John Anthony Hawkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 12 2017, 9:10 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John Anthony Hawkins Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indiana State Prison Attorney General of Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Anthony Hawkins, October 12, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1703-CR-712
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G01-9708-PC-127418
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] John Anthony Hawkins (“Hawkins”), pro se, appeals the trial court’s order
denying his second motion to correct erroneous sentence. In his motion and on
appeal, he challenges the trial court’s determination of the aggravating
circumstances, weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
imposition of an enhanced sentence of sixty-five years without a determination
of aggravating circumstances found by a jury as required by Smylie v. State, 823
N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), reh’g denied. Because a motion to correct erroneous sentence is limited
to correcting sentencing errors apparent on the face of the judgment and
Hawkins raises issues outside of this context, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous
sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hawkins’s
motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Facts
[3] The underlying facts and procedural history of Hawkins’s case were set forth in
our Court’s memorandum decision affirming the denial of his first motion to
correct erroneous sentence:
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In 1997, Hawkins was charged with the murder of Rogshan
Love. Hawkins v. State, 748 N.E.2d 362, 363 (Ind. 2001), reh’g
denied. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to the maximum term of sixty-five years
imprisonment. Id. Our supreme court affirmed Hawkins’s
conviction and sentence on direct appeal.[1] Id. at 364. In 2011,
the trial court denied Hawkins’s petition for post-conviction
relief, a judgment later affirmed by this Court in an unpublished
decision. See Hawkins v. State, No. 49A04-1108-PC-424, slip op.
at 7 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2012), trans. denied.
On April 27, 2015, Hawkins filed a motion to correct sentence
and memorandum of law in support of the motion. The motion
raised federal and state constitutional claims and challenged the
trial court’s identification and weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. In an order dated May 13, 2015, the
trial court denied the motion, finding that Hawkins’s motion
“simply attempts to re-litigate issues that were addressed on
direct appeal without success.” (App. 24.) Hawkins then filed a
motion to correct error on June 19, 2015,[] which the trial court
denied on June 23, 2015.
Hawkins v. State, No. 49A05-1507-CR-855, *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).
Our Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Hawkins’s first motion to correct
erroneous sentence. We explained that, pursuant to Robinson v. State, 805
N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 2004), “Hawkins’s federal and state constitutional claims, and
his contentions that the trial court improperly identified and weighed
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, require considerations beyond the
1
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Hawkins that two of the four aggravating circumstances found by
the trial court were improper (specifically, the depreciates the seriousness of the crime aggravator and the
recommendation from the victim’s family that Hawkins receive an enhanced sentence). Nevertheless, our
supreme court affirmed Hawkins’s sentence, holding that “the single aggravating factor of Hawkins’ prior
criminal history [wa]s enough to support an enhanced sentence.” Hawkins v. State, 748 N.E.2d 362, 364 (Ind.
2001), reh’g denied.
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face of the sentencing judgment[,]” and that “[s]uch claims may be raised only
on direct appeal or through postconviction proceedings, not through a statutory
motion to correct sentence.” Hawkins, No. 49A05-1507-CR-855 at *2.
[4] Subsequently, on March 3, 2017, Hawkins filed a second motion to correct
erroneous sentence.2 In this motion, Hawkins again challenged the trial court’s
determination of the four aggravating circumstances 3 and its weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Additionally, Hawkins argued that
the trial court’s imposition of a maximum sentence of sixty-five years was
improper because the sentence was enhanced by aggravating circumstances not
found by a jury as required by Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005), cert.
denied and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), reh’g denied. The trial
court denied Hawkins’s second motion to correct erroneous sentence. Hawkins
now appeals.
Decision
[5] Hawkins appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous
sentence pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15. We review a trial court’s
denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the
2
Hawkins attached his abstract of judgment to his motion to correct erroneous sentence. As explained in
Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008), when a defendant files a motion to correct sentence in a
county such as Marion County, which does not issue judgments of conviction, the abstract of judgment will
serve as an appropriate substitute for the judgment of conviction for purposes of making the claim.
3
Hawkins failed to recognize the Indiana Supreme Court’s direct appeal opinion that determined that two of
the four aggravating circumstances were improper and that his enhanced sentence was, nevertheless, proper
given his criminal history aggravating circumstance.
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facts and circumstances before it. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012).
[6] An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion
to correct the sentence pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15. Neff v. State,
888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-51 (Ind. 2008). INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15 provides:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
“The purpose of the statute ‘is to provide prompt, direct access to an
uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal
sentence.’” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 785 (quoting Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d
535, 537 (Ind. 1991)).
[7] A statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence “may only be used to correct
sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the
sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.
“Such claims may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and
the applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or
extrinsic to the record.” Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). If a claim requires consideration of the proceedings before, during, or
after trial, it may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous
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sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Such claims are best addressed on
direct appeal or by way of a petition for post-conviction relief where applicable.
Id. “Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly
confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the
“facially erroneous” prerequisite should henceforth be strictly applied[.]” Id.
[8] Here, Hawkins challenges the trial court’s determination of the aggravating
circumstances and its weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
He also suggests that his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B). These sentencing issues, however, are not proper claims for a
motion to correct erroneous sentence because they “necessarily require[]
consideration of the sentencing hearing[.]” See Godby v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1235,
1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the defendant’s motion to correct
erroneous sentence was not the proper method to challenge a sentencing
aggravator).4
[9] Additionally, in regard to Hawkins’s contention that the trial court imposed his
sentence in violation of the requirements of Blakely, our Court has explained
that such a claim is not one to be raised in a motion to correct erroneous
sentence:
Blakely, however, does not prohibit all enhanced sentences;
rather, Blakely requires only that the facts used to support an
enhanced sentence, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must
4
Moreover, Hawkins has already raised some of these sentencing challenges to our supreme court, which
held that two of the four aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were improper but affirmed his
sentence. See Hawkins, 748 N.E.2d at 364.
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be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. 542 U.S. at
301, 124 S. Ct. 2531. See also Edwards v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1106,
1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Thus, a determination of whether a
sentence was properly imposed under Blakely would require that
we look beyond the face of the judgment to see if imposition of
an enhanced sentence was based upon facts determined through
constitutionally permissible channels. As such, a Blakely claim is
not the type of claim which may be brought through
a motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Fulkrod, 855 N.E.2d at 1067.
[10] The errors that Hawkins alleges are not clear from the face of the sentencing
order and are not appropriate for a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See
Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Because Hawkins has failed to show that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment. See, e.g., Bauer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct erroneous
sentence where the defendant’s claims required consideration of matters in the
record outside the face of the judgment and were, accordingly, not the types of
claims properly presented in a motion to correct erroneous sentence), trans.
denied.
[11] Affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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