Amber Cosgrave v. French Lick Resort & Casino d/b/a Blue Sky Casino, LLC ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    May 09 2018, 7:40 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Matthew D. Barrett                                        Jeffrey L. Hansford
    Logansport, Indiana                                       Curtis P. Moutardier
    Boehl Stopher & Graves, LLP
    New Albany, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Amber Cosgray,                                            May 9, 2018
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    59A01-1710-CT-2512
    v.                                                Appeal from the Orange Circuit
    Court
    French Lick Resort & Casino                               The Honorable Steven L. Owen,
    d/b/a Blue Sky Casino, LLC,                               Judge
    Appellee-Defendant.                                       Trial Court Cause No.
    59C01-1512-CT-330
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018                      Page 1 of 12
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Plaintiff, Amber Cosgray (Cosgray), appeals the trial court’s grant of
    Appellee-Defendant’s, French Lick Resort & Casino d/b/a Blue Sky Casino,
    LLC (French Lick Resort), motion for summary judgment, concluding that
    French Lick Resort did not owe a duty to Cosgray, an invitee, to protect her
    from a criminal attack by an unknown assailant.
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Cosgray presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether
    the trial court properly concluded that French Lick Resort did not owe Cosgray
    a duty as a matter of law to protect her from a criminal attack by an unknown
    assailant while on French Lick Resort’s premises.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   On December 7, 2013, Cosgray, along with her employer, Greg Pomasl
    (Pomasl), attended a work-related Christmas party at the hotel/casino owned
    and operated by French Lick Resort, at French Lick, Indiana. Cosgray and
    Pomasl arrived at the hotel around 2:00 p.m. and checked into their rooms.
    Cosgray was in Room 1504 and Pomasl’s room was nearby. At the time of
    check-in at the hotel, all guests were given a key card, which is placed in a key
    card holder and which includes the following safety instructions:
    1. Don’t answer the door to your guest room without verifying
    who it is. If the person claims to be an employee, call the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018   Page 2 of 12
    front desk and ask if someone from their staff is supposed to
    have access to your room and for what purpose.
    2. Keep your room key with you at all times and don’t
    needlessly display it in public. Should you misplace it, please
    notify the front desk immediately.
    3. Close the door securely whenever you are in your room and
    use all of the locking devices provided.
    4. Check to see that any sliding glass doors or windows and any
    connecting room doors are locked.
    5. Don’t invite strangers to your room.
    6. Be aware of potential phone scams and prank calls to your
    guest room. Hotel employees will never request credit card or
    personal information over the phone, nor will they advise a
    guest to damage hotel property.
    7. Place all valuables in the guest room safe.
    8. When returning to your hotel late in the evening, be aware of
    your surroundings, stay in well-lighted areas and use the main
    entrance.
    9. Take a few moments and locate the nearest exit that may be
    used in the event of an emergency.
    10. If you see any suspicious activity, notify the hotel operator or
    a staff member.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018         Page 3 of 12
    (Appellant’s Amended App. Vol. II, p. 96). All guest room doors at the French
    Lick Resort are equipped with three separate locking devices. The first security
    lock automatically locks the door upon closing. The second device is a
    deadbolt located near the doorknob which a guest has to manually turn to
    provide additional security. The third security device is a rasp safety lock which
    a guest simply flips over the closed door.
    [5]   After checking into her room, Cosgray joined her co-employees in the bar area
    of the casino for drinks and dinner. The dinner ended between 8:00 and 9:00
    p.m., after which everyone went to their room to change before going to the
    casino. While at the casino, Cosgray played the slot machines for a while and
    then joined other colleagues in the bar area for dancing. After consuming two
    or three beers and two additional mixed drinks, Cosgray “felt the effects of the
    alcohol.” (Appellant’s Amended App. Vol. II, p. 74). At approximately 2:00
    a.m., Cosgray walked back to her hotel room. Because Pomasl intended to join
    her in her room after he cashed-in his chips at the casino, Cosgray propped her
    room door open by flipping the rasp lock through the door jamb, preventing the
    door from completely closing. After changing into sweatpants, Cosgray fell
    asleep on the bed while waiting for Pomasl.
    [6]   About two hours later, Cosgray, laying on her stomach, awoke with her
    sweatpants and underwear pulled down and an unknown man on top of her,
    vaginally penetrating her. The unknown assailant never said anything and
    Cosgray did not make any noise. After approximately six minutes, the male left
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018   Page 4 of 12
    the room, and Cosgray locked the door. Law enforcement later identified
    Cosgray’s assailant as Javier Urbano Uribe (Uribe). 1
    [7]   The criminal investigation later determined that French Lick Resort’s
    employee, Summer Andrews (Andrews), had invited Uribe onto the hotel and
    casino’s property. Andrews was employed in customer service, serving food
    and beverages to French Lick Resort’s guests at the casino. Due to inclement
    weather conditions, French Lick Resort had provided Andrews with a hotel
    room. At the conclusion of her shift on December 8, 2013, Andrews clocked
    out at 1:13 a.m. and left the premises. She visited a local bar where she
    befriended Uribe and invited him back to her room at the French Lick Resort.
    After accompanying Uribe into the hotel, and prior to arriving at her room,
    Andrews rebuked Uribe’s advances and left him alone near Cosgray’s room.
    [8]   On December 4, 2015, Cosgray filed a Complaint for damages against French
    Lick Resort, claiming negligence, vicarious liability, and negligent infliction of
    emotional distress. On May 9, 2017, French Lick Resort filed a motion for
    summary judgment and designation of evidence, to which Cosgray responded
    on July 10, 2017. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted summary
    judgment to French Lick Resort, concluding in pertinent part:
    This [c]ourt does now find that, in general, resorts and hotels do
    not routinely contemplate that an invitee might rape another
    1
    On December 10, 2013, the State filed an Information, charging Uribe with rape and burglary. Uribe pled
    guilty to the charge of rape on April 3, 2017.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018                        Page 5 of 12
    invitee, nor do they contemplate that an invitee will voluntarily
    leave their doors open and unlocked all night. In addition, it
    would be unreasonable to hold a hotel or resort responsible for a
    rape occurring on its premises, especially given the circumstances
    of the case before the [c]ourt. [French Lick Resort] does not have
    a blanket duty to [Cosgray] to protect her from any and all
    criminal attacks. Thus[,] the [c]ourt finds that in this case, as a
    matter of law, it is unforeseeable by [French Lick Resort], that
    [Cosgray] would be sexually assaulted in her room that she
    intentionally left unlocked and that it would be unreasonable to
    require that French Lick Resort should have taken any further
    precautions to avoid such an attack.
    (Appellant’s Amended App. Vol. II, p. 15).
    [9]    Cosgray now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [10]   In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the
    shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to
    affirm or reverse summary judgment. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley,
    
    891 N.E.2d 604
    , 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Thus, on appeal, we
    must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether
    the trial court has correctly applied the law. 
    Id. at 607-08
    . In doing so, we
    consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party. 
    Id. at 608
    . A fact is ‘material’ for summary judgment purposes if
    it helps to prove or disprove an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018     Page 6 of 12
    action; a factual issue is ‘genuine’ if the trier of fact is required to resolve an
    opposing party’s different version of the underlying facts. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins.
    Group v. Blaskie, 
    727 N.E.2d 13
    , 15 (Ind. 2000). The party appealing the grant
    of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this court that the trial
    court’s ruling was improper. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 
    891 N.E.2d at 607
    .
    When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must show that the
    undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or
    that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative defense that bars the
    plaintiff’s claim. 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment must be
    reversed if the record discloses an incorrect application of the law to the facts.
    
    Id.
    [11]   We observe that, in the present case, the trial court entered findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in support of its judgment. Special findings are not required
    in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal.
    AutoXchange.com. Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 
    816 N.E.2d 40
    , 48 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2004). However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the
    trial court’s rationale for its review and facilitate appellate review. 
    Id.
    II. Analysis
    [12]   To recover in negligence, Cosgray must establish: (1) a duty on the part of
    French Lick Resort to conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its
    relationship with Cosgray; (2) a failure on the part of French Lick Resort to
    conform its conduct to the requisite standard of care; and (3) an injury to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018        Page 7 of 12
    Cosgray proximately caused by the breach. Jones v. Wilson, 
    81 N.E.3d 688
    , 692
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
    [13]   In this case, the threshold inquiry is whether French Lick Resort owed a duty to
    its invitee, Cosgray, to protect her from a criminal attack by an unknown
    assailant while she was in her room on French Lick Resort’s premises with her
    room door intentionally left unlocked. Necessary to our analysis is
    consideration of two Indiana Supreme Court cases, which “redrew the premises
    liability landscape.” Hoosier Mountain Bike Ass’n v. Kaler, 
    73 N.E.3d 712
    , 716
    n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The decisions in Rogers v. Martin, 
    63 N.E.3d 316
     (Ind.
    2016) and Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 
    62 N.E.3d 384
     (Ind. 2016),
    carefully synthesized years of “less than perfectly lucid” caselaw on premises
    liability law in Indiana. Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 387. Reviewing the applicable
    precedents, Goodwin and Rogers initially observed that a landowner has a
    general duty to exercise reasonable care for the invitee’s protection while the
    invitee is on the premises. Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 320. However, our supreme
    court continued that “although landlords owe invitees a well-established ‘duty
    to protect,’ courts must look at one critical element before extending that duty
    to cases where an invitee’s injury occurs not due to a dangerous condition of the
    land but due to some harmful activity on the premises. That element is
    foreseeability.” Id. at 324. That is, while landowners have a duty to take
    reasonable precaution to protect their invitees from criminal attacks by third
    parties, there is a foreseeability component in that analysis, requiring the trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018     Page 8 of 12
    court to decide, in the context of duty, whether the criminal act was foreseeable.
    See Jones, 81 N.E.3d at 693.
    [14]   In its decisions, our supreme court distinguished the foreseeability component
    in the context of duty from the foreseeability component in the context of
    proximate cause, stating: “‘[T]he foreseeability component of proximate cause
    requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while foreseeability
    as a component of duty involves a lesser inquiry which requires a more general
    analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the
    facts of the actual occurrence.’” 2 Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 391 (quoting Goldsberry
    v. Grubbs, 
    672 N.E.2d 475
    , 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied); see also
    Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 325 (foreseeability in duty context is a general threshold
    determination that “should focus on the general class of persons of which the
    plaintiff was a member and whether the harm suffered was of a kind normally
    to be expected—without addressing the specific facts of the occurrence”). The
    Goodwin court further clarified the trial court’s task when determining whether a
    criminal act was foreseeable:
    But because almost any outcome is possible and can be foreseen,
    the mere fact that a particular outcome is “sufficiently likely” is
    not enough to give rise to a duty. Instead, for purposes of
    determining whether an act is foreseeable in the context of duty
    we assess “whether there is some probability or likelihood of
    2
    In reaching this decision, the Goodwin court specifically rejected the totality of the circumstances test when
    analyzing the foreseeability analysis in the context of duty. See Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 389 (“[W]e now
    recognize that although the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test is useful in determining foreseeability in the
    context of proximate causation, it is inappropriate when analyzing foreseeability in the context of duty.”)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018                               Page 9 of 12
    harm that is serious enough to induce a reasonable person to take
    precautions to avoid it.
    Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 392.
    [15]   Distinguishing Goodwin, Cosgray claims that “[t]he broad type of patron at a
    small neighborhood bar typically stays for a short period of time to drink
    beverages and socialize. On the other hand, the broad type of patron at issue in
    the present case stays for an exceedingly longer period of time to play casino
    games, drink, socialize, and then sleep overnight in guest rooms.” (Appellant’s
    Br. p. 16). In Goodwin, the plaintiff was socializing at a bar when another
    patron became angry, produced a handgun, and shot the plaintiff. Goodwin, 62
    N.E.3d at 392. In its analysis of the bar’s duty, our supreme court noted:
    The broad type of plaintiff here is a patron of a bar and the harm
    is the probability or likelihood of a criminal attack, namely: a
    shooting inside a bar. But even engaging in a ‘lesser inquiry’ we
    conclude that although bars can often set the stage for rowdy
    behavior, we do not believe that bar owners routinely
    contemplate that one bar patron might suddenly shoot another.
    Id. at 393. See also Martin, 63 N.E.3d at 326 (“Although house parties can often
    set the stage for raucous behavior, we do not believe that hosts of parties
    routinely physically fight guests whom they have invited. Ultimately, it is not
    reasonably foreseeable for a homeowner to expect this general harm to befall a
    house-party guest.”); Jones, 81 N.E.3d at 694-95 (The random criminal attack in
    the parking lot on a paying spectator at a wrestling match was not foreseeable
    and therefore no duty was owed); Powell v. Stuber, 
    89 N.E.3d 430
    , 434 (Ind. Ct.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018   Page 10 of 
    12 App. 2017
    ) (No duty was owed to the patron of a bar who “pursued his
    assailants and grabbed onto the vehicle as it was being driven away.”), reh’g
    denied.
    [16]   Here, Cosgray’s injuries resulted from the conduct of a third person. Under the
    foreseeability test outlined in Goodwin and Rogers—examining the broad type of
    plaintiff and the broad type of harm, without consideration of the actual facts—
    we find that the sexual criminal attack on Cosgray by another invitee in a room
    left intentionally unlocked was not normally to be expected, and thus not
    foreseeable, and therefore French Lick Resort did not owe a duty to Cosgray.
    [17]   Cosgray encourages this court to take into consideration the “ongoing history of
    assaults and batteries involving injury and a prior reported rape” and the
    specific security measures to impose a duty on French Lick Resort.
    (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). However, Cosgray’s inclination to incorporate the
    totality of the circumstances into our consideration of the duty element is no
    longer applicable since our supreme court decision in Goodwin and Martin. See
    Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 392 (The totality of the circumstances test “is ill-suited to
    determine foreseeability in the context of duty.”). Accordingly, we affirm the
    trial court’s summary judgment for French Lick Resort.
    CONCLUSION
    [18]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that French Lick Resort did not owe
    Cosgray a duty as a matter of law to protect her from a criminal attack by an
    assailant while on French Lick Resort’s premises.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018   Page 11 of 12
    [19]   Affirmed.
    [20]   May, J. and Mathias, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1710-CT-2512 | May 9, 2018   Page 12 of 12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 59A01-1710-CT-2512

Judges: Riley

Filed Date: 5/9/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024