Taiveon Tramayne Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                   FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                               Feb 18 2019, 6:45 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                         Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Patrick M. Schrems                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Monroe County Public Defender                            Attorney General of Indiana
    Bloomington, Indiana
    Matthew B. Mackenzie
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Taiveon Tramayne Taylor,                                 February 18, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-2022
    v.                                               Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Marc R. Kellams,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    53C02-1801-F6-49
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2022 | February 18, 2019            Page 1 of 4
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Taiveon Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals the trial court’s order revoking his
    probation. Finding sufficient evidence to support the revocation, we affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue
    Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the revocation of
    Taylor’s probation.
    Facts
    [3]   In March 2018, Taylor pled guilty to Level 6 felony intimidation. In exchange
    for his guilty plea, the State dismissed two additional counts of Level 6 felony
    intimidation. Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, the trial court
    sentenced Taylor to two (2) years and (6) months and suspended the sentence to
    probation.
    [4]   Two months later, in May 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke Taylor’s
    probation alleging that he had violated the terms of his probation by: (1)
    committing the offense of auto theft; (2) operating a motor vehicle without a
    license; and (3) failing to provide proof of participation in and/or completion of
    a treatment program.
    [5]   At the revocation hearing, Tiffani Sims (“Sims”) and Bloomington Police
    Department Officer Brandon Siniard (“Officer Siniard”) both testified that they
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2022 | February 18, 2019   Page 2 of 4
    had seen Taylor driving Sims’ Mercedes on May 26, 2018. Officer Siniard
    specifically testified that he was fifteen feet away from Taylor at the time he
    made the identification and that it was a clear and sunny day. There was
    nothing obstructing his view of Taylor, with whom he had had prior contact.
    [6]   At the end of the revocation hearing, the trial court concluded that the State
    had proved all three violations that were set forth in the revocation petition.
    The trial court further ordered Taylor to serve 456 days of his previously
    suspended sentence. Taylor now appeals the revocation of his probation.
    Decision
    [7]   Taylor argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the revocation of his
    probation. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a
    right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007). It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine the
    conditions of probation and to revoke probation if those conditions are violated.
    Heaton v. State, 
    984 N.E.2d 614
    , 616 (Ind. 2013). When reviewing an appeal
    from the revocation of probation, we consider only the evidence most favorable
    to the judgment and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
    the witnesses. Sanders v. State, 
    825 N.E.2d 952
    , 954-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),
    trans. denied. A probation violation need be proven only by a preponderance of
    the evidence. Pittman v. State, 
    749 N.E.2d 557
    , 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans.
    denied. Further, the violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to
    revoke probation. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2022 | February 18, 2019   Page 3 of 4
    [8]   Here, Taylor does not dispute that he does not have a license. Rather, he
    argues that there was “insufficient evidence to support the allegation that
    Taylor was driving a vehicle in violation of his terms of probation.” (Taylor’s
    Br. 8). However, our review of the evidence reveals that both Sims and Officer
    Siniard testified that they had seen Taylor driving Sims’ Mercedes. Officer
    Siniard further testified that he was fifteen feet away from Taylor when he
    identified him and that it was a clear and sunny day. There was nothing
    obstructing the officer’s view of Taylor, with whom he had had prior contact.
    Taylor’s argument that Officer Sinian might be mistaken is an invitation for us
    to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See 
    Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 954
    -
    55. We find that there is sufficient evidence to support the revocation of
    Taylor’s probation.1
    [9]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    1
    Because we have found sufficient evidence to support one of the probation violations, we need not address
    the sufficiency of the evidence to support the other two violations. See 
    Pittman, 749 N.E.2d at 559
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2022 | February 18, 2019                Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-2022

Filed Date: 2/18/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2019