In the Matter of the Marriage of Robin L. Rajski and Robert A. Rajski: State of Indiana, Robin L. Rajski v. Robert A. Rajski (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                           FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                       May 14 2018, 8:57 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                     CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                           and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Attorney General of Indiana
    Frances Barrow
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Marriage of                        May 14, 2018
    Robin L. Rajski and Robert A.                           Court of Appeals Case No.
    Rajski:                                                 71A03-1710-DR-2321
    State of Indiana,                                       Appeal from the
    St. Joseph Circuit Court
    Appellant-Intervenor,
    The Honorable
    Robin L. Rajski,                                        John E. Broden, Judge
    The Honorable
    Petitioner,                                             William L. Wilson, Magistrate
    v.                                              Trial Court Cause No.
    71C01-1305-DR-273
    Robert A. Rajski,
    Appellee-Respondent.
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018                  Page 1 of 7
    [1]   The State of Indiana intervened, representing the interests of the State, in the
    dissolution action between Robin L. Rajski (“Mother”) and Robert A. Rajski
    (“Father”), seeking reimbursement from Father for public assistance funds that
    Mother had received. The State appeals the trial court’s order denying the
    State’s request for reimbursement from Father and contends that the trial court
    abused its discretion when it denied the request because the State was not
    reimbursed for the public assistance funds it provided to Mother due to Father’s
    not making child support payments through the clerk’s office.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On March 31, 2015, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law,
    and a decree that dissolved the marriage between Mother and Father.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 22-31. The decree established Father’s child support
    obligation at $117 per week and directed Father “to pay all child support
    through the office of the County Clerk by direct payment.” 
    Id. at 23-24.
    Father
    challenged the child support order in a motion to correct error, and on June 8,
    2015, the trial court entered an order that changed his child support obligation
    to $100 per week. 
    Id. at 33.
    [4]   On December 23, 2016, Father filed a petition to modify child support, and a
    hearing was held on this motion on January 23, 2017. The State appeared at
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018   Page 2 of 7
    the hearing and informed the trial court that Mother had been on TANF1
    between approximately the months of April and September of 2016, and the
    State wanted to collect the $1,399 she had received in TANF benefits during
    that time period. Tr. Vol. 2 at 185. The State advised the trial court that it had
    not been reimbursed for the benefits because Father had made child support
    payments directly to Mother and not through the clerk’s office, as he had been
    previously ordered. 
    Id. [5] At
    the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Father did not owe
    any arrearage and that his child support obligation should be suspended for the
    period of time the parties’ child lived with Father. 
    Id. at 196.
    Although it
    determined that Father did not owe any arrearage, the trial court did find
    “there’s definitely money owed to the State.” 
    Id. at 195.
    The trial court said it
    would revisit the issue of money owed to the State on another date, stating,
    “The Court further preserves an obligation owed to the State of Indiana under
    Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in the amount of $1,399.00 as of this
    date.” 
    Id. at 196-97.
    [6]   On May 30, 2017, the State filed a petition for reimbursement of State funds,
    requesting that Father reimburse the State for funds that Mother had received
    from the beginning of March 2016 until September 2016 under the TANF
    program. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 45. The petition stated that, during this
    1
    TANF stands for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018   Page 3 of 7
    period of time, Mother also received child support payments directly from
    Father. 
    Id. Father did
    not begin paying through the clerk’s office until
    November 2016. 
    Id. At the
    July 20, 2017 hearing on the State’s petition, the
    State advised that, when Mother registered for public assistance, she assigned
    her rights to child support to the State. Tr. Vol. 2 at 202. The State argued that,
    under these circumstances, Father’s direct payments to Mother should be
    treated as gifts, and he should bear the burden of reimbursing the State for the
    money provided to Mother by the State. 
    Id. [7] On
    July 11, 2017, the trial court issued an order regarding the State’s petition
    for reimbursement and declined to order Father to reimburse the State,
    reasoning “it would not be fair to ex post facto label the payments he made
    during the relevant time period as a gift.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 47. The
    trial court also declined to order Mother to reimburse the State as Father had
    argued and stated that it “has not seen evidence sufficient to determine that
    [Mother] actually misrepresented the support payments to her caseworker when
    she applied for TANF.” 
    Id. The trial
    court concluded that neither Mother nor
    Father should be required to reimburse the State because “[e]vidence of
    [Mother’s] culpability is absent, and it would be fundamentally unfair to make
    [Father] pay twice because of his mistake in the form of paying his child
    support directly to [Mother]. 
    Id. at 48.
    The State now appeals.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018   Page 4 of 7
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]    Decisions regarding child support rest within the sound discretion of the trial
    court. Taylor v. Taylor, 
    42 N.E.3d 981
    , 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
    Therefore, we reverse child support determinations only if the trial court abused
    its discretion or made a determination that is contrary to law. 
    Id. An abuse
    of
    discretion occurs only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
    the facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable
    inferences therefrom. Hooker v. Hooker, 
    15 N.E.3d 1103
    , 1105 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2014).
    [9]    The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the
    State’s petition for reimbursement of funds from Father. The State contends
    that the trial court erred in refusing to order Father to reimburse the State
    because Mother received twice the amount of child support to which she was
    entitled due to the fact that Father was paying her directly, and at the same
    time, Mother was receiving TANF benefits. The State maintains that, although
    Father’s direct payments to Mother substantially complied with the dissolution
    decree, Mother was required to assign her right to child support to the State,
    and that requirement was not met when Father failed to pay his child support
    through the clerk’s office. Therefore, the State had not been reimbursed for the
    public assistance given to Mother.
    [10]   “Generally, an obligated parent will not be allowed credit for payments not
    conforming with the support order except in three narrow situations: (1) when
    the proof offered is sufficient to convince the trier of fact that the judicially
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018   Page 5 of 7
    required support payments have actually been made by the obligated party to
    the person entitled even though the payments are technically nonconforming;
    (2) the parties have agreed to and carried out an alternative method of payment
    which substantially complies with the spirit of the decree; and (3) where the
    obligated parent by agreement with the custodial parent has taken the children
    into his or her home, assumed custody of them, provided them with necessities,
    and has exercised parental control over their activities for such an extended
    period of time that a permanent change of custody has in effect occurred.” Gill
    v. Gill, 
    72 N.E.3d 945
    , 949-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
    [11]   In the present case, Father was ordered in the dissolution decree to “to pay all
    child support through the office of the County Clerk by direct payment.”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 23-24. Despite this order, the evidence presented to
    the trial court established that Father paid child support directly to Mother “in
    response to her request to be paid directly.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 185, 187. In its order,
    the trial court declined to order Father to reimburse the State for the TANF
    benefits that Mother received, reasoning “it would not be fair to ex post facto
    label the payments [Father] made during the relevant time period as a gift,” and
    “it would be fundamentally unfair to make [Father] pay twice because of his
    mistake in the form of paying his child support directly to [Mother].”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 47.
    [12]   The evidence presented to the trial court showed that, although Father was
    ordered to pay his child support obligation through the clerk’s office, he and
    Mother agreed to and proceeded to have Father pay his child support obligation
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018   Page 6 of 7
    to Mother directly. Indiana courts have recognized credit for technically non-
    conforming payments of a support obligation where the parties have agreed to
    and carried out an alternate method of payment which substantially complies
    with the spirit of the original support decree. Payson v. Payson, 
    442 N.E.2d 1123
    , 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). Therefore, Father substantially complied with
    the child support order. Further, although Mother was required to assign her
    right to child support to the State when she received TANF benefits, see Ind.
    Code § 12-14-7-1, there was no evidence presented that Father was aware that
    Mother was receiving TANF payments from the State and that her right to
    child support had been assigned to the State. Therefore, the evidence showed
    that Father substantially complied with the child support order when he paid
    his support obligation directly to Mother, and there was no evidence that he
    knew that Mother had assigned her right to child support to the State and was
    knowingly circumventing the State’s right to the support. The trial court did
    not abuse its discretion when it denied the State’s petition for reimbursement of
    State funds from Father.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-DR-2321 | May 14, 2018   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 71A03-1710-DR-2321

Filed Date: 5/14/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/14/2018