Keith Phillips v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                     FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    Jul 27 2018, 9:24 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Donald E.C. Leicht                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Kokomo, Indiana                                           Attorney General
    Chandra K. Hein
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Keith Phillips,                                           July 27, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-210
    v.                                                Appeal from the Howard Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable William C.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Menges, Jr., Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    34D01-1503-F2-298
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-210 | July 27, 2018                   Page 1 of 5
    Case Summary
    [1]   Keith Phillips appeals the trial court’s order revoking his previously suspended
    sentence for violation of the terms and conditions of his re-entry program. He
    claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him credit
    time for the time he spent incarcerated during his participation in the program.
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In March 2015, the State charged Phillips with level 2 felony dealing in cocaine,
    level 3 felony dealing in cocaine, level 6 felony maintaining a common
    nuisance, and class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On September 30,
    2015, the State and Phillips entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which
    Phillips pled guilty to level 3 felony possession of cocaine in exchange for the
    dismissal of the other charges. The parties also agreed that Phillips would be
    sentenced to fifteen years executed with ten years suspended to probation. The
    agreement provided that a modification of sentence by the trial court would be
    considered if Phillips completed a therapeutic community program while
    incarcerated. The trial court accepted the agreement and sentenced Phillips
    accordingly.
    [3]   A little less than one year later, on September 22, 2016, Phillips requested a
    modification of sentence after he completed the Westville Therapeutic
    Community substance abuse treatment program. On November 2, 2016, the
    trial court modified Phillips’s sentence by suspending the balance of his
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-210 | July 27, 2018   Page 2 of 5
    executed sentence to probation and approving his participation in the
    Department of Correction Community Transition Program. “As a specific
    condition of the Community Transition Program and Probation, [Phillips]
    [was] ordered to successfully complete, and make satisfactory arrangements to
    pay for the Howard County Re-Entry Program.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 68.
    Phillips signed a program participation agreement in which he agreed to waive
    his right to earned credit time for any time spent in jail or otherwise confined
    during his participation in the re-entry program.
    [4]   On March 9, 2017, the trial court found Phillips in indirect contempt of court
    for violating the terms of the re-entry program and issued an arrest warrant.
    Phillips was taken into custody on March 10, 2017. Apparently, he was
    subsequently released and he absconded to Nevada. On April 17, 2017, the
    trial court found that Phillips again violated the terms of the re-entry program
    for failure to appear and issued another warrant. Phillips was subsequently
    arrested in Nevada and brought back to Indiana. A notice of termination from
    the re-entry program was filed on November 22, 2017. The trial court held a
    hearing and terminated Phillips’s participation in the re-entry program on
    December 20, 2017.1 That same day, the State filed a petition to revoke
    Phillips’s probation and, following a hearing on January 19, 2018, the trial
    1
    Phillips claims in his brief that he was continually incarcerated for his re-entry program violations from
    March 10, 2017, through December 20, 2017, when he was terminated from the program. The record does
    not support this assertion. During the probation revocation hearing, Phillips testified that he was
    incarcerated from March 10 until sometime in April 2017, when he left Indiana. He stated that he was later
    arrested in Nevada and brought back to Indiana “in about June” of 2017. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-210 | July 27, 2018                      Page 3 of 5
    court entered its order revoking Phillips’s previously suspended sentence. The
    court awarded him credit for thirty actual days served plus ten days of good
    time credit. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   “‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
    a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Heaton v. State, 
    984 N.E.2d 614
    , 616 (Ind.
    2013) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007)). It is within the
    trial court’s discretion to determine probation conditions and to revoke
    probation if the conditions are violated. 
    Id.
     “In appeals from trial court
    probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of
    discretion.” 
    Id.
     An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the
    trial court misinterprets the law. 
    Id.
    [6]   Phillips argues that, in revoking his probation and imposing his previously
    suspended sentence, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him
    credit for the time he spent incarcerated as a sanction for his violations of the re-
    entry program. Credit time is a matter of statutory right, and for that reason
    trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit.
    Meadows v. State, 
    2 N.E.3d 788
    , 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). However, Phillips
    fails to acknowledge the provision of the re-entry program participation
    agreement in which he voluntarily and intentionally waived his right to earn
    credit time for any sanction under the re-entry program. This Court has
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-210 | July 27, 2018   Page 4 of 5
    determined that a defendant may waive the right to credit time as part of a
    written participation agreement. House v. State, 
    901 N.E.2d 598
    , 600 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2009). Paragraph nine of the participation agreement for the re-entry
    program specifically states, “Participant agrees to waive his right to earn credit
    time for any time spent in jail or otherwise confined to which he would
    otherwise be entitle[d] pursuant to Indiana law during participation in the
    Reentry Program.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 70. Thus, Phillips was not
    eligible to earn credit for time served while he was participating in the re-entry
    program; he was eligible to begin earning credit for time served only once his
    participation in the program was terminated on December 20, 2017. He was,
    therefore, only entitled to credit time from December 20, 2017, the date he was
    no longer participating in the re-entry program, until January 19, 2017, the date
    his probation was revoked. When the trial court revoked his suspended
    sentence, it gave Phillips credit for thirty actual days served while awaiting the
    disposition of the case plus ten days of good time credit. The trial court did not
    abuse its discretion.
    [7]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-210 | July 27, 2018   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-210

Filed Date: 7/27/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/27/2018