James I.M. Lines v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Jul 18 2017, 8:57 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ryan P. Dillon Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marita K. Webb Attorney General of Indiana
Dillon Legal Group, P.C.
Katherine Cooper
Franklin, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James I.M. Lines, July 18, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
55A01-1610-CR-2392
v. Appeal from the
Morgan Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Jane Spencer Craney, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
55D03-1411-F5-1720
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] James I.M. Lines (“Lines”) was convicted after a jury trial of battery on a
person less than fourteen years of age resulting in bodily injury1 as a Level 5
felony, domestic battery2 as a Level 6 felony, strangulation3 as a Level 6 felony,
and criminal confinement4 as a Level 6 felony and was sentenced to a total of
six years executed. Lines appeals his convictions, asserting that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony at trial, and raises the
following specific claims as to why the evidence was erroneously admitted:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion because the
testimony was hearsay and did not fall into any of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule;
II. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to admit the
testimony because it constituted impermissible vouching;
and
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion because the
witness was not properly qualified to testify as an expert
witness.
[2] We affirm.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1), (f)(5)(B).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2).
3
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9.
4
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a).
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] Between November 10 and 12, 2014, A.L., who was nine years old at the time,
lived with his mother, Stephanie, and his father, Lines, who was over eighteen
years of age at that time, and his younger brother. That day, Stephanie
returned to their home in Morgan County after she finished work, and she took
a nap. When she awoke, Lines was angry with her because she had not yet
made dinner. Because the gas in the home had been turned off, Stephanie had
to cook using a camp stove, and she asked Lines to come into the kitchen to
light the stove for her. After he lit the stove, he walked over to Stephanie and
hit her in the nose with the palm of his hand. Stephanie then went into the
bathroom and noticed a bruise above her eye. When she returned to the
kitchen, Lines accused Stephanie of causing the bruise to herself and shoved her
against the refrigerator. He placed his forearm on Stephanie’s neck and pushed
against it so that she could not breathe or speak. Stephanie attempted to run
away from Lines, but he chased her, pulled her hair, and dragged her through
the house by her hair. Lines also took Stephanie’s cell phone so that she could
not call for help, and he would not allow Stephanie to leave the house. He
continued to abuse Stephanie by yelling at her, shoving her on the couch,
holding her on the ground, and putting his forearm on her neck and squeezing
to the point that “it felt like he was going to crush [her] esophagus.” Tr. Vol. I
at 212. The children were not present when this incident occurred. Eventually,
Lines went into the other room and fell asleep.
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[4] The next day, November 11, Stephanie went to the hospital to visit her mother
who had had surgery, and when she returned home, she sat down in the living
room with the children. Lines asked Stephanie where she had been and took
her cell phone. The argument moved to the kitchen, where Lines began to
strangle Stephanie by placing his forearm on her neck and then shoved her
against the refrigerator and wall, pulled her hair, and pulled her down to the
ground where he continued to strangle her. The strangulation made it difficult
for Stephanie to breathe. She was able to go to the living room, where the
children were, and thought Lines would not attack her in front of the children.
However, Lines again began to strangle her, this time with his hands around
her neck. Stephanie was terrified because she could not break free and thought
she might die. Stephanie went back into the kitchen, and Lines followed her
and punched her in the side, which caused her to gasp for air. Lines pointed to
the family room and told Stephanie, “I ought to take you in there and bash your
head in.” Id. at 216. He also told her, “I should have killed you a long time
ago.” Id. Lines dragged Stephanie into the family room as she screamed and
tried to get away from him. A.L. observed Lines drag Stephanie by the hair
and hit her. As a result of being abused by Lines, Stephanie suffered bruising
and tenderness around her left eye.
[5] A.L. ran into the family room, and Stephanie told him to “run to the neighbor’s
and have her call the cops.” Id. at 216-17. When A.L. reached the front door,
Lines grabbed him by the arm and pulled him away from the door. He told
A.L. “if you try to run out this door again, I’ll beat your ass.” Id. at 217. Lines
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then picked up both children, who were screaming and crying, by their arms
and threw them down. A short time later, Lines walked into the other room
and went to sleep. The children laid down next to Stephanie on the couch, and
they all fell asleep.
[6] On the next day, November 12, Annette Rohlman (“Rohlman”), who was a
registered nurse with the Martinsville School District and was also the Morgan
County Coroner, met with A.L. at his school where she was working that day
as the school nurse. The school had received a call from a concerned person,
who had reported that A.L. and his brother needed to be checked for injuries
due to being involved in a domestic disturbance the prior night. Rohlman
called A.L. to her office and asked him if he had any concerns or if anything
was going on that he needed to talk about. A.L. told Rohlman that he felt sick
to his stomach. Id. at 194. A.L. was shy at first and then became upset and
tearful. He told Rohlman that things had happened at his home the night
before that he wanted to talk to her about. He was shaking a little bit and told
Rohlman that his mom and dad had been fighting that night and that his dad
had hit his mom repeatedly and choked her. Id. at 196. A.L. said that he was
told to try to get help, but that when he ran to the door his dad grabbed him by
the arm, jerked him away, and threw him to the floor. Id. at 197. A.L. relayed
to Rohlman that his dad told him he would “beat his ass if [A.L.] did it again”
and that he needed to stay where he was. Id. Rohlman observed redness and
bruising on both sides of A.L.’s right forearm which she felt was consistent with
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what A.L. had told her, and she reported the situation to the Department of
Child Services and the Morgan County Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 204.
[7] On November 13, 2014, the State charged Lines with six counts: Count I,
Level 5 felony battery on a person less than fourteen years of age resulting in
bodily injury; Count II, Level 6 felony criminal confinement; Count III, Level 6
felony domestic battery; Count IV, Level 6 felony criminal confinement; Count
V, Level 6 felony strangulation; Count VI, Level 6 felony strangulation. A jury
trial was held, and at trial, Lines objected to Rohlman’s testimony regarding the
statements made by A.L. on the grounds that the statements were hearsay. Id.
at 196. The State argued that the statements were admissible under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court found that the
statements were not an excited utterance because they were too far removed
from the incident; however, the trial court instead found that the statements did
not constitute hearsay because “A.L. [was] a witness” and overruled the
objection. Id.[8] Lines also objected to Rohlman’s testimony regarding whether the bruise she
observed on A.L.’s arm was consistent with a grabbing of the arm on the basis
that there was no foundation for Rohlman “to testify about what was consistent
based upon a narrative given by a child.” Id. at 203. The State responded that
Rohlman was “a registered nurse . . . [and] a coroner who . . . knows about
injuries and the nature of receiving them and how they look and what to look
for. I think she ha[s] extra information, extra training that would help the
jury.” Id. at 203. The trial court sustained the objection, but later, a juror asked
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Rohlman the question, “[w]as the bruising consistent with the grabbing of an
arm?” Id. at 204. Lines objected, and the State responded that Rohlman was a
skilled witness and needs to be “shown to have enough knowledge to make the
opinion helpful to [sic] clear understanding of a witness’s testimony in
determining a fact.” Id. The State further stated, “She’s a skilled witness, or
expert witness, I believe, she has the training.” Id. The trial court overruled the
objection, and Rohlman testified that the bruising on A.L.’s arm was consistent
with grabbing an arm. Id.[9] A.L. also testified at the trial, prior to Rohlman, and gave testimony concerning
the events of November 11, 2014. This testimony included that Lines battered
Stephanie and that Lines grabbed A.L.’s arm when he attempted to go outside
to get help, and then Lines threw A.L. on the floor. Id. at 180-83, 189.
Additionally, Stephanie testified regarding the events that occurred on
November 10 and 11, 2014. Lines testified at the trial and acknowledged that
he had a physical altercation with Stephanie, although he claimed that the
physical violence was mutual and he only hit Stephanie in order to protect
himself. Tr. Vol. III at 102-04, 115. Lines also admitted that he grabbed A.L.
by the arm, and claimed that A.L. pulled away and fell on the floor. Id. at 106-
09. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Lines guilty of Level 5
felony battery on a person less than fourteen years of age resulting in bodily
injury, Level 6 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Level
6 felony criminal confinement. The trial court sentenced Lines to an aggregate
sentence of six years executed. Lines now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[10] Lines argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain
testimony of Rohlman at the trial. Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling
on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 982
N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672,
676 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. We reverse only where the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. Even if the trial
court’s decision was an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse if the admission
constituted harmless error. Id. An error is harmless if it does not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. Ind. Trial Rule 61. The improper admission of
evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by substantial
independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no
substantial likelihood that the erroneously-admitted evidence contributed to the
conviction. Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. Furthermore, if the erroneously-admitted evidence is merely cumulative
of other evidence in the record, it is harmless error and not grounds for reversal.
Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
I. Hearsay Statements
[11] Lines contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony
of Rohlman regarding statements made to her by A.L. Lines asserts that these
statements were hearsay because they were out of court statements offered for
the truth of the matter and were, therefore, inadmissible. He further argues that
the testimony did not fall into the hearsay exception as an excited utterance
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because the statements provided by A.L. to Rohlman occurred the day after the
events described, and it was not established that A.L. was still under the stress
of excitement caused by the events when he made the statements to Rohlman.
Lines also alleges that the statements did not fall into the hearsay exception for
statements made for medical diagnosis because A.L. did not make the
statements to Rohlman for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Lines additionally maintains that the testimony was not admissible under
Crawford v. Washington5 because A.L. was available for testimony and cross-
examination at trial.
[12] We need not address Lines’s hearsay and Crawford arguments because the
testimony of Rohlman regarding the statements made to her by A.L. is
cumulative of other evidence presented at trial that established the events that
occurred on the night of November 11, 2104. The admission of evidence is
harmless error and is not grounds for reversal where the evidence is merely
cumulative of other evidence properly admitted. Hunter, 72 N.E.3d at 932.
Here, in addition to Rohlman, A.L. testified to the events that occurred on
November 11 as he observed them, including that Lines battered Stephanie and
grabbed A.L. by the arm. Tr. Vol. II at 181-83. Additionally, Lines testified
that he had a physical altercation with Stephanie and that he grabbed A.L. by
the arm. Tr. Vol. III at 102-04, 106-09. Further, Stephanie testified as to the
5
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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incident that occurred on November 11. Tr. Vol. II at 214-17. Therefore,
Rohlman’s testimony as to the statements made to her by A.L. were merely
cumulative of other evidence before the jury, and the any error in its admission
was harmless error.
II. Vouching Testimony
[13] Lines argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony
of Rohlman regarding the statements that A.L. made to her because the
testimony constituted impermissible vouching. He contends that the testimony
by Rohlman was provided for the sole purpose of bolstering A.L.’s credibility.
Lines asserts that Rohlman had no personal knowledge of the events described
by A.L., and offering this statement served only the purpose of bolstering
credibility of the witness, which is impermissible.
[14] Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) provides that “[w]itnesses may not testify to
opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or
falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal
conclusions.” Such vouching testimony is considered an invasion of the
province of the jurors in determining what weight they should place upon a
witness’s testimony. Alvarez-Madrigal v. State, 71 N.E.3d 887, 892 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2017) (citing Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
denied), trans. denied.
[15] Here, Rohlman testified to what A.L. had told her about what occurred on
November 11 at his home, that Lines and Stephanie had been fighting and that
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Lines had hit Stephanie repeatedly and choked her. Tr. Vol. II at 196-97.
Rohlman also related that A.L. had told her that, when A.L. had run to the
door to get help, Lines had grabbed A.L. by the arm, jerked him away, and
threw him to the floor. Id. at 197. A.L. also reported to Rohlman that Lines
had told him that “he would beat [A.L.’s] ass if he did it again.” Id. Rohlman
did not state any opinions or make any statements about the truth or falsity of
A.L.’s allegations, nor did she express any opinions regarding A.L.’s credibility.
We, therefore, conclude that Rohlman’s testimony did not constitute
impermissible vouching, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting it.
III. Opinion Testimony
[16] Lines asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in qualifying Rohlman as
an expert witness and allowing her to testify as to her opinion on causation of
the bruise on A.L.’s arm. He argues that Rohlman was not qualified as an
expert to testify as to whether the bruise that she observed on A.L.’s arm was
consistent with his arm being grabbed. Lines contends that the trial court did
not properly establish that Rohlman had the training and experience to be
qualified as an expert and to allow her to testify regarding the consistency of the
bruise with the events that occurred. The State argues that Rohlman offered her
testimony as a skilled witness rather than an expert witness.
[17] We note that it is not clear whether the trial court qualified Rohlman as a
skilled witness or as an expert witness. The State initially requested that the
trial court qualify Rohlman as a skilled witness, stating that she had “extra
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information, extra training that would help a jury” because she was a nurse and
a coroner. Tr. Vol. II at 203. The State later noted, “[S]he is a skilled witness.
She needs to be shown to have enough knowledge to make the opinion helpful
to [sic] clear understanding of a witness’s testimony in determining a fact.” Id.
at 204. In response to a question by the trial court as to whether the State was
asking “to qualify her as an expert,” the State responded, “She’s a skilled
witness, or expert witness, I believe, she has the training.” Id. The trial court
then overruled Lines’s objection and permitted Rohlman to testify that the
bruise on A.L.’s forearm was consistent with grabbing an arm, but did not
specify whether she was qualified to do so as a skilled witness or an expert
witness. Id.[18] Indiana Evidence Rule 701 governs the admission of testimony by skilled
witnesses and provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of
opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; and
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or
to a determination of a fact in issue.
The difference between skilled witnesses and ordinary lay witnesses is their
degree of knowledge concerning the subject of their testimony. Satterfield v.
State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015). Neither has the “scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge” of experts, Ind. Evidence Rule 702(a), and both
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ordinary lay and skilled witnesses testify from their perceptions alone, not
necessarily established scientific principles. Id. at 353. Skilled witnesses,
though, possess knowledge beyond that of the average juror. Id.[19] Indiana Evidence Rule 702(a) provides that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
In construing this rule, only one of these characteristics—knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education—is necessary to qualify an individual as an
expert. Lyons v. State, 976 N.E.2d 137, 141-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Our
Supreme Court has determined that the “specialized knowledge” set forth in
Evidence Rule 702(a) is not necessarily scientific knowledge, and it need not be
proven reliable by means of “scientific principles.” Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d
1071, 1084 (Ind. 2003). Rather, such evidence is governed only by the
requirements of Rule 702(a), and any weaknesses or problems in the testimony
go only to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility, and should be
exposed through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary evidence.
Lyons, 976 N.E.2d at 142 (citing Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1050 (Ind.
2011)). Under Evidence Rule 703, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or
data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally
observed.”
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[20] Although it is not clear if the trial court found Rohlman to be a skilled witness
or expert witness, we find that she qualified as both. Rohlman was qualified as
a skilled witness because, as a nurse and a coroner, she possessed knowledge
beyond that of the average juror, and she based her opinion as to the cause of
the bruise on her perception of A.L.’s injury and her additional knowledge.
Her opinion was also helpful to a clear understanding that such an injury was
consistent with being physically grabbed.
[21] Additionally, Rohlman was also qualified as an expert witness. Rohlman
testified that she is a registered nurse who works as a nurse for the school
district, and she is also the Morgan County Coroner. Tr. Vo. II at 192. She
testified that she has an associate’s degree in the science of nursing and that she
is a certified medical legal death investigator. Id. Rohlman formally worked as
a police officer with the Mooresville Police Department, and as a coroner, she
is required to complete sixteen hours of continuing education each year, which
includes different death investigation cases. Id. at 193. Based on her
knowledge, skill, training, and practical experience, particularly as a nurse in a
school setting, the trial court had sufficient information to qualify Rohlman as
an expert witness. Rohlman observed a bruise on A.L.’s forearm that had
redness and bruising on both sides of the arm, which she believed was
consistent with a grabbing of the arm. Id. at 197, 203-05. We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony by Rohlman
that the bruise on A.L.’s forearm was consistent with being grabbed on the arm.
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[22] Lines takes issue with the fact that, during cross-examination, Rohlman
testified that she did not know what stage the bruise was and could not refer to
the stages of bruising. Id. at 205-06. Any weaknesses or problems in the
testimony go only to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility, and
should be exposed through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary
evidence. Lyons, 976 N.E.2d at 142. Rohlman was qualified as an expert
witness to testify that the bruise she observed on A.L.’s arm was consistent with
being grabbed on the arm and not what stage the bruise was. This testimony
that occurred during cross-examination allowed Lines to expose possible
weaknesses or problems with Rohlman’s testimony and did not affect the
admissibility of her opinion testimony. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Rohlman’s testimony.
[23] Affirmed.
[24] Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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