Matthew Edmonds v. State of Indiana , 86 N.E.3d 414 ( 2017 )

FILED
Oct 26 2017, 8:54 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth Ann Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Victoria L. Bailey Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender
Appellate Division Angela N. Sanchez
Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Matthew Edmonds, October 26, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1703-CR-400
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant W.
Appellee-Plaintiff Hawkins, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G05-1506-F3-20232
May, Judge.
[1] Matthew Edmonds appeals his convictions of one count of Level 3 felony
resisting law enforcement resulting in the death of another person 1 and two
1
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 1 of 12
counts of Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement resulting in serious bodily
injury to another person. 2 He asserts the State did not present sufficient
evidence he was still resisting law enforcement when he caused death and
serious bodily injury. 3 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On the morning of June 8, 2015, Edmonds was observed shoplifting in the
Beech Grove Wal-Mart. The Asset Protection Manager notified the police of
the theft after Edmonds left the store. In response to a police dispatch, Beech
Grove Police Officer Josh Hartman went to the Wal-Mart parking lot and
identified the vehicle Edmonds had entered. Beech Grove Police Officer Darrin
McGuire also responded to the dispatch, but he waited outside the Wal-Mart
parking lot. After Officer Hartman pulled in behind Edmonds’ vehicle, but
before Officer Hartman could activate his lights and siren, Edmonds drove
away “at a high rate of speed.” (Tr. Vol. II at 124.)
[3] Both officers pursued Edmonds with their police lights and sirens activated.
Edmonds was traveling at “seventy-five, 80,” (id. at 127), miles per hour in a
forty mile-per-hour zone, running red lights, and driving on the wrong side of
the streets. As they approached a hill with a blind spot, the officers turned off
2
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2014).
3
Edmonds filed a motion for leave to file an amended brief. However, as we sua sponte address the concerns
raised in that motion, we deny his motion by separate order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 2 of 12
their lights and sirens but continued to watch “in case [Edmonds] hit somebody
else . . . to provide safety until the medics get there[.]” (Id. at 129.)
[4] On the other side of the hill, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
(“IMPD”) Lieutenant Donald Bender, who had been monitoring the
communications regarding the chase, saw Edmonds and, activating his lights,
started to follow him. Officers Hartman and McGuire followed suit once they
cleared the hill. Shortly after, however, they encountered a school bus and
again terminated the chase as too dangerous to the public.
[5] The officers momentarily lost track of Edmonds but continued to search for
him. Edmonds “came out of the alleyway and almost t-boned [IMPD Officer
William Bueckers].” (Id. at 192.) Edmonds accelerated away from Officer
Bueckers. Without speeding or activating his lights and siren, Officer Bueckers
followed Edmonds. Officer Bueckers estimated Edmonds was going “80, 90
miles an hour at least.” (Id. at 196.)
[6] Other officers had lined up on Edmonds’ projected trajectory to attempt to keep
the streets clear and avoid the possibility he might harm others. However,
Edmonds ran a red light and hit a truck in the intersection. Edmonds exited his
vehicle and ran away on foot. IMPD Sergeant David Gard witnessed Edmonds
hit the truck and leave his vehicle. Sergeant Gard intercepted Edmonds as he
“jumped over the fence and fell right in front of [Sergeant Gard’s] car.” (Tr.
Vol. III at 17.) Sergeant Gard ordered Edmonds “to get on the ground.” (Id.)
Eventually, Edmonds complied and was taken into custody.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 3 of 12
[7] Donna Niblock, the driver of the truck, was killed when Edmonds hit her truck.
Her daughter, Ladonna, and grandson, Johnathan, were seriously injured. The
State charged Edmonds with nine other charges, in addition to the three
resisting law enforcement charges, including: Level 5 felony reckless homicide, 4
Level 5 felony driving while suspended resulting in the death of another, 5 two
counts of Level 6 felony driving while suspended resulting in bodily injury, 6
Level 5 felony failure to remain at the scene of an accident with death, 7 two
counts of Level 6 felony failure to remain at the scene of the accident with
injury, 8 Class A misdemeanor theft, 9 and Class B misdemeanor failure to
remain at the scene of an accident. 10 The jury found him guilty of all charges.
[8] After the jury returned, Edmonds filed a motion for judgment on the evidence
on the three charges of driving while suspended because the State did not
present sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. The trial court dismissed
those charges. The trial court merged the charge of Level 3 felony resisting law
enforcement causing the death of another person with the charge of Level 5
felony reckless homicide. Edmonds was sentenced to an aggregate term of
4
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5 (2014).
5
Ind. Code § 9-24-19-3 (2015).
6
Id.7
Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(2) (2015).
8
Id.9
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (2014).
10
Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(a)(1)(B) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 4 of 12
twenty-five years on the remaining eight charges: fifteen years for the Level 3
felony resisting law enforcement causing the death of another person; five years
each for two Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement resulting in serious bodily
injury, to be served consecutive to the Level 3 felony sentence; 180 days for the
Class B misdemeanor failure to remain at the scene of an accident, to be served
concurrent with the Level 3 felony sentence; and one year each for all
remaining counts, to be served concurrent with the Level 3 felony sentence.
Discussion and Decision
Double Jeopardy
[9] First, we sua sponte address the double jeopardy violation that occurred when
the trial court convicted Edmonds of three counts of resisting law enforcement,
one resulting in death and two resulting in serious bodily injury. 11 See Ind.
Const. art. 1, § 14 (“No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense.”). We review de novo whether a defendant’s convictions subjected him
to double jeopardy. Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 458 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). “A defendant’s right to not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense
arises from the United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution.” Davis
v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Prohibitions against
double jeopardy protect against multiple punishments for the same offense in a
11
This is the sole issue Edmonds sought to raise in his amended brief.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 5 of 12
single trial. Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 37 n.3 (Ind. 1999), holding
modified by Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. 2013).
[10] In Wharton v. State, 42 N.E.3d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), Wharton was stopped
by the police. Based on that traffic stop, Wharton was charged with one count
of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and one count of operating a vehicle
with an ACE of .08 or more. Under the actual evidence test, we held “both
offenses arose from the same action, on the same day, at the same place.” Id. at
541. Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2(a) makes it a Class C misdemeanor to
“operate[] a vehicle while intoxicated,” but it “is a Class A misdemeanor if the
person operates a vehicle in a manner that endangers a person.” Ind. Code § 9-
30-5-2(b) (2001). Similarly, Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1 sets out the crime
of resisting law enforcement, and then also enumerates different consequences
for which the crime’s classification may be enhanced, such as causing death or
injury.
[11] Like in Wharton, Edmonds committed one act that was enhanced by the
consequences of that action. His three resisting law enforcement offenses,
under the actual evidence test, stemmed “from the same action, on the same
day, at the same place,” Wharton, 42 N.E.3d at 541, because for the purposes of
the charged incidents, Edmonds ran one light and crashed into one vehicle. See
Armstead v. State, 549 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (distinction made
between separate offenses and one offense of resisting law enforcement -“unless
more than one incident occurs, there may be only one charge”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 6 of 12
[12] In Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, cert.
denied, Wood left the scene after a boating accident that resulted in two deaths
and one person having serious bodily injury, as defined by Indiana Code
section 14-15-4-1 (1995). Wood was convicted of all three counts. On appeal,
Wood argued his convictions subjected him to double jeopardy because they all
stemmed from one accident and therefore violated the prohibition against
multiple punishments for the same offense. Because Indiana Code section 14-
15-4-1 imposes enumerated duties when a person is involved in an accident and
the statute is “framed in terms of ‘an accident’ rather than injury to a person,”
id. at 1065, we held the statute was adopted for the purpose of punishment of
leaving the accident, rather than injury inflicted. Thus, no matter how many
people were injured in a single accident, only one conviction of leaving the
scene of the accident could be entered. 12 Wood, 999 N.E.2d at 1065.
[13] Although Edmonds killed one person and seriously injured two others, all three
counts of resisting law enforcement were charged based on one incident of
resisting law enforcement. Likewise, all four counts of leaving the scene of an
accident are based on one incident of doing so. As charged, Edmonds may
only be punished for one act of resisting law enforcement and one act of leaving
the scene of an accident. Conviction on all three counts of resisting law
12
We note this also applies to Edmonds’ four charges of failure to remain at the scene of an accident. Thus,
while his conviction for Level 5 failure to remain at the scene of an accident resulting in the death of another
person may stand, the two charges of Level 6 felony failure to remain at accident resulting in serious bodily
injury of another person and the Class B misdemeanor failure to remain at the scene of an accident must be
vacated.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 7 of 12
enforcement and all four counts of leaving the scene of an accident constitute a
violation of Edmonds’ protection from double jeopardy and the additional
convictions must be vacated. Therefore, we vacate Edmond’s two convictions
of Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement and three lesser convictions of
failing to remain at the scene of an accident. See Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538,
545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (when double jeopardy implications exist, reviewing
court is to decide the charges to vacate, keeping in mind “the penal
consequences that the trial court found appropriate”), trans. denied. We remand
for the trial court to resentence Edmonds for the remaining crimes. See Guffey v.
State, 42 N.E.3d 152, 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (Trial court has “flexibility upon
remand, including the ability to increase sentences for individual convictions
without giving rise to a presumption of vindictive sentencing, so long as the
aggregate sentence is no longer than originally imposed.”), trans. denied.
Sufficiency of Evidence
[14] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 8 of 12
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
[15] Edmonds contends that, because the officers turned their lights and sirens off
before he crashed into the truck and killed Niblock, he was no longer resisting
law enforcement. 13 He argues the State did not provide sufficient evidence to
prove he was.
[16] To prove Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement the State must prove
Edmonds “knowingly or intentionally fle[d] from a law enforcement officer
after the officer ha[d] . . . identified himself or herself and ordered [Edmonds] to
stop.” I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2014). It is enhanced to a Level 3 felony if “the
person operates a vehicle in a manner that causes the death of another person.”
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(3) (2014). To sustain a conviction for resisting law
enforcement, the State must prove the person accused of resisting knew he was
dealing with an officer. Conley v. State, 57 N.E.3d 836, 838 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016), trans. denied. “[D]riving a marked police car is sufficient to meet this
standard.” Id. Additionally, law enforcement must issue an order to stop. This
order may be accomplished audibly or visually. Spears v. State, 412 N.E.2d 81,
83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
13
As we have decided two of the counts must be vacated, we address only the Level 3 felony resisting law
enforcement resulting in the death of another person.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 9 of 12
[17] The State presented evidence police began to pursue Edmonds in the Wal-Mart
parking lot when Officer Hartman pulled up behind Edmonds and Edmonds
drove away “at a high rate of speed.” (Tr. Vol. II at 124.) Officer Hartman and
Officer McGuire, amongst others, had lights and sirens activated at different
times to indicate they wished Edmonds to stop.
[18] Although the officers may have broken off the high-speed pursuit due to safety
concerns, Edmonds’ was still aware officers were in pursuit as evidenced by his
actions after he almost wrecked into Officer Bueckers and accelerated as he
drove away. In the residential area with a speed limit of thirty miles per hour,
Edmonds was traveling “two, three times the speed limit . . . 80, 90 miles an
hour at least.” (Id. at 196.)
[19] At no time did Edmonds act as though he was not fleeing the police. At no
time did the police not actively track Edmonds. Lieutenant Bender testified
that although the officers had terminated the high-speed pursuit and turned
their lights and sirens off, they “were still on the lookout for the vehicle,” (Tr. at
154), in the hopes the driver would “[s]low down, stop, abandon the vehicle,”
(id.), and the police would be able to apprehend him. IMPD Officer Joshua
Reese testified that following without lights and sirens is an apprehension tactic
employed by the police. The tactic involves the officers “hoping [the
perpetrator] would get into the area, feel safe now that the lights and sirens have
been turned off and bail on foot and run and try and hide in the area.” (Id. at
248-49.) At that point, officers would attempt to apprehend the perpetrator on
foot or with the assistance of a K-9 unit.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 10 of 12
[20] A reasonable person would have interpreted the officers’ actions, together with
Edmonds’ continued flight, to indicate Edmonds was aware the officers were
still following him and wanted him to stop. These actions continued through
Edmonds’ running the red light, hitting the truck, killing Niblock, fleeing on
foot, and being apprehended by Sergeant Gard. The State presented sufficient
evidence to support Edmonds’ conviction of resisting law enforcement resulting
in the death of another person. See Spears, 412 N.E.2d at 83 (sufficient evidence
presented to show police presence and valid order to stop when Spears sped
away from the scene); see also Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.3d 689, 691 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015) (Lewis committed one continuous crime when first fleeing in his vehicle
and then on foot).
Conclusion
[21] As resisting law enforcement is a conduct-based crime rather than a result-based
crime, Edmonds may only be convicted of only one count of resisting law
enforcement. This holding also applies to the leaving the scene of an accident
charges. As the State provided sufficient evidence to support Edmonds’
conviction of resisting law enforcement resulting in the death of another person,
we affirm that conviction. Therefore, we affirm Edmond’s conviction of Level
3 felony resisting law enforcement causing the death of a person and his
conviction of Level 5 felony leaving the scene of an accident, vacate the two
lesser charges of resisting law enforcement and the three lesser charges of
leaving the scene of an accident, and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 11 of 12
[22] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Barnes, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1703-CR-400 | October 26, 2017 Page 12 of 12