In the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.P. and A.P. (Minor Children), and C.P. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 26 2016, 9:23 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy E. Stucky Gregory R. Zoeller
Stucky, Lauer & Young, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
James D. Boyer
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- October 26, 2016
Child Relationship of S.P. and Court of Appeals Case No.
A.P. (Minor Children), and 02A04-1604-JT-752
C.P. (Mother), Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Hon. Charles F. Pratt, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause Nos.
02D08-1506-JT-56
The Indiana Department of 02D08-1506-JT-57
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Respondent C.P. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to S.P. and A.P. (collectively, the “Children”).
She raises the following restated issue on appeal: whether the Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient evidence to support the termination
of her parental rights to the Children. Specifically, Mother contends that the
juvenile court erroneously found that (1) there was a reasonable probability that
the conditions resulting in the removal of the Children would not be remedied,
(2) adoption was a satisfactory plan for the Children, and (3) termination was in
their best interests. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient evidence to
support the termination order, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother is the biological parent of S.P., who was born on June 6, 2010, and
A.P., who was born on October 3, 2012.1 On July 11, 2013, DCS filed petitions
alleging the Children to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) due to
Mother’s neglect. DCS removed the Children and placed them in foster care.
On August 5, 2013, DCS filed amended CHINS petitions stating that, among
other things, Mother was unable to provide the Children with appropriate
1
The Children have different biological fathers. The parental rights of the fathers of S.P. and A.P. were also
terminated, but they do not participate in this appeal.
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housing and care and had a substance-abuse problem. At a hearing on August
8, 2013, the Children were determined to be CHINS based in part to Mother’s
admission on DCS’s allegations. Specifically, Mother admitted that:
On or about June 2013 to about July 9, 2013, and all times
relevant; [Mother] has been unable or unwilling to personally
provide care and supervision for [the Children].
On or about June 2013, July 2013, and all times relevant;
[Mother] has been unable or unwilling to personally provide
independent or sustainable housing for [the Children].
….
On or about June 2013 or July 2013 [Mother] placed [A.P.] in an
inappropriate living environment.
On or about July 6, 2013 [Mother] smoked marijuana.
[Mother] has a criminal history that involves convictions or plea
agreements regarding illegal drugs or alcohol.
[Mother] does not have the custody of her two oldest children.
[Mother] has not had independent or sustainable housing for
about three years.
[Mother] is addicted or has substance abuse issues with alcohol
or illegal drugs.
DCS Ex. 9 pp. 2, 3 ¶4(A). The juvenile court subsequently established a Parent
Participation Plan (“PPP”) specifying various services in which Mother was to
participate and complete in order to effectuate reunification with her Children.
At a review hearing on October 29, 2014, the juvenile court found that Mother
had not complied with the ordered services in the PPP. Consequently, the
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juvenile court concluded that Mother had not demonstrated an ability to benefit
from the services being offered to her.
[3] At the March 4, 2015 permanency hearing, the court again found that Mother
had not participated in any of the ordered services. Specifically, the juvenile
court found that Mother had not participated in any of the home-based services
or therapy, tested positive for illegal substances, did not complete the substance-
abuse assessment, failed to maintain communication with DCS, and she did not
regularly visit the Children. Based upon this information, the juvenile court
found that it was in the Children’s best interest to change the permanency plan
to termination of parental rights. On July 7, 2015, DCS filed its termination
petitions.
[4] Although Mother failed to personally attend the evidentiary hearing on the
termination petitions on December 8 and 15, 2015, she was represented by
counsel. At the hearing, the service providers testified that termination of
parental rights is in the best interests of the Children. Based upon all of the
evidence, the juvenile court found that termination of parental rights is in the
Children’s best interests. On March 9, 2016, the juvenile court entered an order
terminating Mother’s parental rights. In doing so, the juvenile court made the
following pertinent specific findings:
9. A Periodic Review Hearing was held on October 29, 2014, and
the Court found that the Mother was not in compliance with the
Dispositional Decree. The children were continued in licensed
foster care.
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10. A Permanency Hearing was held on March 4, 2015. The
Court found that the Mother . . . [was] not incompliance [sic]
with the Dispositional Decree. The Mother had not participated
in home based services or therapy. She had tested positive for
illegal substances and had not regularly visited the children . . .
The Court adopted a Permanency Plan that provided for the
termination of parental rights.
11. A Periodic Review Hearing was held on August 31, 2015, at
which the Court found that the Mother did not have appropriate
housing and had only visited the children on two (2) occasions
since April 2015. The children were continued in licensed foster
care.
12. From the testimony of Dockside Services therapist, Melissa
Bortom, the Court finds that the Department referred the
[M]other to that agency for a drug and alcohol assessment. Ms.
Bortom met with the [M]other on one (1) occasion in October
2014. A new referral was issued in January 2015 and, again, the
[M]other only met with the therapist on one (1) occasion. A
third referral was made in September 2015. However the case
was closed due to the [M]other’s noncompliance.
13. From the testimony of Kimberly Schenk of Whitington
Home and Services the Court finds that the Department referred
the Mother for supervised visitation with her children. Between
October 2014 and December 2014 the [M]other only saw the
children two (2) times. Between March 2015 and October 2015,
the Court finds from the testimony of Heather Plastner that the
[M]other only exercised three (3) visits.
14. The [M]other has not completed home based services. Nor
according to the testimony of Robert Young, Jr. of C.A.P., Inc.
did she complete a drug and alcohol assessment.
15. In addition to the forgoing instances of the Mother’s
noncompliance Department case manager Beverly Marcus
testified and the Court finds that Mother did not complete family
counseling nor did she comply with referrals for medication
management through Park Center.
….
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18. The child[ren]’s Court Appointed Special Advocate has also
concluded that the child[ren]’s best interests are served by the
termination of parental rights. In support of her conclusion she
cites the fact that Mother has not completed any of her services
required under the Dispositional Decree. The . . . Mother [has]
not regularly visited the child[ren].
Mother’s App. pp. 60, 61, 65, 66.
[5] As of the date of the termination hearing, the Children were placed with their
Grandmother and had lived there since November of 2015. Based upon the
testimony of the DCS family case manager (“FCM”), the Grandmother already
has custody of Mother’s two eldest children and is willing to adopt the
Children.
Discussion and Decision
[6] This court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases
concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we
will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most
favorable to the judgment. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004), trans. denied. Thus, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. We will only set aside the court judgment
terminating a parent-child relationship if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879
N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[7] The traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise her children is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005).
Furthermore, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the
most valued relationships of our culture.” Id. However, parental rights are not
absolute and the law allows for the termination of such rights when a parent is
unable or unwilling to meet her responsibilities as a parent. In re T.F., 743
N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans denied. The purpose of terminating
parental rights is to protect the child, not to punish the parent. Id. The juvenile
court may terminate the parental rights if the child’s emotional and physical
development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child
has suffered from irreversible harm. Id.[8] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) one (1) of the following exists:
(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree;
(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31–34–21–5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description of
the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
in which the finding was made; or
(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a county office of family and
children or probation department for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months,
beginning with the date the child is removed from the
home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in
need of services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS’s burden of proof for establishing these
allegations in a termination case is one of “clear and convincing evidence.” In
re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009).
[9] Here, Mother does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s findings. Mother,
however, argues that DSC failed to submit sufficient evidence to support the
juvenile court’s findings and conclusions that (1) there was a reasonable
probability that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the Children
would not be remedied, (2) there was a satisfactory plan for the Children, and
(3) termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests.
I. Conditions Resulting in Removal Not Likely to Be
Remedied
[10] Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal and
continued placement outside of her care will not be remedied. However, a
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juvenile court may properly consider evidence of the parent’s drug and alcohol
abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate
employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family and Children,
798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App 2003). Additionally, a juvenile court can
“reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the parent and the
parent’s response to those services.” Id. (quoting In re A.C.C., 682 N.E.2d 542,
544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The evidence presented by DCS “need not rule out
all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need establish only that there is a
reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not change.” In re
Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236,
242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[11] Here the evidence showed that Children were originally removed from
Mother’s care in July of 2013 due to allegations of neglect. The Children were
later adjudicated to be CHINS and Mother was ordered to participate in,
among other things, supervised visits; refrain from using illegal substances;
complete a substance-abuse assessment; find and maintain suitable housing and
employment; and participate in case management services. The Children
continued to be placed in foster care over the course of the next three years after
their removal from Mother’s care in 2013.
[12] During that time, the evidence shows that extensive services were offered to
Mother to assist her to reunite with the Children, obtain employment, and find
and maintain suitable housing. However, according to testimony by the service
providers, Mother did not complete the substance-abuse assessment despite
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having been given numerous referrals. Consequently, she did not participate in
any substance-abuse treatment despite her admission that she had a problem.
The evidence shows that Mother also tested positive in numerous drug screens.
Moreover, based upon the evidence, Mother failed to consistently participate in
and benefit from the homebased services and counseling to help her with
parenting, employment, and securing stable housing. According to testimony
by the service providers, parenting education could not be made available to
Mother due to inability to comply with the other services. While Mother did
request medication management services for depression, the record shows that
she never followed through with any of the services and referrals that were
offered to her. Mother cancelled or failed to attend the vast majority of the
supervised visits with the Children. When she did attend a visitation, service
providers described the visits as “very rough visits” because mother would
arrive unprepared and was unable to control the Children’s behavior. Tr. p. 97.
The juvenile court eventually concluded that the services were ineffective due to
the Mother’s non-compliance throughout the course of the CHINS cases.
Based upon the ample evidence regarding Mother’s non-compliance with the
court-ordered services, we conclude that Mother has not sustained her burden
to show that the juvenile court’s determination in this regard was clearly
erroneous.
II. Adoption as a Satisfactory Plan
[13] Next, Mother argues that DCS did not have a satisfactory plan for the Children
because transfer of custody or open adoption with Grandmother were better
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permanency options. Mother, however, does not provide further explanation
regarding her proposed permanency options. According to the plan, the
Children would be adopted by the Grandmother who already has custody of
Mother’s two oldest children. Moreover, Mother herself states that she is
amenable to a “permanent transfer of custody” to the Grandmother. This
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that an adoption with
Grandmother was a satisfactory plan. See generally In re A.K., 755 N.E.2d 1090,
1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
III. Termination in Children’s Best Interests
[14] Finally, Mother argues that termination is not in the best interests of the
Children because there is a “readily available and currently existing permanent
family placement” for the Children in Grandmother’s home. Appellant’s Br. p.
16. Mother further argues that termination was not in the Children’s best
interests “in light of the close and bonded relationship between them as
established by the evidence of record.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16. As stated above,
Mother has indicated that an open adoption or some form of custody
arrangement would better serve the interests of the Children.
[15] However, as outlined above, DCS has demonstrated that Mother has failed to
remedy the conditions that led to the Children’s removal. Mother has not
secured suitable housing. Mother continues to use illegal substances. Mother
has not successfully completed the services and assessments outlined in the
PPP. Mother’s lack of constancy, compliance, and follow-through create
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significant uncertainty as to when, if ever, Mother would be capable of
providing for S.P. and A.P. In addition, the Children’s Court Appointed
Special Advocate testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
the Children’s best interests. Such testimony is sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s conclusion in this regard. See In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008).
[16] In light of the juvenile court’s findings, considered with the Children’s need for
consistency and permanency, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
establish that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in S.P. and A.P.’s best
interests and the juvenile court did not error in finding such. Mother’s claim to
the contrary is no more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence,
which we will not do. See In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of
S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[17] The judgement of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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