Kyle Yoquelet v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                                FILED
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    08/22/2017, 11:00 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                                              CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as                                          Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Kimberly A. Jackson                                      Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Caryn N. Szyper
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kyle Yoquelet,                                           August 22, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    57A03-1611-CR-2550
    v.                                               Appeal from the Noble Superior
    Court.
    The Honorable Michael J. Kramer,
    State of Indiana,                                        Judge.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    57D02-1507-CM-492
    Friedlander, Senior Judge
    [1]   Kyle Yoquelet appeals from the trial court’s sentencing order, contending it
    violates the terms of his plea agreement. The State agrees. We reverse and
    remand with instructions.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1611-CR-2550 | August 22, 2017          Page 1 of 4
    [2]   Yoquelet entered into an oral plea agreement which provided that he would
    1
    plead guilty to one count of driving while suspended, a Class A misdemeanor,
    2
    and one count of carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A
    misdemeanor, in exchange for the dismissal of other counts. The State and
    Yoquelet, who was pro se, agreed to a sentence of one year on each count with
    all but 180 days suspended to probation.
    [3]   During the sentencing hearing, the State acknowledged the 180-day cap on the
    executed portion of Yoquelet’s sentence and that the sentences were to be
    served concurrently, but consecutively to any sentence he should receive on
    pending charges against him in two other counties. The trial court stated the
    following at the sentencing hearing:
    Okay I will sentence you in each count to uh, three hundred
    sixty-five (365) days a[sic] I’ll suspend all of that except for one
    hundred and eight[sic] days to be served without any credit for
    time served and I will place you on probation for one hundred
    and eighty (180) days under standard terms one (1) through
    fourteen (14). I’ll also order that uh, that there be a fine of one
    hundred (100) dollars in each count and court cost[s] of one
    hundred and eighty three (183) dollars and fifty (59) cents in
    count one (1) and I’ll waive the court costs in count 2 and I’ll just
    put a due date for those of June 1st of next year. This sentence is,
    they are concurrent with each other but consecutive to your other
    sentences out of Steuben and DeKalb.
    1
    Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2 (2012).
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(a) (2014).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1611-CR-2550 | August 22, 2017   Page 2 of 4
    Tr. pp. 15-16.
    [4]   The trial court’s written sentencing order, however, imposed a sentence on
    Count I of 365 days and 185 days suspended, to be served consecutively to all
    other cases and placed Yoquelet on probation for 180 days. The trial court
    imposed a sentence on Count II using identical language. Per the trial court’s
    written order, which conflicted with its statement at the hearing, Yoquelet was
    to serve the sentences for these two counts consecutively, not concurrently, and
    consecutively to his sentences in other counties.
    [5]   Here, though acknowledging the disparity between the trial court’s two
    statements, the State would prefer that we credit the trial court’s oral sentencing
    statement as more accurate and affirm the trial court’s sentencing order. Citing
    Murrell v. State, 
    960 N.E.2d 854
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), Yoquelet agrees that the
    oral sentencing statement is accurate, but requests a remand to the trial court to
    correct or clarify its written sentencing order to reflect that the sentences from
    Noble County should be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively
    to sentences from other counties. In Murrell, the oral sentencing statement
    imposing concurrent sentences differed from the written sentencing statement
    imposing consecutive sentences. We remanded with instructions for the trial
    court to correct its written sentencing order. The same approach should be used
    here.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1611-CR-2550 | August 22, 2017   Page 3 of 4
    [6]   We reverse the trial court’s written sentencing order and remand with
    instructions that the trial court correct and clarify its written sentencing order
    consistent with its oral sentencing statement and this opinion.
    [7]   Reversed and remanded with instructions.
    Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1611-CR-2550 | August 22, 2017   Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 57A03-1611-CR-2550

Filed Date: 8/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/22/2017