Maurice Webster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 30 2018, 9:50 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Maurice Webster, August 30, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-336
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stanley E. Kroh,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1705-F5-18429
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-336 | August 30, 2018 Page 1 of 10
Case Summary
[1] Maurice Webster appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for level 5
felony leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death and class C
misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or
its metabolite in the body. He contends that the State presented insufficient
evidence to support his class C misdemeanor conviction. He also asserts that
the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing and that his five-year
aggregate sentence, with one year suspended to probation, is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Finding the evidence
sufficient, no abuse of discretion, and that Webster has not met his burden to
show that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 13, 2017, beginning at 4:30 p.m., Webster was at his brother’s house.
While there, he drank four beers. He smoked marijuana at around 7:00 p.m.
He left his brother’s house around 8:30 p.m. At approximately 9:45 p.m.,
Webster was driving his truck north in the far-right lane around the 2300 block
of Illinois Street in downtown Indianapolis. As he was approaching 24th
Street, Webster noticed that the two cars in front of him were slowing down.
Webster did not slow down, but instead moved over into the left lane to pass
the other vehicles. Webster’s vehicle struck ninety-year-old Marion Jones as
she was crossing the street. Although he knew he had hit a pedestrian, Webster
did not stop but instead drove to his daughter’s house which was nearby. The
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other motorists remained at the scene and called 911. Jones died at the scene
from her injuries caused by the accident.
[3] After the accident, Webster bought a pint of vodka and walked around the
canal drinking. At around 3:00 a.m. the next morning, Webster turned himself
in to authorities at the Marion County Jail. He was transported to Eskenazi
Hospital, where he consented to a blood draw. Subsequent testing of his blood
indicated the presence of THC and its metabolite.
[4] The State charged Webster with level 5 felony leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in death, level 5 felony driving while suspended, class C misdemeanor
operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite
in the body, and class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
Prior to trial, the State dismissed the driving while suspended charge. A jury
trial was held on December 7 and 8, 2017. At the close of the State’s evidence,
the State dismissed the operating while intoxicated charge. The jury found
Webster guilty of the remaining two charges. The trial court sentenced Webster
to five years executed with one year suspended to probation for level 5 felony
leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The court imposed a
concurrent sentence of sixty days for the class C misdemeanor operating a
vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the
body. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The State presented sufficient evidence to support
Webster’s conviction for operating a vehicle with a schedule I
or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body.
[5] Webster first contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support
his conviction for class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or
II controlled substance or its metabolite in his body. When reviewing a claim
of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness
credibility. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). We look to the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the
conviction, and will affirm if there is probative evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. In short, if the testimony believed by the trier of fact is
enough to support the conviction, then the reviewing court will not disturb it.
Id. at 500.
[6] Regarding the challenged conviction, the State was required to prove that
Webster operated a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or
schedule II of Indiana Code Section 35-48-2 or its metabolite in his body. Ind.
Code § 9-30-5-1(c). The parties stipulated that the active ingredient in
marijuana, THC, is listed as a schedule I controlled substance. Webster
concedes that the State presented evidence that a blood test conducted five to
six hours after the accident showed the presence of THC and its metabolite in
his blood. Webster maintains, however, that the State presented insufficient
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evidence that such substances were in his body when he operated a vehicle. We
disagree.
[7] Webster admitted in his own trial testimony that he smoked marijuana at his
brother’s house earlier in the evening before the accident. In addition, Sergeant
Michael Duke testified that he interviewed Webster at the hospital just prior to
the blood draw and that, in response to a specific question regarding whether he
had ingested any alcohol or drugs, Webster told Sergeant Duke that he drank
beer and smoked marijuana at his brother’s house before the accident. Webster
also told Sergeant Duke that he walked around drinking vodka after the
accident.
[8] On appeal, Webster argues that the State failed to present toxicology evidence
connecting the marijuana he smoked before the accident to the THC and its
metabolite detected in his blood five to six hours after the accident, and thus
there is no evidence that he had THC or its metabolite in his body when he was
driving. Indeed, Webster argues that his trial testimony suggests that he also
smoked marijuana after the accident1 and that it could have been THC and its
metabolite from this marijuana that was detected in his blood. However,
Webster made no claim to Sergeant Duke that he also smoked marijuana after
the accident. It was the jury’s prerogative to resolve any conflicts in the
1
Webster’s testimony in this regard was equivocal at best. When specifically asked by his own counsel if he
smoked marijuana after the accident, Webster replied, “I don’t recall.” Tr. Vol. 3. at 30. When asked again
about whether he also smoked marijuana while he was walking around drinking alcohol after the accident,
Webster testified, “I probably took a hit of something. I’m not quite sure.” Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-336 | August 30, 2018 Page 5 of 10
evidence and to judge the credibility of Webster’s trial testimony in light of his
statement on the night of the accident. See McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 163
(Ind. 2017) (noting that we trust juries to make inferential decisions and to sort
out conflicting evidence in searching for the truth) (citations omitted). Based on
the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably infer that the THC and its
metabolite detected in Webster’s blood five to six hours after the accident was
from marijuana that he admitted to smoking prior to the accident, and therefore
was in his blood at the time he was driving. There is sufficient evidence to
support Webster’s conviction for operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II
controlled substance or its metabolite in his body.
Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion during
sentencing.
[9] Webster next argues that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,
490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion occurs
if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) enters “a sentencing
statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of
aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the
reasons”; (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
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supported by the record and advanced for consideration”; or (4) considers
reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91. However, the
relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which
should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id.
[10] The trial court found Webster’s remorse and the undue hardship his
incarceration would place on his children to be mitigating factors. He claims
that the court abused its discretion in failing to also find his act of turning
himself in after the accident, albeit delayed, to be mitigating factor. It is well
settled that a trial court is under no obligation to explain why a proposed
mitigator does not exist or why the court gave it insignificant weight. Sandleben
v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015). It is
understandable here why the trial court may not have found Webster’s
surrender to be a significant mitigating factor. As noted by the State, by the
time Webster turned himself in several hours after the accident, authorities had
already obtained information from eyewitnesses who stayed on the scene, were
able to locate Webster’s vehicle, and were able to determine that it had been
involved in the accident. Thus, Webster’s prosecution was inevitable and not
necessarily facilitated by him. Moreover, Webster’s conscious decision to wait
several hours before going to authorities caused undue evidentiary problems for
the State because of the delayed testing of Webster’s blood for alcohol and
controlled substances, prompting the State’s dismissal of the operating while
intoxicated charge. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to find Webster’s act to be a significant mitigating factor.
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Section 3 – Webster has not met his burden to demonstrate
that his sentence is inappropriate.
[11] Webster also claims that his sentence is inappropriate and invites this Court to
reduce it pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, we find that the sentence “is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The defendant bears
the burden to persuade this Court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Indiana’s flexible
sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the
circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should receive
considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008).
The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id.
at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day
turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,
the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given
case.” Id. at 1224.
[12] We consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in
sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence is ordered
suspended “or otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools
available to the trial judge.” Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.
2010). In conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s
sentence is appropriate or “if another sentence might be more appropriate;
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rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Fonner
v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[13] Regarding the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point
that the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime
committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). The sentencing range
for a level 5 felony is between one and six years, with the advisory sentence
being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court here imposed a
five-year sentence, with one year suspended to probation for the level 5 felony.2
[14] Webster argues that the nature of his offense, leaving the scene of a fatal
accident, was not especially egregious and thus he was not deserving of a
sentence above the advisory. However, it is undisputed that Webster operated
a vehicle after consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he struck a
pedestrian, resulting in horrific injuries and death. We are not persuaded that
the nature of this offense warrants sentence reduction.
[15] We are similarly unpersuaded after a review of Webster’s character. The
character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life and
conduct. Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Included in
the assessment of a defendant’s character is a review of his criminal history.
Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (2016).
A record of arrests is also relevant to a trial court’s assessment of the
2
Webster does not address the appropriateness of his concurrent sixty-day sentence for his class C
misdemeanor, and neither do we.
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defendant’s character. Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 528 (Ind. 2005). Webster
has a lengthy criminal history spanning almost thirty years. While not replete
with serious crimes or a significant number of convictions, his numerous arrests
show a clear pattern of alcohol and substance abuse. Webster admits to regular
marijuana use, and in the instant case, rather than stay at the scene of the
accident and offer his assistance, he selfishly fled and drank a pint of vodka.
Webster’s conduct does not reflect positively on his character. In sum, he has
not met his burden to demonstrate that the sentence imposed by the trial court
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or his character.
[16] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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