In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.C., Father, and C.A.C., Minor Child, T.C. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 19 2018, 9:25 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer A. Joas Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Joas & Stotts Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
John L. Kellerman II Katherine A. Cornelius
Kellerman Law Offices Deputy Attorneys General
Batesville, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination February 19, 2018
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of T.C., Father, and C.A.C., 69A01-1708-JT-2010
Minor Child, Appeal from the
T.C., Ripley Circuit Court
The Honorable
Appellant-Respondent,
Ryan J. King, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
69C01-1701-JT-1
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] T.C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights
to his minor child, C.A.C. (“Child”).1 Father raises one issue on appeal that we
restate as: whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
presented sufficient evidence that it had a satisfactory plan for Child’s care and
treatment.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Father acknowledges that he has an “extensive DCS history” that expands over
the course of twenty years in “different states with different children.”
Appellant’s Br. at 6 n.2. As is relevant here, Father and A.C. (“Mother”) are the
biological parents of Child, born in November 2004. In spring 2015, Child was
sent to live with Father and his then-girlfriend (“Girlfriend”). Prior to that
time, Child and her younger brother (“Brother”), who was born in 2012, were
living with Mother in Kentucky, and near the time that the local child services
department was going to remove them from her care, Mother fled with them to
Ohio. When Ohio child services became involved, Mother returned to
Kentucky with Child and Brother (together, “Children”) and left them with a
friend. Eventually, the Children came to live with Father and Girlfriend in
Indiana.
1
The parental rights of Child’s mother were also terminated, but she does not participate in this appeal.
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[4] On August 13, 2015, when Child was ten years old, she was removed from
Father’s home on an emergency basis, after DCS investigated reported child
abuse or neglect of three-year-old Brother, who suffered non-accidental injuries
while in the care of Girlfriend. Brother was taken to the hospital, where doctors
discovered both new and healing broken bones, bruising, and brain injuries
from blunt force trauma. Brother later died.2 DCS filed a verified petition
alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). At the time of
her removal from Father’s care, Child was malnourished and had no spare
clothing or belongings to take with her. In a child advocacy interview that took
place on August 13, Child stated that she would get one sandwich per day and
that she would sometimes cook an egg and share it with Brother. Child was
placed in foster care. A week or two later, the foster mother took Child to the
hospital due to Child’s vomiting, diarrhea, and lack of energy. Child was
determined to have a body mass index in the 1.39th percentile for children her
age. A nutritionist advised the foster mother, giving her suggestions for
supplements and recommendations for nutrition for food intake. She took
Child regularly to her primary care physician, and Child gained weight
appropriately in the following weeks and months.
[5] The CHINS matter proceeded to a fact-finding hearing in October 2015, and
upon the conclusion of the evidence, the juvenile court found that Child was a
2
Girlfriend was convicted of murdering Brother and of neglect of a dependent as to Child, and she is
currently serving a sentence of sixty-seven and one-half years.
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CHINS. Its findings included: Father could not give a plausible explanation
for Brother’s injuries; Father had prior neglect and abuse history in Kentucky
and Ohio; and he failed to seek medical attention for Child’s low weight. In
December 2015 and January 2016, the CHINS court entered a dispositional
decree and ordered Father to participate in services, including home-based
counseling, parenting assessment, psychological evaluation, and to follow all
recommendations. At a February 2016 review hearing, DCS presented
evidence that Father had not complied with the case plan, had not obtained a
psychological evaluation, was not actively engaging in therapy, refused to open
up to counselors, and refused treatment for anger management. The court
again ordered Father to complete a psychological evaluation.
[6] Father thereafter participated in an evaluation with Dr. Linda McIntire (“Dr.
McIntire”) in March 2016. Father completed the interview but he was
unwilling to talk about certain things, and he would not sign releases for his
criminal and medical history. Father had one of the highest scores Dr.
McIntire had ever seen on the Child Abuse Potential Inventory, indicating that
he was very much at risk for being abusive to a child. Dr. McIntire diagnosed
Father with borderline intellectual functioning, and schizotypal personality
disorder. Her opinion was that Father’s diagnoses made it unlikely that he
would be able to effectively and safely parent Child on his own, and “poses a
risk even if doing so with assistance.” Pet’r’s Ex. O.
[7] In July 2016, the State charged Father in Ripley County with Level 6 felony
neglect of a dependent for failing to seek medical attention for his children. A
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no-contact order was issued, and his supervised visitation with Child was
discontinued by DCS. In August 2016, the CHINS court changed the
permanency plan to guardianship or adoption with a contemporaneous plan of
reunification with Mother; Child remained in foster care.3 Id. At an October
2016 review hearing, the CHINS court continued foster placement and found
that Father still was not compliant with services. Visitation with Father was
suspended because he was charged with neglect of a dependent associated with
Brother’s death. In February 2017, the CHINS court changed the permanency
plan to termination of Father’s parental rights and adoption. State’s Ex. 64. In
early 2017, Child was placed with a pre-adoptive foster family.
[8] On January 27, 2017, DCS filed its Verified Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 14-17. At a May
2017 CHINS review hearing, Father still was not participating in services, and
the no-contact order with Child was still in effect. Child had been exhibiting
acting out behaviors, and a psychological evaluation of Child was ordered at
DCS’s request. Dr. McIntire conducted an evaluation of Child in May 2017,
and she submitted her report to the court in June 2017. On May 24, 2017,
Father entered into an open guilty plea to the Level 6 felony neglect of a
dependent charge.
3
In or around November 2015, Child changed placement from her first foster home to a second one. Tr. Vol.
II at 66.
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[9] On July 12, 2017, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition
to terminate Father’s parental rights, and Father appeared in person and by
counsel. At the hearing, DCS presented the testimony of, among others,
Derdre Moore (“Moore”) a social worker with the Carroll County, Kentucky
Department of Health and Family Services (“HFS”), an equivalent to Indiana’s
DCS. Moore testified that HFS began receiving reports of neglect and abuse
involving Father beginning in 1995 or 1996 and spanning over twenty years.
Moore stated that the parents4 had a history of filthy and inadequate home
conditions, domestic violence, physical abuse, and Father’s children exhibited
extreme hygiene issues, lack of food, medical neglect, and school truancy. The
parents had a history of moving to avoid child services. Moore testified to
Father’s criminal history, which included a conviction for assault of his
seventeen-year-old daughter, who was removed from Father’s custody and
placed with a relative in Indiana.
[10] Next to testify was Child’s first foster mother (“Foster Mother”), who testified
that when Child came to live with her in August 2015, Child was “very, very
thin” with her clavicle, cheek, and hip bones visible and protruding. Tr. Vol. II
at 60. Child ate, but could not keep food down at first, and experienced
vomiting and diarrhea and was very weak, with no energy to play or do much
of anything. Foster Mother took Child for medical treatment, and doctors
4
It appears Father was married to one woman for a period of time, that marriage was dissolved, and he later
married Mother.
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explained that her inability to eat was due to lack of food. Foster Mother
followed nutritional recommendations for Child, and Child gained weight
appropriately. Child lived with Foster Mother until around Thanksgiving of
2015, when she was moved to another foster home.
[11] Dr. McIntire, who completed a psychological evaluation of Father and,
separately, an evaluation of Child, testified, and her reports were admitted into
evidence. Dr. McIntire noted that Father was “moderately cooperative,” but
refused to sign releases for his criminal and medical history. Id. at 104. Dr.
McIntire discussed Father’s personality disorder, borderline intellectual
functioning, and impaired interpersonal functioning, and she opined that it was
unlikely that Father would ever be able to safely and effectively parent Child, or
any child, on his own and posed a risk even with assistance. Id. at 103. His test
scores reflected that he was a high risk for perpetrating verbal and physical
abuse. Id. at 108.
[12] Dr. McIntire recalled that, during her meeting with Child, Child described her
past as “horrible[.]” Id. at 78. Child expressed having a recurring fear of being
abducted by her parents, and she did not want them to know where she was.
Dr. McIntire diagnosed Child with, among other things, post-traumatic stress
disorder with dissociative features, borderline intellectual functioning, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Id. at 98. Dr. McIntire testified that
Child’s mental and physical health required stability, strong social support,
therapy, consistent medication and management, and social skills training.
Based on her evaluations of Father and Child, Dr. McIntire opined that Father
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was not capable of parenting Child or any child, and it would be
psychiatrically, behaviorally, and educationally detrimental and unsafe for
Child to be returned to Father’s care. Id. at 103, 111. Dr. McIntire testified
that termination of Father’s rights was in Child’s best interests. Id. at 113. Dr.
McIntire did not ask Child where she wanted to live, but Child offered and
“was very clear” that she wanted to be adopted and did not want to live with
her parents. Id. at 79. Dr. McIntire had met with and interviewed the pre-
adoptive foster family, with whom Child was living, a few days before she met
with Child, and Dr. McIntire testified that the family was capable of providing
Child with the care and treatment she needs. She characterized them as being
“very invested” in Child’s care and well-being, and noting the foster parents’
“quality of their insight, their questions, their concern,” she believed adoption
by them was in Child’s best interests. Id. at 113.
[13] Paegan Kersey (“Kersey”), a Relative Care Specialist for DCS, testified to
efforts at reunification with Father and services offered. She described that
Father was initially compliant, but not “actively engaged” and did not make
progress. Id. at 138. Eventually, his visitations were suspended because of the
neglect charge. He was ordered to complete a psychological evaluation, which
he did not do until ordered again to do so. Once Dr. McIntire’s evaluation was
completed, there was a child and family team meeting to discuss the results.
DCS offered to continue with services, but Father stated he did not want to
participate. Kersey recommended termination of Father’s parental rights and
adoption by the pre-adoptive family, with whom Child had been living for
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about six months. Id. at 157. Child had told Kersey that she wanted to be
adopted by the pre-adoptive foster family, and Kersey noted that Child “already
refers to them as mom and dad[.]” Id. at 156.
[14] Counsel for Father asked Kersey about DCS’s efforts to find relative placement
for Child. Kersey stated that DCS had received “an approved ICPC from
Georgia” for Father’s mother, Ivalee Brown (“Grandmother”), but noted that,
after talking to Child and other family members, “there were concerns on our
end” about placement with Grandmother, including and not limited to
Grandmother’s health condition. Id. at 159-61, 163, 172. Because of those
concerns combined with Child’s desires, DCS decided that Grandmother’s
home was not an appropriate placement for Child. Id. Child had expressed
fear to Kersey that Grandmother would “give her back” to Father. Id. at 164.
[15] CASA Sandra Wakefield (“CASA Wakefield”) also testified. She began as
CASA for Child in August 2015. At an August 2016 DCS team family
meeting, Father told CASA Wakefield that he no longer wished to participate
in services, and he did not do so. CASA Wakefield testified to having met with
all of the foster placements since removal, and, as to the pre-adoptive family,
she said there was a strong bond between the family and Child, offering that
Child “loves those people” and “wants to stay there and . . . be their daughter.”
Id. at 178. CASA Wakefield testified that it was in Child’s best interests for
Father’s parental rights to be terminated and that she be adopted by the current
family. Id. at 178, 180. CASA Wakefield also testified, “[Child] has told me,
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without me even asking, that she does not want to live with her [G]randmother
or any of her family members.” Id. at 180.
[16] Following the conclusion of DCS’s evidence, Father’s counsel called two
witnesses, Father and Grandmother. Father acknowledged that Child should
not be returned to his care at the present time, stating that he believed he would
soon be going to prison for the neglect of a dependent conviction. Father
testified that his desire was that his mother, Grandmother, raise Child in
Georgia. Grandmother, who was sixty-four years old at the time, testified that
she wanted Child to come and live with her. During her testimony, she was
asked about a 2014 visit she made to see Child and her Brother when they were
living with Mother in Ohio. At that time, neighbors told Grandmother that the
Children were sleeping “in all different places,” including the doghouse. Id. at
200. She also recalled that both Children were extremely thin, and she
suspected they were being abused, but she did not report the suspected abuse or
neglect.
[17] On July 31, 2017, the juvenile court issued its Order on Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights (“Order”) terminating Father’s parental rights
to Child. The Order’s findings noted that Grandmother had three children,
including Father and his sister, whose parental rights to her children were
terminated, and Father’s oldest daughter was removed from his care in
Kentucky and then his son was murdered by his Girlfriend. The court
continued:
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It is this history, [Child]’s fear of being placed with
[Grandmother] and [Child’s] desire to be adopted by [adoptive
family], the inconsistency of contact between [Child] and
[Grandmother] and [Child]’s close and stable relationship with
the [adoptive family] that DCS cited as reasons for denying
[Grandmother]’s request for placement of [Child]. Although the
Department need not prove that adoption of [Child] by the
[adoptive family] is anything more than a “satisfactory plan,” the
Court finds that said adoption by the [adoptive family] is in
[Child]’s best interests, especially when compared to being sent to
live with [Grandmother].
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 38. The Order also noted that Child submitted a
Youth Report to the juvenile court, expressing her desire to be adopted by the
identified adoptive family. CASA Wakefield testified to contacting Child after
the report to ensure it was true, accurate and uncoerced. The juvenile court
stated, “[Child]’s wishes, while not controlling, should be a factor for the
Court’s consideration in determining the best interests of the child.” Id.
[18] The Order concluded, in relevant part, that termination was in the best interests
of Child and:
That there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
child. Specifically, that [Child] will be adopted by her pre-
adoptive foster parents. With respect to this issue, the Court
would note that [Father] argued that TPR should be denied
because the plan should have been for his mother to adopt
[Child] because she is a blood relative. This is not the state of the
law. Case law is clear that relatives have no preferential legal
right to adopt. The controlling factor is the best interests of the
child.
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Id. at 39. The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, and he now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[19] As our Supreme Court has observed, “Decisions to terminate parental rights are
among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also
among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the
trial courts[.]” E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014).
While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise his child, and thus
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the
termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his
responsibility as a parent. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839
N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. That is, parental rights are not absolute and must be
subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the appropriate disposition
of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office
of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[20] When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145,
149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover,
in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will
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set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is
clearly erroneous. Id. at 148-49. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the
legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of
fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d
874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[21] Where, as here, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions, we
apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.
Id. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or
inferences drawn therefrom that support it. Id. If the evidence and inferences
support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[22] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is
required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
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(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these
allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In
re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a
petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate
the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).
[23] Here, Father does not challenge the determinations that the conditions that
resulted in the Child being removed or the reasons for Child’s placement
outside the home would not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-
child relationship posed a threat to her well-being. Rather, he asserts that DCS
failed to prove “that adoption by pre-adoptive placement was a satisfactory plan
in [Child]’s best interests.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.
Satisfactory Plan
[24] Initially, we observe that Father’s argument appears to conflate two separate
statutory requirements: (1) that termination be in the child’s best interests and
(2) that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the child in question. Ind. Code § 31-
35-2-4(b)(2)(C), (D). That is, there is no requirement that DCS’s plan be in the
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child’s best interests.5 Rather, Indiana courts have held that for a plan to be
“satisfactory,” for purposes of the statute, it “need not be detailed, so long as it
offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the
parent-child relationship is terminated.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374. A DCS plan
is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the
children. Id. In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable
adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive
parent. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[25] The basis of Father’s position on appeal is that “[t]here was a fit and willing
relative” – namely Grandmother – “who was approved for placement well
before the termination hearing[,]” and placement with her, “would have
alleviated the need for parental termination.” Id. Father advises that he “is
aware of the current status of the law[,]” under which the juvenile court was not
required to place Child with Grandmother, and relatives do not possess a
preferential legal right to adopt. Appellant’s Br. at 17. However, he challenges it
under the facts of this case, arguing that Child should have been placed with
Grandmother, especially given the fact that she was both approved6 and
5
The juvenile court’s Order noted the same when it stated, “Although the Department need not prove that
adoption of [Child] by the [adoptive family] is anything more than a “satisfactory plan,” the Court finds that
said adoption by the [adoptive family] is in [Child]’s best interests, especially when compared to being sent to
live with [Grandmother].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 38.
6
Father notes that “the ICPC” evaluation of Grandmother’s residence in Georgia was completed and
approved in March 2017. Appellant’s Br. at 17. This is a reference to Indiana’s Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children, Indiana Code Chapter 31-28-4, a statutory scheme that facilitates the interstate
placement of children and resolves jurisdictional issues.
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available during the CHINS proceedings. We find no error with the trial
court’s decision to terminate Father’s rights and not place Child with
Grandmother.
[26] Father urges that “[Child] had a relationship with paternal [G]randmother,”
suggesting a close relationship, but the evidence was that, for the preceding five
years or so, Grandmother generally saw Child once per year for about five days
each. Appellant’s Br. at 18; Tr. Vol. II at 204. When Grandmother saw Child in
2014 in Ohio, while Child and Brother were living with Mother, Grandmother
noticed that Child was very thin and suspected child abuse, but did nothing
about it. Neighbors told Grandmother that Children were sleeping in the
doghouse while Mother slept in the car, and Grandmother did nothing about it.
Evidence was presented that Child did not want to be with Grandmother or any
other relative, and, in fact, did not want her family to know where she was
living. She expressed concern that, if she was placed with Grandmother, that
eventually she would be returned to her parents’ care. She avoided using social
media because she did not want family, including Father, to find her. Child
had recurring fears that her parents would locate and abduct her. Child
submitted a Youth Report to the juvenile court, expressing her desire to be
adopted by the pre-adoptive family with whom she was placed, and CASA
Wakefield thereafter spoke with Child to verify that her report was true,
accurate, and uncoerced. Dr. McIntire met with the pre-adoptive foster parents
for an interview, and she believed adoption by them was in Child’s best
interests.
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[27] The juvenile court heard and considered Father’s evidence and argument
regarding placing Child with Grandmother, as well as DCS’s evidence
concerning Child’s needs, desires, and recommended placement, and it
determined that adoption was not only a satisfactory plan, as is required by
statute, but was “in [Child]’s best interests, especially when compared to being
sent to live with [Grandmother].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 38. We find no
error with the juvenile court’s decision.
Best Interests
[28] To the extent that Father also claims DCS failed to prove that termination of
his parental rights was in Child’s best interests, we reject his claim. First, other
than arguing the position that Grandmother would have been a better
placement, Father did not present separate argument or support for the position
that termination was not in Child’s best interests, and his claim is waived. Ind.
Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Second, waiver aside, the record supports the juvenile
court’s determination that termination was in Child’s best interests. In
determining what is in the best interests of the child, the trial court is required to
look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
denied), trans. dismissed. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper
where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing
In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The trial
court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her
physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before
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terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for
permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a
child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d
185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). Testimony of the service providers, such as
recommendations of the case manager and guardian ad litem, in addition to
evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are
sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005.
[29] Here, it is without dispute that Child has suffered numerous traumas in her
lifetime, resulting in needed and ongoing support and therapy. Dr. McIntire
testified to Child’s PTSD, the recurring fears Child experienced about possibly
be abducted by either of her parents, and the need for someone other than
family to adopt her. Dr. McIntire testified that Father was not able, and likely
never was going to be able, to adequately and safely care for Child even with
assistance. Kersey and CASA Wakefield testified that termination of Father’s
rights was in Child’s best interests, and they recommended adoption. DCS
presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental
rights was in Child’s best interests.
[30] We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of “clear
error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Based
on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of
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Father’s parental rights to Child was clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm
the juvenile court’s judgment.
[31] Affirmed.
[32] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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