Janine M. Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 31 2016, 5:38 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Dale W. Arnett Gregory F. Zoeller
Winchester, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Janine M. Jackson, October 31, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
68A01-1601-CR-120
v. Appeal from the Randolph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Peter D. Haviza,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
68D01-1410-CM-544
May, Judge.
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[1] Janine Jackson appeals her conviction of Class B misdemeanor battery. 1
Jackson argues the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey Brenton was mowing his lawn when he noticed a
woman he did not know, later identified as Jackson, yelling at him from across
the street and “flailing her arms.” (Tr. at 6.) Brenton could not determine
precisely what Jackson was saying, but he thought she was cursing at him.
Brenton continued mowing. Jackson crossed over to Brenton’s side of the
street, tried to block Brenton’s path, and was yelling about her son. Brenton
turned his mower around and went the other direction. As Brenton mowed
near the house, Jackson “trapped [him] against the house.” (Id. at 7.) Brenton
turned off the mower and pulled out his cell phone. Jackson slapped Brenton
on the side of his face.
[3] Brenton called police to report that an intoxicated woman slapped him.
Jackson left the scene while Brenton was on the phone with police, and Brenton
returned to mowing. The police arrived and spoke to Brenton about what had
occurred. While they were talking, Jackson exited a house across the street.
Police crossed the street and called for Jackson to stop. When she stopped, she
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2014).
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turned around and began yelling and cursing at one officer. As another officer
approached, Jackson made a fist and told the officers not to touch her. Police
believed Jackson was intoxicated due to her slurred speech, watery eyes, and
odor of alcohol. After further interaction, Police arrested Jackson.
[4] The State charged Jackson with Class B misdemeanor battery. At trial, Brenton
testified to the facts presented above. Jackson testified she had been drinking
and had confronted Brenton because he came close to hitting her with his
lawnmower. Jackson denied slapping Brenton. Following a bench trial, the
court found Jackson guilty and imposed a 180-day suspended sentence.
Jackson filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Jackson contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction of Class
B misdemeanor battery.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, “appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it “most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.”
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
“overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” “[T]he
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evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.”
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
[6] Jackson argues we should reverse her conviction because Brenton’s testimony
was incredibly dubious. Under this rule, an appellate court may impinge on the
fact-finder’s responsibility to judge witness credibility, but “only when
confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly
uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Stephenson v. State, 53
N.E.3d 558, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Application of this rule is limited to
cases where a sole witness testifies and there is a total and complete lack of
circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt. Id.
Cases where we have found testimony inherently improbable
have involved situations either where the facts as alleged “could
not have happened as described by the victim and be consistent
with the laws of nature or human experience,” or where the
witness was so equivocal about the act charged that her
uncorroborated and coerced testimony “was riddled with doubt
about its trustworthiness.”
Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Watkins v.
State, 571 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d in relevant part,
575 N.E.2d 624 (Ind. 1991)), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
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[7] Jackson alleges two parts of Brenton’s testimony at trial contradicted his prior
statements. 2 However, the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply to conflicts
between multiple statements. Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). Further, there is no suggestion that Brenton’s trial testimony was
equivocal, the result of coercion, or “inconsistent with the laws of nature.” See
Carter, 31 N.E.3d at 31 (quoting Watkins, 571 N.E.2d at 1265). Therefore, the
incredible dubiosity rule does not apply, and we may not reweigh the evidence.
See Stephenson, 53 N.E.3d at 560.
[8] Class B misdemeanor battery occurs when a person “knowingly or intentionally
. . . touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” Ind. Code §
35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2014). Brenton testified Jackson was yelling and cursing at him
and then she slapped him. The fact-finder believed Brenton’s testimony. (See
App. at 7 (Trial court denied Jackson’s motion to correct error because it “finds
his testimony regarding being struck by the Defendant to be credible.”).)
Brenton’s testimony was sufficient for a rational fact finder to find Jackson
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind.
2001) (uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction), reh’g denied, cert. denied sub nom. Carter v. Indiana, 537 U.S. 831
(2002). Accordingly, we affirm.
2
The police report states Brenton told police he knew who Jackson was, he had trouble with her before, and
Jackson hit him several times. Brenton testified he did not know Jackson and she hit him once.
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[9] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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