JLP v. William Royce, Allen County Treasurer, Nicholas D. Jordan, Allen County Auditor, and BLN Investments, LLC (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not
    be regarded as precedent or cited before                                         FILED
    any court except for the purpose of
    Oct 31 2017, 11:22 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the                                           CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    case.                                                                             and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE,
    BLN INVESTMENTS, LLC
    William A. Ramsey
    Joshua C. Neal                                           Robert W. Eherenman
    Barrett McNagny, LLP                                     Andrew L. Teel
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                      Haller & Colvin, P.C.
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES,
    WILLIAM ROYCE, ALLEN COUNTY
    TREASURER AND NICHOLAS D.
    JORDAN, ALLEN COUNTY AUDITOR
    Thomas A. Hardin
    Shine & Hardin, LLP
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    JLP,                                                     October 31, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    02A05-1703-MI-460
    v.
    Appeal from the Allen Circuit
    Court
    William Royce, Allen County
    Treasurer, Nicholas D. Jordan,                           The Honorable Thomas J. Felts,
    Judge
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017            Page 1 of 15
    Allen County Auditor, and BLN                            Trial Court Cause No.
    Investments, LLC,                                        02C01-1606-PL-270
    Appellees-Plaintiffs,                                    02C01-1408-MI-646
    Barnes, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   JLP appeals the denial of its motion to set aside a tax deed and the grant of
    summary judgment in favor of BLN Investments, LLC (“BLN”), regarding
    BLN’s action to quiet title. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred by finding that JLP
    received adequate notice of tax sale proceedings.
    Facts
    [3]   JLP, a general partnership, owned a parcel of real estate (the “parcel”) located
    at 15415 Washington Street in Huntertown. JLP provided a business address of
    521 Ley Road, Fort Wayne (“Ley address”), to the Allen County Auditor
    (“Auditor”) as its business address of record. JLP eventually sold the property
    located at the Ley address and began to use P.O. Box 219, Pleasant Lake, as its
    new address. JLP failed to provide an updated business address to the Auditor,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 2 of 15
    who continued to mail JLP’s tax-related documents concerning the parcel to
    the Ley address.
    [4]   In November 2013, the Allen County zoning administrator filed suit against
    JLP regarding an unrelated matter. The zoning administrator successfully
    served process upon JLP at the Pleasant Lake P.O. box address.
    [5]   Due to unpaid property taxes, the parcel was included in Allen County’s 2014
    tax sale. On July 11, 2014, a “notice of tax sale” was sent to JLP by certified
    mail, return receipt requested, at the Ley address. The notice was returned to
    the Auditor bearing “RETURN[ED] TO SENDER,” “UNCLAIMED,” and
    “UNABLE TO FORWARD” markings. App. p. 86, 97. The Auditor then
    sent the notice by regular first class mail to JLP at the Ley address on August 7,
    2014. The post office did not return the second notice. JLP did not receive the
    notice.
    [6]   On September 10, 2014, the parcel was sold at a tax sale to Robert F. Jones.
    On March 10, 2015, a “notice to owner of record at the time of sale with a
    substantial property interest of public record” was sent by certified mail, return
    receipt requested, to JLP at the Ley address. The notice, intended to alert the
    owner of record of its right to redeem the property, was returned to the Auditor
    bearing “RETURN[ED] TO SENDER,” “UNCLAIMED,” and “UNABLE
    TO FORWARD” markings. 
    Id. at 87,
    97. The Auditor then sent the notice by
    regular mail to JLP at the Ley address on April 8, 2015. The post office did not
    return the second notice to owner. JLP did not receive the notice.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 3 of 15
    [7]   On September 16, 2015, a “notice of petition for a tax deed” was sent to JLP at
    the Ley address. The notice was returned to the Auditor bearing
    “RETURN[ED] TO SENDER,” “UNCLAIMED,” and “UNABLE TO
    FORWARD” markings. 
    Id. at 87,
    98. The Auditor then sent the notice by
    regular first class mail to JLP at the Ley address on October 8, 2015; the post
    office did not return it. JLP did not receive the notice. The Auditor also
    published notice of the tax sale of the parcel in a newspaper1 and “researched
    the records of the Allen County Auditor’s Office,” to no avail, in an effort to
    identify an alternate address for JLP. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 87.
    [8]   The Allen County Circuit Court entered an order directing issuance of a tax
    deed for the parcel on October 19, 2015. The Auditor issued a tax title deed to
    Jones on October 26, 2015. On May 25, 2016, Jones conveyed the parcel to
    BLN. On December 20, 2016, JLP filed a motion to set aside the judgment and
    the tax deed. On February 1, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
    motion to set aside the tax deed and denied the motion.
    [9]   In a separate action, BLN filed a complaint to quiet title on June 8, 2016. BLN
    named as defendants all persons believed to have a claim or interest in the
    parcel. On October 21, 2016, BLN filed a motion for summary judgment. JLP
    filed a response and cross-motion for summary judgment on November 21,
    2016. On February 2, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
    1
    The date of publication is unclear from the record; however, the fact of publication is not in dispute.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017                 Page 4 of 15
    summary judgment motions and, finding that (1) JLP failed to designate any
    evidence that the Auditor failed to provide all of the notices required by law for
    the tax sale; (2) the Auditor issued the notices in the manner prescribed by
    statute; and (3) the Auditor took reasonable and practicable steps to inform JLP
    of the tax sale, the trial court found that JLP was not deprived of due process
    regarding the tax sale and that the tax sale was valid. The trial court further
    decreed that BLN was the fee simple owner of the parcel and granted summary
    judgment in its favor.
    [10]   On March 1, 2017, the trial court consolidated the tax deed and quiet title
    actions. JLP now appeals from the denial of its motion to set aside the tax deed
    and the grant of summary judgment in favor of BLN.
    Analysis
    [11]   JLP argues that the tax deed at issue here is void because the Auditor failed to
    provide constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale. “[T]he proper
    procedure for appealing the issuance of a tax deed is found in Ind[iana]Trial
    Rule 60[.]” Kessen v. Graft, 
    694 N.E.2d 317
    , 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans.
    denied. Rule 60(B)(6) provides that a trial court may relieve a party from the
    entry of judgment if the judgment is void. “Failure to comply substantially with
    statutes governing tax sales renders void subsequent tax deeds which deprive
    owners of their property.” Lindsey v. Neher, 
    988 N.E.2d 1207
    , 1210 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2003) (quoting 
    Kessen, 694 N.E.2d at 320
    ). As a general matter, a trial
    court’s ruling on a Rule 60(B) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 5 of 
    15 Rice v
    . Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 
    782 N.E.2d 1000
    , 1003 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2003). A ruling under Rule 60(B)(6), however, “requires no discretion on the
    part of the trial court because either the judgment is void or it is valid.” 
    Id. at 1003
    (quoting Hotmix & Bituminous Equip. Inc. v. Hardrock Equip. Corp., 
    719 N.E.2d 824
    , 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
    [12]   Our standard of review upon appeal from a trial court’s ruling at summary
    judgment is well settled. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo on
    appeal. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
    907 N.E.2d 1012
    , 1018 (Ind.
    2009). Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue
    of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    T.R. 56(C); Shi v. Yi, 
    921 N.E.2d 31
    , 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Our review of an
    order upon a motion for summary judgment is limited to the materials
    designated to the trial court. 
    Shi, 921 N.E.2d at 39
    . We draw all facts and
    reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmovant, and we review
    summary judgment decisions carefully to ensure a party was not improperly
    denied its day in court. 
    Id. [13] If
    a real estate owner fails to pay property taxes, the property may be sold to
    satisfy the tax obligation. Schaefer v. Kumar, 
    804 N.E.2d 184
    , 191 (Ind. Ct. App.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 6 of 15
    2004), trans. denied. Indiana statutes make clear the process required for tax
    sales of real property with delinquent taxes.2
    A tax sale is purely a statutory creation, and material compliance
    with each step of the statute is required. While a tax deed creates
    a presumption that a tax sale and all of the steps leading to the
    issuance of the tax deed are proper, the presumption may be
    rebutted by affirmative evidence to the contrary. An order to
    issue a tax deed will be given if the court finds that the notices
    have been provided pursuant to the statutes. However, title
    conveyed by a tax deed may be defeated if the notices were not in
    substantial compliance with the manner prescribed by the
    pertinent statutes.
    Iemma v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
    992 N.E.2d 732
    , 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
    (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A tax deed is void if the former
    owner was not given constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale
    proceedings.” 
    Schaefer, 804 N.E.2d at 192
    ; see Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-16(7).
    Before the government may sell property due to unpaid property
    taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution requires the government to
    provide the owner with “notice and opportunity for hearing
    appropriate to the nature of the case.” Marion Cnty. Auditor v.
    Sawmill Creek, 
    964 N.E.2d 213
    , 217 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Jones v.
    Flowers, 
    547 U.S. 220
    , 223, 
    126 S. Ct. 1708
    (2006)). Due process
    does not require that a property owner receive actual notice
    before the government may take his property. 
    Jones, 547 U.S. at 2
      The statutes governing tax sales and tax deeds have been amended since the events in this case occurred.
    Unless otherwise noted, citations to these statutes are to the edition of the Indiana Code in effect at the time
    of the 2014 tax sale.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017                Page 7 of 15
    226, 
    126 S. Ct. 1708
    . Rather, the government must provide
    notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
    apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
    them an opportunity to present their objections. 
    Id. Prince v.
    Marion County Auditor, 
    992 N.E.2d 214
    , 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [14]   A person may defeat a tax deed only by proving one of the seven defects set
    forth in Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-16. Swami, Inc. v. Lee, 
    841 N.E.2d 1173
    ,
    1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. One such defect exists if the three
    notices required by Indiana Code Sections 6-1.1-24-4 (notice of tax sale), 6-1.1-
    25-4.5 (notice of the right of redemption), and 6-1.1-25-4.6 (notice of petition
    for tax deed) were not in substantial compliance with the requirements
    prescribed in those Sections. I.C. § 6-1.1-25-16(7); 
    Schaefer, 804 N.E.2d at 191
    .
    [15]   The notice of tax sale is governed by Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-24-4,3 which at
    the time of these events required the county auditor to send notice of the tax
    sale (1) by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the owner(s) of the real
    property “at the last address of the owner for the property as indicated in the
    records of the county auditor”; and (2) by regular first class mail to the owners
    from whom the certified mail return receipt was not signed and returned.” The
    statute at the time further provided,
    3
    The version of Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-4 was effective from March 14, 2012 to December 31, 2014.
    The statute was subsequently amended by P.L. 247-2015, sec. 13, which became effective on January 1,
    2015.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017        Page 8 of 15
    If both notices are returned due to incorrect or insufficient
    addresses, the county auditor shall research the county auditor
    records to determine a more complete or accurate address. If a
    more complete or accurate address is found, the county auditor
    shall resend the notices to the address that is found in accordance
    with this section. Failure to obtain a more complete or accurate
    address does not invalidate an otherwise valid sale.
    *****
    Failure by an owner to receive or accept the notice required by
    this section does not affect the validity of the judgment and order.
    The owner of real property shall notify the county auditor of the
    owner’s correct address. The notice required under this section is
    considered sufficient if the notice is mailed to the address or
    addresses required by this section.
    [16]   Next, Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5 governs notices of the right of
    redemption. The version in effect at the time of these events,4 provided in part
    that a person who purchases property at a tax sale must send notice of the sale
    and of the right of redemption “by certified mail” to “the owner of record . . . at
    the last address of the owner for the property, as indicated in the records of the
    county auditor”; and “any person with a substantial property interest of public
    record at the address for the person included in the public record that indicates
    the interest.” Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5(d) provided that a notice that
    4
    The version of Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.5 was effective from July 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015.
    The statute was subsequently amended by P.L. 236-2015, which became effective on January 1, 2016.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017          Page 9 of 15
    was mailed to “the last address of the owner for the property, as indicated in the
    records of the county auditor” is “considered sufficient.”
    [17]   Finally, if the owner of record does not redeem the property from the tax sale
    within the required period, the purchaser may petition the trial court for
    issuance of a tax deed. I.C. § 6-1.1-25-4.6.5 The version in effect during the
    relevant period required that tax sale purchaser to provide “[n]otice of his filing
    of this petition . . . to the same parties and in the same manner as provided in
    section 4.5 of this chapter[.]” See I.C. § § 6-1.1-25-4.5, 6-1.1-25-4.6. Thus,
    Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.6 required that the notice of tax deed petition
    be sent by certified mail to “the last address of the owner for the property, as
    indicated in the records of the county auditor.” Notice sent in such a manner
    was “considered sufficient.” I.C. § 6-1.1-25-4.6(a).
    [18]   Here, the record reveals that the three statutory notices were initially sent by
    certified mail; however, each was returned bearing “RETURNED TO
    SENDER,” “UNCLAIMED,” and “UNABLE TO FORWARD” markings.
    App. p. 87, 97, 98. The Auditor then sent the notices by regular first class mail,
    as required by the relevant statutes. See I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4(a) (In addition [to
    sending notice of tax sale to the owner via certified mail, “the county auditor
    5
    The version of Indiana Code section 6-1.1-25-4.6 was effective from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015. The
    statute was subsequently amended by P.L. 251-2015, sec. 22, which became effective on July 1, 2015.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017          Page 10 of 15
    shall mail a duplicate notice to the owner of record . . . by first class mail to the
    owners from whom the certified mail return receipt was not signed and
    returned”); see 
    Flowers, 547 U.S. at 234-35
    (holding that following up with
    regular mail after failed delivery of certified mail is an additional reasonable
    step that might increase chances of actual notice to the property owner.). It is
    undisputed that the Auditor also published the notice of tax sale in a
    newspaper.
    [19]   The second set of notices, sent by regular first class mail, was not returned to
    the Auditor. Had both sets of notices been returned, the Auditor’s duty to
    search for a more complete or accurate address would have been triggered. See
    I.C. 6-1.1-24-4 (“If both notices are returned are returned due to incorrect or
    insufficient addresses, the county auditor shall research the county auditor
    records to determine a more complete or accurate address.”). Nevertheless, the
    Auditor researched the records of the Allen County Auditor’s Office to
    determine if a more complete or accurate address existed for JLP. See
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 87. That the search ultimately proved fruitless
    because JLP failed to supply an updated address is not a failing of the Auditor.6
    6
    To be clear, a property owner’s failure to provide an auditor with an updated address does not relieve the
    auditor of his or her statutory duties. See Farmer’s Mut. Ins. Co. of Grant and Blackford Counties v. M Jewell, LLC,
    
    992 N.E.2d 751
    , 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“[W]e cannot conclude that a landowner’s failure to provide the
    auditor’s office with a correct mailing address excuses the auditor’s failure to carry out his [or her] duties
    under [Indiana Code Section] 6-1.1-24-4.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017                 Page 11 of 15
    See I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4(a) (owner of the real property at issue “shall notify the
    county auditor of the owner’s correct address”).
    [20]   We reject JLP’s suggestion that the fact of the Allen County zoning
    administrator having JLP’s updated Pleasant Lake P.O. Box address indicates
    that the Auditor was derelict in failing to search all Allen County records to
    determine JLP’s new address. JLP has presented no evidence to explain how
    the zoning administrator found its address or how the Auditor could have
    similarly located the updated address information. We cannot impute to the
    Auditor a duty to conduct a county-wide, inter-agency electronic records
    search, when no such obligation exists under Indiana’s existing tax sale
    statutory scheme. See 
    Flowers, 547 U.S. at 236
    (“An open-ended search for a
    new address—especially when the State obligates the taxpayer to keep his
    address updated with the tax collector . . . imposes burdens on the State . . . .”).
    If the Legislature intends for the Auditor to undertake such a duty and to
    assume the attendant risks, it certainly knows how to do so.7
    [21]   Nor can we, as JLP urges, apply either of the readily distinguishable federal
    cases upon which JLP relies. In Kelber, LLC, v. WVT, LLC, et al., 
    213 F. Supp. 7
            A decision to undertake an open-ended search not only imposes burdens upon the State, but is also
    potentially fraught with risk. Here, for instance, an open-ended search for an entity known only as “JLP”
    could steer an auditor’s office far afield.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017          Page 12 of 15
    3d 789, 791-92 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2016), Kelber’s real property was sold at
    a tax sale. The purchaser requested that the state auditor send the certified
    notices of the tax sale proceedings to the purchaser’s list of persons entitled to
    redeem the property. The purchaser also asked that the notices be sent via
    regular first class mail and published. When the certified notices were returned
    as undeliverable, the purchaser took no further steps to provide notice to
    Kelber. Kelber is distinguishable because the purchaser’s duty to take additional
    reasonable steps to provide notice to Kelber was triggered and went unheeded.
    See 
    Kelber, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 797
    ([“Purchaser] not only failed to take further
    steps after the unsuccessful delivery, it also demonstrated no desire whatsoever
    to ascertain the results of its notification efforts. Essentially, it closed its eyes
    and hoped for the best.”). Such is not the case here, as we have discussed.
    [22]   Also distinguishable is Caplash v. Johnson, 
    230 F. Supp. 3d 128
    (W.D. N.Y. Jan,
    18, 2017), which involved federal immigration officials’ failure to pursue
    additional reasonable steps to notify a plaintiff of an outstanding USCIS request
    for evidence before denying his immigration petition. The Caplash court found
    that the immigration officials were specifically aware that Caplash would not
    receive the notice, but still failed to take additional steps to provide him with
    reasonable notice before denying his immigration petition. This distinction
    renders Caplash factually inapposite for purposes of analyzing JLP’s claims.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 13 of 15
    [23]   Here, the Auditor substantially complied with the statutes that govern the
    notices, and the manner of service that the Auditor chose was reasonably
    calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise JLP of the pending tax sale
    proceedings and to afford JLP an opportunity to object. See 
    Prince, 992 N.E.2d at 220
    ; see also Sawmill 
    Creek, 964 N.E.2d at 220
    (determining that county
    auditor’s manner of service satisfied due process requirements, despite the
    property owner’s failure to receive actual notice, because Auditor published
    notices in multiple ways, mailed notices to all known addresses, and obtained a
    title search in an attempt to find additional addresses for the owner).
    [24]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that JLP was not denied due process, and
    the tax deed is valid; thus, the trial court properly denied JLP’s motion to set
    aside the tax deed. Additionally, no genuine issue of material fact exists
    regarding the superiority of BLN’s interest and title to the parcel, BLN’s status
    as fee simple owner of the parcel, and as to whether BLN is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted
    summary judgment in BLN’s favor in its action to quiet title.
    Conclusion
    [25]   We conclude that the trial court properly denied JLP’s motion to set aside the
    tax deed. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in BLN’s
    favor regarding BLN’s quiet title action. We affirm.
    [26]   Affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 14 of 15
    May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1703-MI-460| October 31, 2017   Page 15 of 15