Russell Goodman v. Stephanie Goodman , 94 N.E.3d 733 ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    Mar 06 2018, 9:45 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Leanna Weissmann
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Russell Goodman,                                          March 6, 2018
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    77A04-1706-DR-1300
    v.                                                Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit
    Court
    Stephanie Goodman,                                        The Honorable Lakshmi Reddy,
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                      Special Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    77C01-1502-DR-117
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018                           Page 1 of 33
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Respondent, Russell Goodman (Husband), appeals the trial court’s
    Order dissolving the marriage between Husband and Appellee-Petitioner,
    Stephanie Goodman (Wife).
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUES
    [3]   Husband presents us with seven issues on appeal, which we restate as:
    (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by deviating from the
    presumption of an equal division of marital assets;
    (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by omitting to offset the
    value of certain marital assets already in Wife’s possession from the
    marital estate;
    (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by including goodwill as a
    marital asset;
    (4) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when valuating certain
    assets of the marital estate;
    (5) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding physical
    custody of the minor child to Wife;
    (6) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay
    child support retroactively; and
    (7) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay
    a portion of Wife’s attorney fees.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 2 of 33
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   When divorce proceedings span more than half a decade, it is reasonable to
    assume that this was not an amicable breakup. Exploiting the judicial system to
    its fullest, the parties caused the trial court to enter two hundred and thirty-six
    entries in the chronological case summary since March 9, 2015 alone. Over the
    last two years, the trial court issued ninety-two orders and ten income
    withholding orders. Instead of aiding the trial court in reaching its decision by
    submitting the customary excel spreadsheet with the proposed allocation of
    assets, the trial court had to wade through a box of loose exhibits and puzzle
    together the parties’ marital estate. We are very grateful for the detailed
    findings of fact and conclusions thereon issued by the trial court which brought
    this herculean task to an end.
    [5]   Husband and Wife married on June 24, 1995, and both had children from
    previous relationships. While no children were born during the marriage, the
    parties adopted Husband’s natural granddaughter, K.G., born on November 5,
    2006. Around March 2012, Wife and K.G. moved out of the marital residence
    and Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on March 12, 2012. On
    May 30, 2012, the trial court entered a joint temporary restraining order. On
    July 26, 2012, the parties submitted a Provisional Agreed Order, which was
    approved by the trial court on July 31, 2012, and which included the following
    provisions:
    a. [Wife] with primary custody of [K.G.] and [Husband] to
    exercise parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time
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    Guidelines. [Husband] to pay child support in the amount of
    $110.00/week.
    b. [Husband] to have temporary possession of the marital
    residence at 7834 S. Pleasant Main, Carlisle, Indiana 47838 and
    shall not be permitted to allow any other individuals to reside
    within the marital residence until further order by the court.
    c. [Husband] shall be responsible for all debts in his name
    individually and all debts associated with the business A1
    Affordable Goodman’s Tree Service. [Wife] shall be responsible
    for all debts in her name individually and any joint debts shall be
    allocated at the final hearing.
    d. [Wife] was to be paid $9,500.00 for the Chevy Camaro within
    ten (10) days from July 5, 2012, and if she was not paid, then the
    parties were to trade and/or sell said vehicle to a dealership for a
    vehicle of [Wife’s] choosing and [Wife] was to maintain full
    possession and title of the new vehicle of her choosing. If any
    financing was required, [Wife] would be responsible for the debt
    associated with the new vehicle.
    e. The parties were to inventory the personal items within the
    marital residence and amicably divide temporary possession of
    the personal property and if they were unable to agree, then the
    property was to remain in the marital residence. [Wife] was
    entitled to her clothes, [K.G.’s] toys, and [K.G.’s] bedroom suite.
    f. [Husband] shall be responsible for the operation and expense of
    A1 Affordable Goodman’s Tree Service. [Husband] shall be
    entitled to temporary possession of all assets of A1 Affordable
    Goodman’s Tree Service in order to dutifully operate said
    business.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 4 of 33
    (Trial Court’s Order, p. 5).
    [6]   For the next five years, the parties engaged in fierce and relentless litigation,
    filing more than one-hundred-and-seventy pleadings resulting in the issuance of
    ninety-two orders. Finally, by agreement, the marriage was dissolved on
    December 2, 2015, with bifurcation of the issues regarding the division of
    marital assets, apportionment of marital debt, and establishment of custody,
    parenting time, and K.G.’s support arrangements. On December 4, 2015, Wife
    filed a Verified Motion for Order to Produce Documents, contending that
    Husband failed to respond to discovery requests and produce the requested
    documents. Wife alleged that she requested discovery on August 14, 2015 and
    on August 24, 2015, but each time Husband produced the same non-responsive
    and handwritten responses without attaching the supporting documents. The
    discovery dispute was never resolved as Wife continued to indicate that she did
    not receive all the documents requested and Husband argued that he properly
    responded and produced all documents in his possession.
    [7]   The trial court conducted a final hearing over seven non-consecutive days:
    May 15 & 27, 2016, August 22 & 23, 2016, December 14, 2016, and February
    22, 2017. During these hearings, the trial court received evidence concerning
    Husband’s one-hundred-and-six pleadings filed over the past two years and
    Wife’s sixty-four pleadings filed in the same time period. The evidence
    presented during the proceedings reflected that during the marriage, Husband
    and Wife both worked in their tree trimming business. Despite receiving an
    income from the business, the family was on government health insurance,
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    received food stamps, and qualified for free/reduced school lunches and
    textbooks. Testimony suggests that Husband had complete and total financial
    control during the marriage over the parties’ personal and business possessions,
    with ownership of all property placed in his name.
    [8]   Both Husband and Wife were gamblers: they often purchased lottery tickets
    and visited the casino in Evansville. Over the years, Husband accrued
    significant winnings from gambling. In 2009, Husband won a scratch off
    lottery ticket in the amount of $100,000. While Wife testified that there was at
    least $70,000 left in a lock box at the time of filing the divorce proceeding,
    Husband claimed that he and Wife lost all the money gambling, eating in five
    star restaurants, and purchasing a $20,000 Camaro for Wife. Family members
    stated that Husband would often hide money in shoe boxes and mattresses and
    kept a very low balance in a checking account.
    [9]   Despite having received parenting time in accordance with the Indiana
    Parenting Time Guidelines, by February 2015, Wife was always present during
    Husband’s parenting time. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL) noted, in a
    February 2015 report, that the parties frequently did things together as a family.
    Wife indicated that she attended the visits because K.G. was afraid to stay
    alone. However, after two in camera interviews of K.G., the trial court did not
    find evidence that K.G. was fearful of Husband, “but did determine that [K.G.]
    has been coached and influenced by [Wife].” (Trial Court Order, p. 28). The
    trial court clarified that “[m]uch like [Husband] has engaged in a pattern and
    behavior of hiding financial assets, the [c]ourt believes that [Wife] has been less
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    than truthful in [K.G.’s] feelings towards her father and has tried to discourage
    and prevent a meaningful relationship between [K.G.] and [f]ather.” (Trial
    Court’s Order, p. 29).
    [10]   On May 16, 2017, after receiving evidence for seven days, the trial court issued
    its Order, spanning forty-nine pages, including one-hundred and sixty findings
    of fact and ninety conclusions of law. The trial court concluded, in pertinent
    part, as follows:
    6. This [c]ourt deviates from the presumption of equal division of
    assets because there is such a large disparity of income and
    because [Husband] has engaged in dissipation of assets. While
    [Husband’s] income tax returns for several years provide that his
    income was nominal and a net income of less than $20,000, this
    [c]ourt finds that to be contrary to the evidence presented.
    Documentation submitted by [Wife] for the year 2013,
    demonstrates that [Husband] was receiving checks in large
    amounts written in his individual name and that [Husband]
    cashed these checks at the payor’s bank, rather than depositing
    into his business account. [Husband] did not provide any bank
    statements to rebut this or to show where these checks were
    deposited and how the money was used. The [c]ourt also
    believes that [Husband] engaged in dissipation of assets because
    he has no real good explanation of what happened to all his
    lottery and casino winnings or engaged in dissipation of assets by
    using such large amounts of discretionary income to gamble
    rather than paying debts, timely paying child support, or have
    some type of savings for their future. In addition, the [c]ourt
    believes that [Husband] has engaged in a pattern of hiding assets
    and not turning over documentation that was reasonably
    requested on numerous occasions and the [c]ourt believes that
    there are assets that [Husband] has not disclosed and so an
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    unequal distribution seems only reasonable and fair under the
    circumstances.
    7. For the foregoing reasons, the [c]ourt awards [Wife] Sixty
    Percent (60%) of the assets and [Husband] Forty Percent (40%).
    [Husband] can continue to earn tremendous income through his
    business as he has done for decades and/or through his gambling
    efforts which he appears to be very successful at based upon his
    income tax returns. His income tax returns are not reflective of
    all his gambling winnings and may not be reflective of any lottery
    winnings. Any and all debts in [Husband’s] name and any and
    all business debts shall be the responsibility of [Husband] as the
    [c]ourt finds no reasonable explanation for these debts not to
    have been paid when he had so much discretionary income to
    gamble.
    ****
    24. The total value of marital assets to be allocated is Three
    Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Nine and
    00/100 Dollars ($332,839.00). In order to provide [Wife] with
    60% of the marital assets, [Huband] will have to make an
    equalization payment to [Wife] in the amount of One Hundred
    Ninety Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Three and 40/100
    Dollars ($199,703.40). Because this matter has been pending for
    five (5) years, the [c]ourt believes that the best course of action
    and to conserve judicial economy so the parties are not
    constantly returning to [c]ourt for collection purposes, the [c]ourt
    hereby reduces this property settlement to a judgment . . .
    ****
    31. [] A trial court has discretion to make a modification of child
    support relate back to the date the petition to modify is filed, or
    any date thereafter. The [c]ourt sees no reason to use any other
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018      Page 8 of 33
    date for child support modification other than the date that
    [Wife] filed her Petition to Modify. Accordingly, the child
    support is modified retroactive to May 24, 2013.
    ****
    33. Accordingly, [Husband’s] child support payment of
    $320/week is modified retroactive to the date of filing, which is
    May 24, 2013. Because it took the parties so long to reach the
    point where they could litigate this issue, [Husband] now has a
    substantial arrearage. As stated already, the reason for this long
    delay rests with the actions of both parties. [Husband] repeatedly
    failed to fully respond to discovery requests and provide
    necessary financial information, which to this day has still not
    been produced. [Wife] was not diligent on numerous occasions
    on bringing the matter to the [c]ourt’s attention until just days
    before a scheduled hearing making it too late to attempt to
    remedy the dispute before having to continue and reschedule
    hearings. Additionally, [Husband] made efforts to hide assets
    and/or dissipate assets and knowing how much income he was
    earning, [Husband] should have known all along that his child
    support should have been significantly more than the $110/week.
    ****
    51. [Wife] is hereby awarded sole legal custody due to the
    inability of the parties to communicate in any reasonable and
    effective manner. However, [Husband] has the right to all
    information regarding [K.G.] and [Wife] is to follow the
    recommendations of GAL [] to insure that [Husband] has all
    such information and that the school and medical providers have
    his contact information. [Wife] is hereby cautioned that it will
    reflect negatively on her if the [c]ourt discovers that [Wife] is
    failing or refusing to provide school, medical, extra-curricular or
    relevant information regarding [K.G.] to [Husband]. It would be
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    in [K.G.’s] best interest if someday these parties reach a point
    where they can better communicate and both be involved in
    important decisions regarding [K.G.].
    52. [Wife] is hereby awarded primary physical custody.
    ****
    59. The [c]ourt believes that it is time for [Husband] to have
    unsupervised parenting time with [K.G.] as there does not appear
    to be any basis for supervised parenting time to continue. That
    there has been the opinion of the GAL which the [c]ourt has
    adopted. However, much time has lapsed and the [c]ourt
    provides for a short transition period. The [c]ourt EXPECTS
    [Wife] to cooperate and allow this relationship to be rebuilt and
    not to engage in action that causes [K.G.] to be in fear of her
    father. Children thrive when they have a relationship with both
    parents and they both chose to adopt [K.G.] together and must
    now figure out how to co-parent effectively and successfully.
    ****
    64. [Husband] submitted an Affidavit for Attorney Fees in the
    amount of over Fifty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($50,000.00)
    requesting reimbursement. [Husband] also filed a Notice of Lien
    of Attorney Fees for over $27,000.00. The [c]ourt DENIES
    [Husband’s] request for attorney fees.
    65. [Wife] submitted an Affidavit for Attorney Fees in the
    amount of over One Hundred Fifty Thousand and 00/100
    Dollars ($150,000.00) requesting reimbursement. The legal fees
    expended by [Wife] are significantly high in comparison to the
    assets available to the parties and the [c]ourt could not possibly
    award fees in that amount. The legislative purpose behind
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    authorizing a [c]ourt to order one party to pay another party’s
    attorney fees is to ensure that party to a dissolution proceeding
    has access to an attorney who would not otherwise be able to
    afford it. In determining whether to award one party attorney
    fees, the court looks at the economic circumstances of the parties,
    the ability of the parties to engage in gainful employment to earn
    adequate income, and any other pertinent factors. In this
    circumstance, [Wife] has no income by which she could have
    afforded an attorney and would not have been able to present her
    case without an attorney. [Husband] complicated and delayed
    the process by not producing proper discovery responses and
    documents. However, the [c]ourt must be reasonable in the fees
    awarded and the [c]ourt takes into account that she has been
    awarded a property settlement. Based on the foregoing, the
    [c]ourt awards [Wife’s] attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty-
    Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) and those fees
    shall be reimbursed by [Husband]. [Husband] shall have one
    hundred and twenty (120) days to reimburse [Wife’s] counsel.
    [Husband] is instructed that he needs to find a good method of
    keeping track of his payments, such as utilizing checks or
    cashier’s checks rather than cash that cannot be accounted for.
    (Trial Court’s Order, pp. 30-31, 34, 35, 36, 40-41, 42, 43).
    [11]   Husband now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [12]   After the final hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions
    thereon regarding the parties’ dissolution proceedings. In reviewing an order in
    which the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions thereon, our
    standard of review is well-settled. First, we determine whether the evidence
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    supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.
    Troyer v. Troyer, 
    987 N.E.2d 1130
    , 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In
    deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment
    only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to
    support the judgment. 
    Id. We do
    not reweigh the evidence, but consider only
    the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. 
    Id. Challengers must
    establish that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are
    clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a
    mistake has been made. 
    Id. Additionally, a
    judgment is clearly erroneous
    under Indiana Trial Rule 52 if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. 
    Id. We evaluate
    questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court’s
    determination of such questions. 
    Id. Thus, on
    appeal, we “shall not set aside
    the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
    to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
    Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).
    II. Division of Marital Property
    [13]   Challenging the trial court’s division of marital property, Husband contends
    that the trial court improperly based its deviation from an equal division on its
    findings that he dissipated marital assets and the disparate income between the
    parties. A trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and we
    will reverse a trial court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion. O’Connell v.
    O’Connell, 
    889 N.E.2d 1
    , 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The “party challenging the
    trial court’s division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption
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    that the trial court considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that
    presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our
    consideration on appeal.” 
    Id. On review,
    we will neither reweigh evidence nor
    assess the credibility of witnesses, and “we will consider only the evidence most
    favorable to the trial court’s disposition of the marital property.” 
    Id. [14] In
    dissolution proceedings, the trial court is required to divide the property of
    the parties “in a just and reasonable manner.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b). This
    division of marital property is a two-step process. See 
    O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10
    . First, the trial court must ascertain what property is to be included in the
    marital estate; second, the trial court must fashion a just and reasonable
    division of the marital estate. 
    Id. The “one-pot”
    theory—i.e., that all property
    acquired before or during the marriage is to be included in the marital estate—
    ensures “that all assets are subject to the trial court’s power to divide and
    award. 
    Id. While the
    trial court may ultimately determine that a particular
    asset should be awarded solely to one spouse, it must first include the asset in its
    consideration of the marital estate to be divided.” 
    Id. at 11
    (quoting Hill v. Hill,
    
    863 N.E.2d 456
    , 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
    [15]   In determining how to divide a marital estate, the trial court “shall presume that
    an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and
    reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5 (emphasis added). However, this is a rebuttable
    presumption, and a party may present relevant evidence to establish that an
    equal division would not be just and reasonable. I.C. § 31-15-7-5. The trial
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    court may consider evidence of the following factors in concluding whether it
    would be appropriate to deviate from the presumption of an equal division:
    (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
    property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
    producing.
    (2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
    spouse:
    (A)Before the marriage; or
    (B) Through inheritance or gift.
    (3) The economic circumstances or each spouse at the time the
    disposition of the property is to become effective, including
    the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to
    dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court
    considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
    (4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
    the disposition or dissipation of their property.
    (5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
    (A) A final division of property; and
    (B) A final determination of the property rights of the parties.
    I.C. § 31-15-7-5.
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    [16]   Here, the trial court found that Wife rebutted the presumption and awarded
    60% of the marital estate to her. In support of its decision to deviate from the
    presumption of an equal division, the trial court relied on the evidence littered
    throughout the proceedings that Husband dissipated the marital estate by
    gambling and the extensive documentation and testimony that Husband was
    not completely forthcoming in reporting his income, including in his lottery and
    casino winnings.
    1. Dissipation of Marital Assets
    [17]   We have previously stated,
    Fault is not relevant in dissolution proceedings except as related
    to the disposition or dissipation of marital assets. One spouse’s
    claim of improvident spending by the other spouse can be a
    powerful weapon in an attempt to secure a larger share of the
    marital estate.
    In re Marriage of Coyle, 
    671 N.E.2d 938
    , 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). “Waste and
    misuse are the hallmarks of dissipation. Our legislature intended that the term
    carry its common meaning denoting ‘foolish’ or ‘aimless’ spending. Dissipation
    has also been described as the frivolous, unjustified spending of marital assets
    which includes the concealment and misuse of marital property.” 
    Id. at 943.
    Factors to consider in determining whether dissipation has occurred, include:
    (1) whether the expenditure benefited the marriage or was made for a purpose
    entirely unrelated to the marriage; (2) the timing of the transaction; (3) whether
    the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and (4) whether the dissipating
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    party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset. Goodman v.
    Goodman, 
    754 N.E.2d 595
    , 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
    [18]   Although both parties did gamble during the marriage, the evidence establishes
    that Husband had complete and total financial control over all assets, including
    the gambling winnings. Wife submitted documentary evidence that between
    2006 and 2010, Husband earned $140,961 in gambling winnings. After Wife
    filed for divorce in 2012, Husband’s gambling winnings through 2015
    amounted to $200,639. Yet, during the marriage, Husband had complete
    control over the finances and only allocated a little bit of money to Wife on a
    weekly basis to help with the household expenses. The family was on
    government health insurance, received food stamps, and K.G. received a
    free/reduced lunch and textbooks at school. After the separation and
    institution of an initial child support order, Husband failed to contribute to the
    payment of the marital debts and incurred a significant debit on his child
    support obligations. Instead, Husband testified that while he was in prison
    from December 2012 through May 2013, he helped other inmates buy supplies
    and pay their attorney fees. A more egregious example of dissipation would be
    hard to come by.
    2. Disparate Income
    [19]   Husband also claims that no true earning disparity exists between him and his
    Wife. Focusing on the tax returns, he asserts that his reported income is barely
    higher than Wife’s annual earnings of $30,368. However, the record is littered
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    with testimony of Husband’s attempts to hide his assets. Several witnesses
    testified about Husband’s habits of carrying large sums of cash with him and
    counting wads of money on the kitchen island. At times, this cash alone
    amounted to $16,000. In his business dealings, Husband would encourage
    customers to pay cash or make checks payable in his name. Husband would
    then cash the check at the customer’s bank so the income was never shown in
    his business records or deposited in his business bank account. Another witness
    testified that Husband had informed him that the business income in 2014 was
    $420,000, and $480,000 in 2015. Based on the exhibits submitted by Wife and
    witness testimony, we agree with the trial court’s finding that “it is reasonable
    to conclude that in 2013, [Husband] cashed checks and received cash payments
    in the amount of $160,458.12,” which he failed to report as income. (Trial
    Court’s Order, p. 13).
    [20]   Without any supporting references to the voluminous record, Husband asserts
    that the trial court also failed to account for the payments made to his business
    partner, which would reduce his purported business income. However, our
    review indicates that Husband’s business partner is his adult daughter from a
    previous marriage, who testified that even though she is the half-owner of the
    business on paper, she received no income from the business but instead relies
    on public assistance to meet her own living expenses.
    [21]   Considering the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s division of marital
    property, and the wealth of evidence that Husband was less than forthcoming
    about his income, we conclude that Wife rebutted the presumption of an equal
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    division of marital assets and a deviation from an equal split was warranted.
    We affirm the trial court’s award of 60% of the marital estate to Wife.
    III. Offsetting the Value of Certain Assets
    [22]   Next, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion by omitting to
    offset the value of certain assets to Wife in its calculation of the respective
    shares of the marital estate. Pointing to the Agreed Provisional Order entered
    into by the parties on July 5, 2012, Husband argues that the trial court failed to
    credit Wife’s share of the marital estate with the value of the Camaro and the
    personal property in her possession.
    [23]   With respect to the Camaro, the Provisional Agreed Order provided Husband
    with the option to either keep the Camaro himself and pay Wife $9,500 to
    purchase a vehicle or to sell or trade in the Camaro, allowing Wife $9,500 from
    the sale or trade to purchase a vehicle. During the final hearing, Wife testified
    that Husband elected to trade in the vehicle and pay off the balance of
    $18,759.67 on the car loan. Husband affirmed that he was able to pay off the
    balance with the trade-in amount received for the Camaro and had only $500
    left over. Although the parties never explicitly testified to it, a reasonable
    inference can be made that in light of the high debt still remaining on the
    vehicle at the time of trade-in, Wife never received the $9,500 she was due to be
    paid after trading in the Camaro, or received a vehicle of her choice.
    [24]   Husband makes a similar argument with respect to the personal property valued
    at $13,510. The Provisional Agreed Order alluded to a future amicable division
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 18 of 33
    of the marital property with the exception of Wife’s clothing, and K.G.’s toys
    and bedroom suite which were awarded to Wife in 2012. The Agreed Order
    required the parties to inventory the personal items remaining within the
    marital residence and if the parties were unable to agree about their ownership,
    the property was to remain in the marital residence, which was temporarily
    awarded to Husband. Despite a prohibition to remove the personal property
    from the marital residence, Husband admitted to having relocated some of the
    property. Nevertheless, during the final hearing, Husband submitted an
    appraisal of the personal property left in the marital residence in the amount of
    $13,510. Absent any other evidence submitted by either party, and based on the
    fact that Husband had control over the marital residence, the trial court could
    reasonably infer that this personal property was in Husband’s possession and
    should properly be credited to him.
    IV. Goodwill
    [25]   With respect to the division of the business assets, Husband contends that the
    trial court abused its discretion by including the business’ goodwill into the
    calculation of the marital estate and by assigning him the totality of the
    business’ debts.
    [26]   In Yoon v. Yoon, 
    711 N.E.2d 1265
    , 1268-69 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations
    omitted), our supreme court analyzed the issue of goodwill as follows:
    Goodwill has been described as the value of a business or
    practice that exceeds the combined value of the net assets used in
    the business. Goodwill in a professional practice may be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 19 of 33
    attributable to the business enterprise itself by virtue of its
    existing arrangements with suppliers, customers or others, and its
    anticipated future customer base due to factors attributable to the
    business. It may also be attributable to the individual owner’s
    personal skill, training or reputation. This distinction is
    sometimes reflected in the use of the term “enterprise goodwill,”
    as opposed to “personal goodwill.”
    Enterprise goodwill “is based on the intangible, but generally
    marketable, existence in a business of established relations with
    employees, customers and suppliers.” Factors affecting this
    goodwill may include a business’s location, its name recognition,
    its business reputation, or a variety of other factors depending on
    the business. Enterprise goodwill is an asset of the business and
    accordingly is property that is divisible in a dissolution to the
    extent that it inheres in the business, independent of any single
    individual’s personal efforts and will outlast any person’s
    involvement in the business. It is not necessarily marketable in
    the sense that there is a ready and easily priced market for it, but
    it is in general transferrable to others and has a value to others.
    ****
    In contrast, the goodwill that depends on the continued presence
    of a particular individual is a personal asset, and any value that
    attached to a business as a result of this “personal goodwill”
    represents nothing more than the future earning capacity of the
    individual and is not divisible. * * * *
    The General Assembly has determined that the “relative earning
    power” of the parties is not a divisible asset because it is not
    property, but may be considered in determining the percentage of
    property to be given to each. Accordingly, we join the states that
    exclude goodwill based on the personal attributes of the
    individual from the marital estate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 20 of 33
    [27]   In its identification and quantification of enterprise goodwill, the trial court
    concluded that:
    As the parties were married for nearly seventeen (17) years before
    the date of filing and the testimony was clear that [Wife]
    participated heavily in the administrative side of the business
    which was a significant role and she continued to participate in
    the business on occasion through 2015, this [c]ourt believes it is
    appropriate to assign some value to goodwill, especially when
    there is no business valuation, no true inventory of business
    assets along with value, and so much dispute as to what the
    business is worth.
    The parties did a poor job of reporting income and keeping track
    of income and business expenses. It is difficult to ascertain how
    much of a role [Wife] played independently or whether she was
    coerced into this business practice, but it appears that [Husband]
    has continued to engage in the same business practice after the
    date of filing. He continued to purchase business equipment in
    his individual name, sometimes he places title in his children’s
    names, and often pays cash. This [c]ourt really does not have an
    accurate way to value the business so has determined that the
    best it can do is take what it believes to be the annual net income
    and divide that in half to assign a goodwill value to the business.
    [Wife] would then he entitled to 60% of that figure.
    (Trial Court’s Order, p. 33) (footnote omitted).
    [28]   In an effort to challenge the trial court’s conclusion of enterprise goodwill,
    Husband contends that the survival of the business is dependent on his
    continued presence. In support of his argument, he focuses on his habit to title
    business assets in his personal name, pay his employees in cash, and accept
    customer checks written to Husband personally instead of the business entity.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 21 of 33
    We find that this evidence rather establishes Husband’s propensity to
    intermingle personal and business assets and points towards an inference of
    hiding assets.
    [29]   To the contrary, we find that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion.
    As noted by the trial court, Wife continued her involvement with the
    administrative side of the business for several years after filing for dissolution.
    Wife’s adult son from a previous marriage testified that he worked in the
    parties’ business for about ten years in a supervisory position with financial
    responsibilities. Likewise, Husband’s adult daughter from a previous marriage
    informed the trial court that Husband at times would place business assets in
    her name and even though she was made co-owner of the tree trimming
    business she received no income. Accordingly, as the business was
    “transferable” to other family members and thus “independent” of Husband’s
    “personal efforts,” we affirm the enterprise goodwill in the amount of $76,748.
    See 
    Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1268
    .
    [30]   Continuing to dispute the trial court’s division of the parties’ business, Husband
    claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that “Husband must
    pay business debt totaling $46,438.00 because he should have been paying off
    debt during the marriage instead of gambling.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 34). The
    record indicates that after the marriage, Wife became a homemaker and
    assisted Husband’s business by soliciting work, scheduling jobs, and accounting
    services. Even after she filed for dissolution, Wife continued her involvement in
    Husband’s tree trimming business. While Wife worked in the business for more
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 22 of 33
    than twenty years, she received no income. Considering the evidence in the
    record that Husband interpreted the business to be his own personal fiefdom in
    which he could intermingle personal and business assets as well as the absence
    of any salary for Wife’s employment in the business, we find that the
    assignment of all business debt to Husband was “just and reasonable.” Crider v.
    Crider, 
    26 N.E.3d 1045
    , 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Although the trial court
    based its finding on a different ground—Husband’s gambling habit—we will
    not reverse the trial court’s Order with respect to the business debts as it does
    not amount to a prejudicial error. Riehle v. Moore, 
    601 N.E.2d 365
    , 369 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1992) (“[W]e may reverse a trial court’s judgment only if its findings
    constitute prejudicial error. A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless
    it directly supports a conclusion of law adverse to him.)
    V. Valuation Date
    [31]   Husband’s final argument with respect to the marital property relates to three
    specific assets, which, according to Husband, were not in existence on the
    valuation date and therefore should not have been included in the marital pot.
    [32]   Generally, the marital pot closes on the day the petition for dissolution is filed.
    Sanjari v. Sanjari, 
    755 N.E.2d 1186
    , 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The date of
    filing is defined by statute as the date of “final separation.” I.C. § 31-9-2-46.
    When dividing property in a dissolution proceeding, the court shall include
    property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage, acquired by either
    spouse in his or her own right after the marriage and before the final separation
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 23 of 33
    of the parties, or acquired by the joint efforts by the spouses. I.C. § 31-15-7-
    4(a).
    [33]   After identifying the marital assets, the trial court has discretion to set any date
    between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing for
    their valuation. Eyler v. Eyler, 
    492 N.E.2d 1071
    , 1074 (Ind. 1986). “The
    selection of the valuation date for any particular asset has the effect of allocating
    the risk of change in the value of that asset between the date of the valuation
    and date of the hearing. Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    , 103 (Ind. 1996). We
    entrust this allocation to the discretion of the trial court. 
    Id. [34] Husband
    first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it included
    the marital residence and the real estate on which it is located in the marital
    estate even though the property was owned by Husband’s adult daughter from a
    previous marriage. The evidence reflects that even though ownership of the
    residence and real estate was in name transferred to Husband’s daughter,
    Husband and Wife continued to reside in the house for several years, Husband
    continued to pay the taxes, and remodeled the property several years after Wife
    filed for dissolution. Husband’s daughter testified that she never claimed the
    residence as her own nor paid its taxes and in fact was living in subsidized
    housing. Although Wife moved to join Husband’s adult daughter into the
    proceedings on December 7, 2015, the trial court denied the motion, ordering
    Husband’s daughter to be called as a witness. Instead, viewed in light of the
    overwhelming evidence in the record of Husband hiding assets, we agree with
    the trial court that the property transfer was “just a scheme to keep assets from”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 24 of 33
    Wife. (Trial Court’s Order, p. 32). Therefore, it was properly included in the
    marital pot.
    [35]   In 2009, Husband won $100,000 with a scratch off ticket. Husband claims that
    the entire winnings were expended prior to the dissolution and should not have
    been included in the marital assets in the amount of $70,000. Husband testified
    that the lottery winnings, which had been placed in a lockbox, purchased
    Wife’s Camaro for $20,000, with the remainder spent on gambling and eating at
    five star restaurants. Mindful of the Camaro’s purchase price and the parties’
    other expenditures, we conclude that the trial court’s valuation of the asset at
    $70,000 was reasonable and we will not disturb its decision.
    Lastly, Husband disputes the trial court’s inclusion of his 2013 gambling
    winnings in the amount of $42,694. He claims that because the dissolution was
    filed in 2012, the 2013 winnings are not part of the marital assets. However,
    Husband intermingles the identification of marital assets with their valuation.
    The record is overflowing with references to the parties’ gambling during the
    marriage. Wife submitted documentary evidence that between 2006 and 2010,
    Husband earned $140,961 in gambling winnings. As these amounts were
    “acquired after the marriage and before the final separation of the parties,” they
    are part of the marital estate. I.C. § 31-15-7-4(a). As they are part of the marital
    pot, the valuation of these gambling winnings falls within the discretionary
    province of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of
    discretion. See 
    Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 103
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 25 of 33
    [36]   The trial court valued the gambling winnings at their 2013 amount and
    reasoned that
    [t]he [c]ourt does not utilize [Husband’s] 2012 tax return as that
    is the only year in which he had negative income and the [c]ourt
    questions whether this was intentional due to the fact that the
    Petition for Dissolution was filed in the year 2012. This
    conclusion is based on the evidence of [Husband’s] attempt to
    hide assets and observations of him over the course of seven (7)
    days for [f]inal [h]earings and a few other hearings. Accordingly,
    the [c]ourt used information from 2013.
    (Trial Court’s Order, p. 33). “So long as there is sufficient evidence and
    reasonable inferences to support the valuation, an abuse of discretion does not
    occur.” 
    Id. at 103.
    Nevertheless, Husband now posits that the trial court
    omitted “to account for gambling losses and tax consequences.” (Appellant’s
    Br. p. 38). However, the trial court noted that “Father did not introduce
    evidence that these losses needed to be deducted from the winnings. He also
    did not introduce evidence of the amount of all his other winnings because
    testimony revealed [Husband] could have had winnings not included in the
    W2G total.” (Trial Court’s Order, p. 15). “Where the parties fail to present
    evidence as to the value of assets, it will be presumed that the trial court’s
    decision is proper.” 
    Id. at 103.
    We affirm the trial court.
    VI. Custody of K.G.
    [37]   Moving away from the marital assets and now turning towards the minor child,
    Husband advocates for a change in custody. He advances that the trial court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 26 of 33
    abused its discretion by awarding physical custody of K.G. to Wife as Wife
    “has actively tried to poison K.G. against her [f]ather,” and her best “interests
    would be served by being in the custody of her [f]ather.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
    46).
    [38]   Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, the trial court shall determine
    custody and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the
    child. In determining the best interests of the child, there is no presumption
    favoring either parent; instead, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
    including the following:
    (1) The age and sex of the child.
    (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
    (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
    child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
    (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
    (A)The child’s parent or parents;
    (B) The child’s sibling; and
    (C) Any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
    best interests.
    (5) The child’s adjustments to the child’s:
    (A)Home;
    (B) School; and
    (C) Community.
    (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
    (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent.
    (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
    custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
    consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
    I.C. § 31-17-2-8. As our supreme court has held:
    The court must consider factors that are relevant, including but
    not limited to those explicitly listed in the statute. Although a
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    court is required to consider all relevant factors in making its
    determination, it is not required to make specific findings. A trial
    court’s custody determination is reviewable only for an abuse of
    discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the evidence before the
    court.
    Russell v. Russell, 
    682 N.E.2d 513
    , 515 (Ind. 1997) (footnote and citations
    omitted).
    [39]   Out of the 160 findings made by the trial court, 24 deal with the custody issue;
    and out of the 90 trial court conclusions, 14 involve K.G.’s custody. Even
    though Husband contends that Wife maintained a persistent pattern of
    preventing his parenting time and tried to discourage a relationship with his
    minor child, the record and Order—including two in camera interviews with
    K.G.—both demonstrate that the trial court carefully considered these
    allegations, as well as a multitude of others, in ensuring that its custody decision
    would be in K.G.’s best interests. Husband now merely asks that we reweigh
    all this evidence in his favor. As the trial court’s order clearly reflects that it
    gave proper consideration to the statutory facts when determining the custody
    arrangement that was in K.G.’s best interests, we conclude that the trial court
    acted within its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to Wife.
    VII. Child Support
    [40]   Next, Husband challenges the trial court’s increase of his child support
    obligation and its retroactive application to the date of filing for the
    modification of child support on May 24, 2013. Despite evidence that Husband
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018     Page 28 of 33
    gave the family barely sufficient money to support the basic necessities to
    survive, Husband now incredibly claims that “[t]he [r]ecord reveals this child
    lived in a manufactured home, attended public school and relied on social
    services for basic needs. Far from living a lifestyle of the rich and famous, K.G.
    ha[d] a normal middle-class existence.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 55) (internal reference
    omitted, emphasis added). As such, Husband maintains that the current weekly
    support obligation of $330 is too high compared to the standard of living K.G.
    enjoyed during the marriage of the parties.
    [41]   As part of the divorce proceedings between two parents of a child, the trial
    court may order either of them “to pay any amount reasonable” for the child’s
    support. I.C. § 31-16-6-1. A trial court’s calculation of child support is
    presumptively valid and its decision will only be reversed if it is clearly
    erroneous or contrary to law. Young v. Young, 
    891 N.E.2d 1045
    , 1047 (Ind.
    2008). Child support calculations are made utilizing the income shares model
    set forth in the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 
    972 N.E.2d 371
    , 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The guideline approach is promulgated
    in Indiana Code section 31-16-6-1, which considers, among other things, the
    standard of living the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been
    dissolved and the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
    Nikolayev v. Nikolayev, 
    985 N.E.2d 29
    , 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    In making its calculation, the trial court concluded
    31. [Wife’s] petition of modify child support was filed on May
    24, 2013 and a hearing was never conducted on that Petition nor
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 29 of 33
    was a decision ever rendered. It could not have been issued any
    earlier without the introduction of evidence which took place
    during the days of the [f]inal [h]earing. Perhaps if [Husband] had
    been transparent about his gambling winnings and income
    generated but not shown as business income, the issue of child
    support could have been resolved much earlier. []
    32. Because the most accurate information that the [c]ourt has is
    related to 2013 and [Wife’s] Petition to Modify was filed on May
    24, 2013, the [c]ourt utilizes income information for 2013 in
    calculating child support. As stated above, [Husband’s] business
    income in 2013 was $153,495. However, child support is based
    on all income received and the gambling/lottery winnings are
    income. By adding the $42,694.00 gambling winnings in 2013,
    [Husband’s] income in 2013 was $196,189.00 which is the
    equivalent of $3,772.86/week. [Wife] was working as a waitress
    at that time and her income is imputed at minimum wage.
    Attached in a child support obligation worksheet identified as
    Exhibit B which includes what the [c]ourt most accurately
    reflects the parties’ income in 2013 and shows that [Husband’s]
    child support in 2013 would have been $320/week.
    (Trial Court’s Order, p. 36).
    [42]   Acknowledging that this new child support order represents a considerable
    increase from the temporary 2012 order of $110/week, the trial court
    emphasized Husband’s efforts to hide assets and the overwhelming evidence
    that Husband earned far more than disclosed in his tax returns. During the
    marriage, Husband controlled the purse strings, forcing the family to survive on
    food stamps, rely on government health care, and free school lunches while he
    went gambling, played the lottery, and had large amounts of cash in his
    possession. Even though Husband “never gave [Wife] money and she may not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 30 of 33
    have been living at a standard commensurate with the amount of income that
    [Husband] was generating, [] that should not deprive [K.G.] of now being able
    to live at a standard that is commensurate with the earnings of the parties.”
    (Trial Court’s Order, p. 38).
    [43]   In light of Husband’s challenge to the retroactive application of the trial court’s
    child support order, we note that it is well established that “the trial court has
    the discretionary power to make a modification for child support relate back to
    the date the petition to modify is filed or any date thereafter chosen by the trial
    court.” Laux v. Ferry, 
    34 N.E.3d 690
    , 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Here, the trial
    court elected to relate Husband’s obligation back to May 24, 2013, the date the
    petition to modify was filed.
    [44]   Trial courts make case-by-case determinations regarding weekly gross income
    from self-employment and impute income for the purpose of computing child
    support based on specific circumstances as they exist or are presented to the
    court. Our standard of review is flexible enough to permit the trial court to
    fashion a child support order that is tailored to the circumstances of the
    particular case before it and consequently reflects its best judgment. Given
    Husband’s propensity to hide his assets, his discretionary money to gamble
    extensively while not paying child support, and his business dealings, we
    conclude that the trial court properly calculated Husband’s child support
    obligation.
    VIII. Attorney Fees
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 77A04-1706-DR-1300 | March 6, 2018   Page 31 of 33
    [45]   As a final issue, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion
    when ordering him to reimburse $25,000 out of Wife’s incurred attorney fees in
    the amount of $150,000.
    [46]   Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1 provides that a trial court may order a party to
    pay a reasonable amount to the other party for the cost of maintaining or
    defending any action in dissolution proceedings. We review a trial court’s
    award of attorney fees in connection with a dissolution decree for an abuse of
    discretion. Hartley v. Hartley, 
    862 N.E.2d 274
    , 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). When
    making such an award, the trial court must consider the resources of the parties,
    their economic condition, the ability of the parties to engage in gainful
    employment and to earn adequate income, and other factors that bear on the
    reasonableness of the award. 
    Id. Consideration of
    these factors promotes the
    legislative purpose behind the award of attorney fees, which is to insure that a
    party in a dissolution proceeding, who would not otherwise be able to afford an
    attorney, is able to retain representation. 
    Id. The trial
    court need not, however,
    give reasons for its determination. 
    Hartley, 862 N.E.2d at 287
    .
    [47]   Where, as here, “one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other
    party, an award of attorney fees is proper.” Ratliff v. Ratliff, 
    804 N.E.2d 237
    ,
    249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Despite Husband’s contention, other evidence found
    credible by the trial court suggests that the business generated $420,000 in 2014,
    and $480,000 in 2015. Viewed in light of the particularized circumstances of
    this case, we conclude that the disparity of the parties’ earnings, Husband’s
    dissipation of marital assets, and his “misconduct that directly result[ed] in
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    additional litigation expenses” justified the trial court’s decision to award
    attorney’s fees to Wife. Hanson v. Spolnik, 
    685 N.E.2d 71
    , 80 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1997), trans. denied.
    CONCLUSION
    [48]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    in (1) dividing the marital estate between the parties; (2) awarding custody of
    K.G. to Wife and calculating Husband’s child support obligation; and (3)
    granting attorney fees to Wife.
    [49]   Affirmed.
    Mathias, J. and Brown, J. concur
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