In the Matter of the Commitment of J.M., J.M. v. Northeastern Center, Inc. ( 2016 )

FILED
Oct 27 2016, 9:14 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robert J. Hardy Eugene C. Bosworth
Hardy Law Office Angola, Indiana
Auburn, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the October 27, 2016
Commitment of J.M., Court of Appeals Case No.
76A05-1509-MH-1477
J.M., Appeal from the Steuben Superior
Appellant-Respondent, Court
The Honorable William C. Fee,
v. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Northeastern Center, Inc., 76D01-1508-MH-88
Appellee-Petitioner.
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] J.M. appeals her involuntary mental health commitment. Though the issue
raised on appeal is moot, we address J.M.’s argument because it is a matter of
great public importance. On the merits of her argument, we hold that there was
sufficient evidence to support her temporary commitment. As such, we affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 10, 2015, Northeastern Center, Inc. (“Northeastern”) filed a petition
for the involuntary commitment of J.M. due to mental health concerns. The
court held a fact-finding hearing on August 13 and August 20.1 At that hearing,
Dr. Lynnea T. Carder testified as follows:
[J.M.] was admitted [to Northeastern] on August 5th. The
admission was prompted by family who called the Angola Police
Department. They were saying she was delusional,
hallucinations, thinks she was an alien, thought family was
against her. She had allegedly made threats to the family. The
family was fearful of her. . . . [S]he wasn’t recognizing her
daughter anymore . . . .
***
We have her diagnosed [with] schizoaffective disorder. . . .
***
Since admission, we’ve observed her getting very religiously
preoccupied, . . . explosive. We’ve actually had to restrain her
and seclude her at various times throughout her time here. She’s
somewhat paranoid. She doesn’t trust me. She doesn’t trust my
1
The parties mistakenly refer to the August 13 and August 20 hearings, and orders that followed each
hearing, as independent events. They were not. At the start of the hearing on August 20, the trial court
plainly informed the parties that the August 20 hearing was an extension of the earlier hearing held on
August 13, Tr. at 18, and the order that followed the August 20 hearing was an amended version of the order
that the court had issued after the August 13 hearing. Accordingly, this appeal is an appeal from the August
20 order, and the entirety of the evidence before the court on both dates is available for our review.
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qualifications to treat her. Difficult to engage and difficult to
have her follow rules and comply with treatment . . . .
***
In April of this year, . . . a family member called our hotline
voicing concern because she had been living without heat and
electricity and wasn’t caring for herself. And I think shortly
thereafter[] they had her move in with family. And now she is,
essentially, disowning her family—wanting nothing to do with
them because she believes they are manipulating and are the ones
that took her here. . . . [S]he has no other means of support—
nowhere to go. So she actually was in danger and not having
shelter and caring for herself.
***
. . . I was really hopeful that she would comply with medication.
And I could stabilize her and transition her home, or to a group
home, or an out-patient setting. But . . . she has refused to
comply with any medication. We have had to give her injections
every single day . . . , which has not been fully effective to
stabilize her and is somewhat medically dangerous to continue to
give her shots every day. So I am just really concerned about her
stability. If we cannot get oral medicines in her, she will just
have to stay in a hospital long term until we can stabilize her
with injections . . . .
***
. . . One of the admission issues with family said that she was
threatening them and felt very fearful of her. Prior to the
initiation of medications here, she was quite belligerent and
agitated, threatening to staff, and as I mentioned, we did have to
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restrain and seclude her on various occasions because of her
behavior. Since we’ve been giving her some injections daily, that
has subsided somewhat. She’s not making threats to harm
herself and she’s not been (indiscernible) of violence and again
that’s because she’s been getting the daily injections.
Tr. at 19-25.
[3] Following the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the trial court found that
J.M. suffered from a mental illness, was dangerous, and was gravely disabled.
Accordingly, the court ordered J.M. to be committed for a period not to exceed
ninety days at Northeastern or another appropriate facility. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] J.M. appeals her involuntary commitment at Northeastern. However, we first
acknowledge Northeastern’s response that, as J.M.’s ninety-day commitment
has expired, her appeal is moot. Northeastern is correct. “When a court is
unable to render effective relief to a party, the case is deemed moot and usually
dismissed.” In re J.B., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re
Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)).
[5] However:
“Although moot cases are usually dismissed, Indiana courts have
long recognized that a case may be decided on its merits under
an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions
of ‘great public interest.’” [In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37.]
Typically, cases falling in the “great public interest” exception
contain issues likely to recur. Id.; see Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
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(“Although Indiana does not require that the issue be capable of
repetition, cases falling into the public interest exception usually
involve issues that are likely to recur.”).
The question of how persons subject to involuntary commitment
are treated by our trial courts is one of great importance to
society. Indiana statutory and case law affirm that the value and
dignity of the individual facing commitment or treatment is of
great societal concern. See Ind. Code § 12-26-5-1 (establishing
procedures for seventy-two-hour commitment); Ind. Code § 12-
26-6-2 (establishing procedures for ninety-day commitment); In re
Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Ind. 1987)
(noting that the statute granting a patient the right to refuse
treatment “profoundly affirms the value and dignity of the
individual and the commitment of this society to insuring
humane treatment of those we confine”). The instant case
involves the proof necessary for involuntary commitment . . . .
Th[is is an issue] of great public importance and [is] likely to
recur, so we will address [it] here.
Id. at 798-99.
[6] On the merits of her appeal, J.M. asserts that Northeastern failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her involuntary commitment. As we have
explained:
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we look to the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
decision and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In re
Commitment of G.M., 743 N.E.2d 1148, 1150-51 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001). If the trial court’s commitment order represents a
conclusion that a reasonable person could have drawn, the order
must be affirmed, even if other reasonable conclusions are
possible. Id. at 1151. In an involuntary commitment case, the
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petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) the
individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely
disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that individual is
appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e).
Id. at 799.
[7] J.M. asserts that Northeastern failed to demonstrate that she is dangerous under
Indiana Code Section 12-26-2-5(e)(1). “Dangerous” as used in that statute
“means a condition in which an individual as a result of a mental illness[]
presents a substantial risk that the individual will harm the individual or
others.” I.C. § 12-7-2-53. J.M. contends that the evidence on this issue is
insufficient because
[a]t no point did any witness describe the actions that led up to
J.M. being placed in restraints or why that option was selected by
the staff at the Northeastern Center. . . . There was no discussion
of any actions of violence or threats of violence or any other
actions that might result in harm to J.M. or others.
Appellant’s Br. at 9.
[8] We cannot agree with J.M.’s assessment of the record. A reasonable fact-finder
could conclude from Dr. Carder’s testimony that J.M., as a result of her mental
illness, presented a substantial risk of harm to herself or others. Dr. Carder
testified, without objection, that J.M.’s family had described J.M. as delusional
and hallucinatory; that J.M. had made threats against them; that they were
fearful of J.M.; and that J.M. did not recognize her own daughter. Dr. Carder
further testified that, since J.M.’s admission at Northeastern, J.M. had been
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“religiously preoccupied, . . . explosive”; “paranoid”; and not trusting of her
care providers or their qualifications. Tr. at 21. Dr. Carder informed the court
that J.M. had been “belligerent” and “threatening to staff” such that she had to
be “restrain[ed]” and “seclude[d]” on “various occasions.” Id. at 25. And Dr.
Carder testified that J.M. had no clear shelter or ability to care for herself, and
that J.M. had not been willing to take necessary medications. Based on the
evidence before it, a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that J.M.
presented a substantial risk to herself or others. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s order of involuntary commitment.2
[9] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.
2
As we conclude that the trial court’s finding that J.M. was dangerous is supported by substantial evidence,
we need not consider J.M.’s additional argument on appeal challenging the court’s finding that she was also
gravely disabled. See I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e)(1).
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