Michael L. Wilson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral Sep 04 2018, 10:07 am
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael Roose Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael L. Wilson, September 4, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-621
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stephen R.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bowers, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D02-1010-FB-26
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-621 | September 4, 2018 Page 1 of 8
Case Summary
[1] In January of 2018, a jury found that Michael Wilson was a habitual criminal
offender. Wilson appeals, arguing that the jury’s finding should be overturned
because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 13, 2010, the State charged Wilson with Class B felony burglary
and alleged that he was a habitual offender. Following a bifurcated trial, the
jury found Wilson guilty as charged. We affirmed Wilson’s conviction and the
habitual offender finding on direct appeal. However, the habitual offender
finding was overturned during post-conviction proceedings and the matter was
remanded for a new trial on the habitual offender allegation.
[3] On January 17, 2018, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the habitual
offender allegation. In both its preliminary and final instructions, the trial court
instructed the jury that:
The State may seek to have a person convicted of a felony
sentenced as a habitual criminal offender by proving that the
person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony
convictions. To be unrelated, a felony must be committed after
the Defendant has already committed and been sentenced for
another felony. The Defendant was convicted of Burglary, a
felony, as charged on page one (1), on August 24, 2011, for a
burglary committed August 8, 2010, after a jury trial. In this
phase of the case, you must consider this further charge of
Habitual Criminal Offender[.]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-621 | September 4, 2018 Page 2 of 8
Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 24, 42 (bold in original). The trial court’s
instructions informed the jury that “the Defendant has entered a plea of not
guilty and … the burden rests upon the State of Indiana to prove to each juror,
beyond a reasonable doubt, every material element of the crime(s) charged in
this information.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 25, 43. The trial court further
instructed the jury as follows:
On August 24, 2011, the Defendant has been convicted of the
offense of Burglary, a felony, charged in Page I of this
Information, an offense committed on or about the 8 th day of
August 2010.
You may find the Defendant is a habitual criminal offender only
if the State has proven each of the following facts beyond a
reasonable doubt:
The Defendant:
1. On the 13th day of January, 2007, committed the
offense of Receiving Stolen Property, a class D
felony, and was convicted and sentenced for such
felony on the 23rd day of May, 2007, under cause
number 20D06-0701-FD-21, Elkhart County and;
2. Later on the 12th day of December, 2008,
committed the offense of Escape, a class D felony,
and was convicted and sentenced for such felony on
the 8th day of September, 2009, under cause number
20D02-0904-FD-22, Elkhart County, and;
3. Later committed the offense set out in Count I,
Burglary, a felony, on or about the 8th day of August,
2010, of which the Defendant was convicted of in
Phase I on the 24th day of August, 2011.
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If the State failed to prove these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the Defendant is not a Habitual Criminal
Offender.
If the State did prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt
you should find the Defendant is a Habitual Criminal Offender.
Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 27, 45 (bold in original).
[4] The following exchange occurred during the State’s presentation of evidence:
[THE STATE]: Thank you Your Honor.… At this point the
State moves to incorporate by reference all evidence, testimony
and the jury verdict from Phase one –
MR. WILSON: Objection.
[THE STATE]: – of the trial into Phase two of this trial.
Specifically I ask that you instruct to the jury that they can
consider the information that Mr. Wilson committed the act of
burglary, a felony, on August 8, 2010 and was convicted by a
jury on August 24th of 2011.
THE COURT: Response [Defense Counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No objection Your Honor.
MR. WILSON: Why ain’t you objectin’?
THE COURT: I will grant that request.
[THE STATE]: Will you so instruct the jury?
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you are specifically
instructed that the date of commission of the underlying offense
from page one of the information and the date of conviction are
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-621 | September 4, 2018 Page 4 of 8
as set out in your instructions and that that date is – and that the
commission of that offense and the date of commission as well as
the date of conviction are not at issue in this case. Those matters
have already been established having been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of another jury.
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 62–63. The jury found that Wilson was a habitual offender.
The trial court imposed a sentence enhancement of fifteen years, with three of
those years suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[5] “To establish that the defendant is a habitual offender, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been previously convicted of
two separate and unrelated felonies.” Flint v. State, 750 N.E.2d 340, 341 (Ind.
2001).
To be “unrelated,” the commission of the second felony must be
subsequent to the sentencing for the first, and the sentencing for
the second felony must have preceded the commission of the
current felony for which the enhanced sentence is being sought.
Failure to prove the proper sequencing requires that the habitual
offender determination be vacated.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Therefore, in order to prove that Wilson was a
habitual offender, the State was required to prove proper sequencing of the
felonies listed in the habitual offender allegation.
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[6] In challenging the habitual offender finding on appeal, Wilson only contends
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury during the habitual offender
phase of his trial.
Because instructing the jury is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court, we will reverse a trial court’s decision
to tender or reject a jury instruction only if there is an abuse of
that discretion. We determine whether the instruction states the
law correctly, whether it is supported by record evidence, and
whether its substance is covered by other instructions. Jury
instructions are to be considered as a whole and in reference to
each other; error in a particular instruction will not result in
reversal unless the entire jury charge misleads the jury as to the
law in the case.
Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). “Where, as here, the defendant failed to preserve an
alleged instructional defect, the objection is waived, and reversal is warranted
only in instances of fundamental error.”1 Id.
Error is fundamental if it is a substantial blatant violation of basic
principles and where, if not corrected, it would deny a defendant
fundamental due process. This exception to the general rule
requiring a contemporaneous objection is narrow, providing
relief only in egregious circumstances that made a fair trial
impossible.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
1
Wilson does not assert that his outbursts during trial were sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-621 | September 4, 2018 Page 6 of 8
[7] Wilson claims that it was fundamental error to instruct the jury that the dates of
the commission of, and his conviction for, the underlying burglary were not at
issue. In making this claim, Wilson argues the challenged instruction violated
his due process rights “because it created a mandatory, conclusive presumption
that relieved the State of its burden of proving the timing and sequence of the
underlying offense, which is necessary to show that the two other alleged
felonies were ‘unrelated’ to the underlying offense.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. We
disagree.
[8] A close examination of the challenged instruction convinces us that the
instruction did not relieve the State of any part of its burden of proof. It merely
informed the jury in the habitual offender phase that a different jury had
determined in a prior phase of the trial that the State had met its burden of
proving the facts relating to the underlying burglary conviction. Wilson has
pointed to no relevant authority suggesting that it was improper for the trial
court to refer to findings and conclusions made during earlier phases of the trial.
As such, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error, much less
fundamental error.2
[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
2
In reaching this conclusion, we additionally note that Wilson’s defense was not based on any assertion
relating to his burglary conviction. Instead, it was based on the assertion that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that he committed one of the two alleged prior convictions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-621 | September 4, 2018 Page 7 of 8
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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