In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.S. (Minor Child) And C.S. (Mother) and B.S. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Apr 24 2018, 7:02 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jennifer A. Joas Abigail R. Recker
Madison, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary April 24, 2018
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of: 69A04-1712-JT-2905
A.S. (Minor Child) Appeal from the Ripley Circuit
Court
And
The Honorable Ryan King, Judge
C.S. (Mother) and B.S. (Father), Trial Court Cause No.
Appellants-Respondents, 69C01-1705-JT-10
v.
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellants-Respondents, B.S. (Father) and C.S. (Mother) (collectively,
Parents), appeal the termination of their parental rights to their minor child,
A.S. (Child).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Parents raise one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the Indiana
Department of Child Services (DCS) presented clear and convincing evidence
to support the termination of Parents’ parental rights.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Father and Mother are the biological parents of the Child, born January 27,
2014. At the time the Child was born, Parents were married. Mother also has
an older child, J.S. from a previous relationship. 1 On December 3, 2014, the
Ripley County office of DCS received a report alleging neglect, and possible
abuse, of the Child and J.S. Specifically, it was reported that the ten-month-old
Child “was malnourished and had dark circles under her eyes,” and the
reporting source indicated that in the previous month J.S. had been observed
1
J.S. is not a subject of this appeal.
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with bruises and a black eye. (DCS Exh. 1). It was further alleged that Parents
were using drugs in the home. That day, DCS conducted a home visit. DCS
observed no marks on the Child or J.S., and Parents explained that the Child
had recently been hospitalized and had seen a doctor that morning. Parents
submitted to a drug screen and admitted to smoking marijuana. At that time,
DCS worked with Parents to establish a safety plan, pursuant to which Parents
agreed to not use drugs in their apartment or care for the children while under
the influence of drugs.
[5] Two weeks later, DCS obtained information from the Child’s doctor indicating
concerns over the Child’s weight loss. The doctor questioned Mother’s ability
to care for the Child without assistance based on Mother’s apparent inability
“to recognize the importance of regular feedings.” (DCS Exh. 1). The doctor
opined that Parents’ report of the Child’s food consumption did not align with
her physical condition. On January 9, 2015, DCS filed a request for approval
for a Program of Informal Adjustment. The trial court approved the Informal
Adjustment on January 12, 2015, at which time it was noted that the Child and
J.S. “are at imminent risk of removal from the home environment and absent
effective preventative services, [DCS] will petition the court to place the
[children] in foster care.” (DCS Exh. 1). During the Informal Adjustment, it
became apparent to DCS and service providers that both Father and Mother
suffer from some type of intellectual disability. Nevertheless, Parents
substantially complied with the program, and on June 6, 2015, DCS moved to
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discharge the Informal Adjustment, which the trial court approved on July 12,
2015.
[6] Four months later, on November 7, 2015, DCS was notified that Parents were
again using drugs. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana. A safety plan was
implemented, but on November 12, 2015, Mother submitted a positive drug
screen for marijuana. On December 11, 2015, Mother again admitted that she
had smoked marijuana. Both Parents subsequently submitted positive drug
screens and also refused to submit to drug screens when requested to do so.
Thus, on December 22, 2015, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Child and
J.S. were each a child in need of services (CHINS). As to the Child, the
CHINS petition asserted that her “physical or mental condition is seriously
impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect
of [C]hild’s [Parents] . . . to supply [C]hild with necessary food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, education or supervision.” (DCS Exh. 2). On January 6,
2016, the trial court held an initial hearing and ordered Parents to submit to all
drug screens as requested by DCS, the refusal of which would warrant DCS’s
detainment of the Child.
[7] Despite DCS’s attempts to “warn” Parents, they failed to “grasp[] the concept
that marijuana use in the home with the children was a safety risk.” (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 34). On February 1, 2016, the trial court held a detention hearing and
granted DCS’s request to remove the Child from Parents’ home due to ongoing
drug use. At the DCS office, while considering where to place the Child, the
DCS caseworker observed that the Child just “walked in circles . . . around the
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whole office for hours” and “she would look straight through you.” (Tr. Vol.
II, pp. 25-26). The Child was also found to be infested with lice and had to be
treated prior to being placed. The Child was subsequently placed in foster care.
J.S. was also removed and placed in the same foster home.
[8] When the Child arrived at her foster home, she “was very, very skinny, . . .
much smaller than an average two year old is.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148). She was
pale and had “very sunken skin.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 158). The Child was “very
sensitive to any lights or sounds,” and certain noises were “very terrifying to
her.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 148-49). She lacked confidence and walked with the skill
level of a one-year-old who would have “just started walking. She did not like
shoes, couldn’t walk in them well.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 149). The Child “didn’t
know how to eat food” and “didn’t know how to drink out of a cup.” (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 149). Furthermore, the Child was non-verbal, “gave blank stares,” and
did not recognize her own name. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 151). The Child would sleep
through the night and then, instead of alerting her foster parents when she
awoke, she would just lie silently in her crib. Essentially, the Child was “[v]ery
much delayed.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 149). Under her foster parents’ care, the Child
immediately commenced regular therapy and quickly demonstrated substantial
progress with her muscle tone, speech, and vocabulary. In October of 2016, the
Child was examined at Peyton Manning Children’s Hospital. Although she
had previously been deemed as “failure to thrive,” the Child’s drastic
improvement during the six months she had been in foster care established that
her failure to thrive was the result of her prior home environment and lack of
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adequate nutrition. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 153). In December of 2016, the foster
parents had the Child tested to determine whether she would need a special
education preschool program, but the Child was instead found to be
average/above average for her age. The Child is bonded with her foster
parents, and they intend to adopt her.
[9] On March 14, 2016, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing during which
Parents admitted to the allegations contained in the CHINS petition, and on
March 17, 2016, the trial court adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS. On April
14, 2016, subsequent to a hearing, the trial court issued a Dispositional Order,
granting wardship of the Child to DCS. The trial court additionally ordered
Parents to participate in services designed to facilitate reunification. In relevant
part, the trial court directed Parents to participate in any programs
recommended by DCS or other service providers; maintain suitable housing;
refrain from illegal drug use; engage in home-based counseling; complete a
substance abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations; submit
to random drug screens; meet the Child’s medical and mental health needs; and
attend visits with the Child. The trial court further ordered Mother to undergo
a psychological evaluation.
[10] In substantial part, Parents participated with their case plan. Within two
months of the Dispositional Order, Parents achieved sobriety and maintained it
for the remainder of the case. They attended substance abuse counseling and
drug education classes, and they worked with a home-based caseworker. Both
Parents also completed psychological evaluations. Parents attended the
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majority of their supervised visits, with the exception of several weeks when
Mother had a lice outbreak and during instances of inclement weather as
Parents lacked their own transportation.
[11] Despite Parents’ apparent effort to comply with DCS’s case plan, DCS and the
service providers maintained significant concerns about Parents’ ability to safely
parent the Child and J.S. without DCS intervention. In fact, visits never
transitioned from fully supervised because Parents had to be prompted
regarding the same basic parenting tasks at every visit. The visit provider “had
to make sure that everything was very structured, . . . to the point that
everything had to be . . . repeated every visit. We had to make sure that they
knew exactly what to do from the beginning to the end.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 119).
The visit provider additionally had to ensure that Parents “brought the
appropriate food, . . . that their discipline[e] was accurate . . . for both age
levels, . . . and that they . . . properly played with the girls in a way that was
appropriate for both age levels.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 119).
[12] More specifically, Parents struggled with their personal hygiene, which
triggered concerns about ignoring the Child’s hygienic needs and health as well.
DCS also cited that Parents consistently had to be reminded to bring nutritious
foods to visits and to monitor that the Child was actually eating. Given the
Child’s prior malnourishment, DCS heavily focused on this issue, but Parents
seemingly failed to grasp the importance of the Child’s diet. Parents were able
to follow service providers’ very specific directions, but they could not
independently anticipate and provide for the Child’s needs at visits. To
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illustrate, it was suggested that Parents bring more vegetables, instead of
cookies and candy, to the visits; at the next visit, Parents arrived with a
vegetable tray but brought nothing else for the Child’s meal. Parents also had
to be repeatedly coached at each visit as to proper discipline techniques. It was
noted that Mother lacked empathy toward the Child, and Father was observed
to get frustrated and give up in difficult parenting situations. If the Child was
crying during a visit, the visitation supervisor would have to encourage Father
to console the Child and coach him through it. When the Child squirmed
during a diaper change, Father gave up. DCS also reported that Father could
not be dissuaded from ideas that he believed to be true—i.e., certain medical
treatments—notwithstanding proof to the contrary. DCS feared “that he would
apply that, anything that he may learn from somebody else and apply that in
the care for [the Child] and it may not be true.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 108).
A psychological evaluation of [Father] stated that due to his low
cognitive scores and ongoing psychiatric issues, it is unlikely that
he will ever be able to safely parent his [Child]. A psychological
evaluation of [Mother] recommended that her parenting time be
supervised until she could show improvement in her parenting
issues, which she has failed to do.
(DCS Exh. 2).
[13] In approximately the fall of 2016, Parents were evicted from their apartment,
and for the next year, they lived with either friends or relatives. Following their
eviction, “that was pretty much [Father’s] only goal, was to find . . . housing. . .
. [O]ther providers got the impression that he thought if he got an apartment, he
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would get the [Child] . . . , and . . . [the court-appointed special advocate
(CASA)], providers, [and DCS] would just remind him that there were other
expectations, he would still just focus on the housing.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 51).
Parents also divorced at some point during the pendency of the CHINS action,
although this seemed to ultimately have a positive effect on their independence.
Furthermore, on September 29, 2016, Parents were arrested and each charged
with one Count of unlawful sale or transfer of a precursor, a Level 6 felony, for
purchasing pseudoephedrine on behalf of another to be used in the manufacture
of methamphetamine. On March 7, 2017, Parents pled guilty to their respective
charge and were both sentenced to 910 days of reporting probation.
[14] On May 10, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to
the Child. Father’s application for disability benefits was approved, and around
the fall of 2017, he obtained suitable housing. Mother’s application for social
security benefits was denied, and she remained both unemployed and homeless.
However, both Parents continued to engage in visits with the Child and attend
other services. On October 25, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on
DCS’s termination petition. On November 8, 2017, the trial court issued an
Order on Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship, granting
DCS’s request to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Child.
[15] Parents now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[16] Parents challenge the termination of their parental rights to the Child. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). “A
parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is
‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). However, parental rights “are not absolute
and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the proper
disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. If “parents are unable
or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,” termination of parental
rights is appropriate. Id. We recognize that the termination of a parent-child
relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last
resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural
relationship between parent and child have failed.’” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015).
[17] Indiana courts rely on a “deferential standard of review in cases concerning the
termination of parental rights” due to the trial court’s “unique position to assess
the evidence.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
dismissed. Our court neither reweighs evidence nor assesses the credibility of
witnesses. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.
2013). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences that
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support the trial court’s judgment, and we accord deference to the trial court’s
“opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand.” Id. Where, as
in this case, the trial court enters special findings of fact and conclusions
thereon under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we evaluate whether the trial court’s
decision is clearly erroneous. Id. Under this standard, we must determine
“whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the
findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id. at 1230.
II. Termination of Parental Rights Statute
[18] In order to terminate a parent’s rights to his child, DCS must prove:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
****
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
under the supervision of a local office . . . for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning
with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of
the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] . . . ;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
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(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a [CHINS];
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each of the foregoing elements by
clear and convincing evidence. C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85,
92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[C]lear and convincing evidence requires the
existence of a fact to ‘be highly probable.’” Id. On appeal, Parents do not
contest the trial court’s findings that the Child has been removed from the home
for the requisite period of time or that DCS has established a satisfactory plan
for the Child’s care and treatment.
A. Threat to Child’s Well-Being 2
[19] Parents claim that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
determination that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the Child’s well-being. It is well established that “[a] trial court must
“judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into
consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of
Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.
2
Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive; therefore, DCS is required to prove
only one of three listed elements. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220-21. In this case, the trial court based its
termination decision on DCS’s satisfaction of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii)—that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being.
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“[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is
a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. A trial court
“need not wait until the children are irreversibly influenced by their deficient
lifestyle such that their physical, mental and social growth is permanently
impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Furthermore,
“[c]lear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of
the parents is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival. Rather, it is
sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional
and physical development are threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.”
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.
[20] The trial court found that
[P]arents’ lack of progress in services, their visitation remaining
at fully supervised, and the [P]arents’ inability to develop the
necessary skills to care for their children, as well as [Mother’s]
lack of suitable or stable housing and her lack of stable income,
support a finding that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the [C]hild.
(Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 32).
[21] Father contends that there is no evidence establishing that he was responsible
for the Child’s removal or that his parenting actions caused the Child’s
developmental delays. Father argues that the record establishes that he
achieved stable housing and maintained sobriety as ordered. He suggests that
his Level 6 felony conviction for the unlawful sale or transfer of precursors
during the pendency of the case did not pose any threat to the Child. He further
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asserts that the trial court improperly relied on the subjective opinions of service
providers that he failed to make any progress during the eighteen months that
he participated in services because there is no evidence that his parenting would
endanger the Child. Similarly, Mother contends that DCS’s reasons as to why
the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being “were
either flimsy or not supported by the [r]ecord.” (Appellant-Mother’s Br. p. 18).
Mother contends that she “did what was asked of her. She became drug free
and participated in visits and services,” and there is no evidence that Mother
harmed the Child or caused the Child’s developmental delays. (Appellant-
Mother’s Br. p. 19).
[22] We find that DCS clearly established that Parents cannot independently act to
ensure the Child’s safety, and the trial court clearly accorded substantial weight
to the concurring testimonies of DCS, the Child’s CASA, the home-based
caseworker, and the visitation supervisor that Parents are not capable of
consistently providing full-time care for the Child in an unsupervised setting.
The evidence reveals that Parents, to a limited extent, are able to follow specific
directions when DCS is involved. However, as they demonstrated following
the discharge of their Informal Adjustment, these Parents revert to their prior
habits when left to their own devices. Parents stopped smoking marijuana for
the duration of this case, but they did not consider the consequences—for either
themselves or the Child—of providing pseudoephedrine to another individual
for manufacturing methamphetamine. Furthermore, the Child was removed
from the home in a malnourished state. It was due to the efforts of the foster
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parents and DCS that the Child finally began to thrive during the pendency of
this case. The Child’s failure to thrive for the first two years of her life was the
direct result of the environment she was subjected to in Parents’ care and their
failure to provide her with adequate nutrition. Parents’ inability to recognize
the severity of the Child’s poor health while previously in their care, and their
failure to prioritize the Child’s nutritional needs during their supervised visits—
even after consistent efforts by service providers reminding them to do so, is
indicative of a future likelihood that the Child’s health will be neglected if
returned to Parents’ care.
[23] Father obtained housing, and he improved his personal hygiene shortly before
the termination hearing. Yet, he had to be prompted to console his crying
Child, and he gave up when the Child resisted a diaper change. These are
nominal parenting frustrations when compared to the challenges that he would
be expected to face in the future without the assistance of service providers.
Mother never obtained housing or employment, and despite her improvement
in hygiene near the end of the case, DCS was validly concerned that Parents’
neglect of their own hygiene would translate to a neglect of the Child’s hygiene
and other needs. Also, importantly, neither parent really seemed to be bonded
with the Child. DCS maintained supervised visitation throughout the case
because Parents established that they could not react to parenting situations
without repeated prompting and coaching from the supervisor. See Stone, 656
N.E.2d at 828 (finding termination appropriate where DCS and other
caseworkers opined, in part, that the parents were “incapable of adequately
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parenting” the children as “little progress” was made to correct the problems
throughout the case and the children “would be at a very high risk of regressing
to their previous behaviors”).
[24] The evidence establishes that Parents’ failure to comprehend and implement
parenting skills stems, at least in part, from their low-level intellectual
functioning, but Parents correctly assert that mental limitations may not
provide the sole basis for termination of parental rights. See id. at 831.
However, an intellectual disability is a factor “to be considered along with other
pertinent evidence bearing upon the question of a parent’s fitness.” Id. “Every
child is entitled to a minimum level of care regardless of the special needs or
limited abilities of . . . [the] parents.” Id. at 828. In this case, DCS established
that Parents would be unable to meet the Child’s basic needs—physically and
emotionally—if she were returned to their care. Parents’ psychological
evaluations indicated that they could not safely parent the Child. 3 Father points
out that the home-based case manager testified that if Father had “an on-going
mentor, he might do alright.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 109-10). Parents must be able to
meet their parental obligations independently of DCS intervention; it is not
realistic to expect that DCS can provide a mentor to Father for the rest of the
Child’s minor years. Accordingly, we find that the evidence supports the trial
3
Father argues that the psychological evaluation was not made part of the record; thus “we don’t know how
[the psychiatrist’s] opinion was surmised.” (Appellant-Father’s Br. p. 22). However, through testimony and
CHINS records, DCS admitted certain conclusions from the psychological report with no objection from
either parent.
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court’s determination that the continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the Child’s well-being.
B. Best Interests of the Child
[25] Parents also challenge the trial court’s determination that termination of their
parental rights is in the best interests of the Child. The parent-child relationship
is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at
147 (quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285
(Ind. 2003)). Thus, the purpose of terminating a parent-child relationship is to
protect the child, not to punish the parent. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. When considering whether termination would be
in a child’s best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified
by [DCS] and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The
trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the
child’s physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before
terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235.
Permanency is a central consideration in determining a child’s best interests.
Id. “[T]he right of parents to raise their children should not be terminated solely
because there is a better home available for the children.” In re K.S., 750
N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
[26] In concluding that termination would serve the Child’s best interests, the trial
court relied, in part, on Parents’ failure to progress in services and their inability
to safely parent the Child. The trial court also cited Mother’s lack of housing
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and income, as well as Parents’ participation in a methamphetamine-related
crime. In addition, the Child’s CASA and service providers all recommended
that the Child’s best interests would be served by remaining with her foster
parents. However, Parents again dispute the evidence establishing that they
lack the ability to safely parent the Child, and they emphasize that they
remedied the drug-use that initially resulted in the Child’s removal. Parents
also argue that they demonstrated their willingness and desire to work toward
reunification throughout the case.
[27] It is well established that “[a] parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable
environment, along with the parent’s current inability to do the same, supports
finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” In
re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Moreover, the testimony of
the DCS caseworker and child advocates is sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that termination is in the Child’s best interests. See McBride v.
Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003). Here, DCS, the Child’s CASA, the home-based caseworker, and the
visitation supervisor all testified regarding their concerns about Parents’
inability to take proper care of the Child. There is no dispute that Parents love
the Child, and they endeavored to participate as directed. However, there was
also evidence that Father would not “think that he would need help” on his
own; Mother did not have housing or income, and she lacked empathy for the
Child. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 110). The record establishes that the Child is not bonded
with Parents but considers the foster parents to be her family. By the time of
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the termination hearing, the Child had been removed from Parents’ care for
more than twenty months, during which time she thrived. Therefore, we find
that there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s determination that
termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Child’s best interests.
CONCLUSION
[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing
evidence to support the trial court’s order terminating Parents’ parental rights to
the Child.
[29] Affirmed.
[30] May, J. and Mathias, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A04-1712-JT-2905 | April 24, 2018 Page 19 of 19