Jaylin Keshawn Jefferson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) , 121 N.E.3d 153 ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 31 2019, 7:06 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paul J. Podlejski Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jaylin Keshawn Jefferson, January 31, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1591
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David A. Happe,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C04-1608-F4-1672
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 1 of 8
[1] Jaylin K. Jefferson appeals the revocation of his probation, presenting two
issues on appeal:
1. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the
revocation of Jefferson’s probation?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Jefferson to
serve the entirety of his previously-suspended sentence?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On April 17, 2017, Jefferson pled guilty to assisting a criminal as a Level 6
felony, theft as a Level 6 felony, and theft as Class A misdemeanor. Jefferson
was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty months, with 508 days suspended
to probation after credit given for time served.
[4] On August 15, 2017, the State filed a notice of probation violation alleging that
Jefferson failed to abstain from the use of marijuana and that he was living at a
residence where illegal drugs were used and/or possessed. On September 22,
2017, Jefferson appeared at the initial hearing and admitted to the violations.
On November 20, 2017, the State filed an amended notice of probation
violation adding two additional allegations—that Jefferson had committed the
criminal offenses of domestic battery and invasion of privacy. At a November
27, 2017 hearing on the amended notice, Jefferson denied the new allegations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 2 of 8
[5] On May 29, 2018, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the amended notice.
Prior to the hearing, the State moved to dismiss the invasion-of-privacy
allegation in the amended petition, which motion the court granted. At the
hearing, the State presented evidence from Officer Chris Barnett of the
Anderson Police Department, who testified about completing a domestic-
battery report. Officer Barnett spoke with the victim, who was able to provide
Jefferson’s name, date of birth, and “identifiers.” Transcript at 98. The victim
reported to Officer Barnett that a few days prior, Jefferson had struck her
several times on her legs and left arm with a metal rod that was approximately
twelve inches long. Officer Barnett observed bruising on the victim consistent
with the victim’s report. The State also moved to admit the probable cause
affidavit prepared by Officer Barnett, which the trial court admitted over
Jefferson’s objection. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found
that the State established by a preponderance of the evidence that Jefferson had
committed the offense of domestic battery. Based on this finding and
Jefferson’s previous admission to the State’s first two allegations, the trial court
found that Jefferson violated the terms of his probation.
[6] With regard to the sanction to be imposed, Jefferson requested that the court
consider placement in community corrections or home detention. The State’s
preference was for incarceration but given the short amount of time remaining
on Jefferson’s sentence, it did not believe that option was available. The State
therefore requested that Jefferson serve the balance of his sentence on work
release. The court revoked Jefferson’s 508-day suspended sentence and ordered
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 3 of 8
that he serve the remainder in the Indiana Department of Correction. Jefferson
now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
1. Admission of Evidence
[7] Jefferson frames his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
His argument on appeal, however, is based solely on his claim that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the probable cause affidavit prepared by
Officer Barnett, which documented the victim’s report of being battered by
Jefferson. Jefferson maintains that had the trial court not admitted the probable
cause affidavit into evidence, then the evidence would have been insufficient to
prove one of the three probation violations he was found to have committed.
[8] We begin by noting that Jefferson admitted that he violated his probation by
using marijuana and living in a residence where illegal drugs were used and/or
possessed. Based on this alone, the trial court had discretion to revoke his
probation and impose sanctions. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3; Gosha v. State, 873
N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that a violation of a single
condition of probation is sufficient to support revocation). Jefferson
nevertheless challenges the revocation of his probation.
[9] A probation revocation hearing is civil in nature, and the alleged violation must
be proven by the State by a preponderance of the evidence. Mateyko v. State,
901 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. When reviewing a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 4 of 8
claim of insufficient evidence to support a trial court’s decision to revoke
probation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and
we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.Revocation is appropriate if there is substantial evidence of probative value to
support the trial court’s conclusion that the probationer has violated the terms
of probation. Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[10] Indiana Rule of Evidence 101(d)(2) allows for the admission of evidence during
probation revocation hearings that would not be permitted in a criminal trial.
“The due process right applicable to probation revocation hearings allows for
procedures that are more flexible than in a criminal prosecution.” Reyes v. State,
868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972)). In Reyes, our Supreme Court adopted the substantial trustworthiness
test as the means for determining whether hearsay evidence should be admitted
at a probation revocation hearing. Under this test, the trial court must
determine whether the evidence reaches a certain level of reliability—i.e.,
whether it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness—in order to be
considered at a probation revocation hearing. Id. at 441.
[11] Here, the probable cause affidavit was signed by Officer Barnett under penalty
of perjury. The victim of the domestic battery, from whom Officer Barnett took
his report, was able to give Jefferson’s name and date of birth. Officer Barnett
was in full uniform when the victim gave her statement. Officer Barnett was
also able to corroborate the victim’s claim of being battered because he
observed bruising on her legs and left arm that were consistent with her
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 5 of 8
statement of what had occurred. The trial court concluded, and we agree, that
there are multiple indicia of reliability. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the probable cause affidavit related to the domestic
battery charge. This evidence, in conjunction with Officer Barnett’s testimony,
is sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Jefferson
violated his probation by committing domestic battery. Moreover, as noted
above, Jefferson admitted to violating his probation by using marijuana and
living in a place where illegal drugs were used and/or possessed. There is
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Jefferson’s
probation.
2. Sanction
[12] Jefferson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to
serve the entirety of his previously-suspended sentence as a sanction for his
probation violation. We review a trial court’s sentencing decision in a
probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 838
N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). An abuse of discretion occurs if the
decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Moreover, “[o]nce a
trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than
incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
proceed.” Id. “If the court finds the defendant has violated a condition of his
probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period, and the
petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 6 of 8
order execution of the sentence that had been suspended.” Gosha, 873 N.E.2d
at 664; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).
[13] Jefferson admitted to violating his probation by using marijuana and living in a
place where illegal drugs were used and/or possessed. Jefferson asserts that
these violations were “technical in nature” and thus, did not warrant the
sanction imposed by the trial court. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Relying upon his
admission of evidence/sufficiency argument, Jefferson affords no weight to the
fact that he was found to have committed a new crime that involved violence.
[14] As set forth above, Jefferson was properly found to have violated his probation
by using marijuana, living in a place where illegal drugs were being used
and/or possessed, and by committing the new criminal offense of domestic
battery. In addition to these formally charged violations, the State presented
evidence during the sanctions proceedings that Jefferson was found in
possession of marijuana on or about April 28, 2018. At that time, Jefferson was
located in the driver’s seat of a car in the driveway of a home where the
Madison County Drug Task Force was executing a search warrant. A
subsequent search revealed a plastic bag containing marijuana in Jefferson’s
pants pocket, a second plastic bag containing marijuana was located in the
center console of the car, and a functioning digital scale was located in the
passenger door compartment of that same car. A search of the room that
Jefferson shared with his girlfriend inside the home that was searched revealed
another plastic bag containing marijuana and $340 in cash. When questioned,
Jefferson admitted to possessing and selling marijuana.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 7 of 8
[15] In setting forth the sanction, the court explained:
Mr. Jefferson, what I see . . . is I’ve got a person who’s been
convicted of a felony, he’s subject to court supervision, and he’s
out dealing drugs. That is so beyond acceptable it’s hard to even
find words to discuss it. Based on the statements made in the
probable cause affidavit, there’s no doubt that you were dealing
marijuana while you were under supervision from this court.
That shows me a person who has zero interest in rehabilitation,
zero interest in building a decent life that he can be proud of.
This is a person who’s going to think like a criminal and act like
a criminal and do what a criminal does to get by. And there’s
just no reason to hope for your rehabilitation within the short
time that the Court has access to you here, so I find that there’s
no purpose to be served by putting you on community
corrections.
Transcript Vol. II at 132. We will not second guess the trial court in this regard.
Based on the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering Jefferson to serve the balance of his sentence at the Department of
Correction.
[16] Judgment affirmed.
Najam, J. and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1591 | January 31, 2019 Page 8 of 8