In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.W., J.W., D.B., Minor Children and Their Father, J.J., J.J v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    Oct 25 2017, 8:39 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Kimberly A. Jackson                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Involuntary                          October 25, 2017
    Termination of the Parent-Child                           Court of Appeals Case No.
    Relationship of J.W., J.W.,                               49A02-1705-JT-1046
    D.B., Minor Children and Their                            Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Father, J.J.                                              Court
    J.J.,                                                     The Honorable Marilyn A.
    Moores, Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,
    The Honorable Scott B. Stowers,
    v.                                                Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    Indiana Department of Child                               49D09-1601-JT-77, 49D09-1601-
    Services,                                                 JT-78, 49D09-1601-JT-79
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017        Page 1 of 21
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   J.J. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to Jr.W. and Ja.W.
    (collectively, the Children). On appeal, Father argues that his due process
    rights were violated when the Department of Child Services (DCS) placed the
    children with a non-relative, rather than his mother (Paternal Grandmother).
    Father also argues that the trial court’s termination order was not supported by
    sufficient evidence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   R.W. (Mother) and Father have two children: Jr.W., born in 2006, and Ja.W.,
    born in 2007. On March 10, 2014, DCS received a report that Mother had
    placed the Children and their half-sibling, D.B., at the Children’s Bureau
    because she was homeless and that she had not returned for the Children and
    D.B. because she was subsequently arrested for assaulting her boyfriend.1 On
    March 12, 2014, DCS filed a petition alleging the Children to be children in
    1
    The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to all three children and D.B.’s father’s parental rights.
    Neither Mother nor D.B.’s father participates in this appeal. Our review concerns only the termination of
    Father’s parental rights to the Children.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017             Page 2 of 21
    need of services (CHINS) because Mother was unable to care for them due to
    her incarceration and Father’s whereabouts were unknown.
    [4]   On May 8, 2014, the trial court adjudicated the Children as CHINS after
    Mother admitted the CHINS allegations and Father waived a factfinding
    hearing. That same day, the trial court entered a parental participation order
    that required Father to successfully complete the Father Engagement Program.
    At that time, the court ordered that Father have unsupervised visits with the
    Children. A Family Case Manager (FCM) was ordered to assess Father’s home
    for possible placement of the Children. Following the assessment, the FCM did
    not recommend placement of the Children with Father due to his admitted drug
    use.2
    [5]   Father had requested that the Children be placed with Paternal Grandmother.
    DCS considered placement with Paternal Grandmother “[o]ver quite a bit of
    time,” but her “CPS history” and criminal history precluded her from being a
    placement option. Transcript Vol. 2 at 171, 174. DCS applied for waivers on
    two occasions so that the Children could be placed in Paternal Grandmother’s
    care, but both requests were denied. Although Paternal Grandmother indicated
    that she intended to ask the court to consider placement of the Children with
    2
    Father’s girlfriend, whose name was on the apartment lease, also admitted to drug use and refused to
    submit to a drug screen.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017         Page 3 of 21
    her, she did not follow through and make such request during the course of
    several hearings.
    [6]   Initially the Children and D.B. were placed in the same foster home. Ja.W.
    was eventually placed in a separate foster home because of her severe
    behavioral issues, including outbursts at home and school that were
    characterized by physical aggression, property destruction, and acting out with
    sexually charged behaviors. A behavioral consultant working with Ja.W.
    observed Ja.W. at her foster home throw things, break a bed frame, hit Jr.W.
    and D.B., and put her exposed breast up to Jr.W.’s mouth. Ja.W. later pulled
    down her pants exposing her buttocks and put her finger in her rectum in front
    of Jr.W. When informed of Ja.W.’s behaviors, Father tended to minimize the
    severity and would not consent to use of medications recommended by a
    physician. DCS invited Father to a team meeting to discuss the use of
    medication for Ja.W., but he did not attend. DCS thus sought and obtained a
    court order to provide Ja.W. with the recommended medication.
    [7]   At a subsequent team meeting that Father did attend, the importance of Ja.W.
    taking her psychotropic medication was discussed. Father, however, continued
    to adamantly express his disapproval of providing medication to Ja.W. The
    behavioral consultant noted that with treatment, including therapy and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 4 of 21
    medication, Ja.W. was making “a lot of progress in controlling her behavior.” 3
    
    Id. at 101.
    [8]   In July 2014, the FCM requested suspension of Father’s visitation with the
    Children because of Father’s “anger outbursts” and threats to “whoop” the
    children in addition to his failure to report that Jr.W. was burnt by a lit
    cigarette. 
    Id. at 16.
    The trial court denied the request, but ordered that Father’s
    visitation be supervised. Also in July of 2014, Father pled guilty to battery
    resulting in bodily injury, which offense arose out of a domestic violence
    incident. On August 14, 2014, the trial court modified its dispositional order to
    require Father to participate in additional services, including substance abuse
    and domestic violence assessments and follow all recommendations, and to
    submit to random drug screens.
    [9]   Initially, Father participated in the Father Engagement Program, but then he
    “just stopped participating in those services.” 
    Id. at 58.
    DCS made an
    additional referral for Father to participate in the Father Engagement Program,
    but he continued to have “minimal participation.” 
    Id. Father also
    “refused” to
    complete the substance abuse assessment and never started the domestic
    violence assessment because he did not believe he needed those services. 
    Id. at 18.
    3
    There is some indication in the record that Ja.W.’s behavior did not significantly improve after she first
    started taking the medication, but that with adjustments to her medication and continued therapy, positive
    changes in her behavior were observed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017           Page 5 of 21
    [10]   Sometime between 2015 and 2016, DCS referred Father to participate in home-
    based therapy as an alternative to the Father Engagement Program. Father,
    however, refused to participate because he did not feel it was necessary. For
    approximately seven months between May 2015 and January 2016, Father did
    not participate in any services as ordered in the CHINS case.
    [11]   On July 31, 2015, Father was found to have violated probation after being
    arrested and charged with possession of marijuana, testing positive for
    marijuana, and failing to submit to drug screens. The court revoked Father’s
    probation and ordered him to serve seventy days in the Marion County Jail.
    Father was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana and, as a
    condition of his probation, he was required to submit to random drug screens.
    Father maintained that the probation department was supposed to submit the
    results of those drug screens to DCS. Just before Christmas 2015, DCS
    conducted a home visit and, on account of Father’s demeanor and appearance
    during the visit, asked Father to submit to a drug screen, which he refused.
    [12]   On January 7, 2016, the trial court issued a permanency order finding that
    Father was not compliant with services and changing the permanency plan to
    adoption. On January 22, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s
    parental rights. Around this same time, Father expressed an interest in again
    engaging in services. Father, however, indicated to DCS that he had complied
    with treatment for substance abuse and domestic violence through his
    probation, and thus, he was not willing to participate in such services a second
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 6 of 21
    time through DCS. Father also claimed he had signed a release with probation
    authorizing disclosure of such information to DCS.
    [13]   Based on Father’s representations, DCS worked to increase Father’s visitation
    and move toward unsupervised visits. DCS ultimately recommended that the
    Children be placed with Father for a trial home visit, but the trial court would
    not permit the placement until Father provided documentation of his
    compliance with services. Father did not provide the requested documentation
    and DCS’s attempts to acquire the information by directly contacting Father’s
    probation officer and service providers were unsuccessful because, contrary to
    Father’s claim, he never signed a release authorizing disclosure. About six
    months later, Father admitted to DCS that he had not participated in the
    required services through probation. Father also never provided the results of
    his drug screens through probation to DCS.
    [14]   During the time frame from January 2016 to June 2016, a court appointed
    special advocate (CASA) attempted four in-home visits with Father, who either
    cancelled or was incarcerated during each of the scheduled visits. The Children
    had also informed the CASA that Father instructed them not to talk to her or
    they would get their “ass whooped.” 
    Id. at 150.
    [15]   In May 2016, Father’s unsupervised visitation with the Children stopped
    because of problems with the Children’s behaviors upon their return, in
    addition to their complaints of being hungry. DCS sought to implement
    therapeutic visitation to address the Children’s behaviors, but Father did not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 7 of 21
    begin this service because he was arrested in June 2016 for felony possession of
    marijuana. Starting in August or September, DCS no longer had contact with
    Father except for one occasion when he appeared at a hearing in September
    that concerned Ja.W.’s medication.
    [16]   On September 8, 2016, the CHINS court found Father was not participating in
    services and had refused to submit to drug screens since his most recent release
    from incarceration. The CHINS court ordered that the permanency plan
    remain adoption despite the request of the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) that the
    plan be changed back to reunification.
    [17]   Jr.W. is in a foster/pre-adoptive home with D.B. and is doing well. When
    Jr.W. first entered foster care, he struggled in school and was at risk of
    retention. He has since improved in school and is now on the honor roll. Jr.W.
    has indicated his desire to be placed separately from Ja.W.
    [18]   After approximately nine different placements, Ja.W. is now in a pre-adoptive
    home where her behaviors are being addressed. Ja.W.’s pre-adoptive parents
    are “well versed in her behaviors and they are educated in how to deal with
    behaviors like this . . . through their own education.” 
    Id. at 119.
    Ja.W. has
    indicated that she is happy and wants to be adopted and “part of a family with a
    mom and dad.” 
    Id. [19] By
    December 5, 2016, DCS had discharged Father from all services due to non-
    participation. DCS moved forward with the petition to terminate Father’s
    parental rights. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the termination
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 8 of 21
    petition on January 10, January 31, and February 7, 2017. The court issued its
    order, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, terminating Father’s
    parental rights on April 18, 2017. Father now appeals. Additional facts will be
    provided as necessary.
    Discussion & Decision
    Due Process
    [20]   Intertwined with his challenge to the court’s determination of the best interests
    of the Children, Father argues that DCS’s alleged failure to comply with Ind.
    Code § 31-34-4-2 and place the Children with Paternal Grandmother
    constituted a violation of his due process rights. Father’s argument is misplaced
    and otherwise without merit.
    [21]   As pertinent here, I.C. § 31-34-4-2 requires DCS to consider placing a child
    determined to be a CHINS with a “suitable and willing relative . . . before
    considering any other out-of-home placement.” We first note that I.C. § 31-34-
    4-2 is found in Article 34 of the Indiana Code, which is titled “Juvenile Law:
    Children in Need of Services” and applies to CHINS proceedings; it is therefore
    not relevant to a termination proceeding such as this. See Hite v. Vanderburgh
    Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 
    845 N.E.2d 175
    , 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
    (“CHINS proceedings are separate and distinct from involuntary termination
    proceedings because a CHINS cause of action does not necessarily lead to an
    involuntary termination cause of action”). We also note that Father did not
    raise this issue before the CHINS court and did not raise it below during the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 9 of 21
    termination proceedings. Because Father presents this argument for the first
    time on appeal, the argument is waived. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 834 n.1
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that mother waived her due process claim because
    she raised it for the first time on appeal).
    [22]   Seemingly acknowledging his failure to challenge DCS’s placement of the
    Children in the proceedings below, Father argues that DCS’s alleged failure to
    comply with I.C. § 31-34-4-2 constitutes fundamental error. Citing In re D.D.,
    
    804 N.E.2d 258
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, Father maintains DCS’s
    compliance with the kinship placement statute is a “prerequisite” to termination
    of his parental rights and that such compliance “would have negated the need
    for the filing of the termination of parental rights petition.” Appellant’s Brief at
    28. Father’s reliance on D.D., however, is misplaced. In D.D., the court
    addressed DCS’s failure to comply with the termination statute that required
    DCS prove that the child had been removed from a parent for at least six
    months under a dispositional decree before termination of parental rights could
    occur. As noted above, the kinship placement statute applies to CHINS
    proceedings; it does not create a “prerequisite” to termination of parental rights.
    
    Id. [23] Finally,
    Father asserts, without citation to authority, that DCS’s failure to
    comply with the kinship placement statute “changed the entire course of this
    case” and “deprived Father of his right to due process.” Appellant’s Brief at 27.
    Father does not explain how generally claimed procedural irregularities
    amounted to a violation of his due process rights. “Bald assertions of error
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 10 of 21
    unsupported by either cogent argument or citation to authority result in waiver
    of any error on review.” See Pasha v. State, 
    524 N.E.2d 310
    , 314 (Ind. 1988).
    [24]   Notwithstanding the forgoing, Father’s argument is without merit.
    Undermining his due process claim, the record indicates that DCS did in fact
    “consider” Paternal Grandmother for placement of the Children.4 See I.C. § 31-
    34-4-2. In February 2015, DCS informed the court that it was examining the
    possibility of an adoption placement with Paternal Grandmother. Ultimately,
    the Children were not placed with Paternal Grandmother because her CPS and
    criminal history precluded such placement. DCS twice sought a waiver to
    permit such placement, but such requests were denied. Father has not
    established any error, let alone fundamental error, with regard to placement of
    the Children.
    Sufficiency
    [25]   Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s termination
    of his parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we
    will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
    D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265
    . Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable
    inferences most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id. In deference
    to the trial court’s
    unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment
    4
    Paternal Grandmother acknowledged at the termination hearing that DCS considered her for placement of
    the Children.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017    Page 11 of 21
    terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,
    
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Thus, if the evidence
    and inferences support the decision, we must affirm. 
    Id. [26] The
    trial court entered findings in its order terminating parental rights. When
    the court enters specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a
    two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence
    supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support
    the judgment. 
    Id. “Findings are
    clearly erroneous only when the record
    contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v.
    Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    , 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous only if
    the findings do not support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not
    support the judgment thereon. 
    Id. [27] We
    recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise
    their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution.” In re M.B., 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
    Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for
    the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet
    their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 
    892 N.E.2d 144
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those
    of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination.
    
    K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 836
    . The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to
    punish the parents, but to protect their children. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 12 of 21
    [28]   We first address Father’s challenge to the court’s Finding No. 13 in which the
    court noted that DCS sought suspension of Father’s parenting time “following a
    number of incidents of physical discipline by [F]ather.” Appellant’s Appendix at
    48. In the affidavit in support of its request to suspend Father’s visitation, DCS
    referenced only one incident in which Father admitted that he spanked Ja.W.
    for misbehaving at school. DCS advised Father that physical discipline was not
    acceptable and Father and his girlfriend signed a safety plan in which they
    acknowledged such. DCS seemingly admits that the trial court’s finding of “a
    number of incidents of physical discipline” was erroneous, noting that the
    record “does not indicate any other incidents of physical discipline” aside from
    the one identified in the affidavit. Appellee’s Brief at 25. Considering the totality
    of the circumstances, this error is harmless.
    [29]   Finding No. 13 aside, we turn to Father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in
    Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence,
    among other things:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
    wellbeing of the child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 13 of 21
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services[.]
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). DCS must also prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children and there is a
    satisfactory plan for the children’s care and treatment. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C),
    (D).
    [30]   Father challenges the trial court’s conclusions as to subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) and
    (ii). We note that DCS was required to establish only one of the three
    requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence before
    the trial court could terminate parental rights. See In re L.V.N., 
    799 N.E.2d 63
    ,
    69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Here, the court found that DCS presented sufficient
    evidence to satisfy two of those requirements, namely, that there is a reasonable
    probability the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal or continued
    placement outside Father’s care will not be remedied and that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. See
    I.C. 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii). We focus our review on the requirements of
    subsection (b)(2)(B)(i).
    [31]   In determining whether the conditions that resulted in placement of a child
    outside the home will be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness
    to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
    consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 
    742 N.E.2d 509
    , 512
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The court must also evaluate the parent’s
    habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 14 of 21
    probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. 
    Id. In conducting
    this
    inquiry, courts may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug
    and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of
    adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family &
    Children, 
    762 N.E.2d 1244
    , 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The court
    may also consider the parent’s response to the services offered through DCS.
    Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    861 N.E.2d 366
    , 372 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007), trans. denied. “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting
    problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction
    with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable
    probability that the conditions will change.” 
    L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 210
    .
    [32]   Father acknowledges that the conditions that led to continued placement of
    Children outside his care were his drug use, criminal activity (including
    domestic violence) and related incarceration, use of physical discipline, and
    failure to complete services. In an effort to reunify Father with the Children,
    Father was ordered to participate in the Father Engagement Program,
    substance abuse treatment, random drug screens, and services to address issues
    of domestic violence.
    [33]   The record reveals that Father only minimally participated in the Father
    Engagement Program and did not participate in alternative services offered by
    DCS due to his periodic incarceration.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 15 of 21
    [34]   With regard to substance abuse, Father continued to use and possess marijuana
    throughout the CHINS case. Father was convicted of marijuana possession in
    August 2015 and pled guilty in yet another case in or about March 2017.
    Father discounts his marijuana use, asserting that he only “occasionally smoked
    marijuana” and that there was no evidence that he did so or was under the
    influence in front of the Children. Appellant’s Brief at 19. We will not indulge
    Father’s request to reweigh the evidence.
    [35]   DCS also had concerns about Father’s unresolved anger issues. In July 2014,
    Father pled guilty to battery, which stemmed from a domestic violence incident
    that occurred within days after Father signed a safety plan with regard to the
    Children. Father minimizes the domestic violence incident, pointing to his self-
    serving statement that the single incident arose from an argument in which he
    threw his keys at his girlfriend. In contrast to Father’s version of events, a DCS
    service provider reported that a visit to the home after the incident revealed that
    Father’s girlfriend had a black eye and that Father was in jail on charges of
    battery, domestic battery, and strangulation. Father’s version of events does not
    undermine the trial court’s concern about Father’s unresolved anger issues and
    the potential for physical violence as it concerns the Children. Indeed, DCS
    service providers and the Children observed Father have angry outbursts at
    other times. The Children reported that Father would threaten to “whoop”
    them if they talked to service providers. Transcript Vol. 2 at 16. Father admitted
    to spanking Ja.W. for misbehavior at school and he threatened to spank the
    Children for other reasons.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 16 of 21
    [36]   Throughout much of the CHINS case, Father indicated that he did not need
    services or he intentionally misled DCS by representing that he was
    participating or had completed services through probation. DCS relied on
    Father’s representations to reunify the Children with him, even going so far as
    to request court authorization for a trial home visit. DCS sought documentary
    proof of Father’s claimed compliance with services, but was unsuccessful. After
    six months of trying to obtain information confirming Father’s representations,
    Father admitted to DCS that he had not participated in services through
    probation. Thereafter, Father did not participate in any services and by the
    time of the termination hearing, had not visited with the Children in over a
    year.
    [37]   Father’s lack of cooperation, manipulation of service providers, and minimal
    participation in services substantially interfered with DCS furthering the goal of
    reunification. Father’s history and actions throughout the CHINS case
    demonstrate that he is unwilling to improve his parental fitness and to assume
    full care of the Children. The court’s determination that there is a reasonable
    probability that the conditions resulting in the continued placement of the
    Children outside the home will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.
    [38]   Father also argues that the court’s conclusion that termination was in the best
    interests of the Children is clearly erroneous. In determining whether
    termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the juvenile court
    is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the
    totality of the evidence. In re J.C., 
    994 N.E.2d 278
    , 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 17 of 21
    In so doing, the juvenile court must subordinate the interest of the parent to
    those of the child, and the court need not wait until a child is irreversibly
    harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride v. Monroe
    Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
    “Moreover, we have previously held that the recommendations of the case
    manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition
    to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is
    sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
    child’s best interests.” In re J.S., 
    906 N.E.2d 226
    , 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    [39]   Much of Father’s argument in this regard is that the best interests of the
    Children would have been served by placement of the Children with Paternal
    Grandmother. Father asserts that “[s]uch placement would have allowed the
    family to remain intact” and that “DCS’s efforts to seek termination of Father’s
    parental rights would have been unnecessary.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. As noted
    above, DCS considered placement of the Children with Paternal Grandmother,
    but her CPS and criminal histories precluded such placement. DCS even went
    so far as to seek a waiver on two different occasions, but such requests were
    denied. We will not second-guess the determination that placement with
    Paternal Grandmother was not a suitable arrangement for the Children.
    Further, Father’s assertions that termination would not have been necessary if
    the Children would have been placed with Paternal Grandmother from the
    outset or even that he might have consented to adoption of the Children by
    Paternal Grandmother are pure speculation.
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    [40]   The court concluded that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
    best interests of the Children because it “would allow them to be adopted into a
    stable and permanent home where their needs will be safely met.” Appellant’s
    Appendix at 50. The court found and the record supports that the Children have
    suffered trauma as a result of Father’s drug use, criminal behavior, anger
    control issues, and removal from their home. The children are “very confused”
    about their circumstances and have remained out of their home for almost three
    years. Trial Transcript Vol. 2 at 184. Father’s failure to participate in and
    complete services and his continued drug use and criminal conduct has directly
    impacted the lack of consistency in the Children’s lives.
    [41]   Of particular concern is that Ja.W. struggles with the trauma she has
    experienced. Ja.W. exhibits extreme behaviors both at home and at school.
    Father continues to minimize Ja.W.’s behaviors and disapproves of providing
    Ja.W. with medication that is helping control her behavior. Service providers
    expressed concern over Father’s lack of insight into Ja.W.’s needs and his
    ability to handle her behaviors appropriately. Father’s own anger issues only
    increased the concern about Father’s ability to provide the necessary treatment
    for Ja.W.’s well-being and development.
    [42]   As this court long-ago stated and which continues to be true today, “children
    continue to grow up quickly; their physical, mental and emotional development
    cannot be put on hold while their recalcitrant parent fails to improve the
    conditions that led to their being harmed and that would harm them further.”
    Matter of D.T., 
    547 N.E.2d 278
    , 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). The Children have
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 19 of 21
    been separated from the home for over three years. The Children need
    permanency and stability that Father cannot provide and they have both
    expressed a desire to be adopted into the family in which they have been placed.
    Service providers also indicated their agreement with termination of Father’s
    parental rights and adoption of the Children by their respective foster parents.
    DCS recommended termination because the CHINS case had been open for
    three years. The CASA opined that termination was in the Children’s best
    interests because of their behavior after visits with Father and Father’s threats to
    Children to maintain secrecy. The CASA further opined that Ja.W. was greatly
    in need of a stable environment and consistent care, which Father was unable
    to provide. Another service provider recommended termination because the
    Children, especially Ja.W. needed stability, structure, and permanency. Father
    was unable to provide a safe, healthy, and suitable environment for the
    Children and he remains unable to do so. The court’s conclusion that
    termination is in the best interests of the Children is not clearly erroneous.
    [43]   In arguing that there is not a satisfactory plan for the Children’s care and
    treatment, Father asserts that the plan of adoption that “would separate
    permanently these siblings cannot be in their best interest.” Appellant’s Brief at
    25. Father maintains that the better choice for the Children is guardianship or
    adoption by Paternal Grandmother.
    [44]   Generally, adoption is a satisfactory plan. In re S.L.H.S, 
    885 N.E.2d 603
    , 618
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Here, the plan is that the Children will be adopted by
    their respective foster parents. The record demonstrates that Jr.W. indicated a
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    desire to be placed separately from Ja.W. due to Ja.W.’s extreme behaviors,
    some of which were directed toward Jr.W. Ja.W. has been placed separately
    from Jr.W. in a home that is suitable and capable of handling her behavior
    issues. She is doing very well in her placement and making progress with
    controlling her behaviors. The Children have both expressed their desire to
    remain in their current placement. Service providers also expressed concern
    over the Children being placed together, noting the Jr.W. was a trigger for some
    of Ja.W.’s behaviors. Overall, the record supports the determination that the
    plan of adoption for the Children is a satisfactory plan for the future care and
    treatment of the Children.
    [45]   In sum, the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to Children is
    supported by sufficient evidence.
    [46]   We affirm.
    [47]   Baker, J. and Bailey, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-JT-1046 | October 25, 2017   Page 21 of 21