Daniel E. Messel v. State of Indiana ( 2017 )

FILED
Jun 29 2017, 10:42 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kurt A. Young Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Daniel E. Messel, June 29, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
07A01-1610-CR-2425
v. Appeal from the Brown Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Judith A. Stewart,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
07C01-1504-MR-113
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Daniel Messel appeals following his conviction for Murder1 and adjudication
for being an Habitual Offender.2 Messel argues that the trial court erred by
admitting certain evidence. He also appeals the sentence imposed by the trial
court, contending that it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
his character. Finding no error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we
affirm.
Facts
[2] On April 23, 2015, Hannah Wilson, a 22-year-old senior at Indiana University,
finished her last exam for her undergraduate degree and began celebrating with
friends that afternoon. Later that evening, Hannah and some of her friends
decided to go to a bar in Bloomington. While they were waiting in line to enter
the bar, however, Hannah’s friends decided that she was too intoxicated to
continue with the evening, so they put her in a taxi and told the driver to take
her home. Surveillance videos later obtained by police showed a car similar to
Messel’s following the taxi that was transporting Hannah. The taxi driver
followed the instructions of Hannah’s friends, dropping her off at the corner of
8th Street and Dunn, which was near her apartment.
[3] On the morning of April 24, 2015, Carol Bridges was driving from her Brown
County home to Bloomington when she saw something along Plum Creek
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
2
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(b).
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Road near Indiana 45 that caught her attention, so she stopped to investigate.
When she exited her car and walked closer, she realized there was a body, later
identified as Hannah, lying in a vacant lot with a cell phone at its feet. Bridges
then called the police. The Brown County Sheriff and his deputies, as well as
the Indiana State Police, responded to the scene.
[4] As law enforcement began investigating, they learned that the cell phone near
Hannah’s body belonged to Messel. State Police detectives arrived at Messel’s
home early on the morning of April 24, 2015. He was not home, as he
normally would have been, nor did he show up for work that day—a pay day—
or call in to report his absence. He also did not respond to texts from a friend.
Messel emptied his bank account and filled up his car with gas.
[5] Later that day, a neighbor called police when Messel returned home. State
Police quickly drove to Messel’s home and saw that he was carrying a plastic
garbage bag out to his car. State Police arrested him at that time and seized the
bag. Further investigation revealed that the bag contained clothing that had
blood on it, some of which contained Hannah’s DNA. Hannah’s blood, hair,
and DNA were found in the interior and exterior of Messel’s car. Surveillance
videos showed a vehicle similar to Messel’s on the road that led to the crime
scene early on the morning of April 24. Cell phone location evidence linked
Messel to the location where Hannah was in Bloomington before her
disappearance and to the area near the crime scene on April 24.
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[6] An autopsy on Hannah’s body was conducted on April 25, 2015. The autopsy
revealed that she had sustained various injuries and that she had died after
being struck multiple times with a blunt object on the left side of her head,
crushing her skull.
[7] On April 27, 2015, the State charged Messel with murder. On December 3,
2015, the State added a count alleging Messel to be an habitual offender.
Messel’s jury trial began on August 2, 2016. At trial, the State introduced
testimony that Messel once possessed a mag flashlight. Messel’s attorney
objected to this testimony, but the trial court overruled the objection and
admitted the evidence.
[8] The jury found Messel guilty of murder on August 10, 2016. The jury then
heard evidence regarding the habitual offender allegation and found that Messel
is an habitual offender. On September 22, 2016, the trial court sentenced
Messel to sixty years imprisonment for murder and enhanced that term by
twenty years for the habitual offender finding. Messel now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
[9] Messel first argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence that he once
possessed a mag flashlight, which the State posited may have been the murder
weapon. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the trial court’s
sound discretion, and we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Johnson v. State, 6
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N.E.3d 491, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Messel argues that this evidence was
overly speculative, as a murder weapon was never identified, and that its
prejudicial effect far outweighed its limited probative value. See Ind. Evidence
Rule 403 (evidence may be excluded if probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice).
[10] We will assume solely for argument’s sake that the admission of this evidence
was erroneous. The erroneous admission of evidence is harmless where “the
conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt so as to
satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the questioned
evidence contributed to the conviction.” Duncan v. State, 23 N.E.3d 805, 811
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[11] In this case, the independent evidence of Messel’s guilt in the record includes
the following:
 Surveillance video places a vehicle similar to Messel’s following
Hannah’s taxi home and also at the crime scene the next morning.
 Cell phone evidence places Messel at the location in Bloomington where
Hannah was before she disappeared and also at the crime scene the next
morning.
 Messel’s cell phone was found next to Hannah’s dead body.
 Messel was found with a garbage bag full of clothes covered in blood that
contained Hannah’s DNA.
 The interior and exterior of Messel’s vehicle contained Hannah’s blood,
hair, and DNA.
Given this overwhelming independent evidence of Messel’s guilt, we find that
there is no substantial likelihood that the evidence related to his past ownership
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of a mag light contributed to the conviction. In other words, any error was
harmless. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ind. 2002) (where there
was no murder weapon introduced at trial, erroneous admission of photograph
of the defendant with a gun was harmless where there was overwhelming
evidence of his guilt).
[12] Messel argues that the harmless error standard requires us to conduct an
impermissible reweighing of the evidence. Essentially, he asks us to ignore and
abrogate the harmless error standard—an invitation we decline. Even if the
admission of this evidence was erroneous, it was harmless, and we will not
reverse on this basis.
II. Appropriateness
[13] Messel also contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this Court may revise a sentence if it is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. We must “conduct [this] review with substantial deference and give
‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the ‘principal role of
[our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to achieve a perceived
‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014)
(quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013)) (internal
citations omitted).
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[14] Messel was convicted of one count of murder, for which he faced a sentence of
forty-five to sixty-five years imprisonment, with an advisory term of fifty-five
years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. He received a sixty-year sentence for this
conviction. He was also found to be an habitual offender, for which he faced a
sentence enhancement of six to twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i). He
received a twenty-year enhancement, for an aggregate term of eighty years
imprisonment.
[15] With respect to the nature of the offense, Messel preyed upon an intoxicated
young woman at night, following behind her taxi until she was dropped off and
alone. He brutally bludgeoned her to death, inflicting multiple injuries to her
body, and then dumped her body as if it were a piece of trash in a vacant lot
alongside a road in rural Brown County. The next day, he emptied his bank
account, filled his car with gas, and was attempting to dispose of evidence when
he was arrested. Nothing about the appalling nature of this offense renders his
sentence inappropriate.
[16] With respect to Messel’s character, he has a lengthy criminal history. Among
other things, he has convictions for criminal mischief, public intoxication,
disorderly conduct, leaving the scene of an accident on two occasions, Class A
misdemeanor battery on four occasions, Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement on three occasions, Class A misdemeanor operating while
intoxicated endangering a person, Class C felony forgery, and Class C felony
battery on three occasions. He has violated probation multiple times and has
faced many additional charges to the ones that ended in conviction. His many
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contacts with the criminal justice system have not caused him to reform his
behavior, and his crimes have only become more serious with time. We do not
find that Messel’s character aids his appropriateness argument. In sum, we find
that the sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his
character.
[17] Messel devotes much of his argument to a claim that the trial court overlooked
several mitigating circumstances, but we do not review this argument under
Appellate Rule 7(B). Consequently, he has waived it. Waiver notwithstanding,
he argues that the trial court should have found his physical and mental health
to be a mitigator, but fails to explain how this alleged state of affairs relates to
his murder of Hannah or is relevant to sentencing. He also argues that his close
relationship with his father and nephew should have been a mitigator, but fails
to explain why this is relevant to sentencing. Third, he contends that the fact
that his criminal history is remote should have been a mitigator, but the trial
court observed that the remoteness of his criminal history somewhat mitigated
his criminal history. Fourth, he argues that the fact that he expressed sorrow
for the loss suffered by the victim’s family should have been a mitigator, but
fails to explain why this is relevant to sentencing. Finally, he notes that he was
willing to waive a jury trial for the habitual offender phase of his trial, but this
waiver would have saved the State and the jurors little time and effort because
they had already handled a multiple-day jury trial, were already present, and
the State had already prepared for the hearing. Consequently, we find no error
for any of these reasons.
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[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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