Elijah Roberson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                 FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                              Oct 20 2016, 9:59 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                              CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                       Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Elijah Roberson                                          Gregory F. Zoeller
    Michigan City, Indiana                                   Attorney General of Indiana
    Richard C. Webster
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Elijah Roberson,                                         October 20, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    45A03-1602-CR-456
    v.                                               Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    45G04-0912-FA-57
    Bradford, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-456 | October 20, 2016     Page 1 of 5
    [1]   On August 31, 2010, Appellant-Defendant Elijah Roberson pled guilty to Class
    A felony child molesting. In exchange for Roberson’s plea, Appellee-Plaintiff
    the State of Indiana agreed to dismiss additional charges of Class B felony
    sexual misconduct with a minor, Class B felony incest, and Class C felony
    sexual misconduct with a minor. The trial court accepted Roberson’s guilty
    plea and sentenced him to a forty-year term of incarceration. Roberson’s
    sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. On February 2, 2016, Roberson filed a
    pro se motion seeking a modification of his sentence. The prosecuting attorney
    did not consent to Roberson’s motion. The trial court subsequently summarily
    denied Roberson’s motion.
    [2]   On appeal, Roberson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
    summarily denying his motion for a modification of his sentence. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Our memorandum decision in Roberson’s direct appeal, which was handed
    down on June 24, 2011, instructs us as to the underlying facts and procedural
    history leading to the instant appeal.
    The facts supporting Roberson’s guilty plea can be found in the
    stipulated factual basis for the guilty plea. Roberson, who was
    born in 1962, is the biological uncle and adoptive father of the
    victim, S.R., who was born in 1992. Between March 6, 2003 and
    June 1, 2003, while Roberson and S.R. were living in East
    Chicago, Roberson had vaginal sexual intercourse with S.R. one
    or two times per week. Roberson told S.R. not to tell anyone
    about the sexual intercourse because Roberson would go to jail.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-456 | October 20, 2016   Page 2 of 5
    The trial court accepted Roberson’s guilty plea and sentenced
    him to a term of forty years executed.
    Roberson v. State, 45A03-1011-CR-564, *1 (Ind. Ct. App. June 24, 2011). On
    appeal, we affirmed Roberson’s sentence. Id. at *2. The Indiana Supreme
    Court subsequently denied Roberson’s transfer petition.
    [4]   On February 2, 2016, Roberson filed a pro se motion seeking a modification of
    his sentence. The prosecuting attorney did not consent to Roberson’s motion.
    The trial court summarily denied Roberson’s petition on February 5, 2016.
    This appeal follows.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   Roberson contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion
    for a sentence modification. “We review a trial court’s decision as to a motion
    to modify only for an abuse of discretion.” Carr v. State, 
    33 N.E.3d 358
    , 358
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion has occurred when
    the court’s decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before the court.” Id. at 359 (internal quotation omitted).
    [6]   Roberson qualifies as a violent criminal. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(d)(10).
    Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17(k) provides the following with respect to an
    individual who is classified as a violent criminal and who committed their
    offense or was sentenced prior to July 1, 2014:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-456 | October 20, 2016   Page 3 of 5
    This subsection applies to a convicted person who is a violent
    criminal. A convicted person who is a violent criminal may, not
    later than three hundred sixty-five (365) days from the date of
    sentencing, file one (1) petition for sentence modification under
    this section without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
    After the elapse of the three hundred sixty-five (365) day period,
    a violent criminal may not file a petition for sentence modification
    without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
    (Emphasis added).
    [7]   The record reveals that Roberson was sentenced on October 5, 2010. He did
    not file his motion for a sentence modification until February 2, 2016, far more
    than 365 days after he was sentenced. Thus, pursuant to Indiana Code section
    35-38-1-17(k), the trial court could only grant Roberson’s request for a
    modification of his sentence if he received the consent of the prosecuting
    attorney.1 The record before the court on appeal contains no indication that
    Roberson sought, much less received, the consent of the prosecuting attorney
    before requesting a sentence modification. As such, the trial court could not
    have granted Roberson the requested relief. We therefore conclude that the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Roberson’s
    petition.
    1
    We note that the 2014 amendments to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17 removed the requirement for
    consent from the prosecuting attorney. However, we held in Johnson v. State, 
    36 N.E.3d 1130
    , 1137-38 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2015), that the 2014 amendments did not apply retroactively to penalties incurred, crimes
    committed, or proceedings begun before the statute was amended. Further, it is also of note that Indiana
    Code section 35-38-1-17 was again amended in 2015 to re-introduce the requirement that a prosecuting
    attorney consent to a request for a sentence modification.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-456 | October 20, 2016          Page 4 of 5
    [8]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1602-CR-456 | October 20, 2016   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 45A03-1602-CR-456

Filed Date: 10/20/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021