In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of S.T. v. Madison State Hospital (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                      Aug 03 2017, 5:45 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                               CLERK
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                 Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Valerie K. Boots                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                   Attorney General of Indiana
    Frances Barrow
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Civil                              August 3, 2017
    Commitment of S.T.,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1610-MH-2401
    Appellant-Respondent,                                   Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    v.                                              The Honorable Steven Eichholtz,
    Judge
    Madison State Hospital,                                 Trial Court Cause No.
    49D08-0901-MH-2739
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Barnes, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017     Page 1 of 11
    Case Summary
    [1]   S.T. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for dismissal of regular
    commitment. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   S.T. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly found
    Madison State Hospital proved by clear and convincing evidence that S.T. is
    dangerous to others.
    Facts
    [3]   In September 2006, thirty-eight-year-old S.T. was accused of molesting a three-
    year-old boy at his church. The State charged S.T. with child molesting. S.T.’s
    I.Q. is 57, and he was found incompetent to stand trial. He was committed to
    the Division of Mental Health and Addiction of the Indiana Family and Social
    Services Administration, and he was housed at Logansport State Hospital. In
    January 2009, Logansport State Hospital filed a petition for involuntary
    commitment of S.T. A physician’s statement included with the petition stated
    that S.T. suffered from “Pedophilia [and] Mild Mental Retardation.”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The trial court granted the petition. S.T. filed a
    motion for relief from judgment, arguing that service was not proper and that
    he did not meet the criteria for civil commitment. After a hearing, the trial
    court denied S.T.’s motion for relief from judgment. In its findings, the trial
    court noted:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 2 of 11
    Nancy Maxwell, behavioral clinician 3 and sexual responsibility
    trainer at Logansport State Hospital, testified concerning her
    work with [S.T.]. She testified that she has [S.T.] in group and
    individual therapy once or twice a week, and in sexual
    responsibility training twice a week. She testified that [S.T.] is
    definitely a danger to children. [S.T.] has admitted to four other
    episodes of child molestation. Access to children was gained by
    [S.T.] through the church daycare center where he spent a lot of
    time. [S.T.] has admitted to watching child pornography. Ms.
    Maxwell testified that [S.T.] admitted to “trolling” the
    Greenwood Mall in search of children. [S.T.] drives a “hot
    yellow pickup truck” that works as a “kid magnet.” Ms.
    Maxwell testified that the pickup truck was a “grooming tool”
    and also endearing himself to the parents of young children was
    another grooming tool. [S.T.’s] preference is for young children
    because “they don’t tell on him.”
    Id. at 97.
    [4]   Each year, Logansport State Hospital filed annual reports regarding S.T., and
    the trial court entered orders continuing S.T.’s commitment without hearing.
    In May 2011, S.T. was transferred from Logansport State Hospital to Madison
    State Hospital (“Hospital”), and the Hospital began filing the annual reports.
    The trial court continued extending S.T.’s commitment without hearing. In
    February 2015, hospital staff determined that S.T. was competent to stand trial.
    However, the State dismissed the charges against him. S.T. remained at the
    Hospital under a regular commitment.
    [5]   In July 2016, S.T. filed a motion for a review hearing and dismissal of the
    regular commitment. At the review hearing, the Hospital presented the
    testimony of Dr. Ross Nunes, S.T.’s psychiatrist since 2011, and Dr. Pamela
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 3 of 11
    Gutherie, S.T.’s clinical psychologist. The trial court entered findings of fact
    and conclusions thereon as follows:
    [S.T.] was originally found incompetent to stand trial, and
    subsequently committed under a regular commitment on
    February 3, 2009. His commitment has been renewed annually
    since that time. On January 14, 2016, Madison State Hospital
    filed the current periodic report. On February 1, 2016, the court
    issued an order continuing the regular commitment. The matter
    was heard by the court on October 19, 201[6]. Dr. Nunes
    respondent’s treatment psychiatrist at Madison State Hospital
    testified that the respondent suffers from pedophilia, malingering,
    and mild intellectual disability all of which are mental disorders.
    During the course of his commitment to state hospitals
    respondent admits to having reoccurring urges to have sexual
    contact with minors age 13 or younger. Respondent has chosen
    for most of his stay not to participate in any of the treatment
    programs designed to assist him in coping with those urges. The
    psychiatrist and social worker involved [in] respondent’s care
    testified that they believe he is a danger to others and if released
    would be highly at risk to satisfy those urges. Their opinion is
    based on his behavior within the controlled setting of the state
    hospital. For most of his stay in state hospitals the respondent
    has been on 15 minute intervals to check his room at night to
    prevent him from attempting to enter the rooms of other patients
    to engage in unwanted sexual activity. He consistently acts on
    urges and impulses to violate the personal space of other patients,
    and violate rules of the hospital. His [sic] been giving various
    evaluations which place same in an overall risk/need category of
    moderate to high.
    The respondent has not engaged in any sexual acts with children
    under the age of 13 within the controlled hospital setting.
    However, he continues to attempt to engage in unwanted sexual
    behaviors with peers. He also routinely violates rules, takes
    advantage of peers and violates the rights of other patients.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 4 of 11
    These activities coupled with the risk need assessments support a
    finding that if not under a commitment in the controlled
    environment of the state hospital respondent is a danger to
    others. The court therefore finds:
    1.      Respondent is suffering from pedophilia, malingering, and
    mild intellectual disability which is mental illness as
    defined in IC 12-7-2-130.
    2.      Respondent is a danger to others, as defined by IC 12-7-2-
    53.
    3.      Respondent is in need of commitment to an appropriate
    facility for [a] period expected to exceed ninety (90) days.
    4.      The appropriate facility where Respondent can receive
    rehabilitative treatment or rehabilitation and care is
    Madison State Hospital, which is the least restrictive
    environment suitable for the necessary care, treatment and
    protection of said person and others.
    5.      Each and every form of treatment, and each and every
    alternative form of treatment has specifically been
    evaluated by psychiatrists for Respondent.
    6.      There is not less restrictive alternative treatment and the
    treatment selected is reasonable and restricts the
    Respondent’s liberty in the least possible degree.
    It is therefore ordered that [S.T.], Respondent, is accordingly
    committed to the designated facility, where Petitioner is granted an
    order to treat with medications unless Respondent does not
    specifically benefit from the medications, until the Respondent is
    discharged or until the Court terminates the commitment.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 5 of 11
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 14-15. S.T. now appeals.
    Analysis
    [6]   S.T. challenges the trial court’s continuation of his commitment. “‘[T]he
    purpose of civil commitment proceedings is dual: to protect the public and to
    ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake.’” Civil Commitment of
    T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    27 N.E.3d 271
    , 273 (Ind. 2015) (quoting In re
    Commitment of Roberts, 
    723 N.E.2d 474
    , 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). “The liberty
    interest at stake in a civil commitment proceeding goes beyond a loss of one’s
    physical freedom, and given the serious stigma and adverse social consequences
    that accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an involuntary
    civil commitment is subject to due process requirements.” 
    Id.
     (citing Addington
    v. Texas, 
    441 U.S. 418
    , 425-26, 
    99 S. Ct. 1804
     (1979)). “To satisfy the
    requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary commitment
    must be shown ‘by clear and convincing evidence . . . . [which] not only
    communicates the relative importance our legal system attaches to a decision
    ordering an involuntary commitment, but . . . also has the function of reducing
    the chance of inappropriate commitments.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commitment of J.B. v.
    Midtown Mental Health Ctr., 
    581 N.E.2d 448
    , 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans.
    denied).
    [7]   In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a determination made
    under the statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence, we will
    affirm if, “‘considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 6 of 11
    inferences supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness
    credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find [the necessary elements] proven
    by clear and convincing evidence.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v.
    Robertson, 
    519 N.E.2d 135
    , 137 (Ind. 1988)). This appellate standard of review
    applies in civil commitment decisions. 
    Id.
    [8]   The Hospital was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that S.T.
    “is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled” and that S.T.’s
    continued commitment was appropriate. 
    Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5
    . At least
    annually, the Hospital is required to file with the court a review of the
    individual’s care and treatment. I.C. § 12-26-15-1. The review must contain a
    statement of:
    (1) The mental condition of the individual.
    (2) Whether the individual is dangerous or gravely disabled.
    (3) Whether the individual:
    (A) needs to remain in the facility; or
    (B) may be cared for under a guardianship.
    Id.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 7 of 11
    [9]    S.T. challenges the trial court’s finding that he is dangerous.1 Indiana Code
    Section 12-7-2-53 defines “dangerous” as “a condition in which an individual as
    a result of mental illness, presents a substantial risk that the individual will
    harm the individual or others.” The trial court found:
    [S.T.] continues to attempt to engage in unwanted sexual
    behaviors with peers. He also routinely violates rules, takes
    advantage of peers and violates the rights of other patients.
    These activities coupled with the risk need assessments support a
    finding that if not under a commitment in the controlled
    environment of the state hospital respondent is a danger to
    others.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 14.
    [10]   The Hospital presented evidence regarding S.T.’s dangerousness. Dr. Nunes
    testified that S.T. has urges to have sexual contact with children, that S.T. has
    admitted to contact with more than one child, and that S.T.’s daily behaviors
    demonstrate “the consistent violation of others rights and boundaries.” Tr. p.
    11. Dr. Nunes believed that S.T. was “dangerous to others by virtue of his
    ongoing pedophilic urges.” Id. at 13. He testified:
    [S.T.] has expressed to me repeatedly over time including
    recently, an ongoing predilection towards having sexual fantasies
    of young male children. And one of the most common things
    1
    S.T. does not contest the trial court’s finding that he is mentally ill; however, he does dispute the trial
    court’s finding that he suffers from pedophilia. S.T. does not present “detailed argument on this point”
    because the finding of pedophilia “is not necessary for a finding of mental illness . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 12.
    Consequently, we do not address the issue.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017                 Page 8 of 11
    that I ask him about is you know, whether or not the medication
    that I am prescribing him is giving him any degree of relief from
    those urges, and he explains to me on the one hand yes it give
    him some degree of relief. But simultaneously he explains to me
    that his struggle is so significant that when I ask him as I
    routinely do, what if you were to not be in the hospital at this
    time what could you do – what steps could you take so that you
    would not sexually molest a child. And his most consistent
    answer to me is that he would have to one hundred percent avoid
    children. Not physically be in their vicinity.
    Id. at 13. Dr. Nunes also testified that the treatment team has been concerned
    over S.T.’s treatment of others and that, because of their concerns, S.T. was
    placed on fifteen-minute checks at night to prevent him from entering the room
    of another patient and exploiting or harming him or her. S.T. has also
    repeatedly acted out sexually with his peers at the hospital even when his peers
    have refused to consent. S.T. has difficulty controlling his impulses, plots
    “discord between certain peers and himself, certain peers and each other,” and
    difficulty keeping himself on task while avoiding engaging in disruptive
    behavior. Id. at 16. Although sex offender treatment programs are available at
    the Hospital, S.T. has, until recently, refused to fully participate in the
    programs. Approximately seven to ten days before the hearing, S.T. “suddenly
    rearticulated a desire to participate” in the treatment. Id. at 18. Overall,
    however, his participation has been “sporadic” and “minimal.” Id. Because
    S.T. has not been “very engaged” in sex offender treatment, he is not able to
    “articulate triggers or coping mechanisms, or coping skills,” and S.T. has
    shared his concerns that he would reoffend. S.T. has been prescribed a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 9 of 11
    medication to “diminish testosterone levels” and reduce “sexual aggression.”
    Id. Despite the medication, S.T. continues to act out sexually.
    [11]   Dr. Gutherie testified that S.T. has admitted that “his primary sexual attraction
    is to young male children.” Id. at 56. S.T. had recently told Dr. Gutherie that
    “without further treatment if he were to go back into the community that he
    would probably reoffend.” Id. Dr. Gutherie believed, based on some of S.T.’s
    behaviors, that he also would “probably not respect the boundaries and rights of
    other people who he is sexually attracted to . . . .” Id. at 57. Dr. Gutherie
    prepared a psychological evaluation of S.T. She found that S.T. was at a
    “relatively high risk of reoffending.” Id. at 62.
    [12]   S.T. argues that Dr. Nunes’ testimony, Dr. Guthrie’s testimony, and the
    Hospital’s documentation do not prove by clear and convincing evidence that
    S.T.’s behavior supports a finding of dangerousness. S.T. challenges the basis
    for the fifteen-minute night time checks, the lack of specific examples of
    dangerous conduct, and changing standards in the Hospital’s definition of
    inappropriate sexual behavior. S.T. also challenges the risk assessment tools
    and methodology that Dr. Guthrie used in assessing S.T.’s risk of reoffending.
    S.T. argues that Dr. Guthrie’s “unreasonable opinion about S.T.’s ‘urges’
    reveals a lack of understanding of mental retardation and cognitive disability.”
    Appellant’s Br. p. 25. Finally, S.T. argues that his own admissions do not
    constitute clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness because he is
    susceptible to suggestion. According to S.T., his “own uncorroborated
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 10 of 11
    admissions to prior criminal conduct have little evidentiary value.” Appellant’s
    Reply Br. p. 4.
    [13]   S.T.’s arguments are merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we
    cannot do. Civil Commitment of T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273. The Hospital presented
    clear and convincing evidence that S.T. remains a danger to others. Despite
    years of treatment and medication to reduce his sexual desires, S.T. continues
    to act out sexually. S.T. also continues to break Hospital rules, struggles with
    impulsive behavior, fails to get along with his peers, and fails to fully participate
    in sex offender treatment programs. His treatment team believed that his
    inability to control his behavior and lack of progress did not bode well for his
    ability to control his urges outside of the Hospital setting. The trial court’s
    finding that S.T. is dangerous to others is not clearly erroneous.
    Conclusion
    [14]   The Hospital presented clear and convincing evidence that S.T is a danger to
    others. Consequently, the trial court properly continued S.T.’s commitment.
    We affirm.
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1610-MH-2401 | August 3, 2017   Page 11 of 11