Jeffrey Dean Needler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 15 2019, 6:44 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Russell B. Cate Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Cate, Terry & Gookins LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffrey Dean Needler, July 15, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-15
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Richard
Appellee-Plaintiff. Campbell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D04-1709-F6-6656
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] Following a jury trial, Jeffrey Needler was found guilty of assisting a criminal, a
Level 6 felony, and sentenced to 365 days in the Indiana Department of
Correction, with 305 days suspended. Needler appeals his conviction, raising
one issue for our review: whether the trial court committed fundamental error
by admitting evidence resulting from an allegedly unconstitutional search of
Needler’s residence. Concluding Needler’s claim does not assert fundamental
error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 8, 2017, Deputies Jeffrey Wright and Todd Green from the
Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department went to a home on Chestnut Street in
Noblesville, Indiana, to serve an arrest warrant on Joshua Needler. A man
identifying himself as Joshua’s grandfather greeted the officers and told them
that Joshua was not at that address but was staying with Needler, Joshua’s
uncle, at an address on Cicero Road. In 2016, law enforcement had served an
arrest warrant on Joshua at that Cicero Road address and found him hiding
under a bed.
[3] Deputies Wright and Green then went to the Cicero Road address. Three other
officers, including Deputy Ryan Meier, joined them because a “fairly typical”
way of serving an arrest warrant is to have multiple officers on scene where “a
couple [of officers] will go to the door, try to make contact at the door, then one
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or two will go to the back, just to make sure someone doesn’t run out the back.”
Transcript of Evidence, Volume 2 at 70-71. Deputy Meier, with Deputy Wright
backing him up, knocked on the door of the trailer and after several minutes
passed during which the officers could hear movement and voices from inside,
Needler answered. Officer Meier advised Needler that they were there looking
for Joshua. Needler told him Joshua was not there and that he had not seen
him for a couple of days.
[4] Because of the “totality of circumstances, the amount of time it took to answer
the door, the rustling in there, the previous history that Joshua had been there
and hid in the back,” officers did not accept Needler’s answer at face value but
continued to talk with him for approximately ten minutes. Id. at 94. Officer
Meier asked Needler if he would allow officers into the residence to search for
Joshua. Needler said “that he could not give [officers] permission because he
did not own the trailer.” Id. at 73. Officers explained multiple times that if
Needler lived there, he could give them permission to enter but he still refused.
Officers asked “[t]wo, three, four” times if Joshua was in the trailer. Id. at 74.
Officer Meier told Needler that he thought Joshua was in the trailer and also
told him that if he could prove Joshua was there, he would take Needler to jail
for assisting a criminal.
[5] After repeated questioning, Needler finally admitted Joshua was “probably” in
the trailer. Officer Meier said, “there’s no probably or probably not. You
should know whether he’s in there or not. And if he’s in there, you need to let
us in to go get him.” Id. at 96. Eventually, Needler allowed officers into the
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trailer and said, “follow me.” Id. As Needler led officers directly to a bedroom
in the back of the trailer, he announced, “[T]hey’re coming in, come on out.”
Id. Officers found Joshua hiding under blankets in a closet. Joshua was taken
into custody on the arrest warrant.
[6] Officers then “had further discussion” with Needler, id. at 75, pointing out “that
he had denied [them] access and that he could have given [them] access
immediately and [they] didn’t need to debate over it at the beginning[,]” id. at
100. Needler claimed he was just protecting family. After Deputy Meier
confirmed that the circumstances in 2016 when Joshua was found at the trailer
were virtually identical, Deputy Meier took Needler into custody because “last
time . . . they did not charge him with aiding even though they could have [and]
I decided that since this was the second time I was going to arrest him for
aiding a criminal.” Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 15.
[7] The State charged Needler with assisting a criminal, a Level 6 felony, for
harboring, concealing, or assisting Joshua, “a person who has committed Theft
as a Level 6 Felony, with the intent to hinder [his] apprehension or
punishment” while “not standing in the relationship of parent, child, or spouse”
to Joshua. Id. at 12; see Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-5. A jury found Needler guilty as
charged. Needler now appeals his conviction.
Discussion and Decision
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[8] Needler contends the trial court committed fundamental error “by allowing
evidence of law enforcement’s entrance into a trailer to be admitted at trial” in
violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. Appellant’s Brief at 5.
I. Standard of Review
[9] It is unclear exactly what evidence Needler claims the trial court erroneously
admitted. Nonetheless, he tacitly acknowledges that he did not object to the
admission of any evidence at trial. See Appellant’s Br. at 8-9 (stating standard
of reviewing a claim of fundamental error). A contemporaneous objection is
required to preserve evidentiary error on appeal, and the failure to timely object
generally forfeits the issue for purposes of appellate review. Hastings v. State, 58
N.E.3d 919, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). To avoid this, Needler contends the
admission of evidence was fundamental error.
[10] A claim that has been forfeited by a defendant’s failure to raise a
contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court
determines that a fundamental error occurred. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204,
207 (Ind. 2010). The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow[.]”
Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). Fundamental error allows us
to “address an error that made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly
blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an
undeniable and substantial potential for harm[.]” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d
946, 974 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). “A finding
of fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred . . . by not
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acting when he or she should have, even without being spurred to action by a
timely objection.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
II. Unconstitutional Search as Fundamental Error
[11] Needler claims that law enforcement lacked probable cause to search the trailer,
did not have a search warrant, and did not know whether or not Joshua was in
the trailer and therefore had no right to enter. Needler claims the police
nonetheless coerced him into consenting to their entry by surrounding the
trailer and threatening to arrest him. He argues this was such “a blatant
violation of basic constitutional principles” that the trial court should have sua
sponte raised the issue at trial despite his own failure to object. Appellant’s Br.
at 10.
[12] In Brown, our supreme court explained that a showing of fundamental error
arising from the admission of alleged illegally seized evidence is very limited:
[A]n error in ruling on a motion to exclude improperly seized
evidence is not per se fundamental error. Indeed, because
improperly seized evidence is frequently highly relevant, its
admission ordinarily does not cause us to question guilt. That is
the case here. The only basis for questioning [the defendant’s]
conviction lies not in doubt as to whether [the defendant]
committed these crimes, but rather in a challenge to the integrity
of the judicial process. We do not consider that admission of
unlawfully seized evidence ipso facto requires reversal. Here,
there is no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance
on the part of the investigating officers and no contention that the
evidence is not what it appears to be. In short, the claimed error
does not rise to the level of fundamental error.
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929 N.E.2d at 207. In other words, a claim of error asserting that evidence was
unlawfully obtained, without more, does not constitute fundamental error. See
id.
[13] Needler does not allege that evidence was fabricated, and he does not allege
that the challenged evidence is not what it appears to be – there seems to be no
question that Needler told officers Joshua was not in the trailer when Joshua
was in fact hiding in the trailer. It is possible, however, that Needler’s claim
that his consent for police to enter was coerced could be considered a claim of
willful malfeasance by police, as he argues they were “devoid of information
that would lead them to believe that [Joshua] was present at the residence,” and
“skirt[ed] the warrant requirement by threatening arrest and surrounding [his]
home[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 10-11.
[14] Here, officers went to the trailer because when they went to the address listed
on the arrest warrant, the gentleman who answered the door identified himself
as Joshua’s grandfather and told them Joshua was at the trailer. With this
information and the knowledge that officers had found Joshua at the trailer
before when they were looking for him, they were not “devoid of information”
that Joshua might be at the trailer. Moreover, Officer Wright testified it was
“fairly typical” to have multiple officers on scene when serving an arrest
warrant and to cover all doors so the wanted person “doesn’t run out the back.”
Tr., Vol. II at 70-71; see also id. at 110 (officer testifying that it is “fairly
standard” to cover the rear of a residence “[i]n case the target that we’re looking
for would decide to run or flee”). Officers may have asked Needler if Joshua
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was in the residence up to four times before he finally admitted Joshua was
there, but the interaction between police and Needler lasted only ten minutes.
And finally, although Officer Meier did state that he would arrest Needler “if
we can prove” Joshua is in the trailer, id. at 94, Officer Meier did not threaten
to arrest Needler simply for refusing to allow officers to enter. “Malfeasance” is
defined as:
Evil doing; ill conduct. The commission of some act which is
positively unlawful; the doing of an act which is wholly wrongful
and unlawful[.]
Black’s Law Dictionary at 956 (9th ed. 2009). None of the things Needler
claims amounted to police coercion could be categorized as “positively
unlawful” and therefore do not amount to willful malfeasance.
[15] Needler gives lip service to the fact that he must show fundamental error, but
his analysis does not show that his claims rise to the level of the “egregious
circumstances” that fundamental error is available to address. Brown, 929
N.E.2d at 207. Instead, Needler merely asserts that evidence was improperly
admitted as the product of an allegedly unconstitutional search. See Appellant’s
Br. at 12-14 (citing J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) and State v.
Barker, 734 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) as cases similar to his own, but
neither arises in the context of fundamental error). This does not call into
question the integrity of the judicial process and is therefore insufficient to
demonstrate fundamental error.
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Conclusion
[16] Needler has failed to establish the trial court committed fundamental error in
the admission of evidence. His conviction is therefore affirmed.
[17] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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