Eberaia Fields v. State of Indiana , 91 N.E.3d 597 ( 2017 )

FILED
Dec 22 2017, 9:59 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kerry C. Connor Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney at Law Attorney General of Indiana
Highland, Indiana Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eberaia Fields, December 22, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
43A03-1704-CR-856
v. Appeal from the Kosciusko
Superior Court - 3
State of Indiana, The Honorable Joe V. Sutton,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
43D03-1510-F6-642
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] When Warsaw Police Department Officer Miles Reichard pulled over Eberaia
Fields, Officer Reichard had not taken the statutory oath for law-enforcement
officers. Fields filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, and the trial
court denied his motion, finding that although Officer Reichard had not been
sworn in, he was acting as a de facto officer at the time of the stop.
[2] The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person
acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the
legality of that person’s appointment is deficient. The purpose of this doctrine
is to protect the public by insuring the orderly functioning of the government
despite technical defects in title to office. We find that Officer Reichard’s
failure to take the oath is a technical defect in his title to office. But because the
record shows that Officer Reichard claimed the office, was in possession of it,
and performed its duties under the color of appointment, we conclude that he
was acting as a de facto officer at the time of the stop. We therefore affirm the
trial court’s denial of Fields’s motion to dismiss the charges against him.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. Officer Reichard pulled over
Fields in the early-morning hours of September 12, 2015, due to a broken
license-plate light. At the time of the stop, Officer Reichard was in full Warsaw
Police Department uniform, was driving a marked Warsaw Police Department
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patrol car, and identified himself as an officer with the Warsaw Police
Department. Fields was ultimately charged with Level 6 felony operating a
vehicle while intoxicated, two counts of Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class
C misdemeanor violation of special-driving privileges. The State also alleged
that Fields was a habitual vehicular substance offender.
[4] In December 2016, Fields filed a motion to dismiss all charges against him
because Officer Reichard “had not been lawfully sworn in to act with the
authority of the Warsaw Police Department at the time of the stop and
detention . . . on September 12, 201[5].” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 38; see
Ind. Code § 5-4-1-1(a) (“[E]very officer and every deputy, before entering on the
officer’s or deputy’s official duties, shall take an oath . . . .”); State v. Oddi-Smith,
878 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-48 (Ind. 2008) (concluding that Section 5-4-1-1 applies
to law-enforcement officers and that officers must take an oath before beginning
official duties).1
[5] At the hearing on Fields’s motion to dismiss, evidence was presented that
Officer Reichard began working for the Warsaw Police Department on
November 9, 2014, and that he received his first paycheck a couple weeks later.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-18. However, Officer Reichard did not have his oath of office
administered and filed with the Kosciusko County Clerk until November 19,
1
In that case, our Supreme Court ultimately found that the officer was properly sworn, but it noted that there
“might well be other grounds on which the arrest of Oddi-Smith was valid, like the ‘de facto officer’
doctrine.” Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d at 1249.
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2015—a year after he was hired and two months after he stopped Fields. Exs.
A & B; Tr. Vol. II pp. 13, 19-21. The State presented additional evidence that
before Officer Reichard began working for the Warsaw Police Department, he
worked part-time for the Indiana University Police Department while he was
attending college. As part of the training for that job, he went to the “Police
Academy” and received, among other things, firearms training. Tr. Vol. II p.
32. Upon being hired by the Warsaw Police Department, Officer Reichard
received a paycheck, health-insurance and retirement benefits, a uniform,
handcuffs, a handgun, ammunition, a taser, a fully marked patrol car, and
badge number 161. Id. at 36-40. He also underwent a two-week orientation
and was supervised by a field-training officer for twelve weeks before he was
allowed to patrol on his own. Id. at 31, 49-50. Finally, Officer Reichard acted
with the approval and consent of the Warsaw Chief of Police.
[6] After additional briefing by the parties, the trial court denied Fields’s motion to
dismiss the charges against him, concluding that Officer Reichard was acting as
a de facto officer when he stopped Fields on September 12, 2015.
[7] This interlocutory appeal now ensues.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Fields appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charges against
him. We generally review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a
charging information for an abuse of discretion. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d
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1259, 1262 (Ind. 2015). But where, as here, the arguments presented are
questions of law, we consider them de novo. Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 950
(Ind. 2015), cert. denied.
[9] Fields contends that the de facto officer doctrine does not apply to “grant legal
authority to a purported police officer to make a stop and arrest when the
purported police officer has not taken” the required statutory oath. Appellant’s
Br. p. 6. The de facto officer doctrine is well established in the law. According
to the United States Supreme Court, “The de facto officer doctrine confers
validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title
even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment
or election to office is deficient.” Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180
(1995) (quotation omitted)2; see also King v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1260, 1268 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that the rule that the acts of a de facto officer are as
valid as the acts of a de jure officer “is too familiar to the profession to need the
citation of authority” and that the public “is not to suffer because those
discharging the functions of an officer may have a defective title, or no title at
all” (quotation omitted)). This doctrine “springs from the fear of the chaos that
would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken
2
Fields argues that he is entitled to relief under Ryder. In Ryder, the United States Supreme Court found that
the appointment of two of the three members of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review violated the
Appointments Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution and that the actions of the two civilian
judges were not valid de facto. 515 U.S. at 179. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded for a hearing before
a properly appointed panel of that court. Id. at 188. Because Ryder was limited to constitutional challenges
and this case involves a statutory challenge, id. at 182, Ryder does not apply to this case.
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by every official whose claim to office could be open to question, and seeks to
protect the public by insuring the orderly functioning of the government despite
technical defects in title to office.” Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180-81 (emphasis
added, quotation omitted); see also 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees
§ 23 (2009) (explaining that the de facto officer doctrine “give[s] legal effect to
public acts done under the color of law by persons not officers de jure” and that
the purpose of the doctrine is “to ensure the orderly administration of
government by preventing technical challenges to an officer’s authority”
(emphasis added, footnotes omitted)), § 237 (“[T]he mere failure to comply
with a technical requirement does not void the official’s actions as to third
parties and the public, the acts being valid in the interest of justice.” (emphasis
added)). According to Indiana law, all that is required to make an officer de
facto is that he (1) claim the office, (2) be in possession of it, and (3) perform its
duties under the color of election or appointment. Carty v. State, 421 N.E.2d
1151, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that if a deputy is performing duties
under the color of appointment to office, “he is a de facto officer although some
infirmities may exist which prevent the appointment from being valid. As a de
facto officer he is a ‘law enforcement officer’” for purposes of enhancing a
defendant’s battery conviction to a Class D felony due to the victim being a law
enforcement officer).
[10] We find that Officer Reichard’s failure to take the statutory oath was a technical
defect. Applying the three-prong test from Carty, Officer Reichard claimed the
office when he accepted the job and began working as an officer with the
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Warsaw Police Department on November 9, 2014. From that date forward,
Officer Reichard possessed the office. He was assigned a uniform, handcuffs, a
handgun, ammunition, a taser, a fully marked patrol car, and badge number
161. And he openly performed the duties of an officer while being paid and
employed by the Warsaw Police Department with the approval and consent of
the chief of police. Accordingly, we conclude that he was acting as a de facto
officer when he stopped Fields on September 12, 2015. See 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs &
Constables § 38 (2010) (“[O]ne acting as deputy is a de facto officer
notwithstanding the person has failed to file the requisite oath . . . . A vital
element of de facto status of a deputy sheriff requires that the person be acting
pursuant to the control, approval and consent of the sheriff.” (footnotes
omitted)); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 461 (2012) (“One duly appointed or elected to an
office but who is in law disqualified to act, such as one who has failed to take
the required oath . . ., is at least a de facto officer in that his or her acts are valid
as to the public.” (footnotes omitted)).3 To conclude otherwise and to dismiss
the charges against Fields would run counter to the very purpose of the de facto
officer doctrine, which is to insure the orderly functioning of the government
3
Fields cites only one case where a defendant was granted relief due to a police officer’s failure to take the
oath of office. See Holloway v. State, 342 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1977). However, a requirement to applying the de
facto officer rule in Florida is that the State must show that an innocent party relied on the apparent authority
to his detriment. Id. at 968. Because the State did not make such a showing in Holloway, the Florida
Supreme Court concluded that the officer was not a de facto officer. Id. It does not appear that any other
jurisdictions have relied upon this case. See State v. Roark, 705 P.2d 1274, 1279 n.9 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)
(acknowledging Holloway and stating, “an actual showing of detrimental reliance by innocent persons has not
generally been viewed as a prerequisite of the de facto officer doctrine.”).
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despite technical defects in title to office. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
denial of Fields’s motion to dismiss.
[11] Affirmed.
May, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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