Jagger M. Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 17 2019, 9:03 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ann M. Sutton Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jagger M. Williams, June 17, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2220
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1705-MR-17805
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Jagger M. Williams appeals his conviction for murder. We affirm.
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Issue
[2] Williams raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the evidence
is sufficient to convict Williams of murder, instead of the lesser offense of
voluntary manslaughter.
Facts
[3] In 2017, Williams was involved in a relationship with both Christen Brown,
and Charmella Upchurch; both women knew about the other woman. 1
Upchurch indicated that the relationship between Brown and Williams was
contentious and that they argued regularly. Upchurch recalled an occasion in
April 2017 when Brown and Williams fought at Upchurch’s and Williams’
home. As Brown was leaving, Williams called after her, “I told you don’t come
over here no more you stupid b****,” and then shot at Brown’s car as she drove
away with her children in the car. Tr. Vol. II p. 69. As Williams shot at
Brown’s car, he said, “I’ll kill you[,] you stupid b****.” 2 Id.
[4] On May 10, 2017, Upchurch and Williams went to a junkyard to get parts for
Upchurch’s and Williams’ car. While at the junkyard, Brown repeatedly called
Upchurch and Williams, and Williams became annoyed with Brown’s constant
calls. After Upchurch and Williams left the junkyard and returned home,
1
Williams’ relationship with Upchurch began approximately two years prior to the May 2017 incident,
whereas Williams’ and Brown’s relationship began approximately four months prior to the May 2017
incident.
2
Williams, testifying in his defense, also recalled this incident and stated that he shot at Brown’s vehicle
because she was threatening him.
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Brown came to Upchurch’s and Williams’ home. Williams spoke with Brown
and allowed Brown inside. Subsequently, Upchurch, Williams, and Brown
planned to go to a casino. On the way to the casino, the group stopped at a
liquor store and a hotel so that Brown could inquire about the cost of a hotel
room. Williams was drinking in the car, and Brown had one to two drinks at
the casino.
[5] After twenty to thirty minutes and a $500.00 loss at the casino, the group went
to the gas station and McDonald’s restaurant across the street. While ordering
food, Williams and Brown got into an argument about money. The argument
was so disruptive that other patrons began to notice. Upchurch stated that the
argument centered around Brown’s interest in using the website, “Backpage,”
to rob people that evening, which was the reason the group checked the price of
a hotel room earlier in the evening. Id. at 93. Brown wanted to commit the
robberies to generate rent money. According to Upchurch, Williams did not
refuse to commit the robberies, but he was hesitant because the last time Brown
and Williams committed a similar robbery, the victim “got a little bit rough”
with Brown. 3 Id. at 93.
[6] As the group left McDonald’s, Williams and Brown continued to argue; Brown
got upset and went back inside the restaurant. Williams stayed in the car, and
Upchurch went inside the restaurant to talk with Brown. Upchurch told Brown
3
Later, Upchurch indicated that the argument centered around Brown cutting Williams’ phone off.
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that Brown “can’t win an argument [with Williams], so [Brown should] just
leave it alone. Don’t argue.” Id. at 76.
[7] Brown and Upchurch returned to the vehicle, and the group proceeded to
Brown’s home so Upchurch and Williams could use the shower. While in the
vehicle, it appeared to Upchurch that Brown and Williams reconciled because
they were being affectionate in the backseat. At the home, Upchurch went
inside to take a shower, and Brown and Williams went to a nearby gas station
“to get a cigar to smoke weed.” Id. at 78. As Upchurch was getting dressed in
Brown’s bedroom, Williams and Brown returned from the gas station and
began to argue again. After Upchurch finished her shower and changed
clothes, Williams also took a shower. At this point, Upchurch told Williams
that she was going to leave, but Williams would not allow her to leave.
Williams told Upchurch, “[Y]ou’re not going to leave no mother f******
where. If you leave, there’s going to be a f****** problem.” Id. at 80.
Upchurch indicated this was not an unusual response by Williams because
Williams “always talked to [Upchurch] like that.” Id. at 81. Upchurch went
back into Brown’s bedroom and sat on the bed.
[8] While Williams was in the shower, Brown complained to Upchurch about
Williams’ behavior. When Williams came out of the shower and heard Brown
talking to Upchurch about him, Williams became angry, and he and Brown
argued once again. Eventually, Williams told Upchurch that Williams and
Upchurch could leave. Williams grabbed his gun, which was on the dresser,
and put it in his pocket.
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[9] While leaving the home, Upchurch walked past Brown, who was sitting on the
stairs. As Upchurch walked out of the back door to the home, she again heard
Brown and Williams arguing. When Upchurch reached her car, Upchurch
turned to see Williams standing on the lower portion of the steps with Brown
following behind. Brown had something in her hand that “looked like the
broom” and Brown hit Williams on the back of the head with the broom while
calling Williams a “stupid b****.” Id. at 85. Upchurch saw gunfire, as
Williams shot Brown in the back. Williams exclaimed: “Call the police. I just
shot her.” Id.
[10] While Upchurch was trying to call the police and determine Brown’s address,
Williams told Upchurch to hang up the phone and take Brown to the hospital.
Williams put Brown in the car. Brown was “moaning” and bleeding from the
neck. Id. at 86. Williams instructed Upchurch, “[w]hen you get [to the
hospital,] tell them an intruder shot her.” Id. at 87. Upchurch “ran every light”
to get to the hospital and arrived shortly thereafter. Id. Williams continued to
call and text Upchurch asking for an update on Brown’s condition; Upchurch
told Williams that Brown died. 4
[11] Upchurch subsequently tried to identify Williams for detectives using Williams’
Facebook account; however, Williams deleted his Facebook account before she
4
The most significant of Brown’s injuries was the bullet’s entry into her carotid artery. Brown ultimately
died of a “perforated gunshot wound of the neck and trunk of the body. The manner of death being
homicide.” Tr. Vol. II p. 114.
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could do so. Officer Leonard Nelson with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department (“IMPD”) interviewed Upchurch and obtained additional
information regarding Williams in order for officers to locate Williams.
Officers were ultimately able to locate Williams at a Motel 8.
[12] At the Motel 8, officers recovered Williams’ cell phone. IMPD Detective Grant
Melton reviewed the contents of Williams’ phone. During the investigation,
Detective Melton discovered that Brown was deleted as a contact in Williams’
phone after May 10, 2017, at 9:32 p.m. Williams had previously contacted
Brown using his phone and sent Brown a text message on April 19, 2017, which
stated, “Ima shoot yo s*** up I got bullets.” Id. at 138. Williams’ phone also
contained messages from the early morning hours of May 11, 2017, asking
friends if they could loan Williams a car or could purchase a bus ticket for him.
That same morning, Williams also visited an Indianapolis news website and
searched “woman shot and killed on the east side.” Id. at 133.
[13] Williams was charged with murder on May 15, 2017. Williams waived his
right to a jury trial, and a bench trial occurred on August 6, 2018. Witnesses
testified to the foregoing facts. Williams testified in his own defense and stated
that: (1) he shot toward the house because Brown was throwing things at
Williams, and Williams “shot to scare [Brown];” (2) he was able to get the
room at the Motel 8 in another person’s name after he left Brown’s home; and
(3) he did not recall much more after that because he was “kind of intoxicated.”
Id. at 147, 154.
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[14] In closing arguments, Williams’ attorney asked the trial court to find Williams
not guilty of murder and, instead, guilty of reckless homicide or voluntary
manslaughter based on the theory that the shooting occurred in sudden heat. In
reaching its conclusion, the trial court stated:
Now the question is [--] is it murder or is it sudden heat. The
Defense has also argued for sudden heat. Sudden heat,
according to the case law and a direct quote that all the lawyers
are familiar with, “Sudden heat requires sufficient provocation to
engender passion. Sufficient provocation is demonstrated by
anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror that is sufficient to
obscure the reason of an ordinary person.” Emphas[is] on
ordinary person. To prevent deliberation and premeditation, the
Defendant incapable of cool refection. The classic stereotype for
sudden heat is a man who has no idea or, doesn’t have to be sex
specific, I guess, it’s just a stereotype. It’s a spouse that finds --
has no idea that their spouse is cheating on them ad [sic] comes
home and finds the spouse in bed with another person. That’s
kind of your typical I am so angry, so surprised so -- that I don’t
have time to think about it at all and I just kill. That is your
stereo typical [sic] sudden heat. There are plenty of other
circumstances that can be sudden heat. But that’s the kind of
example we get. Because we are talking about if something
would make somebody really mad and it’s something that you
would do totally out of control and something that you had
intended to do it, but if you had thought about it or had a little
time to reflect on it at all, you’d never have done it. And as I
listened to the testimony I [] considered that.
*****
But the bottom-line is being that the definition of sudden heat
talks about the reason of an ordinary person. And an ordinary
person isn’t one that is this manipulative and this controlling in
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relationships. And an ordinary person isn’t one that sends out
text messages saying I’m going to kill you and I’ve got bullets for
you. An ordinary person is the one within my description that
doesn’t expect to find their spouse in bed with someone else and
then is so uncontrollably angry that we could look at that and
say, yeah, if I was in that person’s shoes, it would have been
dumb but I might of [sic] done the same thing. That’s not what
we have here. This is not ordinary conduct. This is not one
talking about cool reflection and deliberation. It is an individual
that is used to [being] controlling. And almost within the
immediate time of having shot the victim was already cooling
[sic] reflecting as to how they were going [to] deal with the
situation. It’s somebody else’s responsibility to take them to the
hospital. It’s somebody else’s responsibility to learn how it
happened. Because you tell the person that it’s going to be an
intruder. An ordinary person would have sat there and did what
the Defendant tried to say, which was how sorry he was and how
badly he needed to go to the hospital to try and help her and how
badly he needed to explain to the police how this happened and
how it was a terrible terrible mistake. Instead the evidence very
much shows the Defendant’s manipulation of the circumstances,
what his concerns were in terms of his consciousness of guilt.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 168-170. The trial court found Williams guilty of murder.
Williams now appeals.
Analysis
[15] Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of murder
because there was evidence of sudden heat, and accordingly, Williams should
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have been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 5 Specifically, Williams
contends that, instead of finding that Williams knowingly or intentionally killed
Brown, which is a requirement for a murder conviction, the trial court should
have found that Williams killed Brown under sudden heat.
[16] When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither
reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204,
210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. 1985), cert.
denied), cert. denied. Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to
the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” Id.
(quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is
supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some
conflict in that evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84); see also
McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018) (holding that, even though
there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside the point” because that argument
“misapprehend[s] our limited role as a reviewing court”). Further, “[w]e will
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
5
In portions of Williams’ brief, he appears to be arguing that the murder was not performed “knowingly,”
but “recklessly.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. While Williams did argue reckless homicide at the trial court level,
he does not restate this argument for appeal, except for the brief mention that “[c]onduct is [performed]
‘knowingly’ if, when engaged in the conduct, the actor is aware of a high probability that he is doing so, as
opposed to ‘recklessly’ where the conduct is done with plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm .
. .,” and that Williams’ actions were “born[e] out of heat, and perhaps reckless disregard for the harm that
might result.” Id. at 13, 14. To the extent that Williams attempts to reargue that he should have been
convicted of reckless homicide instead of murder, his argument is waived for failure to make a cogent
argument.
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the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696
(Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
[17] In determining whether the evidence is sufficient, we must consider the
elements of murder and voluntary manslaughter. A person commits murder, as
defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-1, when the person, “[k]nowingly or
intentionally kills another human being. . . .” A person commits voluntary
manslaughter, as defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-3, when the person
“knowingly or intentionally . . . kills another human being . . . while acting
under sudden heat.” “The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that
reduces what otherwise would be murder . . . to voluntary manslaughter.” Ind.
Code § 35-42-1-3(b).
[18] We have held:
[a]lthough [v]oluntary [m]anslaughter is a lesser-included offense
of [m]urder, it is an atypical example of a lesser-included offense.
In the case of [v]oluntary [m]anslaughter, sudden heat is a
mitigating factor that the State must prove in addition to the
elements of murder. Sudden heat must be separately proved . . . .
Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
Sudden heat “exists when a defendant is ‘provoked by anger, rage, resentment,
or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person,
prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of
cool reflection.’” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 572 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Isom
v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 486 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016)).
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[19] Importantly, conflict, argument, and fighting alone do not give rise to a finding
of sudden heat. Instead, one must be provoked by more than “mere words”
and “the provocation must be sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary
man,” judged by an objective standard. Suprenant, 925 N.E.2d at 1282-83
(quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, we must determine whether
the trial court, as fact finder, improperly found evidence that Williams
knowingly or intentionally killed Brown, instead of finding evidence of sudden
heat.
[20] The record reveals there was evidence of anger and an argument on the night of
Brown’s death. Brown and Williams argued intermittingly throughout the
night, which resulted in Brown hitting Williams with a broom. These facts,
however, fail to support the allegation that Williams killed Brown under sudden
heat. Williams acknowledges his response, on some level, was “irrational”
stating, “[t]his irrational response was made with less than seconds to reflect,
rather than a knowing determination to inflict harm.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14.
Moreover, the evidence also demonstrated that Williams previously shot at a
car that Brown rode in with her children and threatened to kill Brown both via
text message and verbally in the month before Brown’s death. Williams made
it known on more than one occasion that he would kill Brown if she continued
to behave in a way that Williams did not like. See Earl v. State, 715 N.E.2d
1265, 1267 (Ind. 1999) (noting that evidence regarding the night before the
murder where defendant threatened to kill the victim with a shovel and a meat
cleaver was a “statement of intent [that] foreshadowed events to come and
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served to illustrate premeditation and calculation, rather than the sudden heat
asserted by Defendant”).
[21] Ultimately, “[e]xistence of sudden heat is a classic question of fact to be
determined by the [fact-finder].” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d 566 (quoting Fisher v.
State, 671 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ind. 1996)). The trial court, after hearing all the
evidence, especially the evidence regarding Williams’ prior threats and actions,
concluded that Williams was not acting under sudden heat but, instead,
knowingly or intentionally killed Brown. The evidence was sufficient to reach
this conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt, and we will not reweigh the
evidence to reach a different conclusion. See Earl, 715 N.E.2d at 1267 (“the trial
court, as finder of fact, had the responsibility of balancing [presented evidence
of sudden heat] against that suggesting that Defendant intentionally killed [the
victim] and was not acting in sudden heat”). Accordingly, the evidence was
sufficient to convict Williams of murder.
Conclusion
[22] The evidence is sufficient to convict Williams of murder. We affirm.
[23] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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