Octavio D. Gonzalez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 16 2017, 8:38 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen Celestino-Horseman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Octavio D. Gonzalez, August 16, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1701-CR-151
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant W.
Appellee-Plaintiff Hawkins, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G05-1407-MR-35467
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Following a jury trial, Octavio Daniel Gonzalez appeals his conviction for
murder. He asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction and that the trial court committed fundamental error in admitting
DNA evidence. Finding the evidence sufficient and no fundamental error, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Dexter Smith and Quashawnda Wagner were married with three children and
lived in a single-story house in Indianapolis. Wagner’s cousin introduced the
couple to Gonzalez, resulting in a close friendship between Gonzalez and
Smith. Gonzalez was such a frequent visitor at Smith’s house that “[h]e was
over [at the house] ninety-eight percent of the time.” Tr. at 30. On July 11,
2014, Wagner, Smith, and Gonzalez rented a car and drove to Kentucky and
back while the children stayed with Smith’s mother in Indianapolis. The next
morning, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Wagner left her house and drove the
rental car to her mother-in-law’s residence. Only Smith and Gonzalez, who
was sleeping on a sofa in the sun room, remained in the house.
[3] At approximately 9:30 a.m., Smith used Gonzalez’s cell phone to call Wagner
and said that he was looking for a pair of his earrings. Wagner looked for the
earrings in the rental car but did not find them. About twenty to thirty minutes
later, Wagner called Smith at Gonzalez’s cell phone number and Smith’s three
cell phone numbers, but he did not answer. She decided to return to their
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house, and Wagner’s mother-in-law followed in her vehicle. When Wagner
arrived at the house, she went to the front door, which was locked, and opened
it with her keys. Upon entering the house, she noticed that the house was silent
and Gonzalez was no longer there. Wagner found Smith lying on the bedroom
floor with a pool of blood around his head. She quickly exited the house and
informed her mother-in-law of Smith’s condition. Tyron Belton, the next-door
neighbor, was mowing the grass when he heard Wagner’s wails. Belton called
911, and shortly thereafter the police and emergency medical personnel arrived.
Smith was declared dead. An autopsy determined that his death was caused by
a single gunshot to the back of the head.
[4] Around 10:30 a.m., prior to Wagner’s arrival, Belton had driven to a nearby gas
station to purchase gas for his lawn mower. As Belton drove back to his house
he recognized Gonzalez, by the haircut he had given him a few days earlier,
walking on the sidewalk away from Smith’s house. Belton thought this was
strange because “[Gonzalez] never walked anywhere, he was always with
[Smith].” Id. at 53. Belton did not see anyone else out walking or anyone else
coming and going from Smith’s house that morning.
[5] Wagner informed the police that Smith’s handgun was missing from its holster
on top of the bedroom dresser and that $15,000 in cash, which Wagner had
seen Smith count the previous night, was also missing from Smith’s sweatpants
pocket. The police noticed that the back doors were closed but unlocked and
that the rear security gate was open. Wagner attempted to locate Gonzalez, but
her phone calls went unanswered. Wagner’s cousin provided her with the
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phone number of Gonzalez’s mother-in-law, Shelaime Yamobi, who lived near
Atlanta, Georgia. Wagner called Yamobi, without mentioning the death of her
husband, and Yamobi informed her that she had not seen Gonzalez. On the
same evening as Wagner’s phone call, Gonzalez arrived unannounced at
Yamobi’s house looking to speak with his wife and see their daughter. Yamobi
asked Gonzalez about the sudden visit, and he responded, “I just need to lay
low for a little while. I want to spend time with them.” Id. at 106. Gonzalez
then took his wife and daughter to a hotel.
[6] The following morning Wagner called Yamobi a second time and asked her
whether she had seen or spoken to Gonzalez. Wagner explained why she was
calling and informed Yamobi about the death of her husband. Yamobi
immediately called her daughter and drove over to the hotel. At the hotel,
Yamobi told Gonzalez about Wagner’s phone call, specifically, that Wagner
believed that Gonzalez was responsible for Smith’s death. Gonzalez
responded, “[T]he less you know the better.” Id. at 109. Gonzalez and his wife
started arguing. Yamobi heard Gonzalez tell her daughter that “it was either
him or me. That’s all you need to know.” Id. at 110. Yamobi told Gonzalez to
stay away from them and left the hotel with her daughter and granddaughter.
[7] On July 15, 2014, Yamobi contacted the detective assigned to Smith’s case and
informed him of Gonzalez’s whereabouts and what he had said when he was
confronted. Federal marshals searched the Atlanta area for Gonzalez but were
unable to find him. Gonzalez was charged with murder, murder in the
commission of a robbery, level 2 felony robbery, and a firearm enhancement,
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and a warrant was issued for his arrest. In March 2016, Gonzalez was
apprehended in Atlanta under a false name.
[8] A two-day jury trial was held in November 2016. The jury found Gonzalez
guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to a term of fifty-five years. Gonzalez
now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The State presented sufficient evidence to support
Gonzalez’s murder conviction.
[9] Gonzalez contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support
his murder conviction. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is
well settled. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of
witnesses. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). Rather, we look to the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the
conviction. Id. The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm
if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bell, 31 N.E.3d at 499.
In sum, the reviewing court will not disturb the conviction when the testimony
believed by the trier of fact is sufficient to support it. Id. at 500.
[10] To convict Gonzalez of murder, the State was required to prove that he
knowingly or intentionally killed Smith. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Gonzalez
argues that there was no evidence regarding the specific time of the murder and
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therefore no way to positively identify him as the perpetrator.1 He suggests that
the evidence merely places him “in the vicinity” of the murder along with any
number of neighbors or strangers who could have been present at the
undetermined time of death. Appellant’s Br. at 13.
[11] “Elements of offenses and identity may be established entirely by circumstantial
evidence and the logical inferences drawn therefrom.” Holloway v. State, 983
N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Gonzalez was the only person in the
house with Smith after Wagner left the house at 6:00 a.m. At 9:30 a.m., Smith
called Wagner using Gonzalez’s cell phone, which suggests that Gonzalez was
still present in the house. Belton identified Gonzalez walking on the sidewalk
away from Smith’s house around 10:30 a.m. This was “strange” because
Belton had never seen Gonzalez walking, much less without Smith. Tr. at 53.
Smith’s body was discovered around 11:00 a.m., and Belton did not see anyone
else walking on the streets or coming into or out of Smith’s house while he
mowed the grass next door. Although the exact time of Smith’s death is
unknown, the short time frame in which the murder must have been committed
suggests that Gonzalez alone had the opportunity to commit it.
1
Gonzalez also argues that there was no forensic evidence that supported the conviction and no evidence of
motive. These arguments are immaterial. Although such evidence can be helpful to prove the identity of a
perpetrator, it is not essential to sustain a murder conviction. See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 725 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ind.
2000) (finding sufficient evidence to support murder conviction despite complete lack of forensic evidence);
Moore v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“[I]t is not necessary for the prosecution to offer
evidence of motive, although it may do so.”), trans. denied.
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[12] Also, Gonzalez’s actions after Smith’s murder are indicative that he committed
it. Gonzalez immediately stopped answering his cell phone, fled the state
within a day or two of the murder, and assumed an alias while evading police
for over a year and a half. Our supreme court has stated that “flight may be
considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Jones v. State,
485 N.E.2d 627, 628 (Ind. 1985).
[13] Gonzalez’s comments to his mother-in-law and wife also suggest his guilt. He
told Yamobi that he “need[ed] to lay low for a little while.” Tr. at 106. When
Yamobi confronted him with Wagner’s accusation that he was responsible for
Smith’s death, he simply responded that “the less you know the better.” Id. at
109. Furthermore, when his wife insisted on knowing what happened,
Gonzalez defended his actions by stating that “it was either him or me. That’s
all you need to know.” Id. at 110. The jury, as factfinder, could reasonably
infer from these comments that Gonzalez was guilty. Gonzalez’s argument is
an invitation to this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Bell,
31 N.E.3d at 499. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence to identify Gonzalez as the murderer.
Section 2 – The trial court did not commit fundamental error
in admitting DNA evidence.
[14] At trial, Shannin Guy, a forensic scientist at the Marion County Forensic
Services Agency, testified regarding DNA samples. Specifically, Guy testified
that four swabs from Smith’s sweatpants pocket contained a mixture of DNA
from several individuals from which Gonzalez and Smith could not be
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excluded as possible contributors. More than “possible contribut[ion]” could
not be established due to the lack of “exclusionary information.” Id. at 155.
Guy provided further statistical data about the significance of the analysis.2
Gonzalez argues that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence. Notably,
however, Gonzalez did not object to the admission of the testimony during
trial. Thus, he has waived this issue on appeal. This is because “[a] trial court
cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an
opportunity to consider.” Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004).
[15] Accordingly, Gonzalez asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error
in admitting the DNA evidence. “The fundamental error doctrine is an
exception to the general rule that the failure to object at trial constitutes
procedural default precluding consideration of the issue on appeal.” Halliburton
v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). As an exception it is “extremely
narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic
principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error
2
Regarding the first swab, Guy testified that “[t]he DNA profile … is a mixture of at least three individuals.
[Smith and Gonzalez] cannot be excluded as possible contributors to the mix sample. It is estimated that 1 in
3,000 unrelated individuals could be a contributor to the mix sample.” Tr. at 145. For the second swab,
“[t]he DNA profile … is a mixture of at least four individuals. [Smith and Gonzalez] cannot be excluded as
possible contributors to the mix sample. It is estimated that one in forty unrelated individuals could be a
contributor to the mix sample.” Id. at 148. For the third swab, “[t]he DNA profile … is the mixture of at
least three individuals. [Smith and Gonzalez] cannot be excluded as possible contributors to the mix sample.
It is estimated that 1 in 1,700 unrelated individuals could be a contributor to the mix sample.” Id. For the
fourth swab, “[t]he DNA profile … is the mixture of at least three individuals. [Smith and Gonzalez] could
not be excluded as possible contributors to the mix sample. It is estimated that one in seven unrelated
individuals could be a contributor to the mix sample.” Id.
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denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. In sum, it is available only
in “egregious circumstances.” Id.
[16] Here, the DNA evidence, albeit inconclusive, did not substantially harm
Gonzalez or deny his right to due process. Significantly, at closing argument,
the State conceded that Guy’s testimony was inconclusive and was presented
for the purpose of “[showing that DNA sampling] was done . . . [so that there]
would be no speculation [on the part of the jury] ….” Tr. at 212. The probative
value of such testimony may be minimal, but it cannot be said to have
prejudiced Gonzalez’s substantial rights such that a fair trial was impossible.3
Assuming for argument’s sake that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA
evidence, any error was harmless. “[A]n error of admission of evidence will not
result in reversal of a conviction if the error is harmless. An error will be
viewed as harmless if the probable impact of the evidence upon the jury is
sufficiently minor so as not to affect a party’s substantial rights.” Edmond v.
State, 790 N.E.2d 141, 144-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citation and quotation
3
Indiana Evidence Rule 401 states, “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.” Indiana Evidence Rule 402 states, “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Gonzalez asserts that
because the DNA evidence was inconclusive, it was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The State rebuts
this argument by focusing on Guy’s statistical data, citing Deloney v. State, 938 N.E.2d 724 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. denied (2011). In Deloney, this Court held that “DNA evidence that does not constitute a match
or is not accompanied by statistical data regarding the probability of a defendant’s contribution to a mixed
sample is not relevant … and should not be admitted.” Id. at 730. Here, Guy did testify about the statistical
data, but on cross-examination it became apparent that the statistical weight of the sample, to determine
whether Gonzalez was an actual contributor, was rather tenuous. We note that the mere mention of
statistical data does not automatically make such evidence relevant. Deloney does not stand for the
proposition that any statistical data regarding DNA evidence suffices for the purposes of relevancy and
admissibility. Rather, the statistical data must have the tendency “to make a fact more or less probable.”
Ind. Evidence Rule 401.
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marks omitted), trans. denied. Here, the State presented evidence that Gonzalez
had the opportunity to commit the crime and was the last known person to be
with Smith; he fled the scene and evaded authorities under a false name for
over a year and a half; and his own damning statements to his mother-in-law
and wife implicate his guilt. Finding no fundamental error, we affirm
Gonzalez’s murder conviction.
[17] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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