Brandan Lee Eakright v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                              Apr 30 2018, 7:14 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    CLERK
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                           Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    court except for the purpose of establishing                             and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Justin R. Wall                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Wall Legal Services                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Huntington, Indiana
    Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Brandan Lee Eakright,                                    April 30, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    85A02-1710-CR-2577
    v.                                               Appeal from the Wabash Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Robert R.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      McCallen, III, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    85C01-1501-F5-48
    Barnes, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018        Page 1 of 13
    Case Summary
    [1]   Brandan L. Eakright appeals his conviction and sentence for Level 5 felony
    sexual misconduct with a minor. We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   The issues before us are:
    I.       whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction
    for Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor; and
    II.      whether his sentence is inappropriate.
    Facts
    [3]   On New Year’s Eve 2014, fourteen-year-old A.M. asked her parents to let her
    visit her great-grandmother in Wabash; they agreed. Once there, A.M. asked
    her great-grandmother for permission to visit Courtney Erwin, her twenty-three-
    year-old friend, whose children A.M. occasionally baby-sat. Courtney often
    bought alcohol for A.M. and drank with her. Late that evening, Courtney
    picked A.M. up, purchased alcohol, and drove to her trailer so they could drink
    with Courtney’s boyfriend, Jared Eakright (“Jared”). Jared was Brandan
    Eakright’s (Eakright) cousin. Jared invited Eakright to join them, and Eakright
    arrived before midnight.
    [4]   A.M. had met Eakright once before in the Fall of 2014. Eakright was twenty-
    nine years old, 6' 6", and weighed 200 pounds. That night, A.M., who was 4'
    9" inches tall and weighed eighty-five pounds, drank more alcohol than she had
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 2 of 13
    ever consumed before. The foursome drank, played cards, and retired to the
    living room. They drank “[e]nough that [they] were [all] drunk.” Tr. Vol. II p.
    220.
    [5]   Jared and Courtney eventually went to bed, leaving A.M. and Eakright on the
    living room sofa with a blanket over them. Eakright placed A.M.’s hand on his
    penis over his clothing. A.M. “froze.” Id. at 144. Eakright then kissed her
    mouth, fondled her bare buttocks, and rubbed her vagina. Each time, A.M.
    told Eakright to stop. At least three or four times, he would briefly stop, only to
    resume trying to kiss her and touching her buttocks and vagina. A.M.
    eventually moved to the other end of the sofa. Eakright put on his shoes, said
    he was sorry, and left.
    [6]   A.M. went into Courtney’s bedroom and shook Jared until he told her the
    address of the trailer. She did not tell Jared what his cousin had done. Afraid
    to call her parents, who thought she was with her great-grandmother and not
    out drinking with adults, A.M. called her friend, Payton Helton, in Peru. She
    was crying so much that Payton could not understand her. He hung up and
    sent her a text. A.M. replied that “a guy was touching [her].” Id. at 172.
    Payton drove to Wabash to pick A.M. up. A.M. then called her friend Bethany
    Caldwell’s parents. “[A.M.] was upset, crying, [and] asked if she could come to
    the [Caldwells’] house” because she “needed somewhere to go now.” Tr. Vol.
    III p. 30. Payton drove A.M. to the Caldwells’ house, and they called her
    parents and the police.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 3 of 13
    [7]   On January 1, 2015, North Manchester Police Department Chief James Kirk,
    formerly a detective-captain with the Wabash Police Department, investigated
    the allegation. He interviewed A.M. and accompanied her and her parents to
    the Fort Wayne Sexual Assault Center, where A.M. underwent a rape kit
    examination. On January 5, 2015, Chief Kirk interviewed Eakright, who made
    a videotaped confession; however, Eakright later recanted, claiming his
    confession was coerced and prompted by fear and exhaustion.
    [8]   On January 23, 2015, the State charged Eakright with Level 5 felony sexual
    misconduct with a minor and Class A misdemeanor contributing to the
    delinquency of a minor. He was tried by a jury on February 9, 2016, resulting
    in a partial mistrial when the jury found Eakright not guilty of contributing to
    the delinquency of a minor, but deadlocked as to the Level 5 felony charge.
    [9]   He was retried as to the Level 5 felony charge on September 26, 2017. During
    the State’s case-in-chief, A.M. testified to the foregoing facts. Courtney testified
    that she woke at approximately 6:00 A.M. on New Year’s Day and was “just
    really shocked” to “find this note” from A.M., and “neither one of them
    [Eakright or A.M.] there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 198-99. She testified further that she
    “thought something had happened to [A.M.] . . . . [S]he had never done that
    before.” Id. at 199. Bethany’s mother, Brandi Caldwell, testified that she called
    the police and A.M.’s parents after a “frantic” and “bawling” A.M. arrived at
    her house on New Year’s Day 2015. Tr. Vol. III p. 32.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 4 of 13
    [10]   Chief Kirk testified that he interviewed Eakright. The jury watched the video-
    recording of Eakright’s interview, in which Eakright confessed to putting his
    hand in A.M.’s pants and rubbing her vagina and buttocks. Chief Kirk testified
    that during the interview, “[Eakright] started thinking about what he did,” and
    began to cry. Tr. Vol. III p. 12. Meredith Livingston, forensic DNA analyst at
    the Indiana State Police laboratory, testified that DNA evidence retrieved from
    A.M.’s face, cheek, and lips was “consistent with . . . Brandan Eakright” such
    that “[he] and all of his male paternal relatives cannot be excluded as potential”
    contributors. Id. at 242.
    [11]   During his testimony, Eakright denied kissing A.M. or touching her buttocks
    and vagina. On direct examination, the following colloquy ensued:
    Q:    Okay. We saw video of your interview with Detective
    Kirk. Was that pretty accurate in terms of what happened?
    A:       Yeah.
    Q:    Ultimately, you indicate you don’t remember what
    happened and then seem to indicate, yes, I kissed her, yes, I
    rubbed her vagina. You saw that, right?
    A:       Yeah, I seen [sic] it.
    Q:       Why did you say that?
    A:     I was in shock. I didn’t know what to think. I didn’t
    know what to say. . . . I never dealt with anything like that
    before. And I didn’t know how to handle it.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 5 of 13
    Id. at 87-88. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
    [12]   At Eakright’s sentencing hearing on October 23, 2017, the trial court found no
    aggravating circumstances and, after considering Eakright’s lack of criminal
    history, concluded that factor was not mitigating. The trial court ordered
    Eakright to serve three years in the Department of Correction with six months
    suspended to probation; he now appeals.
    Analysis
    I.      Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [13]   Eakright argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
    because A.M.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. He argues,
    A.M. is the only single witness to provide even a shadow of
    testimony that implicates Eakright of committing the crime as
    alleged. Her testimony is unsupported by any circumstantial
    evidence, other than potentially inconclusive DNA evidence, or
    by testimony of any other witness who heard or saw the alleged
    event occurring. Additionally, A.M.’s testimony was
    contradictory and convoluted at time and her recollection . . .
    was clearly clouded by her intoxication and fueled by potential
    criminal mischief and/or punishment that she could have faced.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 24. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed
    to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness
    credibility. Bailey v. State, 
    907 N.E.2d 1003
    , 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider
    only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that
    can be drawn from such evidence.” 
    Id.
     We will affirm if there is substantial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 6 of 13
    evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
    concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    [14]   To convict Eakright of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, the
    State was required to prove that he, “a person at least eighteen (18) years of
    age,” did “perform[ ] or submit[ ] to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct
    (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5)” with A.M., who was “a child at least
    fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age.” See 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9
    (a).
    [15]   Under the incredible dubiosity rule, we may “impinge on the jury’s
    responsibility to judge the credibility of the witness only when it has confronted
    ‘inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated
    testimony of incredible dubiosity.’” Young v. State, 
    973 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1226 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Rodgers v. State, 
    422 N.E.2d 1211
    , 1213 (Ind. 1981)),
    reh’g denied, trans. denied. In Indiana, the rule of incredible dubiosity requires
    that there be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently
    contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of
    circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 749
    , 756 (Ind. 2015). This
    rule is rarely applicable and should be applied only if the alleged victim’s
    “testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable
    person could believe it.” See Rose v. State, 
    36 N.E.3d 1055
    , 1061 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2015). The witness’s testimony must run “counter to human experience.”
    Campbell v. State, 
    732 N.E.2d 197
    , 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 7 of 13
    [16]   Eakright contends that the incredible dubiosity rule applies because:
    ultimately, the DNA sampling and testing could not prove, nor
    disprove, that Eakright committed the alleged act. At best, . . .
    Eakright could not be excluded, nor could any of his male
    relatives be excluded[;]
    *****
    [H]is ‘confession’ [wa]sn’t a true confession and was induced by
    the nature of the circumstances of the interview, the unfamiliar
    surroundings, the pressure from Chief Kirk, lack of sleep and flat
    out being scared and just wanting to get the interview process
    over with[; and]
    *****
    [T]hrough much of A.M.’s testimony, she cannot recall a lot of
    the facts of what happened and undertook no actions . . . to have
    prevented touching or at least to have stopped the touching as
    alleged . . . . [And] A.M.’s actions and statement during that
    course of the night seem very much to be convoluted and
    inconsistent with someone who has allegedly been touched
    inappropriately[.]
    *****
    A.M. had started . . . that night by lying to her mother, obtaining
    money for alcohol from her great-grandmother, under false
    pretenses, going to a residence that she did not have permission
    to go to, consuming alcohol underage with adults, consuming
    such a quantify [sic] of alcohol sufficient to cause her to vomit . .
    . . A.M.’s version of events that night was concocted to . . . get
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 8 of 13
    her out of potential criminal trouble, or . . . trouble with her
    mother and/or great-grandmother.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 19, 20, 22, 24.
    [17]   None of Eakright’s arguments render A.M.’s testimony inherently improbable
    or incredibly dubious. A.M. was the only eyewitness to the underlying sexual
    acts, as is common in cases involving sex crimes. The record shows her to be a
    consistent and confident witness. She testified unequivocally that Eakright
    kissed her and tried to kiss her, placed her hand on his penis over his clothing,
    touched her buttocks, and rubbed her vagina. She also testified that she
    repeatedly told him to stop, but he repeated his actions three or four times.
    [18]   In invoking the incredible dubiosity rule, Eakright seizes upon the fact that
    A.M. cannot recall whether he digitally penetrated her vagina. Given her slight
    eighty-five-pound frame, her heavy alcohol consumption that night, and her
    testimony that she “passed out” at one point, it is not inherently improbable
    that she might not recall Eakright’s every action against her. See Tr. Vol. II p.
    145. Eakright also makes much of the fact that A.M. did not immediately wake
    Courtney and Jared or call her parents to report his sexual misconduct. It is not
    inconsistent with the laws of human nature or experience that A.M. was
    reluctant to report Eakright to his cousin or was afraid to call her parents after a
    night of underage drinking. The jury was free to decide whether “to believe or
    disbelieve” A.M. See Murray v. State, 
    761 N.E.2d 406
    , 409 (Ind. 2002).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 9 of 13
    Additionally, it is not uncommon for sexual abuse victims to be reluctant to
    report, to feel shameful and alone, or to be traumatized into silence by abuse.1
    [19]   Nor is there an absence of circumstantial evidence in this case. Circumstantial
    evidence alone can sustain a verdict “if that circumstantial evidence supports a
    reasonable inference of guilt.” Maul v. State, 
    731 N.E.2d 438
    , 439 (Ind. 2000).
    Our Indiana Supreme Court has also held “where there is circumstantial
    evidence of an individual’s guilt, reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is
    misplaced.” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 759. A.M. testified that Eakright kissed and
    tried to kiss her as he fondled her. The State presented evidence that DNA
    evidence collected from A.M.’s face was consistent with Eakright’s profile.
    While not conclusive, the State’s DNA evidence was certainly corroborative.
    [20]   The foregoing facts are not so counter to human nature and experience that a
    reasonable jury could not have believed A.M.’s account. Nor is A.M.’s
    testimony “so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable
    person could believe it.” See Rose, 36 N.E.3d at 1061. We conclude that the
    incredible dubiosity rule is inapplicable here and decline Eakright’s invitation to
    invade the province of the jury by reweighing the evidence and reassessing
    witness credibility. See Feyka v. State, 
    972 N.E.2d 387
    , 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
    As a conviction of child molesting may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of
    1
    After the underlying sexual abuse, a counselor diagnosed A.M. with post-traumatic stress disorder
    (“PTSD”). See Tr. Vol. III p. 148.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018           Page 10 of 13
    the victim, we hold the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Eakright
    guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor. See Young, 973 N.E.2d at 1227.
    II.     Sentence
    [21]   Eakright argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
    provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
    consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the
    offender. When considering whether a sentence is inappropriate, we need not
    be “extremely” deferential to a trial court’s sentencing decision. Rutherford v.
    State, 
    866 N.E.2d 867
    , 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Still, we must give due
    consideration to that decision. 
    Id.
     We also understand and recognize the
    unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. 
    Id.
     Under
    this rule, the burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his
    or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind.
    2006).
    [22]   The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the
    outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged
    with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived
    ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind.
    2008). We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than
    the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the
    sentence on any individual count.” 
    Id.
     When reviewing the appropriateness of
    a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 11 of 13
    consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including
    whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 
    926 N.E.2d 1023
    , 1025 (Ind. 2010).
    [23]   Eakright faced a term of one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three
    years. 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6
    (b). The trial court here found no aggravating or
    mitigating circumstances and imposed the advisory, three-year sentence with
    two and one-half years executed and six months suspended to probation.
    [24]   Eakright argues that “he qualifies for a reduced sentence” because the nature of
    the offense “is not particularly egregious due to the nature and location of the
    touch[ing] and [because there was allegedly] no penetration of A.M.’s private
    areas”; “the touching occurred over a short period of time on one evening”;
    alcohol was “potentially a driving factor”; and “A.M. appears to have had no
    long-term injuries,” as evidenced by her “apparent success in school” and her
    ability to juggle being a high school senior, a cheerleader, and working a job.
    Appellant’s Br. 27, 28. We disagree.
    [25]   Regarding the nature of the offense, twenty-nine-year-old Eakright—who was
    6'6" and approximately 200 pounds—engaged in sexual conduct with and
    performed sexual acts upon A.M., a fourteen-year-old child, who was 4'9",
    weighed eighty-five pounds, and was acutely intoxicated. Undeterred by her
    protests, he kissed and tried to kiss her, placed her hand on his penis over his
    clothing, fondled her bare buttocks, and rubbed her vagina multiple times.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 12 of 13
    [26]   As for Eakright’s character, despite his conviction by the jury, he failed to show
    remorse at his sentencing. He offers as evidence of his good character that he
    has no prior criminal history. We are not persuaded and regard the references
    in his brief to A.M.’s intoxication; her inability to recall “a lot . . . of what
    happened”; and her “undert[aking] no actions . . . to have prevented or . . .
    stopped the touching” as suggesting his belief that A.M., rather than himself, is
    accountable for their inappropriate interaction. See Appellant’s Br. p. 22. We
    do not find, under the circumstances before us, that his character renders his
    advisory sentence inappropriate.
    Conclusion
    [27]   The State presented sufficient evidence to support Eakright’s conviction of
    Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. His sentence is not
    inappropriate.
    [28]   Affirmed.
    [29]   Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1710-CR-2577| April 30, 2018   Page 13 of 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 85A02-1710-CR-2577

Filed Date: 4/30/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021