Mark Anthony Woelfel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 13 2017, 9:10 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bernice A. N. Corley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mark Anthony Woelfel, October 13, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1705-CR-977
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Dow
Appellee-Plaintiff Davis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1609-F6-37962
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Mark Woelfel appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness
and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. He raises the following issues on
appeal:
1. Were his convictions supported by sufficient evidence?
2. Do his convictions violate Indiana’s double jeopardy
prohibition?
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On the morning of September 16, 2016, Sierra Gruenwald, Woelfel’s girlfriend
of over two years, was in the process of moving into a new residence. The
couple began arguing early that morning, and the argument continued as they
loaded bags of Gruenwald’s belongings into Woelfel’s truck, drove to
Gruenwald’s new residence, and unloaded Gruenwald’s belongings. The
argument finally ended when Woelfel sped off in his truck.
[4] Shortly after Woelfel left, Gruenwald realized that Woelfel had taken over
$2000 in cash from among her belongings. Gruenwald called Woelfel and told
him to return the money, and he said he would only do so if Gruenwald gave
him the SIM card out of her cell phone. Woelfel then returned to Gruenwald’s
residence, where he remained seated in his truck in the rear alley. Woelfel and
Gruenwald argued over whether the money or the SIM card would be provided
first, and Gruenwald eventually reached into the driver’s-side window, grabbed
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the steering wheel, and attempted to grab the bag containing the money. As she
did so, Woelfel stepped on the gas and accelerated to approximately sixty miles
per hour as Gruenwald continued to hold on. Woelfel then slammed on the
brakes and kicked Gruenwald in the chest, knocking her off the vehicle.
Woelfel then threw Gruenwald’s money out the window and drove away.
[5] As a result of these events, the State charged Woelfel as follows: Count I, Level
6 felony criminal recklessness; Count II, Class A misdemeanor domestic
battery; and Count III, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.
A bench trial was held on March 23, 2017, at the conclusion of which Woelfel
was found guilty of Counts I and II, but acquitted of Count III. In entering its
judgment, the trial court stated that that Counts I and II were “all kind of . . .
the same act and so, you know, for purposes of a sentencing, that would merge
them.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 56. Nevertheless, the trial court subsequently
entered judgments of conviction and separate sentences on both counts.
Woelfel now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[6] Woelfel first argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
convictions. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Atteberry v.
State, 911 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the
evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences flowing
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therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant was
guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be
disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). It
is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
drawn from it to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147
(Ind. 2007). Further, the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction, even where the witness in question is the
victim. Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Ind. 1991).
[7] To support a conviction for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness as charged, the
State was required to prove that Woelfel, while armed with a deadly weapon
(i.e., his vehicle), knowingly or intentionally performed an act that created a
substantial risk of bodily injury to Gruenwald. See Ind. Code § 34-42-2-2(a),
(b)(1)(A) (setting out the elements of Class B misdemeanor criminal
recklessness and providing that the offense is elevated to a Level 6 felony if
committed while armed with a deadly weapon). Woelfel’s appellate argument
is premised on a misunderstanding of the elements of the offense charged.
Specifically, he asserts that the State was required to prove that Gruenwald
suffered serious bodily injury as a result of Woelfel’s aggressive driving, as set
forth in I.C. § 34-42-2-2(b)(1)(B). But to convict Woelfel as charged, the State
was not required to prove that Gruenwald suffered any actual injury, much less
serious bodily injury. Rather, the State was required to prove that Woelfel’s
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actions created a substantial risk of bodily injury and that he was armed with a
deadly weapon. It was certainly reasonable for the trial court to find that
Woelfel created such a risk by accelerating his truck while Gruenwald clung to
the outside of the vehicle, and Woelfel makes no argument to the contrary.
Nor does he dispute that a vehicle can be considered a deadly weapon. See
Johnson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind. 1983). We therefore conclude that
the State presented sufficient evidence to support Woelfel’s criminal
recklessness conviction.
[8] Woelfel also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his domestic
battery conviction. Although we find his arguments unconvincing, we need not
address the issue because, as set forth below, the domestic battery conviction
must be vacated due to a double jeopardy violation.
2. Double Jeopardy
[9] Woelfel also argues that his convictions violate Indiana’s double jeopardy
prohibition. The double jeopardy clause found in Article 1, section 14 of the
Indiana Constitution “was intended to prevent the state from being able to
proceed against a person twice for the same criminal transgression.” Richardson
v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999). Two or more offenses are the “same
criminal transgression” for the purposes of the Indiana double jeopardy clause
if, “with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the
actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense
also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id.
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[10] In this case, the trial court expressly found that the criminal recklessness and
domestic battery offenses were “all kind of . . . the same act” and that they
would therefore merge. Transcript Vol. 2 at 56. Nevertheless, the trial court
entered separate convictions and sentences on both counts. The State
appropriately concedes that this was error. Accordingly, we remand with
instructions to vacate Woelfel’s domestic battery conviction.
[11] Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[12] Baker, J. and Bailey, J., concur.
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