Jonathen R. Lovelace v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                              FILED
    08/31/2017, 10:04 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                        Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                         and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Matthew J. Buehler                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Reed Earhart & Lennox, LLC                               Attorney General of Indiana
    Warsaw, Indiana
    Jodi Kathryn Stein
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jonathen R. Lovelace,                                    August 31, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    43A03-1703-CR-596
    v.                                               Appeal from the Kosciusko
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable David C. Cates,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    43D01-1611-F4-721
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 43A03-1703-CR-596 | August 31, 2017                Page 1 of 6
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Jonathen R. Lovelace appeals his conviction for child molesting, as a Level 4
    felony. He raises one issue on appeal, namely, whether the trial court abused
    its discretion when it admitted into evidence a video recording of a child
    witness’s interview regarding the alleged molestation.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Lovelace is the biological son of Andrew Riley (“Andrew”) and the stepson of
    Jennifer Riley (“Jennifer”). Andrew and Jennifer also have a minor daughter
    together, A.R. On October 27, 2016, Lovelace, who was twenty-three years old
    and who lived in his own apartment, visited the residence of Andrew and
    Jennifer. After they ate dinner, Lovelace and A.R., who was five years old,
    played together in various rooms around the house, including in A.R.’s
    bedroom. At one point, Lovelace and A.R. went under the bed, which was a
    common place for them to play. Jennifer went into A.R.’s room and asked
    them to get out from under the bed. The two did not immediately leave from
    their spot. Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, Andrew went back to the
    room and again asked them to get out from under the bed. At this point, the
    two emerged. A.R. proceeded with her usual bedtime routine and Lovelace
    spent some additional time with Andrew and Jennifer before he returned to his
    apartment.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 43A03-1703-CR-596 | August 31, 2017   Page 2 of 6
    [4]   On October 30, while getting ready for bed, A.R. told Jennifer that she had a
    secret to tell. A.R. told Jennifer that Lovelace “let her touch his private and his
    booty”1 while they were under the bed on October 27. Tr. at 36. The next
    morning, Jennifer went to the Warsaw Police Department station to report
    A.R.’s claims. After she gave her statement, Jennifer picked A.R. up from
    school and took her to the police station. There, Child Protective Services
    Caseworker Kelly Bugg interviewed A.R. During the interview, which was
    video recorded and monitored by a police officer, A.R. used a diagram of male
    anatomy to show Bugg that she had touched Lovelace on his penis. On
    November 2, the State charged Lovelace with one count of child molesting, as a
    Level 4 felony, and alleged that he was a habitual offender.
    [5]   On December 30, the State filed its notice of intent to offer statements and
    videotape of a protected person under the Protected Person Statute, Indiana
    Code Section 35-37-4-6. On January 10, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on
    the Protected Person statute. During the hearing, the State called A.R. as a
    witness. Following the hearing, the court found that A.R. “is not able to
    understand the nature and obligation of an oath[] and, accordingly, is
    unavailable for trial.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 13. The court further found
    that there was “sufficient indicia of reliability by time, content[,] and
    circumstances” for the statement made to Jennifer and the video-recorded
    statement to Bugg and that each statement was admissible at trial. Id. at 14.
    1
    Jennifer testified at trial that A.R. would say “privates and booty” when referring to genitalia. Tr. at 37.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 43A03-1703-CR-596 | August 31, 2017                   Page 3 of 6
    [6]   The trial court held a two-day jury trial on January 17-18, 2017. At the onset of
    trial, while the court addressed preliminary matters but before voir dire,
    Lovelace objected to the use of A.R.’s video-recorded interview as evidence on
    the ground that its admission would violate his Sixth Amendment right to
    confront the witness. The trial court overruled his objection and stated that
    Lovelace had the opportunity to cross examine A.R. at the January 10 hearing.
    After opening statements, Lovelace renewed his objection to the use of the
    video recording as evidence. The trial court again overruled his objection.
    [7]   On January 18, the second day of the trial, the State called Bugg as a witness.
    During Bugg’s testimony, the State moved to admit the video-recorded
    interview of A.R as State’s exhibit 9. Lovelace responded: “No objection.” Tr.
    at 82. The trial court admitted the video-recorded interview as evidence and
    played it for the jury.
    [8]   At the conclusion of the first phase2 of the trial on January 18, the jury found
    Lovelace guilty as charged, and the court entered judgment of conviction.
    During the second phase of the trial, the jury found Lovelace to be a habitual
    offender. On February 16, the trial court sentenced Lovelace to an aggregate
    sentence of sixteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction with two
    years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.
    2
    The trial court bifurcated the trial to address the habitual offender issue separately.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 43A03-1703-CR-596 | August 31, 2017         Page 4 of 6
    Discussion and Decision
    [9]    Lovelace contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
    confront a witness against him when it admitted into evidence A.R.’s video-
    recorded interview. As our Supreme Court recently held:
    The trial court is afforded wide discretion in ruling on the
    admissibility of evidence. Nicholson v. State, 
    963 N.E.2d 1096
    ,
    1099 (Ind. 2012). On appeal, evidentiary decisions are reviewed
    for abuse of discretion and are reversed only when the decision is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
    
    Id.
    Shinnock v. State, 
    76 N.E.3d 841
    , 842-43 (Ind. 2017).
    [10]   On appeal, Lovelace argues that he “made a timely objection to the admission
    of the videotaped statement prior to its introduction into evidence at trial.”
    Appellant’s Br. at 7. However, while the record indicates that Lovelace
    objected to the use of video evidence on two separate occasions early on the
    first day of trial, Lovelace did not object when the State moved to introduce the
    video-recorded interview during Bugg’s testimony.
    [11]   It is well settled that the “failure to make a contemporaneous objection at the
    time evidence is introduced at trial will result in waiver of the issue on appeal.
    Indeed, an appellate claim will not be preserved upon an objection discussed or
    not made immediately prior to or following the admission of evidence.” Dilts v.
    State, 
    49 N.E.3d 617
    , 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (second emphasis added).
    Because Lovelace did not make a contemporaneous objection to the admission
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 43A03-1703-CR-596 | August 31, 2017   Page 5 of 6
    of the video-recorded interview, he has waived this issue on appeal. See e.g.
    Brown v. State, 
    929 N.E.2d 204
    , 207 (Ind. 2010).3 Accordingly, we affirm his
    conviction.
    [12]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    3
    When the State introduced the video-recorded interview into evidence, Lovelace specifically stated: “No
    objection.” Tr. at 82. As such, the doctrine of fundamental error is not available to Lovelace on appeal. See
    Halliburton v. State, 
    1 N.E.3d 670
     (Ind. 2013).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 43A03-1703-CR-596 | August 31, 2017             Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 43A03-1703-CR-596

Filed Date: 8/31/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021