Jeffrey P. Zbyrowski v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 27 2019, 5:26 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Russell W. Brown, Jr. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
King, Brown & Murdaugh, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Merrillville, Indiana Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffrey P. Zbyrowski, June 27, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1847
v. Appeal from the Porter Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey W. Clymer,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
64D02-1311-FB-10121
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Jeffrey Zbyrowski (“Zybrowski”) appeals the Porter Superior Court’s denial of
his request to file a belated appeal pursuant to Post Conviction Rule 2.
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We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Zbyrowski was charged with two counts of Class B felony rape, two counts of
Class C felony incest, and two counts of Class D felony criminal confinement.
On February 6, 2015, Zbyrowski entered into a plea agreement where he
pleaded guilty to two counts of incest as a class C felony and two counts of
criminal confinement as a class D felony, and the two counts of rape were
dismissed. The plea agreement set a cap of eight years incarceration but
otherwise provided for probation sentencing by the trial court with the only
limitation being that statutory sentences would run consecutively. Appellant’s
App. p. 57. The plea agreement also provided, “I waive all right to appeal my
conviction, my sentence, any restitution order imposed, or the manner in which
my conviction, my sentence, or the restitution order was determined or
imposed on any grounds in this cause.” Id. at 59.
[3] At the hearing in which the trial court accepted the guilty plea, the following
exchange occurred:
THE COURT: If you do that, you’ll waive certain rights. You’ll
waive your right to [a] public and speedy trial by court or by jury.
There will be no trial. You’ll waive the presumption of
innocence. The State will not have to prove anything. You’ll
waive your right to face and cross-examine the State’s witnesses,
as well as the right to have me subpoena witnesses to testify in
your favor. You’ll waive your right to remain silent and, in fact,
you will be testifying against yourself. If we went to trial and if
you were convicted, you could appeal that decision to the
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Indiana Appellate Court System. Do you understand that you
are, in fact, waiving all of those rights?
ZBYROWSKI: Yes.
Plea Tr. p. 3. The trial court then scheduled a sentencing hearing to be held on
a later date. At the sentencing hearing, Zbyrowski was sentenced to twenty-two
years, with fourteen years suspended. At the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing, held over a month after the plea was accepted, the trial court told
Zbyrowski,
you’re entitled to take an appeal or file a motion to correct error
with regard to the sentence; not the convictions, but the sentence.
If you wish to file a motion to correct error, it must be done
within 30 days of today’s date. If you wish to take an appeal, you
must file a notice of appeal stating what it is you want included
in the record on appeal, and that must also be done within 30
days of today’s date. If you’re financially unable to employ an
attorney to carry out that process, we will inquire into your
resources and appoint a public defender if that’s what you wish.
Sentencing Tr. pp. 12–13. Before the end of the sentencing hearing, the trial
court then informed Zbyrowski once again that he had thirty days to file either
a notice of appeal or motion to correct error. Id. at 13.
[4] Zbyrowski was then transferred to the Department of Correction (“DOC”).
While in the DOC, he wrote two letters to his trial counsel asking whether
appellate counsel had been appointed to file an appeal on his behalf. He
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received no response from trial counsel, but received his file in October of 2015
and learned that no appeal had been filed on his behalf.
[5] In January of 2016, Zbyrowski, acting pro se, filed a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. The Public Defender’s office was then appointed to represent
Zbyrowski, but this representation ended when Zbyrowski was released from
incarceration on or about March 11, 2018. Zbyrowski, through private counsel,
then filed a Verified Petition for Permission to fie a Belated Notice of Appeal
pursuant to Indiana Post Conviction Rule 2 on June 14, 2018. The State
objected, and the trial court denied the petition without a hearing. Zbyrowski
now appeals the denial of his Verified Petition for Permision to file a Belated
Notice of Appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[6] “[A] defendant may waive their right to appellate review of his sentence as part
of a written plea agreement.” Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008).
However, a “defendant who can establish in a post-conviction proceeding that
his plea was coerced or unintelligent is entitled to have his conviction set
aside.” Id. When the issue on appeal is a pure question of law, the court should
review the matter de novo. Kibbey v. State, 733 N.E.2d 991, 995 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000)
[7] This court has repeatedly addressed the issue of whether a defendant can appeal
after waiving his or her right to appeal as a part of a plea agreement. In Creech,
the Indiana Supreme Court explained that:
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While we take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of
avoiding confusing remarks in a plea colloquy, we think the
statements at issue are not grounds for allowing Creech to
circumvent the terms of his plea agreement.
Creech does not claim that the language of the plea agreement
was unclear or that he misunderstood the terms of the agreement
at the time he signed it, but rather claims that his otherwise
knowing and voluntary plea lost its knowing and voluntary status
because the judge told him at the end of the sentencing hearing
that he could appeal.
***
By the time the trial court erroneously advised Creech of the
possibility of appeal, Creech had already pled guilty and received
the benefit of his bargain. Being told at the close of the hearing
that he could appeal presumably had no effect on that
transaction.
887 N.E.2d at 76-77. Cf. Ricci v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that the trial court’s erroneous statements regarding ability to appeal
made at the time of the entry of the plea did negate the waiver of the right to
appeal in the plea), trans. denied.
[8] Zbyrowski waived his right to appeal “on any grounds” as a part of the
negotiated plea. Appellant’s App. p. 59. Because the terms of the plea
agreement clearly state that Zbyrowski waived his right to appeal on any
grounds, and because this was the court’s understanding of the agreement at the
time the plea was accepted by the court, the statement by the court regarding
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appeal rights at the sentencing hearing well after the plea was negotiated and
accepted does not negate Zbyrowski’s waiver of his appeal right.1
Conclusion
[9] We take this opportunity to remind trial courts of the dangers of reciting
improper boilerplate at any point in court proceedings and especially during
plea bargains and sentencings2. However, as the language used by the trial court
at sentencing in this matter did not change Zbyrowski’s initial waiver of his
right to appeal in his plea agreement, we affirm the trial court’s denial of his
motion to file a belated appeal.
[10] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
1
Because we determine that Zbyrowski waived his right to appeal, we do not reach whether Indiana Post-
Conviction Rule 2 would have allowed him the ability to file a belated appeal in this matter.
2
The judge who sentenced Zbyrowski retired prior to Zbyrowski’s filing of the Verified Petition for
Permission to file a Belated Notice of Appeal. The specific petition on appeal was decided by the current
judge, who did not sentence Zbyrowski.
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