final Instruction No. 9B read as follows:
    Possession of something may take two forms. One can possess
    an item directly, meaning that he or she has actual physical
    control over the item. Or, one can possess something
    constructively, meaning that he or she has the capability and
    intent to possess the item, even though actual physical control is
    absent. When possession of the premises on which drugs or
    paraphernalia is not exclusive [sic], the inference of intent to
    maintain dominion and control over the items must be supported
    by additional circumstances pointing to the accused’s knowledge
    of the nature of the drugs and/or paraphernalia and their
    presence in his hotel room.
    App. at 202. Rather than include the list of recognized “additional
    circumstances,” the trial court permitted both sides to argue the existence of
    “additional circumstances” during closing arguments. Tr. at 476-77.
    [19]   Although we agree with Lamb that his proffered instruction listing the
    recognized “additional circumstances” correctly stated the law, that the
    evidence supported giving the instruction, and that the substance of the
    instruction was not covered by other instructions given, we cannot conclude the
    trial court committed reversible error. The final version of the instruction did
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 11 of 12
    not misstate the law or mislead the jury regarding the requirement of
    “additional circumstances.” Lamb was permitted to argue the absence of
    “additional circumstances,” and we have already concluded the State presented
    sufficient evidence to support Lamb’s conviction. In short, the error was
    harmless.
    Conclusion
    [20]   The evidence was sufficient to support Lamb’s conviction for possession of
    methamphetamine, and the trial court did not commit reversible error by
    rejecting Lamb’s proposed jury instruction. We therefore affirm Lamb’s
    convictions.
    [21]   Affirmed.
    Barnes, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1506-CR-539 | January 19, 2016   Page 12 of 12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 32A04-1506-CR-539

Filed Date: 1/19/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/19/2016