In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.M.F. and L.F.F. (Minor Children), J.F. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 10 2017, 10:29 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer A. Joas Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Madison, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination October 10, 2017
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of A.M.F. and L.F.F. (Minor 40A01-1705-JT-1106
Children), Appeal from the Jennings Circuit
J.F. (Father), Court
The Honorable Jon W. Webster,
Appellant-Respondent,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
40C01-1608-JT-38
Indiana Department of Child 40C01-1608-JT-393
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] J.F. (“Father”)1 appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights over
his minor children A.M.F. and L.F.F. (“the Children”). Father raises a single
issue for our review, which we restate as the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded
that Father would not remedy the conditions that resulted
in the Children’s removal.
2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded
that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the
Children’s best interests.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On January 23, 2014, the trial court entered a dispositional decree in which it
ordered the Children removed from Father’s care and custody. On August 15,
2016, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to
terminate Father’s parental rights. In January and February of 2017, the court
held a fact-finding hearing on the DCS’s petition.
[4] Following that hearing, the court entered the following findings of fact, which
are not disputed on appeal:
1
The Children’s mother, C.F. (“Mother”), does not participate in this appeal.
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7. On August 29, 2012, the DCS completed a home visit at
Mother and Father’s residence to visit [A.M.F.’s] sibling[,] as
there was still an open case regarding that child, and noticed that
the house was very messy. Father was also acting very
erratically. The [Family Case Manager or “FCM”] drug
screened Mother and Father at that time. Mother and Father
both tested positive for morphine and hydromorphone. . . .
***
9. [A.M.F.] was then removed from Mother and Father on
November 1, 2012, due to the fact that Mother and Father were
unable to be located and they had left the child in the care of her
maternal grandmother. At that time, the DCS could not insure
the child’s safety.
10. [L.F.F.] was removed on March 15, 2013, after she was
born a drug[-]exposed infant.
11. Father tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine on March 18, 2013.
12. Father was then arrested on June 19, 2013. Father was
convicted of Dealing Methamphetamine, a class B[] Felony.
Father’s sentence was to include programs related to purposeful
incarceration.
13. A fact-finding hearing was held on July 16, 2013. Mother
and Father both appeared with counsel and admitted that they
had substance abuse issues that inhibited their ability to properly
care for their children at that time.
***
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16. After the Dispositional Decree of January 23, 2014, the
[C]hildren were never returned to the parents’ care and custody.
***
38. While Father was incarcerated, he did not complete any
services regarding reunification with his [C]hildren. Father
stated that he was placed on a waiting list for a “better parent
class” but was never able to participate or complete said service.
39. Father did participate in a class regarding his substance
abuse while incarcerated[;] however, he was dismissed from said
program because he was disciplined by the facility for possession
of an unlawful medication in May of 2014.
40. Father was also disciplined in June of 2015 for use of [a]
controlled substance, specifically suboxone, during his
incarceration.
41. Father was again disciplined during his incarceration in
June of 2016 for drinking alcohol.
***
44. Family Case Manager[] Jorrica Youngblood[] believes that
adoption is in the [C]hildren’s best interests. The Guardian Ad
Litem [(“GAL”)] John Nikoll also echoed that adoption and
termination of parental rights is in the [C]hildren’s best
interests. . . .
***
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46. Both [C]hildren are currently in the same pre-adoptive
home . . . . The [C]hildren are very bonded with their pre-
adoptive family. [A.M.F.] has been in said placement for four (4)
years. [L.F.F.] has been in said placement for three and [one-
]half years (3.5). Father has not visited with the [C]hildren since
before his incarceration. . . .
***
50. Deb Garrett, [A.M.F.’s] therapist, stated that the child is
very confused about her family composition and[,] because of
said confusion, the child has been exhibiting behavioral issues in
pre-school and in her foster home. The child’s behaviors tend to
appear after visitation with her maternal grandmother . . . . Ms.
Garrett opined that the child’s lack of permanency is confusing
her, and that prolonging the child’s permanency would be
detrimental for the child.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 54-55, 57-59 (citations omitted). The court then
concluded as follows:
51. Mother and Father both contend that more time is needed
for them to complete services aimed at reunification. . . . By
prolonging the family’s case, which has been open since
September of 2009, to allow the parents more time to participate
in services, [A.M.F.] will only continue to struggle emotionally
due to her confusion as to her family composition. Therefore, an
extension of time for Father to complete more services will only
continue to threaten the child’s mental and emotional wellbeing
without a guarantee that reunification will ever occur as to him,
as [Father’s] habitual patterns of conduct show a pattern of
continued substance abuse and failure to complete reunification
services.
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52. Father contends that he should be allowed more time once
he is released from incarceration as he has not been provided any
services by the DCS. While Father’s incarceration did not allow
him to participate in any services referred by the DCS, his
incarceration did not inhibit him from taking advantage of
services aimed towards reunification offered by the [Department
of Correction or “DOC”]. . . . Father has not made a “good-
faith” effort to complete any required services available to him
during his incarceration. Father did not avail himself of the
services offered by the DOC. The one and only service Father
did participate in was a substance abuse course, for which he was
dismissed from participating for possession of a control[led]
substance. Also, Father’s continued behavior he exhibited while
he’s been incarcerated, including testing positive for suboxone
and alcohol, shows a clear continuation of his habitual patterns
of conduct.
53. Father has not enhanced his ability to parent the
[C]hildren nor has he addressed his needs relating to why DCS
first became involved with the family.
Id. at 59-60. The court then terminated Father’s parental rights over the
Children. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Overview
[5] We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional
right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe
Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),
trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the
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parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a
termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Office of Family & Children (In re K.S.), 750
N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child
relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is
threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be
terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental
rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or
her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
[6] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS
is required to allege and prove:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.
***
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2017). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of
parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting
I.C. § 31-37-14-2).
[7] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Office of
Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial
court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s
judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Office of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[8] Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific
findings of fact and conclusions thereon following an evidentiary hearing.
When a trial court’s judgment contains findings and conclusions following an
evidentiary hearing, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake
Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we
determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we
determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly
erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either
directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If
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the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm.
In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.
Issue One: Continuation of Conditions that Resulted in Removal
[9] Father first asserts the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the
conditions that resulted in the removal of the Children from Father’s care and
custody will not be remedied. In determining whether the evidence supports
the trial court’s conclusion that Father was unlikely to remedy the reasons for
the Children’s removal, we engage in a two-step analysis. E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the
conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id.(quotations and citations omitted). In the second step, the trial court must
judge a parent’s fitness to care for her children at the time of the termination
hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Id.However, the court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of
conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the
child.” Moore v. Jasper Cty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts
have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and
alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of
adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule
out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a
reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1705-JT-1106 | October 10, 2017 Page 9 of 13
[10] The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that the conditions that
resulted in the removal of the Children from Father will not be remedied.
Father acknowledges on appeal that the Children were removed from him due
to his substance abuse. Yet, following that removal, Father continued his
substance abuse. In particular, in March of 2013 Father tested positive for
amphetamine and methamphetamine. In June of 2013, Father was arrested for
dealing in methamphetamine, and he was later convicted of a Class B felony
offense. And, while in the Department of Correction, Father continued to
abuse substances. In May of 2014, Father was dismissed from a substance-
abuse program in the DOC due to his possession of an “unlawful medication.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 57. In June of 2015, Father was again disciplined by
the DOC for use of the controlled substance suboxone. And in June of 2016,
Father was disciplined for drinking alcohol, his third discipline while in the
DOC. The trial court found that Father’s history of substance abuse, especially
while committed to the DOC, demonstrated “a clear continuation of his
habitual patterns of conduct.” Id. at 60.
[11] Still, Father argues on appeal that, “[w]hile [he] had a few setbacks while
incarcerated, Father made a good faith effort to participate in some programs
that might” have been helpful. Appellant’s Br. at 16. Father also asserts that he
should have been given some time after his release from his incarceration to
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attempt to remedy the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal. 2 But
the trial court considered and rejected both of those arguments in light of
Father’s pattern of conduct and the harm to the Children, and Father’s
arguments on appeal simply amount to a request for this court to reweigh the
evidence. We will not do so. We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred
when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the removal of the
Children from Father’s care will not be remedied.3
Issue Two: Best Interests
[12] Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the termination of his
relationship to the Children is in the Children’s best interests. In determining
what is in the best interests of the child, the trial court is required to look at the
totality of the evidence. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267. In doing so, the trial
court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved.
Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s
emotional and physical development is threatened. Sons v. Lake Cty. Office of
Family & Children (In re R.S.), 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.
denied. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such
2
Insofar as Father asserts that Mother, whose rights the trial court did not terminate, received an
opportunity that Father did not, Father’s argument is not supported by cogent reasoning. See Ind. Appellate
Rule 46(A)(8)(a). The trial court’s order with respect to both Mother’s rights and Father’s rights is incredibly
detailed, and the court’s order with respect to Mother is substantially different on its facts than the order as it
applies to Father.
3
Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) is written in the disjunctive and we affirm the trial court’s
judgment on this issue, we need not address Father’s additional argument that the trial court erred when it
concluded that the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the Children’s well-being.
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that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired
before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s
need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best
interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a
finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. McBride v. Monroe Cty.
Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see also In
re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265 (“Permanency is a central consideration in
determining the best interests of a child.”).
[13] Father’s only argument with respect to the Children’s best interests is that he
“had little opportunity to participate in services” due to his incarceration.
Appellant’s Br. at 21. But Father disregards his continued substance abuse
during his incarceration. Moreover, the trial court expressly found that Father
had not put forth a good-faith effort during his incarceration to comply with
services that were available to him. Accordingly, we reject Father’s argument
on appeal. We also recognize that the FCM and GAL both testified that
termination of Father’s rights was in the Children’s best interests, and the trial
court found that the Children “are very bonded with their pre-adoptive family,”
with whom they have lived for more than three years. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 58. Father does not challenge that finding on appeal. We cannot say that the
trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the termination of Father’s
parental rights over the Children is in the Children’s best interests.
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Conclusion
[14] In sum, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights over
the Children.
[15] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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